CP - EU CP Updates - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS
CP - EU CP Updates - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS.docx
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EU CP vs Space Assets Aff Multilateralism solves the aff---Our evidence assumes all deficits. Suzana Anghel et. al 20. PhD in political science from the European University Institute, MA in European Political Studies from the College of Europe, Assistant Professor of Political Science Department of International Affairs at Vesalius College. “On the path to 'strategic autonomy':The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment.” European Parliamentary Research Service. Sep 20. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/652096/EPRS_STU(2020)652096_EN.pdf 4.3. External action We are today witnessing a return to a more realist vision of the world, driven by geopolitical considerations, where global and even regional powers try to maximise their weight and challenge the established international order using both 'soft' and 'hard' power tools. The EU and the Member States are committed to multilateralism, in a world where some actors are beginning to reject it. This gives greater value to the EU's action in support of multilateralism, a concept that remains key to world peace and security. The EU must continue to rely on a wide range of 'soft power' tools – crisis management, sanctions, development or trade – that need to be strengthened. However, in order to be able to stand up for its values and interests in the world, the EU also needs to develop 'hard power' tools. Only through a mix of 'soft' and 'hard power' tools would the EU be able to act autonomously at any given time. 4.3.1. A renewed approach to multilateralism Multilateralism and the rules-based order were challenged even before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.73 Recent years have been marked by the waning commitment of major countries to multilateralism, an issue which is of major concern to the EU.74 In the area of security, this, among other things, is jeopardising the survival of important nuclear arms-control treaties, with potentially direct implications for Europe. The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, a landmark agreement to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, over allegations that Iran was violating the spirit of the agreement, and the February 2019 announcement that both the USA and Russia would suspend their obligations under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, are cases in point. The INF eliminated and prohibited ground-launched intermediate ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km; its suspension leaves Europe potentially exposed to Russian intimidation.75 More recently, the USA announced its withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty, which permits unarmed observation aircraft to fly over the territories of its parties to observe military forces and activities, increasing trust and transparency. 76 However, the crisis of multilateralism extends beyond traditional notions of security, with the USA having also withdrawn from the landmark agreement on climate change, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Human Rights Council and, in May 2020 announcing its withdrawal from the World Health Organization in mid-pandemic. Beyond the world's major power's policy changes, the crisis of multilateralism is embodied in challenges faced by some of the most established international organisations, most notably the World Trade Organization, as multilateral consensus becomes harder to reach. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised to the UN Security Council the observed rise in nationalism and protectionism is having detrimental effects for transnational trust and multilateralism. For the EU, the promotion and protection of the multilateral rules-based order is a fundamental goal of its external action. Multilateralism lies at the core of the EU's identity, and of its strategy to promote its values and defend its interests. In the words of the former HR/VP Federica Mogherini: '…we achieved security through cooperation. We built peace with multilateralism. […] This is the strength of the European Union experience'. As an example of multilateral cooperation itself, the Treaty on European Union stipulates that the EU 'shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations' whenever possible (Article 20(1) TEU). The first ever comprehensive European Security Strategy (ESS) – formulated in 2003 – made 'strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively' a European priority and placed advocacy of 'effective multilateralism' at the centre of the EU's strategic goals. The 2016 EU Global Strategy reiterates the EU's dedication to the promotion of 'a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core'. At the same time, it emphasises that 'the format to deliver effective global governance may vary from case to case', citing policy areas ranging from cybersecurity (where states, international organisations, industry, civil society and technical experts are actors to consider) and maritime policy (the UN, UN specialised agencies, NATO, strategic partners, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)), to humanitarian, development and climate policy (the UN, G20, new donors, civil society and the private sector). Where multilateral processes already exist, the strategy envisions strengthening them, and at the same time expanding fledgling international regimes in areas such as disarmament and international criminal law. 77 Biodiversity and artificial intelligence are also areas where nascent formats of multilateral governance can be observed. Importantly, the EU Global Strategy acknowledged the need to reform multilateral structures and to address their weaknesses, while at the same time bolstering the spirit and practise of multilateral cooperation. It follows that for the EU, strategic autonomy is synonymous with a greater capacity to defend a principled commitment to multilateralism, rather than the aspiration to act unilaterally. The efforts to bolster the EU's credibility as a geopolitical actor with strategic autonomy should be seen as prerequisites to sustain multilateralism as a constitutive principle of 'a renewed vision of international order that is suited to today's world' – a world, in which the US-led liberal order, that encouraged multilateral cooperation on issues ranging from security to trade, is in crisis. 