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2022 Michigan Affirmative

Aff - Biotech - Packet - Michigan 7 2022

Aff - Biotech - Packet - Michigan 7 2022.docx

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Aff – Biotech – Starter Packet
1AC
1AC – Dual-Use
Meta-analysis shows scientific certainty of the dual-use threat.
Cummings '21 [Christopher L., Kaitlin M. Volk, Anna A. Ulanova, Do Thuy Uyen Ha Lam & Pei Rou Ng, “Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, pp 13–36]
Dual Use
was the most frequently mentioned threat, appearing in half of the analyzed articles. Dual use research of concern is defined as “life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technology that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, material, or national security,” (Lev and Samimian-Darash 2014). DiEuliis and Giordano (2018) further state that “any tool that imparts great capability also involves at least some risk, if not threat, that the power conferred by such capacity can be used to leverage or evoke a variety of ends.” This is at the center of the concern over dual use research. The majority of biotechnology research and modernization is legitimate and done with the goal of benefiting society – that is, to beneficial ends. However, the same knowledge and techniques gained from beneficial research can be used maliciously. For instance, CRISPR-Cas9 is being used to perform targeted gene editing as a treatment for cancer, increasing our ability to treat cancer and reducing our reliance on toxic chemotherapy drugs, but it could also be used to edit pathogens to increase their virulence. Indeed, the dual use applications and threats from CRISPR are prominently featured in the literature (Vogel and Ouagrham-Gormley 2018; Webber et al. 2015).
Much of the controversial dual use research in biotechnology involves gain of function (GOF) studies, a term used in 12% of articles. Duprex et al. (2014) considers GOF to be a “generic label for a broad class of experiments that lead to a genetically altered biological agent with new or enhanced functions.” Much of the concern over GOF studies includes research on the avian influenza virus and relatives of the smallpox virus (Evans et al. 2015; Duprex et al. 2014). These studies conferred new traits to the virus that increased its virulence in order to study transmission or vaccine creation, but also have a clear application for biological weapon (bioweapon) development. In this way, they are both GOF and dual use research. Publishing these sorts of studies is considered a biosecurity threat of its own because the information could allow a nefarious actor to create a bioweapon when they otherwise wouldn’t have had the knowledge to do so. We refer to this threat as “information access” and it is mentioned in 9% of articles. DiEuliss and Gronvall (20) touch on this threat while writing about the controversial publication of a study that synthesized horsepox from scratch. They state that “horsepox is not a significant disease for humans, but there is concern that publication of these experiments could lower barriers toward the synthesis and booting up of another orthopoxvirus, variola (smallpox) virus, which was a significant scourge in history.”
Scenario 1 is bioweapons.
Terror groups are trying to get them.
Langer '20 - Scoville Fellow working with Michael Nelson in the Technology and International Affairs Program [Ronit and Shruti Sharma, Nov 20, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/20/blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity-pub-83252]
SECURITY THREATS
Recent advances in synthetic biology, a technology that can be used to artificially create organisms in labs, carry the foreboding potential to develop biological weapons. Moreover, the emergence of the DIY community and the open-source nature of this movement have sparked concerns that terrorists could easily acquire the information needed to weaponize biotechnology, although none of these DIY groups have exhibited any nefarious intentions. Nefarious actors who previously acquired pathogens from a lab or from nature with the intention of developing a bioweapon can now either order DNA fragments online and assemble them to create dangerous pathogens or synthesize lethal pathogens from scratch using genomic information available online. Moreover, such actors can leverage vulnerabilities in the cyber defenses of labs and private companies to gain access to sensitive information that is not publicly available online.
To better understand the security threats emerging from recent developments in biotechnology, it is worthwhile to return to the aforementioned hypothetical Ebola scenario. Imagine for a moment that the researchers involved, in collaboration with an editor at an esteemed journal, decided that they would publish a redacted version of the methods and the results section of their research due to security concerns. A month after the paper was published, the lab noticed unusual activity on their servers. The lab immediately reported the incident to the university’s information technology department. The department contacted local law enforcement officials, and together they traced the hack to a suspected terrorist organization. The group was trying to gain access to the methodology that led to the accidental creation of a more virulent Ebola strain so as to launch a deliberate biological attack. Law enforcement put DNA synthesis companies on high alert for any orders that closely aligned with research on the Ebola virus or other high-risk pathogens. Thankfully, a company was able to flag an order and law enforcement was able to cooperate with local officials to shut down the unauthorized lab before it began creating and releasing harmful products.
In reality, individuals have at times tried to acquire deadly pathogens and other sensitive biological information. For example, two Canadians were arrested in the city of Buffalo, New York in 1984 after they were suspected of illegally acquiring and smuggling strains of botulism and tetanus to Canada. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo made unsuccessful attempts in 1995 to acquire strains of Ebola from Central Africa to develop the group’s biological weapons program. More recently, two Chinese hackers were indicted in the United States for seeking to obtain intellectual property related to coronavirus treatments and vaccines. Similar incidents were reported in Spain; allegedly Chinese hackers were trying to steal data from Spanish labs conducting vaccine research.
