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2022 Michigan Negative

Neg - Biotech - Starter - Michigan 7 2022

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Neg – Biotech – Starter Packet
AT: Dual Use Advantage
AT: Biodiversity
Bio-d’s not existential and try-or-die is wrong. Nature’s a luxury, not a necessity.
Keim, 19—freelance journalist whose work has appeared in publications including The Atlantic, WIRED, National Geographic News, Aeon, Nautilus, Scientific American Mind, The Guardian, Audubon Magazine, Grist, Mother Jones, Conservation, NOVA, and Anthropocene (Brandon, “Conservation for the World We Want,” Breakthrough Journal, No. 11, Summer 2019, dml)
A slogan’s purpose, of course, isn’t to capture nuance. But there are ways in which this save-it-or-die framing rankles, beginning with the fact that, at precisely the same time as so many wild lives are imperiled, billions of people are enjoying historically unprecedented prosperity and health. That is not to say that economic well-being automatically flows from nature’s destruction, or that future well-being requires it, but simply that it has not yet precluded human flourishing.
Returning to megafauna and fire, Earth is more fire-prone than it once was, but people have managed — not without suffering, often with difficulty, but managed all the same. The depletion of whale populations and terrestrial megafauna reduced nutrient flows from the deep sea and across landscapes to a trickle, but the consequences were not catastrophic for us. Indeed, the state of nature that conservationists hope to protect, and present in terms of human self-interest, has already been radically transformed from just a few thousand years ago — not just because of the late Pleistocene mass extinctions, but also because of the dwindling of what and who remains.
Global turtle populations, to pick one little-appreciated example, have collapsed. Not long ago they existed in densities that, in terms of total per-hectare biomass, often outweighed that of African savannah herbivores like elephant and giraffes. Now turtles “are struggling to persist in the modern world,” as a recent scientific review described their plight. “Their ecological roles are now greatly diminished,” and “The impacts of their lessened roles are poorly appreciated and inadequately understood.” Perhaps the loss of all that habitat engineering (many turtles dig burrows that are used by other creatures and contribute to long-term soil enrichment), seed dispersal, and nutrient cycling has diminished human well-being in significant ways, but it’s a hard argument to make right now.
It is possible, of course, that the effects of turtle decline — and amphibian decline and bat decline and insect decline and megafauna decline, and on and on — have not yet been fully realized, and that human societies are running on a biological “surplus” banked over hundreds of millions of years. By this light, just as people will eventually run out of fuels derived from whole geological epochs’ worth of fossilized plankton and vegetable matter, so might we exhaust soils nourished by organismal activity or air filtered by forest communities now missing animals who once planted their seeds.
Alternatively, one could argue that although even a diminished biosphere was enough to sustain human prosperity, the current 7.7 billion humans and 70 billion domesticated animals they exploit for food have pushed that sustenance to its limits. Taking these precautionary approaches, however, is not quite the same as directly equating human health, security, and prosperity with a recent snapshot of nature — especially when that version of “nature” is implicitly equated with biological diversity and abundance, and even as so much of what we take from the biosphere comes from simplified ecosystems.
Tree plantations still sequester carbon dioxide and exhale oxygen while generating wood. Defaunated wetlands still filter water and buffer against storms. Most of the food we eat comes from comparatively low-diversity croplands. Restoring, say, soil biodiversity to the plains of central North America, the world’s most productive agricultural landscape, is more about reducing chemical use and changing farming techniques to ensure their long-term productivity than returning them to their former prairie glory.
To be sure, these human-directed systems are often less multifunctional than higher-biodiversity systems. Monoculture tree plantations store less carbon than wild forests, and defaunated wild forests store less carbon than those with intact animal communities. But conceiving of engineered ecosystems in terms of resource yield and a few other metrics is terribly reductionist.
Arguably, the greatest service of all is the long-term stability that intact ecologies provide. Species interactions and functional redundancies help ecosystems — and ultimately the biosphere itself — adapt to environmental fluctuations, regrouping and supporting complex arrangements of life even when Earth’s climate changes or an asteroid strikes.
Yet that particular service isn’t one that maps neatly onto short-term human interests in wood production, clean water, or fisheries yield. And to casually say those benefits come from “nature” erodes, or at least blurs, what conservationists want to protect: forms of nature in which communities and processes found in the absence of humans remain largely intact, and where human activity doesn’t divert their yields without nourishing more nonhuman life in return. To view, say, the pollination of commodity crops by managed honeybees trucked cross-country as an example of nature’s bounty would be to diminish nature.
2.
This critique is not intended to downplay the hardships caused by nature’s decline and destruction. The recent Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) report, which estimated that one in eight species of plants and animals is now threatened with extinction, enumerates them well. Nature indeed “sustains the quality of the air, fresh water and soils on which humanity depends, distributes fresh water, regulates the climate, provides pollination and pest control and reduces the impact of natural hazards,” and the impacts of ecological disruption are felt most by people who possess the least.
