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2022 Michigan Evidence

AT - Democracy QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

AT - Democracy QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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AFFIRMATIVE
solvency – general
conditioning fails
Conditioning assistance rarely changes behavior
Stephen Tankel, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017 “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-improve-return-investment-security-assistance, (accessed 5-24-2022)
Wielding influence and securing tactical cooperation is the second. This may translate into trading assistance for access to bases, airspace, or other transit routes. The United States sometimes uses assistance to incentivize short-term tactical cooperation against shared threats. In other cases, assistance is intended to reassure allies and partners of America’s commitment to its security, either in general or against common enemies. Here it is worth noting that plans to slash the State Department’s budget and cut foreign assistance compound concerns about U.S. abandonment and further reduce American influence. Finally, the United States has tried, often without success, to use assistance as a lever to shape a recipient’s behavior either domestically or internationally. Some U.S. objectives overlap with one another. Others conflict. And lest we forget, our partners also get a vote. American objectives for security assistance often do not align with theirs, due in large part to differences in how the United States and a recipient prioritize and perceive threats. The number of different objectives at play complicates efforts to condition assistance; enforcing conditions to achieve one set of objectives could hamper efforts to achieve another set. For example, after the Bahraini government’s security forces launched a major crackdown on protesters during the Arab uprisings, the United States temporarily restricted arms sales to the country. Some members of the Obama administration also argued for placing conditions on security assistance. Others worried that this would undermine Bahrain’s support for U.S. basing and access, which is important for Afghanistan, Iran deterrence, and counterterrorism operations. As a result of competing priorities, the United States often chooses not to condition assistance, as was the case with Bahrain, or attempts to do so in an ad hoc manner. Worst of all, the United States sometimes imposes conditions, but then blinks first and backs down when they are not met.
Countries will not allow intrusive monitoring
Andrew Boutton, assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida, 2018 “POLICY ROUNDTABLE: THE PROS AND CONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-Future-of-Security-Assistance-PDF.pdf, (accessed 5-24-2022)
Positive conditionality requires the United States to verify the efforts undertaken by the partner government, which in turn necessitates more intrusive monitoring. Many countries will balk at this as a violation of sovereignty, but the United States should insist upon it as a condition of military assistance. A larger presence will not only enable better monitoring of the host government’s coup-proofing actions, but may also mitigate the internal security dilemma that drives such behavior. The worst paranoid excesses of the Maliki regime did not occur until after 2011, when the United States was no longer present on the ground as a safety net protecting his regime.
Positive conditionality fails because recipients pretend success
Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015 “The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)
Negative conditionality is generally criticized to be ineffective because sanctions imposed as a result of conditionality might hit the poor instead of the targeted government25 and the recipient country’s government might easily find access to alternative funding resources. In contrast, the application of positive conditionality is much less contested in the critical discussion. The EU’s enlargement strategy is generally used as a clear example of the effectiveness of positive conditionality to boost the democratic space in the Eastern European countries. In fact, the desirability of EU membership appears to have prompted candidate countries to adhere to a host of conditions contained in the so-called Acquis Communautaire. Yet, there are still problems with the way EU uses positive conditionality: it does not always deliver the incentives promised (extra aid, for example), or at least it does not deliver them quickly. Governments may even pretend progress without actually achieving a policy change.26
uneven enforcement
Uneven enforcement [holding some allies accountable, but not others] damages broader democratic cred
Barone 22, MA in Public Management @ JHU (John, “A PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISION OF THE LEAHY LAWS TO ALIGN HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY COOPERATION POLICIES WITH NATIONAL STRATEGY,” https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/66912/Barone-Capstone%20Project-2022.pdf?sequence=1)//BB
Enforcement of human rights initiatives will often damage relations when the US finds that a foreign partner has violated them and then imposes military aid restrictions or sanctions on the guilty units or nations. The issue is compounded when the US does not hold states equally accountable to the US code on foreign aid and policy standards. Until recently, many US embassies did not share vetting results with partner nations, despite legal requirements to share the data with the host nation to avoid damaging relationships.2 As of 2017, the DOS publishes an annual list of suspended units on its website.3 This year, an advisor to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh disclosed that the country is debating whether it should follow procedures established by the Leahy Laws that would remediate Bangladeshi units sanctioned from receiving aid, noting that Bangladesh would then go to the PRC for support. The advisor identified inconsistencies in how the US administered its human rights policies to close allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.4 The US must stand up for human rights abroad but must evenly enforce a policy that does not damage relations, ultimately preventing the US from influencing partners to adhere to human rights concepts.
