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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - EU CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

AT - EU CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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Solvency
2AC – Solvency – Generic
It fails – duplicity, internal divisions, and empirics.
ND 22 [New Direction, 05-22-2022, "Why an EU Army is a bad idea – We don’t need a political bloc of the unwilling", https://newdirection.online/the-european-journal/article/why_an_eu_army_is_a_bad_idea_we_dont_need_a_political_bloc_of_the_unwilling, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]
You might argue that it can only be a good thing if the Europeans step up their defence arrangements. But this has little to do with increasing military muscle. It is not the answer to the plea by successive US presidents for the Europeans to do more on defence. NATO is well established, well proven and credible. 27 of its 30 member countries are European, including 21 that also happen to be EU countries. So why create another structure?
Any EU force would have to draw on the same limited military resources and would be a duplicative, divisive distraction. EU ambitions already intrude into NATO where coordination structures between the two organisations have now been set up, in spite of the fact that their membership is largely the same. The EU wants to become the European leg of NATO – so where would that leave key non-EU European members of NATO such as the UK, Norway and Turkey? In any case, the EU countries can’t even agree among themselves. Many pay lip service to the idea of CSDP while refusing to participate in any meaningful way. Even the arch-federalist European Parliament, in its most recent report on EU defence, noted that “in over 15 years of existence EU battlegroups have never been used, in particular due to the lack of political consensus among Member States and the complexity of implementation and funding…”
At NATO HQ in the early ‘90s, the French were already pushing for European military capabilities separate from NATO. When the Bosnian crisis began they demanded that the matter should be discussed not at NATO but ‘in another place’ – by which they meant the Western European Union (WEU), a purely European group whose headquarters was just down the road in central Brussels. As a consequence, nonsensically, two allied navies operated in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, one under NATO command and the other under WEU, with more or less the same ships rotating between the two. Once the Bosnian military operations got more serious, even France gave up on this farce and backed the NATO option.
Creating EU strategic autonomy trades off with security cooperation AND causes hot internal debates that divide the EU.
Puglierin 21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin (Berliner Forum Zukunft). Prior to this she was an advisor on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation at the German Bundestag, where she also worked on matters relating to German and European foreign and security policy., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653634/EXPO_STU(2021)653634_EN.pdf) //CHC-DS ‍
3.1.2 Reconciling Strategic Sovereignty and the Transatlantic Relationship The idea that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to military crises goes back to the 1998 St. Malo Declaration. Since then, the question of what constitutes an acceptable balance between a more independent European security and defence policy and transatlantic security cooperation in NATO has been hotly disputed on both sides of the Atlantic. The fear of upsetting the US and jeopardising the American security commitment to Europe was a good reason for many European member states to keep EU defence efforts to a minimum. However, the election of Donald Trump as US president has decisively changed the parameters of the debate. The US’ strong footprint in European security could no longer be taken for granted. For many Europeans, this was a wake-up moment that brought the need for greater autonomy from the US back into focus. At the same time, the very notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ became toxic. While Europeans insisted that strategic autonomy was not synonymous with a Europe ‘going it alone’, Washington, but also some EU member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, perceived it as an attempt for de-coupling and hence as a threat. On this account, German defence minister Annegret KrampKarrenbauer spoke on behalf of many Europeans when she sent her message to the incoming Biden administration in November 2020: ‘The idea of strategic autonomy for Europe goes too far if it is taken to mean that we could guarantee security, stability and prosperity in Europe without NATO and without the US’. 36 The related dispute between her and French President Emmanuel Macron has once again shown that Europeans themselves have not yet agreed on how far Europe should be able to act independently of the United States.
Only the US can do security cooperation with NATO on AI---EU is far behind on funding, adoption, and private investment.
Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Research in the areas of International Affairs and International Security, with a particular focus on: Geoeconomics, Economic Statecraft, Defence Economics, Defence Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, NATO, Great Power Competition., (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe” in European View, Volume 21(1), Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/17816858221089372) //CHC-DS ‍
Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020).
Technical impracticalities between EU states and ideological divergences mean EU-NATO cooperation fail.