Ultimately, though, human ingenuity can substitute for many of nature’s services. The results might be unpleasant in many ways — I’d much rather rely on bats and earthworms than pesticides and fertilizers — but they’re rarely an existential threat to human societies. The vast, fertilizer-fueled Gulf of Mexico dead zone is a horrible, shameful thing and has inflicted hardship on many people, but southeastern U.S. coastal communities have not collapsed because of it.
AT: Bioterror
Bioterrror fails
Pinker 18 – Steven Arthur Pinker is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, Professor at Harvard University. [Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, Penguin Group]//BPS
Biological agents are particularly ill-suited to terrorists, whose goal, recall, is not damage but theater (chapter 13).58 The biologist Paul Ewald notes that natural selection among pathogens works against the terrorist’s goal of sudden and spectacular devastation. 59 Germs that depend on rapid person-to-person contagion, like the common-cold virus, are selected to keep their hosts alive and ambulatory so they can shake hands with and sneeze on as many people as possible. Germs get greedy and kill their hosts only if they have some other way of getting from body to body, like mosquitoes (for malaria), a contaminable water supply (for cholera), or trenches packed with injured soldiers (for the 1918 Spanish flu). Sexually transmitted pathogens, like HIV and syphilis, are somewhere in between, needing a long and symptomless incubation period during which hosts can infect their partners, after which the germs do their damage. Virulence and contagion thus trade off, and the evolution of germs will frustrate the terrorist’s aspiration to launch a headline-worthy epidemic that is both swift and lethal. Theoretically, a bioterrorist could try to bend the curve with a pathogen that is virulent, contagious, and durable enough to survive outside bodies. But breeding such a fine-tuned germ would require Nazi-like experiments on living humans that even terrorists (to say nothing of teenagers) are unlikely to carry off. It may be more than just luck that the world so far has seen just one successful bioterror attack (the 1984 tainting of salad with salmonella in an Oregon town by the Rajneeshee religious cult, which killed no one) and one spree killing (the 2001 anthrax mailings, which killed five).60 To be sure, advances in synthetic biology, such as the gene-editing technique CRISPR-Cas9, make it easier to tinker with organisms, including pathogens. But it’s difficult to re-engineer a complex evolved trait by inserting a gene or two, since the effects of any gene are intertwined with the rest of the organism’s genome. Ewald notes, “I don’t think that we are close to understanding how to insert combinations of genetic variants in any given pathogen that act in concert to generate high transmissibility and stably high virulence for humans.”61 The biotech expert Robert Carlson adds that “one of the problems with building any flu virus is that you need to keep your production system (cells or eggs) alive long enough to make a useful quantity of something that is trying to kill that production system. . . . Booting up the resulting virus is still very, very difficult. . . . I would not dismiss this threat completely, but frankly I am much more worried about what Mother Nature is throwing at us all the time.”62 And crucially, advances in biology work the other way as well: they also make it easier for the good guys [public protectors] (and there are many more of them) to identify pathogens, invent antibiotics that overcome antibiotic resistance, and rapidly develop vaccines.63 An example is the Ebola vaccine, developed in the waning days of the 2014–15 emergency, after public health efforts had capped the toll at twelve thousand deaths rather than the millions that the media had foreseen. Ebola thus joined a list of other falsely predicted pandemics such as Lassa fever, hantavirus, SARS, mad cow disease, bird flu, and swine flu.64 Some of them never had the potential to go pandemic in the first place because they are contracted from animals or food rather than in an exponential tree of person-to-person infections. Others were nipped by medical and public health interventions. Of course no one knows for sure whether an evil genius will someday overcome the world’s defenses and loose a plague upon the world for fun, vengeance, or a sacred cause. But journalistic habits and the Availability and Negativity biases inflate the odds, which is why I have taken Sir Martin up on his bet. By the time you read this you may know who has won.65
--xt AT: Bioterror
No impact to bioterror
Jefferson, et al, 14 [ Catherine, 21 August 2014 | doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115, Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”, Catherine, Jefferson, imageFilippa Lentzos and imageClaire Marris* Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College London, London, UK, Catherine joined SSHM in January 2013. Before joining the department, she worked as a senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, where she led a project on Neuroscience, Conflict and Security. Prior to this she was a research fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the University of Sussex, where she also obtained her DPhil. Catherine’s research interests are focused on the intersection of science and security policy, with a particular emphasis on chemical and biological security, dual use governance of emerging technologies and the growth of the amateur biology community. She is currently involved in research on the social dimensions of synthetic biology within theCentre for Synthetic Biology and Innovation, http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115/full]
