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2022 Michigan Counterplan

CP - OSCE - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJK

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OSCE CP
Thanks to Pairie Koh for her great work on this file
OFF
1NC – OSCE CP
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should
OSCE solves – they can regulate new emerging technologies
Liechtenstein 19 [Stephanie Liechtenstein, 03-25-2019, “Regulating new military technologies,” Security and Human Rights Monitor, https://www.shrmonitor.org/regulating-new-military-technologies/]\\pairie
New technologies have reached the military realm and their possible impact is beginning to cause a headache for governments and military experts alike. Discussions are currently focused on four areas: lethal autonomous weapons, or so-called ‘killer robots’, biotechnologies, cyber weapons, and new missile technology.
For most of these technologies, there are no international rules in place.
This comes amid a general crisis of the international arms control regime, caused by the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the potential ramifications this could have on the extension of the New START Treaty, which expires in 2021. Some experts already speak of a complete breakdown of the arms control regime and warn of a general militarization of international relations.
“We must find solutions for the technological challenges of tomorrow. In a nutshell, we must rethink arms control,” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said in his opening speech of a high-level arms control conference at the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on 15 March, bringing together 450 diplomats and experts.
By hosting this conference, Germany is at the forefront of an initiative to discuss the impact of new technologies on future warfare and on arms control. “We are of the opinion that a new start can only succeed if we work side by side – parliamentarians and government representatives, as well as think tanks, researchers, military experts and industry representatives,” Maas said in Berlin.
Margot Wallström, the Swedish Foreign Minister, and Stef Blok, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, came to Berlin to support Germany in this endeavour. The three foreign ministers issued a joint declaration in which they stressed the “utmost importance that we now analyse closely potential negative and positive effects of new technologies, and identify the need for further regulation and new arms control arrangements in order to maintain international peace and stability”.
Killer robots
One major issue of concern are lethal autonomous weapons (or killer robots) that attack targets without human intervention. Such weapons systems are particularly prone to manipulation and miscalculation, thus increasing the risk of accidental wars. One example are kamikaze drones that attack targets without a human taking the decision.
Ethical considerations are also a major issue of concern, as there are currently no rules who can be held responsible for an act of aggression if there is no human decision or control behind. This point was also underlined in a study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, presented on the margins of the conference: “From an ethical perspective, lethal autonomous weapons systems are particularly problematic with regard to human dignity, because robots do not understand what it means to kill a human being”.
Discussions are currently ongoing at the United Nations in Geneva within an expert group, with Germany and France hoping to make tangible progress. “We are committed to this in Geneva right now, and we want to make progress here this year. We want to enshrine the principle of effective human control over all lethal weapons systems at the international level, thereby taking a major step towards the global prohibition of fully autonomous weapons,” Maas emphasised in his opening speech in Berlin.
Germany and France are faced with two additional groups of states in Geneva. “One group of 28 states, among them Austria, wants an immediate ban for all autonomous weapons systems, agreed in an international treaty. Another group of states is opposed to this, among them the U.S., Russia, Israel and Australia, as they prefer to continue developing such systems,” explains Dr. Frank Sauer, senior researcher at the Bundeswehr University Munich.
Biotechnologies
Biological weapons as such are not new, however new technologies make them more dangerous. According to a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on the occasion of the Berlin conference, “the convergence of developments in biotechnology with other, emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing [3-D printing], artificial intelligence and robotics has increased the possibilities for the development and use of biological weapons”.
“Each of these technologies could, in its own way, facilitate the development, production and use of biological weapons, and make them more dangerous,” said Kolja Brockmann, Researcher at SIPRI and lead author of the report.
“The increased use of robots in laboratories could lead to significant gains in productivity during the design-build-test cycle of biological weapons, while artificial intelligence could be used to find new ways to optimize the transmissibility or virulence of a biological agent,” Dr. Vincent Boulanin, Senior Researcher at SIPRI on emerging technologies, added.
The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the main treaty governing biological arms control, is “ill-equipped to comprehensively address these risks”, experts from SIPRI warn in the report.
Governments are particularly concerned about the misuse of biological weapons by terrorists and other non-state actors. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas therefore announced in Berlin that “the Federal Government will therefore work to establish a permanent body of experts and scientists under the umbrella of the Biological Weapons Convention – one that clearly identifies risks and informs and advises states as to them”.
Cyber weapons
Rapid developments in the cyber sector have also reached the military realm. Cyber warfare is already happening, with states or non-state actors attacking another state’s IT infrastructure, or other important infrastructure such as banking system, through the use of computer viruses or other malware.
“Identifying the responsible party behind malicious cyber incidents is a necessary prerequisite for holding these actors accountable, but there are many challenges that accompany cyber attribution,” experts from the RAND corporation stated in January.