In addition to strategically embedding members into research organizations to acquire these deadly pathogens, some terrorist organizations also have sought to rely on lab insiders to either develop biological weapons or grant access to organisms or sensitive information. For example, a Malaysian scientist tried to develop anthrax weapons for Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda.
While most countries have national guidelines for handling safety and security threats, the examples described above highlight the global implications of such threats. It is therefore important to evaluate global best practices, treaties, and conventions that deal with such risks and devise strategies to update these safeguards to govern dual-use applications of emerging biotechnologies.
Biotech is inevitable, we need to understand it to prevent bio-attacks.
Trump '21 – PhD, a research social scientist for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and served as a Strategic Planner and public health subject-matter expert for FEMA Region 1’s Data Analytics Task Force [Benjamin D, Marie-Valentie Florin, Edward Perkins, and Igor Linkov," Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, p. 1-2]
Synthetic biology uses engineering-based modeling and building techniques to modify existing organisms and microbes or to construct them from scratch. The rate of development and research related to synthetic biology for both industry and academia has increased over the past two decades (Ahteensuu 2017), with applications in medicine (new vaccines, delivery of therapeutics, and treatments), energy (biofuels), environmental remediation, food production, and general industry (detergents, adhesives, perfumes) (Evans and Selgelid 2015; Gronvall 2015).
While synthetic biology heralds advances in these fields, its techniques could also be adapted for malicious purposes and used by terrorist organizations, rogue actors, or hostile nations to create dangerous pathogens, invasive organisms, or other disruptive biological agents (Yeh et al. 2012). Such potential makes synthetic biology a dual-use research area of concern (DURC) since the same techniques can be used to benefit or harm people, animals, environments, or nations (Getz and Dellaire 2018). Indeed, there have been 35 confirmed cases of biological weapons deployment between 1970 and 2014 (Franconi et al. 2018). Thus far, the use of advanced biotechnologies for weapons production has mostly been pursued by state-actors. However, synthetic biological weapons are expected to become a larger concern as the field advances and they become increasingly adopted by malicious sub-state or non-state actors (Gronvall 2018).
Synthetic biology raises the possibility that pathogenic bioweapons could be designed, developed, and deployed in new ways that diverge from the disease causing characteristics of naturally occurring pathogens (NAS 2018). Traditionally, only known pathogens found naturally in the environment, such as B. anthracis and Y. pestis, were developed as biological weapons because of the inherent infectious characteristics that readily enabled such organisms to serve as weapons. However, as synthetic biology continues to expand its capabilities to create and modify biological weapons, there is an increasing need for biosafety and biosecurity assurances for humans, animals, plants, and the environment. To cope with threats arising from synthetic biology’s dual-use nature, biosecurity is needed to prevent, detect, and determine the source of biological attacks.
Biological weapons created from synthetic biology represent a new and unique threat space. Potential threats from synthetic biology include increased pathogen transmissibility between and within species in addition to resistance to established treatments. Synthetic biology can be used to engineer normally benign microbes that produce toxic biological compounds or re-build extinct or hard-to-obtain pathogens from scratch (NAS 2018). The main biotechnologies of concern in the near future (over the course of the next decade or so) are projected to be oligonucleotide synthesis, DNA assembly (assembling multiple smaller fragments of oligonucleotides into the desired larger sequence), and genetic modification (editing, deleting, and inserting desired sequences into targeted sites of a genome). Harm may also arise through the purposeful use of these techniques to disrupt human and environmental systems. Malevolent use, but also negligent use (misuse) of synthetic biology techniques, require two circumstances: (a) the spread of information, techniques, or knowhow to utilize synthetic biology’s enabling technologies for irresponsible or nefarious purposes (“information hazard”), and (b) the ability to use such knowledge and tools to generate and disseminate harmful engineered organisms to vulnerable recipients. Creating effective biosecurity procedures and policies to protect humans, agriculture, technology, and the environment from such nefarious usages (or accidental or negligent damage from misuse) will require understanding the current state of synthetic biology. This includes knowing the platforms and technologies available for manipulation or construction (e.g., viruses, microbes, multi-cellular organisms, or cell-free systems) and planning for the future as the field overcomes identified bottlenecks or roadblocks. Biosecurity will require developing screening mechanisms for synthetic pathogens and biological attacks, as well as methods to assess how a synthetic pathogen could be dispersed during an attack, identify what the potential targets of the attack are, and identify who developed the bioweapon.
Bioterror causes extinction and is likely.
Pedersen ‘17—Pepperdine University [Christian, “Reflecting Back on the Ebola Outbreak and the Future of Bioterrorism,” Pepperdine Policy Review: Vol. 9, dml]
Terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) have expressed interested, and have even attempted, to use biological agents in terror plots (Biodefense, 2016). The technical and administrative knowledge of biology and chemistry can be acquired globally in medical schools, research programs, and laboratories, making it difficult to prevent potential practitioners of bioterrorism from acquiring the required scientific knowledge (Chiodo, 2015). While at one time the ability to mutate strands was restricted to advanced research laboratories, rudimentary high school laboratories now have the ability to develop deadly biological agents (Garrett, 2012). With relative easy, terror groups could engineer the flu virus, making it deadlier (Selk, 2017). By combining traits of multiple strains and maximizing the virus’ natural properties, it could become highly transmittable (Farmer, 2107). Genetically engineered viruses have the potential to kill more people than nuclear weapons, governments remain underprepared for that threat (Selk, 2017).