Akturan et al 18, EUChicago, (Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon, “”, The University of Chicago’s Chapter for European Horizons, https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/) //CHC-DS ‍
[Edited] for ableist langauge
However, the difference in how commitment to respective sets of values is executed in NATO and EU results with a wide portfolio of cooperational problems, ranging from bureaucratic to strategic, despite their intention to work together. Could there be comprehensive and mutually respectful cooperation between the two organizations on security issues? Would this cooperation be wearproof given the bilateral conflicts brought up by non-joint members, such as in the Cyprus dilemma? This article surveys how bilateral and regional conflicts challenge the international resolve for transatlantic security cooperation, in which NATO and EU share common milito-political interest.
The European Common Security and Defense Policy: Boon or Bane
The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), known before 2009’s Lisbon Treaty as the European Security and Defence Policy, represented the apex of security cooperation among European Union member states and the EU’s undertaking of a heavier defence role along with NATO. The CSDP seeks to exercise European military independence from NATO within five areas: the self-assured security of the EU, a closer relationship between eastern and western Europe, structural improvement in European conflict management, cooperation between neighboring regions, and pioneering global governance of conflicts. To implement these priorities into pre-existing European structural mechanisms, the EU’s civilian-military status has undergone an updating process. For instance, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created through the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, which made the EU constitutional laws legally binding and further centralized the Union. The Lisbon Treaty also sought to address the independent methods in which the EU member states were answering international crises.
When EEAS was launched in December 2010 as an EU department with the express function of consolidating EU responses to international security issues as an autonomous unit, it actualized CSDP’s vision for a new European crisis management strategy which technically compelled member states to cooperate in situations of security threats, in or out of the EU. Initiatives similar to EAAS make clear what the EU lacks has not been the incentive to incorporate an international security dimension to its agenda, but the technical practicality to implement decisions to that end in a unified manner. Although common goals had been set for NATO-EU cooperation through the Berlin Plus Agreements in 2003 before CSDP, creation of a unified transatlantic defence and security policy between the two entities has encountered ample executive difficulties. For instance, Cyprus – an EU but not NATO member- was excluded from joint EU-NATO meetings by Turkey – a NATO but not EU member- due to the decades long political antagonism over the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974. Even this seemingly inconsequential bilateral problem was enough to [halt]paralyze the NATO-EU cooperation, making some organizational details of Berlin Plus Agreement impossible.
Berlin Agreement’s decision to create a merged NATO-EU headquarters in Brussels to manage conflicts in which both the EU and NATO have common interests has not helped reduce the fracture between American and European politics. For instance, when France and Germany coordinated a joint gathering with Belgium and Luxembourg to protest the British-American invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, NATO and then American government denounced it as “Chocolate Summit,” betraying the spirit of cooperation aimed by CSDP. Joint NATO-EU missions for stabilization in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, in Dafur, Sudan, as an assistance to African Union or in Somali to combat piracy are, however, some successful products of Berlin Plus Agreements. These joint undertakings are cases in which not all the EU or NATO members were interested in intervention, but they were made possible by sharing of military expertise and assets from either of the parties, mostly by NATO. However, post-colonial Africa and Western Balkans are regions over which NATO and EU do not have strong strategic disagreements. Despite Berlin Plus, EU has been critical of NATO’s call for joint missions in Afghanistan for instance and only supported the civilian projects of current Resolute Support Mission of NATO.
Bilateral hurdles in front of NATO-EU cooperation such as Cyprus Dispute are hence not the actual root causes hindering the constructive attitude of Berlin Plus. As Europe’s disapproval of Iraqi invasion or reluctance of cooperation in Afghanistan demonstrates, the CSDP cannot overcome the strategic divergence of NATO and EU in issues of incompatible political interests. Ideological divergence of the two partners should be reconciled before the region specific problems are addressed by calls for joint military actions. The new and more NATO-conscious level of ambition for CSDP thus required European member states to invest more in security and defence, both politically and economic. Perhaps an important undertaking was revisiting Berlin Plus Agreement’s comfort in EU utilizing NATO asset and capabilities when necessary, instead initiating more EU-focused solutions like EAAS.
With the attenuation of this cooperative ethos in both sides, there is a present risk that NATO and the EU will begin to compete for limited military resources, straying from the envisioned Berlin Plus Agreement. Lack of a coherent strategy among Western partners could prevent efficient response to crises, which does not bode well in a time of humanitarian atrocities — whether it be in Syria, Yemen, or South Sudan.
New initiatives set a clear signal that the EU is working towards tech sovereignty in the squo.