Foreign Minister Maas called for “universal behavioural norms and standards in cyberspace” in his speech and also made reference to efforts within the OSCE, the only international organisation that has agreed on politically-binding confidence-building measures for the cyber space.
Hypersonic missiles
New technologies have also found their way into missile systems. One of the main concerns here are hypersonic missiles, capable of flight at speeds of Mach 5 and above as they leave very little time for humans to react.
“The fact that we’re not just talking about science fiction here is demonstrated by Russia’s announcement that the first Avangard systems will be entering service this year,” Foreign Minister Maas said in Berlin.
As worldwide concern is growing about these new developments, Maas seized the opportunity of the conference in Berlin “to establish an international missiles dialogue that takes into account both the challenges posed by new technologies and the dangers of their proliferation”.
A role for the OSCE?
Arms control remains an important part of the global security architecture. The expert conference in Berlin showed that the arms control regime needs to evolve to adapt to changes not only in the political and strategic spheres, but also taking into account rapid technological changes.
The OSCE, as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, could be used in this endeavour as a platform to exchange information on new military technologies and thus build confidence and increase transparency and predictability. The regular military doctrines seminars could be a first starting point.
Counterplan revitalizes OSCE effectiveness by refocusing the organizations and legitimizing its approach
Levinger 18 [Matthew Levinger, 03-2018, “Forging Consensus for Atrocity Prevention: Assessing the Record for the OSCE,” <<Matthew is a Research Professor of International Affairs & Director of the National Security Studies Program @ the George Washington University>>, Genocide Studies and Prevention An International Journal, Volume 11, Issue 3 Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention: Theory, Practice and the State of the Field, Article 9]\\pairie
The Path Forward: Building Cooperative Capacity for Atrocity Prevention In an October 2016 interview, OSCE General Secretary Lamberto Zannier observed that “the OSCE as a security organization is facing a very complicated environment,” because of the “return of geopolitics” involving “divisions in Europe that we haven’t seen in a long time,” aggravated by global challenges including terrorism along with migration stemming from violent conflicts and the effects of climate change. Zannier observed: As the OSCE was built in a divided environment to bridge the gulf between opposing sides, today the convergence of all these problems is eroding the effectiveness of the tools that were created at that time. So we are facing a situation where we may have more division, and the tools that we developed to address the problems coming with the divisions are not functioning… as well as they were. So engagement, creating a space of dialogue in spite of the differences and the bitter debates… remains the key task for all of us.42 In the bitter aftermath of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, where the Russian intelligence services allegedly sought to undermine the campaign of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton in order to tip the result to Republican candidate Donald Trump, such constructive dialogue has become more challenging than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Having long complained of Western meddling in Russia’s “near abroad” through democracy promotion initiatives and support for the “Color Revolutions,” the Putin regime has effectively turned the tables on its Western counterparts. Russia is alleged to have “cultivated an opaque web of economic and political patronage” throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe,43 as well as to have forged connections with right-wing parties in Western Europe including the UKIP in Britain and the National Front in France.44 The heated accusations of ill will on both sides have further narrowed the already constricted avenues for cooperation between the OSCE’s Eastern and Western participating States. As one scholar has written, the OSCE is “par excellence, a ‘soft security’ institution with extremely few material resources at its disposal.” Unlike other regional organizations such as the EU and NATO, the OSCE cannot exercise coercive power by imposing economic sanctions or threatening the use of military force. Nor, in the current geopolitical environment, can it credibly offer material rewards such as the prospect of EU membership, which served as a powerful incentive for cooperation by the Baltic governments in the 1990s. The effectiveness of the OSCE depends on its ability to “use its moral authority as a principled organization and its limited amount of cultural capital (e.g. technical expertise) to exercise symbolic power.”45 In the current polarized international security environment in Eurasia, it is increasingly difficult for the OSCE to assert universally recognized moral authority. During the 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE took shape as a dialogue process between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a period of high international tension and distrust, which eased temporarily during the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. To some degree, the rising frictions between the Russian Federation and its Western counterparts have returned Europe full circle to the geopolitical atmosphere that surrounded the CSCE’s founding. Even in an inhospitable geopolitical context, the OSCE can make several valuable contributions to protecting civilians threatened by violent conflict in Eurasia: conflict prevention, crisis management, cooperative problem-solving, and the promotion of norms favoring peaceful coexistence of diverse ethnic and national groups. The remainder of this essay will address each of these aspects of the OSCE’s work in turn. Conflict Prevention. During the recent period of rising tensions between the Eastern and Western factions of the OSCE, a number of efforts have been made to bridge this geopolitical divide and develop more constructive strategies for mitigating threats of violent conflict. In 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for a new European security dialogue to discuss post-Cold War security arrangements.46 In 2009, the Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE launched a series of dialogues known as the “Corfu Process,” which sought “to strengthen the Organization’s responsiveness to conflict in