Impacts - Heg Good Bad Supplement - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ
Impacts - Heg Good Bad Supplement - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ.docx
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Heg Good 2AC – Impact – LIO US hegemony is strong now but shrinking US engagement outweighs the costs of sustaining it – rising authoritarian powers, economic collapse, LIO collapse Daalder and Kagan, 16 (4/25/16; Ivo H. Daalder is President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, has a PhD in Political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert Kagan is a Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, has a PhD in American History from American University; “The U.S. can’t afford to end its global leadership role”; Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/04/25/the-u-s-cant-afford-to-end-its-global-leadership-role/) //LVL The economic, political and security strategy that the United States has pursued for more than seven decades, under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, is today widely questioned by large segments of the American public and is under attack by leading political candidates in both parties. Many Americans no longer seem to value the liberal international order that the United States created after World War II and sustained throughout the Cold War and beyond. Or perhaps they take it for granted and have lost sight of the essential role the United States plays in supporting the international environment from which they benefit greatly. The unprecedented prosperity made possible by free and open markets and thriving international trade; the spread of democracy; and the avoidance of major conflict among great powers: All these remarkable accomplishments have depended on sustained U.S. engagement around the world. Yet politicians in both parties dangle before the public the vision of an America freed from the burdens of leadership. What these politicians don’t say, perhaps because they don’t understand it themselves, is that the price of ending our engagement would far outweigh its costs. The international order created by the United States today faces challenges greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. Rising authoritarian powers in Asia and Europe threaten to undermine the security structures that have kept the peace since World War II. Russia invaded Ukraine and has seized some of its territory. In East Asia, an increasingly aggressive China seeks to control the sea lanes through which a large share of global commerce flows. In the Middle East, Iran pursues hegemony by supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and the bloody tyranny in Syria. The Islamic State controls more territory than any terrorist group in history, brutally imposing its extreme vision of Islam and striking at targets throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. None of these threats will simply go away. Nor will the United States be spared if the international order collapses, as it did twice in the 20th century. In the 21st century, oceans provide no security. Nor do walls along borders. Nor would cutting off the United States from the international economy by trashing trade agreements and erecting barriers to commerce. Instead of following the irresponsible counsel of demagogues, we need to restore a bipartisan foreign policy consensus around renewing U.S. global leadership. Despite predictions of a “post-American world,” U.S. capacities remain considerable. The U.S. economy remains the most dynamic in the world. The widely touted “rise of the rest”—the idea that the United States was being overtaken by the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China—has proved to be a myth. The dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and people across the globe seek U.S. investment and entrepreneurial skills to help their flagging economies. U.S. institutions of higher learning remain the world’s best and attract students from every corner of the globe. The political values that the United States stands for remain potent forces for change. Even at a time of resurgent autocracy, popular demands for greater freedom can be heard in Russia, China, Iran and elsewhere, and those peoples look to the United States for support, both moral and material. And our strategic position remains strong. The United States has more than 50 allies and partners around the world. Russia and China between them have no more than a handful. 2AC – Impact – Solves War Global economic interdependence stifles hegemonic war Michael Mousseau, 19 (Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, PhD from Binghamton University; “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to perpetual World Peace”; International Security 2019; 44 (1): 160–196. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00352) //LVL Hegemonic realist theories largely predict never-ending cycles of global war and peace, caused principally by varying rates of economic growth among leading powers that trigger relative gains concerns and yield opportunities for rising powers to assert control and change the rules of the global order. This section identifies four core reasons why hegemonic war, defined as a clash over global leadership, is not only unlikely in the future, but probably never happened in the past. First, if internal factors determine national interests, as I argue, then hegemony cannot exist among status major powers. Preferring disorder wherever they lack control, status powers simply are unconcerned with global rules, and thus have no interest in fighting over them. Motivated foremost to make others their subordinates and avoid being the subordinate of others, status major powers have nothing to gain and everything to lose in acquiescing