AT - Fem IR K - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB
AT - Fem IR K - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB.docx
Indexed text preview
AFF 2AC - Realism Good Rational realism is the best way to understand state behavior---anarchy drives states to compete. Peace is only possible if states account for material factors and information asymmetries---that makes our theory different than historical realist theories that deny a role for cooperation. Glaser 18 (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington. “A Realist Perspective on the Constructivist Project” in Mariano E. Bertucci, Jarrod Hayes, and Patrick James eds. Constructivism Reconsidered. University Michigan Press. 181-196. Realism: Partial, Yet Powerful In light of the partial nature of the rational realist theory, one might wonder whether the rational theory is fully useful on its own and why realist theories continue to have so much influence within IR. In fact, the rational realist theory exists stands well on its own for a variety of reasons. First, and most important in this context, the inputs to the rational theory are often known sufficiently well that effective analysis is possible without a more complete theory. Values of the independent variables are often knowable, and known, without a theory that fully explains them. For example, we can measure a state’s power without a full theory of the state that explains its productive potential and its ability to extract resources for national purposes. At the very least, basic material traits can be used to estimate power, with a well-established literature on that subject in place. Similarly, we can often be confident of the causal logics a state will employ to evaluate the impact of available strategies without having theories that explain the origins of the ideas and why one set of arguments was adopted instead of others. In other words, a theory of the inputs to the rational theory is not required to for the rational theory to support productive analysis Second, the rationalist theory is well matched to analyzing many of the key questions that the field of IR is most interested in. These include such questions as: What factors influence the probability of war and, closely related, when is war more or less likely? Are cooperative or competitive strategies best matched to achieving a state’s security, economic, and other goals? When and why do states form alliances, engage in arms races, make territorial concessions, and join international institutions? Are states able to communicate information about their motives and intentions, and under what conditions is this possible? My point here is not that rational realist theories are the only theories capable of shedding light on these questions, as this would clearly undervalue other approaches. But the extensive realist literature that has productively tackled these questions, and many other related questions, should leave little doubt about the analytic value of the theories. This should not be a surprise, because the rationalist approach captures much of what is central to understanding the issues that drive these questions. And, of course, this is not an accident. Quite the opposite; this is why many analysts have chosen this approach to explore these questions. Third, and closely related to the preceding discussion, the importance of these questions to real-world debates and states’ most important security and foreign policy choices virtually guarantees that realist analyses will continue to have a prominent role within IR. More specifically, theories of foreign and security policy that are built on rational realist foundations focus on the strategies that states can choose from—including investing in economic growth, allying, arming, bargaining, fighting, etc.—and therefore have great potential to contribute to policy debates. Competition Origins of the Competition Given the extensive complementarity between the constructivist and realist theories, why have these approaches been cast as competitors in IR theory? Many factors have contributed. Part of the answer undoubtedly lies in the professional inclination within IR theory to generate new arguments that can replace those that preceded them. Some of the answer may lie in the dominance of realist theory during the Cold War and arguably since then, which has made it a target for all other types of explanations. Part of the answer may lie in an underappreciation of realism, especially structural realism, as a partial theory, which meant that complementarity was not possible. In addition to these more generic reasons, some of the competition likely reflects the order in which certain key arguments have been established, which in turn left them vulnerable to critiques from alternative approaches. Specifically, Waltz’s seminal statement of structural realism made two arguments that were flawed or overstated, which left structural realism overly vulnerable: first, the theory was formulated and characterized as a purely material theory; and second, Waltz’s central conclusion was that the anarchic nature of the international system generated a strong tendency toward competition, rendering cooperation both rare and limited.14 As my sketch of structural realism explains, neither of these claims was sustainable, and strands of realism have been developed that correct these shortcomings. Waltz’s formulation therefore left the door open for constructivists (as well as realists and others) to offer as competitors the ideational arguments and the cooperation-under-anarchy arguments that were missing. Wendt’s structural constructivism, which takes Waltz’s structural realism as its central point of departure, develops many of these opposing arguments from a constructivist perspective.15 If the rational realist theory had been more fully developed and appreciated before Wendt tackled these arguments, the debate might have proceeded rather differently. Instead of arguing that structural constructivism could explain and predict interaction and cooperation that were beyond the reach of Waltz’s realism, Wendt would have had to argue that his approach produced similar results from an alternative perspective. Instead, the approaches ended up at least partly talking past each other and appearing to clash even more than they actually do. There is, however, some real competition between the rational realist theory and Wendt’s structural constructivist theory. Substance of the Competition To appreciate how both competition and complementarity between realism and constructivism are possible, it is useful to distinguish different types of constructivism. Some