Challenges to Myth 5 There are two dimensions to Myth 5. The first is about the intention of would-be terrorists, and the assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state-level bioweapons programs. While most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and very present, they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be very small (65). This is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low casualty events aimed at causing panic, and disruption rather than excessive death tolls: (i) the Rajneesh cult’s use of Salmonella on salad bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters and make them stay away from the polls during Oregon elections in 1984; (ii) the 1990–95 attempted use of botulinum toxin and anthrax by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; (iii) and the “anthrax letters” sent to media outlets and members of US Congress in 2001 resulting in at least 22 cases of anthrax, five of which were fatal (66, 67). The second dimension to Myth 5 is the implicit assumption that producing a pathogenic organism equates producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and developing a suitable dissemination method. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers. Drawing from her in-depth study of the Iraqi, Soviet, and US bioweapons programs (3, 4), Ben Ouagrham-Gormley explains: Scaling up fragile microorganisms that are sensitive to environmental conditions and susceptible to change — and viruses are more sensitive than bacteria — has been one of the stiffest challenges for past bioweapons programs to overcome, even with appropriate expertise at hand. Scaling-up requires a gradual approach, moving from laboratory sample, to a larger laboratory quantity, to pilot-scale production, and then to even larger-scale production. During each stage, the production parameters need to be tested and often modified to maintain the lethal qualities of the agent; the entire scaling-up process can take several years (68). The dissemination of biological agents also poses difficult technical challenges. Whereas persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria and viruses can enter the body via that route unless the skin has already been broken. Biological agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection. To expose large numbers of people through the gastrointestinal tract, possible means of delivery are contamination of food and drinking water, yet neither of these scenarios would be easy to accomplish. Large urban reservoirs are usually unguarded, but unless terrorists added massive quantities of biological agent, the dilution effect would be so great that no healthy person drinking the water would receive an infectious dose (66). Moreover, modern sanitary techniques such as chlorination and filtration are designed to kill pathogens from natural sources and would probably be equally effective against a deliberately released agent. Bacterial contamination of the food supply is also unlikely to inflict mass casualties. Cooking, boiling, pasteurization, and other routine safety precautions are generally sufficient to kill pathogenic bacteria. The most likely way to inflict mass casualties with a biological agent is by disseminating it as a respirable aerosol: an invisible cloud of infectious droplets or particles so tiny that they remain suspended in the air for long periods and can be inhaled by large numbers of people. A high-concentration aerosol of B. anthracis or some other pathogen, released into the air in a densely populated urban area, could potentially infect thousands of victims simultaneously. After an incubation period of a few days, depending on the type of agent and the inhaled dose, the exposed population would experience an outbreak of an incapacitating or fatal illness. Although aerosol delivery is potentially the most lethal way of delivering a biological attack, it involves major technical hurdles that most terrorists would be unlikely to overcome. To infect through the lungs, infectious particles must be microscopic in size – between 1 and 5 μm in diameter. Terrorists would therefore have to develop or acquire a sophisticated delivery system capable of generating an aerosol cloud with the necessary particle size range and a high enough agent concentration to cover a broad area. Overall, an important trade-off exists between ease of production and effectiveness of dissemination. The easiest way to produce microbial agents is in a liquid form, yet when such a “slurry” is sprayed into the air, it forms heavy droplets that fall to the ground so that only a small percentage of the agent is aerosolized. In contrast, if the bacteria are first dried to a solid cake and then milled into a fine powder, they become far easier to aerosolize, yet the drying and milling process is technically difficult. The Aum Shinrikyo cult struggled with dissemination (67, 69, 70). In one of its anthrax dissemination attempts, it sprayed unknown, but probably very large, quantities of a liquid aerosol (most likely crude culture, unprocessed in any way) of B. anthracis from the roof of the Aum’s headquarters building in Tokyo. For the dissemination, the Aum set up two sprayers on the roof of the eight-story building, each within a large round cooling tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling towers to tanks below, which were filled with a liquid suspension of B. anthracis. The device worked poorly, producing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed for effective transmission of anthrax. It also appears the spore concentration was very low (at least five orders of magnitude below that necessary for a highly infectious wet aerosol). In another dissemination attempt, targeting the area around the Kanagawa prefectural office and the Imperial Palace, the Aum equipped vehicles with spraying devices, but according to prosecutors’ statements, the nozzle of the sprayer clogged and the operation failed. Despite its 200 m2 laboratory containing, amongst other equipment, a glove box, incubator, centrifuge, drier, DNA/RNA synthesizer, electron microscope, two fermenters each having about a 2,000 litre capacity, and an extensive scientific library, and despite its repeated attempts at dissemination, the Aum was unsuccessful in causing any disease, and in retrospect it is clear that the cult did not even make the first substantive step toward an effective bioweapon. If, despite the odds, aerosolization was achieved, the effective delivery of biological agents in the open air is highly dependent on atmospheric and wind conditions, creating additional uncertainties. Only under highly stable atmospheric conditions would the aerosol cloud remain close to the ground where it can be inhaled, rather than being rapidly dispersed. Moreover, most microorganisms are sensitive to ultraviolet radiation and cannot survive more than 30 min in bright sunlight, limiting their use to night-time attacks. One major exception is anthrax, which can be induced to form spores with tough outer coats that enable them to survive for several hours in sunlight. Terrorists could, of course, stage a biological attack inside an enclosed space such as a building, a subway station, a shopping mall, or a sports arena. Such an attack, if it involved a respiratory aerosol, might infect thousands of people, but even here the technical hurdles would by no means be trivial. Finally, even if a biological weapon had been disseminated s

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