78 In the wake of major geopolitical and geo-economic shifts, countries like the USA or UK, who have done much to construct this post-war international order,79 have quit multilateral formats, while competing powers may seek to weaponise them. This complex situation, where multilateralism is thwarted and contested80 can represent an opportunity for European influence in the context of strategic autonomy. Despite internal divisions and structural problems, 'the EU remains the most consistent and best-resourced supporter of a strong multilateral system in the world today'. A united EU, defining and pursuing its strategic interests, can work towards a renewed approach to multilateralism as an alternative European model of global cooperation vis-à-vis American and Chinese leadership.81 In her political guidelines, Commission President von der Leyen highlighted the intention to 'uphold and update the rules based global order' through assertiveness and a strategic approach, with the Union using its normative power to uphold multilateral decisions in both trade and climate through its own legislation. Furthermore, within its 'stronger Europe in the world' priority, the Commission already announced its intention to launch an initiative on WTO reform in the context of the trade policy review planned for the fourth quarter of 2020. The coronavirus pandemic has arguably been considered a wake-up call for multilateralism, and experts have suggested that it will provide the necessary push for much-needed reform and reinvigoration of multilateral cooperation. As a 2019 European Parliament report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)states, it is for Europe to defend multilateralism and international law. In the wake of the pandemic, in a hearing at the SEDE subcommittee, HR/VP Borrell stated that: 'The world has never needed multilateral and cross-border cooperation so much, but unfortunately we do not have enough of it'. A strategic and autonomous EU would be able to leverage the partnerships needed in this effort. As Parliament has stressed, 'the EU should switch from a responsive to an anticipatory approach and the importance of teaming up with like-minded EU strategic partners, in particular NATO and emerging countries, in order to defend the global rule-based order that is founded on international and humanitarian law and multilateral treaties'. The Counteplan solves space. Alexandra Stickings 19. Research Fellow for Space Policy and Security, MSc in International Security and Global Governance from Birkbeck College, University of London, a BA(Hons) in International Studies from the Open University, and a BSc(Hons) in Physics with Astronomy from the University of Nottingham. “The Future of EU–US Cooperation in Space Traffic Management and Space Situational Awareness.” Chathamhouse. Aug 2019. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ7468-Cooperation-Space-Traffic-WEB-190816.pdf Future of SSA/STM While SSA/STM has traditionally sat within a military setting, particularly in the US, in recent years it has become associated with a more diverse set of providers. Private companies now supply commercial data to operators. This change has also been recognized at government level. In June 2018, President Trump signed Space Policy Directive-3, which proposes to shift the responsibility for providing SSA data to satellite operators from the DoD to the Department of Commerce (DoC).28 The DoC would therefore be responsible for handling the information warning satellite operators of potential collisions. There are a number of benefits that could be felt from this change in policy. First, it will allow the DoD to focus its efforts on national security considerations and not deal with the increasing day-to-day activities resulting from the rising number of satellites and operators. Second, this move creates an opportunity for the DoC to engage with international partners in a way that the DoD was unable to as the data will no longer be behind a military firewall and it has a commercial focus, which alters the opportunity landscape for the EU. The difficulty in understanding exactly what the impact of this move will be on international STM cooperation is that there is still no firm decision as to how this will be organized in the US. While the proposal is for the work to move to the DoC, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is also fighting for the authority over civil STM, and the debate over which organization will ultimately be successful is still ongoing.29 Either way, it is unlikely that the DoD will continue to be the main point of contact for STM data. It is also important to recognize the difficulties that could arise during the military-to-civilian transition, particularly in terms of communication and continuity of service over an extended transition period. Over the next few years there is likely to be an increase in SSA/STM activities by states that are beginning to play a major role in space, whether through the number of satellites in orbit and/or through commercial launch services. An example of such a state is India. In February 2017, India launched 104 satellites on the Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO) Polar Satellite Launch vehicle,30 and as a result it is now one of the leaders in the provision of commercial space launches. It is essential that India and other states entering this arena are included in global SSA efforts and acting responsibly. There are opportunities for Europe to lead in engaging with these actors. Commercial companies operating in this sphere will also continue to grow. Many of these will be looking to increase their geographical coverage to ensure their data is as accurate as possible and could look to partner with European states or companies. The EU could foster an environment that makes such cooperation easy, partnering with both other states and commercial providers to supply more comprehensive SSA. While a European ambition to further SSA cooperation with the US is welcome, this should not be seen in isolation or to the detriment of a move towards a more global coalition of SSA providers. With the US potentially less willing to explore partnership agreements, the EU could act as an intermediary and driver of political will for further international cooperation. Scenarios for EU–US cooperation The broad landscape of SSA activities and their importance for orbital sustainability, as well as the changing operators and policy, mean that there are a number of opportunities for EU–US cooperation, and for the EU to increase its capabilities and become a key player in leading the responsible use of space. The one area in which potential opportunities will be very limited, if not impossible, is military SSA activities. International involvement in the US