Csernatoni 21, Raluca Csernatoni is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where she works on European security and defense with a specific focus on disruptive technologies. Csernatoni is also a guest professor at the Institute for European Studies at the Free University of Brussels (VUB). Prior to joining Carnegie, she was a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the Charles University’s Institute of Political Studies in Prague, where she focused on the impact of new military capabilities and emerging dual-use technologies such as drones on the EU’s security and defense architecture., (Raluca, “The EU’s Rise as a Defense Technological Power: From Strategic Autonomy to Technological Sovereignty”, Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/08/12/eu-s-rise-as-defense-technological-power-from-strategic-autonomy-to-technological-sovereignty-pub-85134) //CHC-DS ‍
EU TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY IS IN THE MAKING
Behind the EU’s recent multiple sovereignty agendas is the need to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to innovation. The very label of a geopolitical European Commission implies a new level of engagement for the EU in the global balance of power. Technological and digital sovereignty are at the heart of such ambitions. The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has further exacerbated the urgency to shore up technological, digital, and regulatory responses to preserve the EU’s economic clout, industrial competitiveness, and geopolitical influence, as well as to reduce dependencies in critical technology areas. What has the EU done so far, and what must it still do to meet that goal of technological sovereignty? Four cross-cutting dimensions can help unpack the concept of technological sovereignty and better structure the discussion about EU initiatives, programs, and instruments: Research and capability-development efforts in security and defense Investments in cutting-edge research and innovation and in digitalization Critical infrastructure resilience and security of supply Tech-related regulatory activism
DEFENSE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
According to Arnout Molenaar, the head of division in the European External Action Service, dealing with security and defense policy is also related to “a learning curve for the Union to develop a ‘hard power’ mentality.” Technology plays a fundamental role in terms of making possible the EU’s hard military power ambitions—not only to act in a tense geopolitical setting but also to defend the EU’s interests in areas related to technology, security, and defense matters. In this regard, collaborative EU defense research and development (R&D) initiatives have been prioritized at the EU level for some time now to support the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.
EU institutions and agencies have made considerable efforts to preserve Europe’s edge in key areas, including emerging and disruptive security technologies and infrastructures such as cybersecurity, drones, secure networks, space technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum technology. Indeed, recent EU initiatives such as the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (EDF) as part of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), 2021–2027—as well as its precursor programs, the Preparatory Action on Defence Research and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme—are intended to financially empower the EU’s autonomy in defense technology and industry and its research and innovation capacity in future-oriented and disruptive defense technologies.
Such initiatives have been framed as timely catalysts and potential game changers for increasing collective European action and for fostering cutting-edge defense research and innovation in Europe. The commission funded the Preparatory Action on Defence Research as a test case of defense-related research and technology projects, pulling directly from the EU budget line rather than from member states’ joint initiatives. This scheme was a concrete step designed to demonstrate the added value of EU-supported defense technology research and innovation. If successfully implemented, the EDF is expected to bolster more lucrative and joint research and capability-driven investment schemes in defense technologies across Europe and to increase the EU’s global leadership position in strategic tech sectors. The commission has already pledged a relatively small percentage of up to 8 percent of the EDF funding to disruptive technology actions. However, with the initially proposed amount of 13 billion euros ($15.4 billion) now reduced to about 8 billion euros ($9.5 billion), the EDF’s real potential to create value added and to incentivize technological and industrial cooperation and competitiveness in Europe is unclear. Indeed, this reduction could be accounted for by the fact that some member states either took a budget-restrictive approach to the entire 2021–2027 MFF or judged that on balance, they would benefit less from the EDF than their contribution to it and thus opted for reducing the overall funding. What is certain is that the EDF marks an important paradigm shift in consolidating the EU’s increased supranational activism in the field of defense technology and industry as a basis for building the EU’s military hard power and defense portfolio. The fund also consolidates the European Commission’s increasing role and strong interventionism in the EU security and defense policy fields that have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of member states’ decisionmaking.
There is also a clear message that developing the defense industry and technology base in Europe is key to strategic autonomy. Hence, logic dictates that defense-related technological sovereignty is central to the EU’s strategic autonomy. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the reduced funding dedicated to the EDF and the small percentage of it that is flagged for disruptive military technologies are sufficient to foster high-risk, high-reward technological innovation in the European defense sector.
Squo solves EU autonomy---E12 and NORDEFCO.
Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University S

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