CP - Burdensharing QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ
CP - Burdensharing QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ.docx
Indexed text preview
Burden Sharing QPQ and Entrapment DA Notes This file contains 2 different strategies: 1. A cp that conditions the plan on European Countries increasing their defense spending. There are internal (burden sharing good for defense) and external (entrapment, politics) reasons why that would be beneficial to unconditionally offering security cooperation 2. A DA that says that security cooperation overassures allies and ensures that they will get the US entangled into conflict. This DA probably is not very strategic with the status quo (because we do security cooperation with NATO now), but could very easily be paired with this cp or with a cp that ceases security cooperation with NATO. Uniqueness for this DA is pretty minimal, but if there is a cp that provides uniqueness, it could be viable Thanks to Amy, Andrew, Annabeth, Brandon, Cyrus, Eric, Lauren, Russell, Seth, Steven Neg ***QPQ CP 1NC 1NC QPQ The United States federal government ought condition its defense cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over [plan area] on increased alliance contribution ratings from North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states. Conditioning cooperation increases burden sharing—empirics prove it convinces allies to increase defense spending Blankenship ’18 [Brian; Then PhD Candidate, now Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington; 2018; "Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances"; Columbia University; https://www.proquest.com/openview/661c7c6284955ee055ca12745326b485/1?cbl=18750&pq-origsite=gscholar; Accessed 7-5-2022; AW] Great power patrons frequently reassure allies of their protection, whether by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, or making public statements. In the case of the United States, observers and practitioners alike have emphasized the need to instill confidence in U.S. allies. However, allied reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it gives away a key source of bargaining leverage: the threat of abandonment. Patrons should ideally strive to limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to allies, lest they encourage allies to free-ride on their protection and contribute little to the common defense. Existing literature tends to either treat reassurance as a secondary effect of deterrence, or to focus on understanding how patrons can reassure their allies rather than why. Studies that do provide explanations for reassurance, for their part, often regard reassurance as strategically suboptimal, and emphasize domestic political factors that drive reassurance. The causes of reassurance are thus poorly understood. I argue that although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies have the capacity to exit the alliance. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more reassurance it will receive. Patrons thus face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains with allies and reassuring allies to dissuade them from exiting the alliance. This dilemma may be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. These threats are more potent to the extent that a patron faces domestic pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments, and that allies face severe threat environments. I test the theory using a mixed-method approach that combines statistical analysis of an original dataset on American reassurance and allied burden-sharing between 1950 and 2010 with qualitative historical case studies. In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduce the concepts of alliance reassurance and burden-sharing and review the literature on both concepts. I argue that reassurance is puzzling in light of existing theories of alliance bargaining which stress the threat of abandonment as a source of leverage. The “reassurance dilemma” that patrons face, however, is that withholding reassurance may encourage allies to distance themselves from the alliance and seek outside options. In Chapter 3, I present a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances in order to identify the conditions under which this dilemma is most severe—and thus to explain variation in patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. I posit that reassurance serves the purpose of discouraging allies from leaving the alliance; the more credible allies’ threats of exit, the more reassurance they will receive. However, patrons can make their assurances conditional on allies’ burden-sharing efforts if their own threat of exiting the alliance is credible as well. I present a simple formal model illustrating both the tradeoffs between reassurance and burden-sharing, as well as the conditions under which patrons are more likely to reassure and allies are more likely to increase their contributions to the alliance. I then introduce hypotheses for testing the theory’s observable implications. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis on the determinants of patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. First, using an original dataset of U.S. reassurance collected and analyzed with automated text analysis, I use statistical models to identify correlates of U.S. willingness to offer reassurances. Second, I study allied burden-sharing using data on allies’ military spending, support for U.S. military bases, and participation in U.S. foreign military interventions. In Chapters 5-8, I conduct case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s. Process-tracing of these cases shows that the United States saw reassurance as a way of discouraging its allies from pursuing outside options—in particular nuclear weapons and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, the United States was simultaneously able to extract significant burden-sharing efforts, especially from West Germany and South Korea owing to their geographic vulnerability, and during the early 1970s due to doubts about U.S. reliability in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of the analysis, as well as a discussion of implications and avenues for future research. My findings suggest that by withholding reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on its protection, a patron makes its allies prone to reconsidering their reliance on it and to instead pursue outside options. Say yes—alliance contribution rating is politically palatable and encourages effective European defense Martin et al. 17, *Garret