to stronger states, and therefore usually balance against them. Second, status states cannot reach the level of economic productivity per capita of contractualist states, and thus it is unlikely that any status power could overtake the combined might of the contractualist hegemony. Fortune may occasionally bestow wealth on a status or axial economy, as it did on the antebellum South, which sold cotton and tobacco in global markets, and as it does on oil-rich states today. But wealth is not economic productivity, so such states are ultimately dependent on the contractualist hegemony and can never seriously challenge it. This explains why the South lost the Civil War. The third reason why hegemonic war resulting from changes in relative economic power is unlikely follows from the second reason: in all likelihood, only another contractualist state can surpass the market leader in economic size; and as discussed, no rising contractualist power would ever challenge a declining one. Contractualist states are uninterested in relative power (unless a state is behaving in a threatening manner), and among them, there are no substantial changes in global rules to fight about. Fourth, even if one were to suppose that a rising contractualist power wanted to be dominant among all contractual states, such a power shift cannot happen, because these states’ economies cannot substantially rise and fall relative to one another. As a result of their shared economic type and preferences for normal trade, their economies have largely converged. American hegemony can coordinate capabilities and protect security in the cyber domain Joshua Rovner and Tyler Moore, 17 (8/14/17; Rovner is a Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University; Moore is a Professor of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the School of Cyber Studies and the Tandy School of Computer Science at the University of Tulsa, PhD in Cyber Studies; “Does the Internet Need a Hegemon?”; Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 2, Issue 3, July 2017, Pages 184–203, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogx008) //LVL The clash of national and global interests in cyberspace is particularly acute because there is no global government to resolve disputes. Sustaining cooperation under anarchy is an enduring puzzle for international relations theorists and animates some of the most enduring debates in political science. Realist scholars view the international system as prone to conflict because there is no higher authority that can enforce agreements among states (Waltz 1979). Liberal theorists, however, posit that international institutions can foster cooperation in part by reducing transaction costs (Keohane 1984). Extensions of this debate, including arguments about the value of institutions, are discussed below. But perhaps the most controversial argument focuses on the role of a hegemon, or a clearly dominant state, in the international system. Hegemonic stability theory (HST) posits that peace and prosperity are more likely when there is a clear hierarchy of states and one undisputed leader. A state with dominant capabilities can sustain cooperation by providing public goods and reducing collective action problems. Incentives to cheat on agreements or free ride are reduced when the hegemon picks up the tab. Hegemons also help coordinate action and deter challengers from threatening the global order. 2AC – No Thucydides Trap No Thucydides Trap – Economic competition fosters peace Michael Mousseau, 19 (Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, PhD from Binghamton University; “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to perpetual World Peace”; International Security 2019; 44 (1): 160–196. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00352) //LVL This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory, I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies. Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II. Mearsheimer agrees Michael Mousseau, 19 (Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, PhD from Binghamton University; “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to perpetual World Peace”; International Security 2019; 44 (1): 160–196. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00352) //LVL Because economic power is central to military power, realist theory rejects the idea that states can be unconcerned with relative gains. Many influential scholars of power politics recognize, however, that factors other than relative power can inform states about whether another state is a threat. Arguably, the behavior of a state says more about whether it is a threat than do its economic and military capabilities. Even John Mearsheimer, considered to be the first theorist to postulate “offensive” realism, has asserted that “the prospects for cooperation among market democracies are ‘excellent.’ 1AR – Sustainability – AT: Debt Financial reasons for unsustainability are wrong. Carla Norrlof 16, Ph.D. in IR, Discipline Representative of Political Science at the University of Toronto; and William Wohlforth, Ph.D. in Political Science, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, 2016, “Is US grand strategy self-defeating? Deep engagement, military spending and sovereign debt;” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 36, No. 