all its phases,” including “early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and postconflict rehabilitation.”47 These dialogues culminated in 2011, under the OSCE’s Lithuanian Chairmanship, in Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, which affirmed “the Organization’s commitment to revisiting its approaches to conflict prevention and conflict resolution for the twenty-first century.”48 Among other things, Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 called for the establishment of a systematic conflict early warning system and a more robust mediationsupport capacity. Unfortunately, there has been limited practical follow-through on many of its recommendations.49 Crisis Management. Some of the most intractable conflicts in the OSCE region—e.g. those in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh—are located in areas on the periphery of the Russian Federation where Russia has a strong vested interest in the outcome. Given the OSCE’s lack of material instruments of leverage, the organization is unlikely to be able to successfully mediate such conflicts that have become locked into a “security competition” frame. Nonetheless, it can help contain violence by focusing international attention on events in the conflict zones, monitoring developments, and providing early warning of potential escalation. The presence of an OSCE field mission or visits by the HCNM may also provide channels of communication between leaders of rival groups, which may help keep a lid on violence even in the absence of a formal settlement. In Ukraine, for example, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has tracked the living conditions of the 1.8 million IDPs from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine since 2014, offering recommendations for how the government of Ukraine and international donors can meet the needs of IDPs and enhance relations between IDPs and host communities.50 The SMM issues daily spot reports on security conditions in Eastern Ukraine, monitoring compliance with the Minsk ceasefire agreements, and “engages with authorities at all levels, as well as civil society, ethnic and religious groups and local communities to facilitate dialogue on the ground.”51 Astrid Thors, who served as High Commissioner on National Minorities from 2013 through 2016, also engaged in efforts to “facilitate a dialogue between national minorities and the Ukrainian authorities on issues of common concern.” For example, she co-hosted a 2016 roundtable in Kyiv on “Strengthening the Institutional Framework Related to Inter-ethnic Relations in Ukraine in the Context of Decentralization.” Asserting that “improved policies in the field of inter-ethnic relations would help to consolidate Ukrainian society and would increase stability in the country as a whole,” the HCNM has worked to provide a platform for Russian and other minority communities in Ukraine to express concerns about the protection of their language and cultural identities.52 In less geopolitically sensitive regions, such as Central Asia and the Balkan states, the OSCE may have greater potential for robust conflict prevention and crisis response—but its record in achieving this potential has been uneven. For example, in May and June 2010, HCNM Knut Vollebaek issued urgent warnings to the OSCE Permanent Council on the risk of interethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan, asserting that the situation represented “one of the OSCE’s biggest challenges since the 2008 war in the Caucasus.”53 When violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in southern Kyrgyzstan that June, however, the OSCE Permanent Council displayed no appetite for a robust response. In the words of one commentator, “The lack of collective will by the participating States and the Kyrgyz interim government’s inability to take substantial steps in managing the conflict in Kyrgyzstan significantly curbed the OSCE’s room for maneuver.”54 Cooperative Problem-Solving. Even in geopolitically contested settings where a comprehensive settlement remains elusive, the OSCE may be able to promote incremental progress toward peaceful coexistence of rival groups. For example, in Georgia, where the OSCE field mission was closed down on Russia’s insistence in 2008, the HCNM has “encouraged the effective implementation of the State Strategy for Civic Equality and Integration for 2015-2020 and Its Action Plan,” and has “continued to support a project to facilitate interaction between the political parties in the country and national minority representatives, including by bringing them together to discuss topical issues on televised talk shows.”55 In Moldova, High Commissioner Thors worked with the parliament to establish a “joint working group with members of parliament and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia” to improve “the functioning of the Gagauz autonomy,” and she has worked with the OSCE Mission to Moldova to address cultural and linguistic issues surrounding the status of Transdniestria.56 Thors also remained engaged in addressing issues related to citizenship rights, political representation of ethnic minorities, and protection of minority languages in a wide range of other countries including Kyrgyzstan, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hezegovina, Macedonia, Hungary, and Slovakia.57 Norm Promotion. Over the past twenty years, the OSCE has issued a number of statements of principles regarding the protection of minority rights, including the Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (2008), and the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (2012).58 In documents such as the Charter for European Security, adopted at the Istanbul summit of 1999, it has also reaffirmed its commitment to “preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible” and “to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction.”59 Beyond affirming these principles related to human security, the OSCE has sought to memorialize its operational approach to conflict prevention in documents including “The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security” (2009) and the Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (2011).60 Scholars disagree about the efficacy of the OSCE’s efforts to transform norms governing relations among diverse ethnic groups in Eurasia. Some observers, such as Wolfgang Zellner, have argued that the HCNM has been relatively successful in “de-securitizing” relationships between states and minority groups by “introducing international minority rights standards as the frame of reference for majority, minority and kin-States.” The HCNM, Zellner asserts, has facilitated 

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