constructivist work has focused on states and individuals, exploring the sources of beliefs, identifies, and norms. Other constructivist research has focused on the international system, exploring how structure influences states’ choices; Wendt’s is the defining work in the structural constructivist field.16 The complementary nature of constructivist arguments that focus on states and individuals is clear; as explained above, these theories explain inputs to the rational theory. In contrast, structural constructivism emphasizes the role of the international system on states’ actions and, therefore, runs largely parallel to structural realism, even though it defines the international system differently. This similarity and, closely related, the similarity in the questions the two approaches set out to answer makes them competitors. Wendt argues that the key to understanding the possibility of multiple “logics” of anarchy is “conceptualizing structure in social rather than material terms.” The sole variable in Waltz’s international structure is the distribution of capabilities. Consequently, Waltz’s theory is characterized as purely material.17 Waltz concludes that international anarchy requires states to pursue competitive policies; in Wendt’s terminology, this means that Waltz finds that anarchy has a single logic. Wendt argues instead that anarchy can take three principal forms, which vary in their tendencies to generate competition and cooperation. He defines the different anarchies in terms of the states’ roles, specifically their orientation toward each other—enemy, rival, and friend—which reflect the rules that states expect others to observe. Working with these structural roles, Wendt explains how cooperation and even deep peace are possible within international anarchy. Enemies generate a Hobbesian anarchy that is highly competitive; although similar in some ways to the anarchy explained by Waltz’s neorealism, the Hobbesian anarchy is more competitive and states are more insecure. Rivals generate a Lockean anarchy that is less competitive and that, Wendt argues, is in certain respects closer to Waltz’s anarchy. Friends are concerned not only about their own security, but also other states’ security, and their interaction generates a Kantian anarchy in which states do not fear that others will use force against them and in which confidence in a long-lasting peace is possible.18 Wendt’s effort to explore the possibility that international anarchy can produce a much wider range of outcomes than is suggested by Waltz is a productive move. Whether extensive security cooperation is possible under anarchy is the central question posed by structural IR theories. Moreover, a variety of historical examples that run counter to Waltz’s claim about the persistent presence of competition—including restraint and cooperation between powerful states, and substantial military capabilities that do not generate substantial insecurity—indicate the need for a more encompassing theory. Wendt’s focus on social variables, however, masks the potential of structural realist and rational theories to explain variation in states’ policies under anarchy and thereby incorrectly suggests that realist theories are incapable of explaining broad and basic variation in states’ strategies in the face of anarchy. In fact, Wendt is explicit on this critical issue: The real question is whether the fact of anarchy creates a tendency for all such interactions to realize a single logic at the macro-level. In the Neorealist view they do: anarchies are inherently self-help systems that tend to produce military competition, balances of power, and war. Against this I argue that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles—enemy, rival, and friend—dominate the system.19 To appreciate why structural realism can explain and predict cooperation but that this possibility is overlooked by Waltz, we need to return to his core argument. It turns out that the logic of Waltz’s arguments requires the introduction of another variable: a state’s information about the opposing state’s motives. Waltz holds that although states may have motives beyond security, their international behavior can be understood largely by assuming that they are seeking only security. If, however, all states knew that all the other states were security seekers (and if all states knew that this is what the others knew), then the international system should not generate competition. This uncertainty about the opposing state’s type lies at the core of the security dilemma, and, closely related, the security dilemma lies at the center of structural realism’s ability to explain competition.20 If states did not face a security dilemma, security seekers could always achieve their core objective while adopting policies that avoided generating competition. Once the importance of uncertainty about motives is made explicit, including it as a variable is the natural next step for the rational theory. A key point for our discussion here is that structural realism, or at the least the more general rational theory that logically flows from it, is no longer a purely material theory. This matters because it means that distinguishing realist and constructivist theories in terms of material versus ideational arguments—a broad category that is typically understood to include information, norms, and causal ideas—no longer creates a sharp divide. The implications reach beyond mere characterizations and definitions, however. Including information about motives as a key variable in a rational realist theory opens the door to arguments that address much of the terrain also covered by Wendt’s structural constructivism. More specifically, the rational realist theory (1) explores the nature of interactions that can enable states to revise their assessments of the opposing state’s type and thereby generate more cooperative or more competitive policies, providing a more straightforward explanation than Wendt’s changes in interests, (2) explains international cooperation under anarchy as a result of information in combination with material factors instead of Wendt’s focus on identities, and (3) shows that Wendt has both exaggerated and underestimated the potential for international cooperation, the former by underplaying the role of material factors in constraining states’ choices and the latter by relying on states’ collective interests instead of pure security seeking, which is more neutral regarding cooperation. The remainder of this section sketches these points.21 First, the realist theory provides an alternative explanation of how states’ interactions can influence their relationship