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216674953 Retrenchment proponents see American military spending as contributing to the growth of public debt3 and the country’s relative economic decline, and they argue that as it approaches its credit limit, the US should cut military spending and act preemptively to forestall steeper decline and even bankruptcy. Some retrenchment supporters also fear that negative feedback between military overstretch and economic decline will eventually put America’s coercive hegemony at risk because economic might is the wellspring of military might (Calleo, 1982; Chace, 1981; Kennedy, 1987a, 1987b; MacDonald and Parent, 2011). In short, retrenchment proponents agree that reducing military spending is an economic necessity, although they disagree about the extent to which the US should reduce its spending and overseas presence as well as the desirability of sustaining military primacy. This argument is noteworthy not only because of its centrality to the retrenchment argument, but also because academic defenders of deep engagement have as yet no direct response. Scholars and policymakers who oppose retrenchment maintain that American military dominance has produced significant economic benefits and warn that reductions in military spending will reduce these benefits (Brooks, et al., 2013; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016; Gottlieb, 2012; Kagan, 2012; Sestanovich, 2014). Three main arguments point to such benefits. First, according to a research program closely connected with the work of Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner, military power underwrites an open economic order. In a series of books, Gilpin and Krasner explain the logic and evidence for hegemonic orders that rest in part on an outsized global military role (Gilpin, 1975; Gilpin, 1981, 1987, 2001; Krasner, 1978). A dominant military power that equates its own interest with expanding economic globalization benefits from providing a stable political context that makes economic exchange more secure and predictable (Brooks, et al., 2013; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016; Norrlof, 2008, 2010). Second, military primacy generates other direct benefits, such as official support for the hegemon’s currency; sustained capital inflows during times of distress; protection of residents’ foreign investments; and economic contributions to the hegemon’s military activities, including economic transfers through basing fees (Beckley, 2011; Helleiner, 2008; James, 2009; McNamara, 2008, Norrlof, 2008, 2010; Posen, 2008). Third, the preeminent military power leverages security to extract economic favors from allies in exchange for protection. As a background condition, security allows the hegemonic power to win concessions in economic and trade negotiations (Ikenberry, 2011; Mastanduno, 2009; Norrlof, 2010). Economic agreements flow from the barrel of a gun. 1AR – Sustainability – AT: Polarization/Domestic Divisions Internal problems don’t preclude US leadership, and retrenching wouldn’t solve them. Hal Brands 21, Bloomberg Opinion columnist, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/9/2021, "Turning Its Back on the World Won’t Help America Heal", Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-09/trump-fueled-u-s-dysfunction-won-t-be-cured-by-isolationist-foreign-policy The severity of the U.S. predicament has led some analysts to the conclusion that Washington must dial back its global ambitions until it conquers its internal demons. As Emma Ashford put it in Foreign Policy, “Ambitious foreign-policy goals are completely out of step with the realities of the country’s domestic political and economic dysfunction.” That’s misguided. No true U.S. ally is advocating that Washington turn its back on the world (although many presumably worry about it), and for good reason. It’s not as though the need for American engagement has become any less pressing: As we have seen during Covid-19, the likely alternatives to constructive U.S. leadership are a breakdown of international cooperation on pandemics and other issues and a vacuum that less principled, less democratic actors such as China will fill. Richard Nixon, another corrupt president who governed at another time of alarming domestic and geopolitical turmoil, warned that “if America were to become a dropout in assuming the responsibility for defining peace and freedom in the world … the rest of the world would live in terror.” Nixon’s own transgressions notwithstanding, a post-American world seems unlikely to be any more stable or benign today. The premise of retrenchment is flawed in other ways, too. Unless foreign policy is a principal cause of America’s divisions and injustices, as it was during Vietnam, then it’s not immediately evident that a less ambitious foreign policy would help address those problems. Withdrawing from Europe’s strategic affairs after World War I didn’t allow the U.S. to avoid a wave of nativism and racism in the 1920s or the profound polarization of the Great Depression. One can plausibly argue that the relationship runs in the other direction. During the Cold War, America’s commitment to combating Soviet influence globally helped motivate it to address its worst domestic sin, state-sponsored segregation. Finally, domestic perfection has never been a prerequisite for purposeful international action. The U.S. protected the world from aggressive autocracy in two global wars despite being a deeply flawed society that fell far short of its founding ideals. It contained the Soviet Union, thereby supporting an unprecedented flourishing of democracy worldwide, while struggling with issues from racial injustice to economic turmoil to bitter political disputes. Had Americans instead insisted on resolving domestic problems before acting internationally, the result would have been a disaster for liberalism everywhere — including, ultimately, in America itself. The U.S. should emerge from the Trump era with greater humility about its own shortcomings and the dangers they pose to its diplomacy as well as its democracy. Yet it cannot fall into despair about its ability to shape a healthy world. The domestic reckoning Amer
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