Martin is a Professorial Lecturer at the School of International Service of American University. He specializes in transatlantic security, NATO, the European Union and E.U. foreign policy. *Balazs Martonffy formerly served as a civilian defense official in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, working on NATO policy and transatlantic security issues. He is currently pursuing his doctorate in international relations at American University in Washington, D.C. (May 19th, 2017, “Abandon the 2 Percent Obsession: A New Rating for Pulling Your Weight in NATO”, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/abandon-the-2-percent-obsession-a-new-rating-for-pulling-your-weight-in-nato/) These alternative proposals and metrics are a start, but they present their own set of problems. Where von der Leyen’s idea lacks in precision, Ischinger’s suggestion would downplay the importance of building adequate military capabilities. Intense political horse-trading likely played as much as a role as pure military considerations when it came to choosing the internal metrics, and those do not completely address all of NATO’s core tasks. The input/output metrics remain, in any case, essentially classified, aside from a few exceptions like Denmark. In other words, the search for a better metric to replace the 2 percent guideline continues. From our standpoint, any credible alternative should a) be simple and intelligible, b) provide a more nuanced assessment of the contribution of states to NATO’s three core tasks, and c) be politically acceptable. Our proposal starts from the assumption that no single metric is sufficient to capture allied member states’ contributions to NATO, and complex ones, such as Ischinger’s, have failed to gather political momentum. We suggest instead a composite metric as a solution: the Alliance Contribution Rating. This rating, similar to the credit assessment used by Moody’s and others in the financial world, would provide a differentiated and nuanced picture of each state’s contributions to NATO. We argue that all three of NATO’s core tasks laid out in the alliance’s current Strategic Concept — collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security — are “mission critical” at any given moment. Collective defense, enshrined in the Washington Treaty’s Article 5, encapsulates the idea that an attack on one member state is an attack on all allies, and remains the cornerstone of NATO. Another of NATO’s fundamental security tasks, crisis management, involves political and military tools the alliance employs in response to a wide range of crises globally. Finally, the third core task, cooperative security, advocates for the alliance to take a proactive stance toward anticipating changes in the international security environment, working mainly through partnership programs with other countries and organizations. For the rating, states would receive a grade on each of NATO’s core tasks, ranging from A through F, with the final rating forming a three-letter grade. This rating system is still a work in progress and one that would need to be fine-tuned. But we believe that this system would be politically palatable because member states prioritize the three core tasks for NATO very differently. As such, individual member states could showcase the part of the rating they care about, and hopefully do well on, while still allowing for the broader metric to be useful for NATO as an organization. Furthermore, this rating system allows NATO to clearly identify areas where member states can focus to improve their contributions to the alliance. This rating also provides a snapshot in time of alliance contribution by a specific member state. If the priorities of the alliance shift, the indicators used for the ratings could change, while keeping the rating system consistent. Each of the three parts of the rating would rely on a number of independent indicators, some already in use, some novel, to measure performance for allied member states. These indicators would be then weighted and combined to form one part of the letter grade for the rating. The indicators for each of the three core tasks could include the following: Collective Defense Grade Rating This part of the rating centers on a member state’s mainly passive contributions to NATO’s collective defense tasks. It measures how much an ally spends, but also how well they do so, because not all defense spending is created equal. In our view, collective defense contributions must reflect an allied military’s robustness, readiness, and preparedness for the future, along with the political will necessary for sustained defense spending. Even so, not all spending is captured in the defense budget. Participating in programs that are central to NATO’s defense and deterrence also are important. Possible indicators we suggest for this part are: Percentage of a member state’s GDP spent on defense, Proportion of defense spending committed to major equipment, including research and development (both of these are in line with NATO’s Wales Declaration), and A qualitative assessment of a member state’s passive contributions to collective defense, including, but not limited to: hosting NATO bases or Force Integration Units; participating in NATO’s nuclear deterrence through assets or the nuclear-sharing program; and taking part in NATO-the-organization’s capabilities, for example NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Force or the Alliance Ground Surveillance System. Crisis Management Grade Rating In the post-Cold War security environment, NATO is no longer only interested in maintaining a defense deterrent, as missions and crisis management form a second and important role the alliance has taken on. We are attempting to determine to what degree a member state is capable of taking part in missions if the need arises along with whether it actually does so, as capacity itself is not the same as intent and implementation. Moreover, sustaining these alliance contributions to crisis management functions is vital as well, thus our indicators include a control for time commitment. The indicators we propose for this core task are the following: The ratio of mission-ready, deployable assets that a member state possesses, The ratio of these deployable assets that are actually deployed in NATO missions (these two metrics form part of NATO’s internal input/output metrics as land forces/sea vessels/airframes), The proportion of NATO missions an allied state contributes to, and The number of years in total a member state has spent participating in NATO