solvency – say no
backlash – general
Conditional aid on human rights is counterproductive – causes retaliation from partner nations
Allendoerfer 10 – Michelle Giacobbe Allendoerfer, assistance professor of political science at George Washington University, program coordinator of International Politics at the Women’s Leadership Program at George Washington University, Ph.D. in philosophy in political science at the University of Michigan, M.A. in political science at the University of Michigan, B.A. in political science and international relations at Carleton College (“When Do Human Rights Matter? Finding a Place for Human Rights in Foreign Policy”, University of Michigan Doctoral Dissertation, https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/78938/mallendo_1.pdf?sequence=1) FGY
3.4 At What Cost? The Salience of Donor-Recipient Relations
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) assert that leaders use foreign aid to buy policy concessions. Further, they argue that the salience of these policy concessions is one key determinant of whether a donor provides aid to a potential recipient and, if aid is provided, how much aid is allocated. I argue that donors consider the salience of these concessions when deciding whether to punish human rights violators. If a donor decides to punish a potential recipient by withholding or reducing aid, the opportunity cost of such action is losing the policy concession. I expect, therefore, that as the value of the concessions increases, the probability that a donor decides to punish a violator decreases. 27 I conceptualize the salience of policy concessions using two dimensions: security and economic ties. 3.4.1 Security Ties Many scholars place national security at the top of any list of foreign policy goals (c.f. Morgenthau 1951; Waltz 1979; Kennan 1985). It would be too idealistic to assume that human rights concerns can trump national security concerns in making foreign policy. In fact, punishing human rights violators may be counterproductive to security goals. For example, violators may respond to being punished by retaliating in such a way that hurts the donor’s national security interests. For example, a recipient may restrict donor access to military bases or air space. In a 1979 lecture on foreign policy and human rights, Morgenthau states: We have a great interest in continuing the normalization of our relations with mainland China, and for this reason we are not going to hurt her feelings. On the other hand South Korea is an ally of the United States, it is attributed a considerable military importance, and so we are not going to do anything to harm those relations. (Morgenthau 1979: 7). Another example of the strategic importance of foreign aid lies in Cold War foreign policy. In particular, western donors were concerned that cutting foreign aid could precipitate a fall to communism. For example, the United States used its foreign aid program during the Cold War to prop rightist regimes in the western hemisphere to contain communism (c.f. Carleton & Stohl 1986; Apodaca & Stohl 1999; Regan 1995). In addition, foreign aid often directly or indirectly supported repressive regimes over leftist opposition (Regan 1995). In these cases, cutting aid would have clear negative implications for the donor’s strategic interests. Morgenthau’s concern – and he is not alone (c.f. Gillies 1996) – is that criticizing or punishing a human rights violator would very likely harm relations with that country and, in turn, the soured relationships could hurt the strategic or material interests of the donor. When donors use foreign aid to punish human rights violators, that foreign aid cannot be used to buy important policy concessions. This represents the opportunity cost for using foreign aid as a punishment tool. If a donor has an interest in buying a policy concession from a recipient, then it is unlikely to manipulate its aid policy to punish human rights violations when, instead, it needs to provide aid to buy the policy concession. One way to conceptualize the strategic importance of potential donors is security alignment. Donors are more inclined to buy policy concessions from states with which they are closely aligned than enemies. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) find that “recipients who are moderately aligned with the donor receive the most aid” (331). If security alignment signifies the presence of important policy concessions, then it follows that close allies are unlikely to be punished for human rights violations because these countries can offer the donor valuable policy concessions. For example, until the mid1970s, the United States consistently turned a blind eye to rights violations by South American dictators with whom the U.S. was allied. Hypothesis 1: Donors are less likely to punish recipients as the strategic alignment between them increase, all else equal.
The counterplan promotes backlash, which undermines alliance solidarity
Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, 2021
“NATO Should Finally Take its Values Seriously,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/, (accessed 6-1-2022)
Admittedly, pursuing a tougher course of action on values and principles comes with risks. Even measured steps could create serious rifts among allies, with the potential of paralyzing the alliance. Because NATO operates by consensus, any punitive action on an ally could provoke retaliatory action on other NATO business. In reaction to Norway’s stark criticisms against the Portuguese and Greek regimes at a June 1971 foreign ministers meeting, then-NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio warned that “if we undermine our solidarity, we run the risk of undermining the substance of our alliance.” Overcoming this dilemma between prioritizing values and preserving unity requires a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach. First, NATO will need to be proportionate when dealing with an ally violating trans-Atlantic values. Allies should start with discussions behind closed doors rather than publicize the dispute. Open and frank dialogue among allies should always be the first step before adopting restrictive measures. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks being counterproductive by widening divisions in the alliance. At the end of the day, this progressive approach should have a deterrent effect on NATO countries, especially on those that value their membership in the alliance and do not want to be singled out as “bad allies.”