and, in turn, their behavior. Wendt argues that interaction between states is the key to their understandings of self and other, and that interactions play a central role in determining whether the international system is competitive or cooperative. He holds that interaction cannot play this important role in realist theories, because “realists would probably argue that each should act on the basis of worst-case assumptions about the other’s intentions, justifying such an attitude as prudent in view of the possibility of death from making a mistake.”22 This is a reasonable reading of Waltz; since he barely touches on a possible role for information about the opposing side, assuming the worst can be seen as implicitly running through his formulation. Offensive realism makes fully explicit the requirement for states to assume the worst about opposing states.23 Contrary to this position, however, rational states should not assume the worst when facing uncertainty about their adversary’s motives and intentions. Instead, at least from a standard expected utility perspective, a state should consider the probability that the opposing state is a revisionist/greedy type as opposed to status quo/security type. The state should also consider the danger if the opposing state is a greedy type; many types of cooperation would not put the state at great risk, that is, death is not always, or even usually, the cost of misjudging the adversary’s motives. These arguments lie at the core of the rationalist realist theory that includes information as a key variable defining a state’s international environment, which in turn enables the theory to fully integrate the security dilemma into its arguments. Given this realist formulation, states’ interactions can influence their understanding (their information) of the opposing state’s motives. When a state takes an action that would be more likely to be taken by a security-seeking state than by a greedy state, the opposing state should positively update its prior estimate of the probability that the state has security motives. Because states have an incentive to mislead adversaries, the opposing state should only find useful information when the state’s action is costly, that is, when the state’s action is a “costly signal.” This occurs when a specific cooperative action would be more costly for a greedy state than for a security-seeking state. Wendt describes a similar process of interaction but emphasizes different changes and relies on different types of arguments— symbolic interactionism—not rational updating made possible by costly signals. His arguments describe how states’ interactions can change their interests and identities, which in turn support cooperation in anarchy. The rationalist explanation has the advantage of greater simplicity—it holds interests constant, does not involve the creation of social structures, and does not require changes in interests—while appearing to explain essentially the same international phenomenon. Second, the rational realist theory explains that anarchy can generate a variety of outcomes—including various degrees of competition, cooperation, and mixtures of the two—that have much in common with Wendt’s three anarchies. According to the rational theory, whether a securityseeking state should choose cooperation over competition depends on both material variables, which include the state’s power and offensedefense variables, and information variables, which capture what a state knows about its adversary’s motives.24 Material variables largely determine the military capabilities a state can acquire, given the opposing state’s ability to build military forces of its own. They determine the types of military missions that states will be able to perform and their relative prospects for performing them successfully. Information variables influence a state’s expectations about its adversary’s behavior, including reactions to the state’s own policies. The theory explains that when defense has the advantage—that is, when holding territory or maintaining the capabilities required for deterrence are relatively easy—states can achieve high levels of security without engaging in intense competition. When offense and defense are distinguishable—that is, when the forces that support offensive missions would contribute less (or more) to defensive missions—states may be able to choose forces and strategies that signal benign motives and to use arms control to increase the feasibility of defensive force postures. Information variables also influence the prospects for cooperation. A state that believes the opposing state is likely to be a security seeker should be more willing to run the risks of restraint and cooperation. These strategies have the potential to generate positive political spirals, which can in turn make states willing to choose military strategies that pose smaller risks to others’ security. In short, the rationalist theory describes the conditions under which anarchy can produce cooperative international security policies and relatively peaceful international politics. It both corrects Waltz’s conclusion about the general tendency for anarchy to generate competition and shows that Wendt’s social structure is unnecessary to produce this result. Again, the rationalist theory has the advantage of being more straightforward, less complex, and more parsimonious than Wendt’s constructivist alternative. Third, and related, the rationalist theory shows that Wendt is both too pessimistic and too optimistic, in different ways, about the prospects for cooperation under anarchy. On the pessimistic side, the rationalist theory shows that cooperation is possible without introducing “friends,” that is, states that have collective identities in which they value each other’s security as well as their own. According to the rational realist argument, the states’ international situation is doing most of the work; nonfriends—security seekers that do not value others’ security—have fundamental preferences that are relatively neutral between cooperation and competition. In contrast, collective identities and altruistic preferences play a central role in the constructivist argument, and it views them as necessary for deep cooperation. My point here is not that considering the impact of collective identities is analytically flawed, but that relying on collective identities to make extensive cooperation possible is a significantly weaker finding regarding the potential of anarchy to allow and support cooperation. If, as seems likely, pure security seekers are much more common than friends, then Wendt
Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.