CSpOC is limited to the UK, Canada and Australia, all members of the Five Eyes community, as well as France and Germany. Any possible involvement of additional European countries would only occur as the result of a larger intelligence and information sharing partnership, although US Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein has stated that he expects the CSpOC to continue to grow.31 The EU should therefore focus on the civilian aspects of SSA and the changing landscape of providers. It has been suggested by a number of experts that SSA needs to become a civil mission with the military augmenting and supporting national security programmes as their mission. That will need a significant shift in US operations (which is happening slowly) and a greater sharing of data. Data integrity and data trust are essential. The concept of the EU SST as a civil programme should provide the required momentum to help with this paradigm shift. However, some important issuesneed to be addressed to support this. First, the civil programme should be the primary goal. Second, EU funds need to be focused on developing sensors, capabilities and experience that complements and contributes to existing activities rather than replicating what is currently available. For Europe that means not spreading funds and resources across a number of countries but focusing on only one or two to support the rest of Europe. Third, sensors dedicated to STM are essential, as one of the difficulties in space tracking for the military is that many of its sensors are primarily focused on missile defence. Fourth, cooperation among EU contributors needs to improve and this must be rectified before Europe can provide an effective support mechanism for global SSA. As a multilateral organization, the EU SST framework also comes with its own set of challenges in cooperation and information integration between member states. It can look to the EU Satellite Centre (Satcen)32 in Torrejon, Spain, as an example of understanding and dealing with the sensitive nature of aggregating national derived data and distributing it among EU member states Nevertheless, the EU’s tradition of support for openness and civil society means that it is well placed to fill the gaps in the other extant SSA systems by being independent, open and free at the point of service. An EU-led open system, with the option for other providers to feed in their data if they wanted to, could rapidly supersede the US SATCAT as the system of choice by virtue of its open availability, and with relatively modest investment. Such a system could also be best placed to increase international cooperation with countries such as Japan and India as well as smaller countries looking to responsibly operate their limited assets and contribute to broader space sustainability. The EU can also look to support and promote initiatives such as the Space Data Association (SDA)33 and the DARPA-led Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS),34 which provide forums for international operators to exchange data and cooperate to avoid collisions. One question that Europe needs to address is cooperation with the UK following Brexit. There should still be opportunities to collaborate between the EU and the UK. One aspect that needs to be looked at is any potential UK involvement in the EU SST programme. In whatever way this plays out, Europe should look to the UK for its experience and expertise, and perhaps also to its ability to act as a bridge to the US. Both the UK and EU member states could host commercial sensors. In the UK, radars or passive radio frequency reception sites like Goonhilly Earth Station,35 a facility in Cornwall that provides commercial tracking in LEO and MEO, are most likely, as the weather is not ideal for optical facilities. It is currently unclear how the transition of space tracking from the US Air Force to DoC in the US will affect the data flows from sensors such as RAFFylingdales. Currently, data from that radar cannot be shared worldwide due to the provisions of the UK–US treaty (the station is operated under the UKUSA Agreement), which also prevents it being optimized for space tracking. For example, it would be possible to implement a new focused tracking mode at Fylingdales to detect and track smaller objects than it currently sees (albeit with the need for cueing data from the Space Fence) but this is not allowed under the treaty. There is a need for mutual exchange of STM data between the EU and the US, but there is a problem regarding the classification and accessibility of data (this is largely a problem on the US side). A multilateral data-sharing agreement between the US and one or more EU member state would greatly help, but the US is often reluctant to implement multilateral agreements. This may change with moves to commercialize STM in the US, but with militaries globally increasing their orbital activities, there is likely to remain a significant portion of data that is not considered releasable. Nevertheless, the EU could contribute independent sources of information on all trackable resident space objects and events. As noted above, one of the major problems with SSA is that rarely, if ever, does a single hypothesis explain the evidence. This implies ambiguity on inferred quantities and events and thus clouds or hinders informed and meaningful decision-making. Global SSA data harmonization is therefore critical for curating the required high quantity and diversity of data and information. The EU could help or even lead in this effort. The broader definition of SSA allows for additional scenarios for collaboration. The first of these is around the issue of space weather. The EU can support and promote the provision of operational weather services as foreseen in the proposed EU space programme. A major space weather event could potentially cause more damage to satellites and ground stations than the other threats and hazards and would render other aspects of SSA obsolete. At present, both NASA and ESA, as well as other international actors, have mechanisms for monitoring solar activity, although current prediction capabilities are limited and there is a need for more missions that increase the ability to understand solar activity and provide longer prediction times. It is also important in this regard to ensure exchange of scientific research outputs and data related to warnings so that all satellite operators, regardless of location, receive the necessary information. A major space weather event could potentially cause more damage to satellites and ground stations than the other threats and
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