Countries can’t easily democratize in response to political conditionality
Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015
“The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)
Finally, the one-model-fits-all approach commonly used by the EU in the application of political conditionality limits the effectiveness of conditionality policy and can no longer be used. Indeed, in the context of democratizing a country, several factors might infuence the outcome other than just the willingness of the government. These include the presence or absence of a strong opposition and civil society, the degree of development of the country, the socio-economic situation in the country, and the country’s history.80 The complexity of these intervening factors clearly indicates that a countrybased democracy promotion’s approach appears a must in order to enhance the effectiveness of political aid as an instrument of democracy promotion in SSA. A great step has been made in this sense by the EU in the revised CPA (in 2010), where more attention is given to flexibility and to the individual circumstances of each ACP country.
Strategic interests, not human rights, should guide US policy
Oleg Svet, PhD and Defense Analyst, 2017
“When Pushing Democracy On Others Backfires,” The American Conservative, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/when-pushing-democracy-on-others-backfires/, (accessed 6-2-2022)
In her July 13 op-ed in Foreign Affairs, “How U.S. Officials Can Craft Innovative Human Rights Policy,” former Ambassador Sarah Mendelson recalls her work as a senior, politically-appointed foreign policy official in the Obama administration. Her personal mission, as she recalls, was to “elevate human rights”–first within USAID, and later when she worked for the US Mission to the United Nations. Her initiatives to promote civil society and human rights within small powers such as post-Ben Ali Tunisia are admirable. However, her implicit suggestion that we ought to elevate human rights in our relations with great powers such as China and Russia is strategically incorrect. Our country’s policies vis-a-vis great powers (and to some extent medium powers, such as Turkey) must be guided, first and foremost, by a grand strategy rooted in our strategic interests, not one that aims to reflect our values.
--- gwinn rehighlgiht
Conditioning fails – delays critical cooperation with partner countries, causes Russia and China to fill in – we’re green
“security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably
Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/) FGY
Hard Is Not Impossible
These failings notwithstanding, there exists no shortage of arguments in favor of the status quo and against shifting America’s focus in security assistance to security-sector reform and conditional aid. In an era of great-power competition, Russia, China, or regional competitors may simply step in to fill the gap with the partner nation if the United States insists upon unwelcome reforms in exchange for aid. I know this is a valid concern because I have sat in meetings where partners made thinly veiled reference to other nations which may provide assistance if the United States is unable or unwilling. Still, the quality and technological edge of U.S. kit and the total-package approach which includes training and follow-on support do provide the United States a competitive advantage. But the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for delivering aid is far too slow and, as a result, is a liability. To outcompete, the security assistance enterprise itself requires major reform to shorten typical lead times from years to months. The Pentagon and State Department need the agility to turn aid on and off like a switch or rheostat.
Another argument against placing preconditions on security assistance is that the stakes are too high to deny a partner a critical capability while waiting for reform to happen. This is the “we can’t let them fail” mentality. It is also valid — but only in certain crisis situations where aid is needed immediately, and reform truly cannot wait. Ukraine today is a good example. Rather than ceasing aid writ large until a condition is met, place conditions on discrete packages of aid. The intent should be to provide sufficient incentive to the host-nation government to modify behavior, not threaten national survival. During the years I spent in Afghanistan, the security threats faced by the government never appeared to afford the breathing space to withhold aid while institutional reform took place. In hindsight, doing so may have required coalition forces to carry a greater operational burden while the Afghan forces sorted themselves out, but it also would have been worth it. As the events of August 2021 demonstrated, 20 years of unconditional capacity-building built shockingly little capacity. Implementing this change requires a recurring review of Defense Department-led train and equip programs to determine which truly qualify as crisis situations. Those which do not should be moved under State Department control for more deliberate, reform-focused approach.
There is also the simple argument that instituting meaningful reform in a recalcitrant partner nation is hard. This is true. But hard is not impossible. The security assistance enterprise should approach reform not in broad, sweeping terms but incremental steps. Rather than requiring the partner to eliminate corruption wholesale across the security forces, perhaps require that a particularly corrupt commander be removed before providing assistance to that unit. In the case of Iraq in the late 2000s, the United States might have required Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to fire certain commanders guilty of sectarian excesses or modify the personnel policy to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive. In other cases, reform measures may be as mundane as switching to an electronic pay system to reduce the opportunity for graft. Such a change in approach would also require

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