Terrorists could be drawn to the use of biological agents because of the difficulty of detection and the ease at which some biological agents can naturally spread through a population (Bioterrorism, 2006). There are essentially three ways which agents could be acquired by terrorist: they could be stolen, created in laboratory environments, or collected naturally. A gloomy reality is that as the advancement of new technologies reduce the costs of genetic sequencing, it will become easier and less expensive to create novel organisms (Garrett, 2012). Bioterrorist attacks can be planned to induce maximum damage and panic with a minimum risk of early detection. Potential agents of attack are categorized by risk (rated as an, A, B, or a C) depending on the agent’s availability, ease of dissemination and transmission, and potential impact (Bioterrorism, 2006). Category A agents are considered the most dangerous and threatening to National Security. Ebola is categorized as a Category A bioagent because of its ability to cause mass panic and disruption and the special public health actions required for treating those infected.
Through the EVD, “mother nature has created the perfect bioweapon” (Thiessen, 2014). Following the Paris terrorist attacks, the French have warned that terrorist organizations may attempt to steal biological agents (Talent & Graham, 2016). The British Ministry of Defense feared terrorists would try to acquire EVD and released a report outlining three separate scenarios in which terror groups could successfully weaponize the virus. (Quinn, 2015) These could be stolen from research facilities, laboratories, or government stockpiles. While the more exotic and devastating agents (such as small pox) must be cultivated in laboratory environments and are therefore more difficult to obtain, many biological agents are naturally occurring (Gottron, 2002). Examples of these naturally occurring, and easier to obtain agents include: human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the hepatitis strands, yellow fever, and the Ebola virus (Gottron, 2002). Moreover, the Ebola virus is native to a continent where terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State are active (Thiessen, 2014). The 21-day incubation period allows potential jihadists more than enough time to infect themselves, then travel to infected population centers, developing the means of mass distribution (Thiessen, 2014).
In June 2001 – months prior to the September 11th attack in New York – Dark Winter, a senior level wargame, was run in conjunction with security think tanks and government agencies to simulate government responses to acts of bioterrorism (Dark Winter). The simulation demonstrated how a biological terror attack could result in mass civilian casualties, civil disorder, institutional breakdown and lack of faith in government – compromising national security (Dark Winter). Major challenges for policymakers included the many “fault lines” which existed between governmental agencies, the levels of government, private healthcare systems, and the public (Dark Winter). Breakdowns in centralized leadership and communication could threaten containment and control. It was revealed that the healthcare system in the United States had no surge abilities to prevent hospitals from becoming overwhelmed or to meet the heightened demand for vaccinations (Dark Winter). Finally, targeted communications and information management was recognized as a challenge, both in working with the media and in disseminating important information (Dark Winter). It became very clear after the exercise that the United States was unprepared for an act of bioterrorism. In 2010, nearly ten years after the Dark Winter exercise, a commission created to evaluate the national emergency response capabilities gave the nation a failing grade on its ability to respond to a bioterrorist threat (O’Grady, 2015).
Scenario 2 is biodiversity.
Biotechnology can either be used to save biodiversity or save it – it is a question of bioethics and regulation.
Gutmann '18 -President of the University of Pennsylvania and Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Professor of Communication [Amy and Jonthan D Moreno, Apr 16, "Keep CRISPR Safe," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-04-16/keep-crispr-safe]
The goal of a gene drive is to spread or suppress certain genes in a wild population of organisms. It works by exploiting a quirk of nature. In sexually reproducing species, most genes have a 50 percent chance of being passed from parent to child, as offspring receive half their genes from each parent. As a result, genetic mutations normally spread only if they make an organism more likely to survive or breed. But some genes have evolved mechanisms that give them better than 50 percent odds of being passed on. That allows changes in those genes to proliferate quickly even if they have no effect on evolutionary fitness. Scientists can exploit this tendency by using CRISPR to insert genetic material into the “selfish” part of an organism’s genome, ensuring that the new trait will be passed on to most offspring, eventually spreading through large populations.
This process could be exploited both to improve public health and to promote economic development. Scientists could use gene drives to break disease transmission chains, eliminating the need to use costly and harmful insecticides. For example, researchers are looking at using the technology to inhibit the transmission of Lyme bacteria from mice to ticks, a move that could wipe out Lyme disease among humans, since humans can catch the disease only from tick bites. In agriculture, gene drives could immunize plants against many kinds of pathogens and curb or eliminate populations of invasive animals, such as mice, that destroy crops. Researchers are working to develop a house mouse that can give birth only to male offspring. If the altered mice were released into the wild, female mice would gradually disappear and the species would die off within the area in which the altered mice were introduced.
Gene drives could also reverse some worrying environmental trends. Many amphib

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