missions, accounting for years of membership in the alliance. Cooperative Security Grade Rating Finally, NATO does more than deter conflict through passive resource commitments and manage crises through active mission participation. The alliance is also committed to fostering cooperative security through actively anticipating changes in the security environment. Our metrics here measure individual member states’ involvement in inter-NATO anticipation processes, such as exercises, and peri-NATO activities, including confidence and security building measures. Our proposed metrics are the following: Proportion of NATO exercises a member state has taken part in, A qualitative assessment of member state future planning activities, such as hosting NATO Centers of Excellence and other Allied Command Transformation contributions, and A qualitative assessment of member state contributions to NATO’s partnership initiatives, such as the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative or the Partnership for Peace, or to NATO’s defense capacity building efforts. It took 18 years for NATO, once it committed to building a new headquarters, to follow through and complete the project. Let us hope that it will not take so long for NATO to find an alternative to the 2 percent guideline, once it decides to shed that flawed metric. That deters war with Russia and China—lack of burden sharing exploits US inability to respond to a two-front war Binnendijk et al 22 (Hans Binnendijk, Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council; Daniel S. Hamilton, Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe; Alexander Vershbow Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council Former NATO Deputy Secretary General (2012-16), Assistant Secretary of Defense (2009-12) and US Ambassador to NATO, Russia and South Korea. “Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense” 6/24/22 https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/) Taken together, these developments underscore the need for Europe and the United States to find a new path forward. Europe’s long-standing aspiration to develop more effective ways to act militarily is now intersecting with the long-standing U.S. aspiration that Europeans shoulder more of the common burden. Stated simply, Europe has wanted autonomy without providing adequate defense resources, while the United States has wanted greater European defense contributions without diminishing NATO and U.S. political influence. Now it is time to unite these two debates and find a new balance for both. As Europe grapples with new and complex strategic realities, it can no longer afford its excessive reliance on the United States, either for collective defense or for crisis management and cooperative security missions beyond Europe’s borders. The U.S. will have to pay increasing attention to China and limit its involvement in the wider Middle East. The United States will therefore increasingly look to European allies to shoulder more of the common burden and encourage greater contributions to security by the European Union.[8] Of course, European allies have already shouldered considerable burdens in the context of the war in Ukraine. They have been coping with the quickest and largest flow of displaced people in Europe since World War II. They have ramped up economic assistance to Ukraine, and are likely to take on the lion’s share of the eventual task of recovery and reconstruction. They are managing an historic effort to wean themselves off their dependence on Russian energy. Many European allies have also stepped up their defense investments considerably in the wake of Russia’s renewed aggression, with Germany the most dramatic example in establishing a special 100 billion euro fund to upgrade its armed forces and finally committing to meet the 2%-of-GDP goal that allies set after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. In the short term, much of these funds are needed to address immediate issues related to Ukraine or to simply replenish depleted European militaries. Longer-term, however, these pledges of enhanced spending must be tied to clear and ambitious goals. Over the next decade, the trans-Atlantic partners must rebalance their relationship so that Europe assumes greater strategic responsibility, even as both parties work to reinforce the trans-Atlantic link. Setting the goal of a rebalanced partnership would move the United States and its European allies and partners beyond contentious arguments over burden-sharing and embrace Europe’s longstanding ambition to play a larger role in its own defense, while sidestepping semantic sideshows over the meaning of “strategic autonomy.” Advancing greater European strategic responsibility starts by defining the concept in a way designed to strengthen the Atlantic alliance. It should focus on two military goals: The first should be to enhance the European allies’ conventional military capabilities to a level that would provide half of the forces and capabilities, including the strategic enablers, required for deterrence and collective defense against major-power aggression. Should a conflict simultaneously break out with China in Asia and Russia in Europe, the United States may not be able to deploy adequate reinforcements to Europe. European allies need to be able to pick up the slack. The second goal should be to develop European capabilities to conduct crisis management operations in Europe’s neighborhood without today’s heavy reliance on U.S. enablers such as strategic lift, refueling, and C4ISR. The EU’s goal in its Strategic Compass released in March of this year of developing the capacity to generate an “intervention force” of 5,000 individuals who could deploy beyond EU boundaries is a small yet useful start. Meeting these two goals would allow Europe to become the first responder to most crises in its neighborhood, acting through NATO, through the EU, or through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. It would permit the United States to shift some of its forces and strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region without any significant reduction in the capabilities needed to deter Russia. Given Russia’s poor initial showing during its 2022 assault on Ukraine, some may believe that Russia is weaker than expected, that its strength will be sapped by the war, and that stronger European defense is therefore not needed. This would be a dangerous conclusion. Despite Moscow’s missteps, the Russian military will be able to re
Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.