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2022 Michigan Affirmative

Aff - PGMs 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

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Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR
Thanks to Archan Sen and Kevin Lai for their work on this file. Please contact khirn10@gmail.com with any questions or concerns
Case
*1AC---Russia Revisionist
Russia is revisionist – only deterrence solves.
Charalambides 6-26 [Yiannos Charalambides, doctorate and head of Ledra College’s International Relations department, 6-26-2022. “A Russian Revisionist Strategy on the Rise?”, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2022.2076303. DOA: 07-02-2022 //ArchanSen]
The better we understand why Russia intends to increase its geopolitical and geostrategic position and role in the regional arena, the better we can realize why and how the Russian revisionist policy has been developing since 2008, from Europe to the Middle East, via the Caucasus region. Since 2008: a) Russia prevented NATO’s expansionist policy through the wars in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine. Russia returned stridently to the international arena; b) Russia has consolidated its position as a leading and dominant power in the Caucasus region; c) It took action in the Middle East and defended its strategic interests in Syria.
Moscow uses all the necessary factors available to realize its revisionist strategy. Such factors are:
Military strength. The first level is that of a preventive strategy. The second is that of the Russian aim to consolidate its strategy either with force—as occurred in the cases of Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Ukraine—or in the shadow of its power.
Gas and oil. Russia uses the pipelines like ‘energy divisions’ to serve its interests and increase its political influence over states and governments.
Technology. Russia combined conventional and cyber techniques and tactics in the wars that it led from 2008. Its conventional military forces include sophisticated weapons such as the missile systems of S-300 and S-400 and the hypersonic missiles (3M22 Zircon) that combined with its extended cyberwar capabilities provide Russia with the chance to attenuate the advantage that the US holds in the sea due to its tremendous war fleet power. 41
Historical and imperial Russian consciousness.42 Moscow has an imperial identity and consciousness, military power, national resources and a pivotal geopolitical position in the core of the Heartland. By combining these factors, Moscow fuels its political machine to accomplish its strategic missions and targets.
Russian minorities existing in other states are used by the Kremlin as strategic instruments to achieve its national goals. This phenomenon is evident in the cases of Crimea and Ukraine. Minorities also exist in the Baltic States and other countries, which emerged in the regional system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this specific issue of minorities takes wider and more complicated dimensions. It is also relevant to political and legal motives and the right to self-determination, the exercise of which depends on conflicting and convergent national interests of the parties involved as well as the uniqueness of each case. Moreover, humanity experienced tragic implications when Adolf Hitler exploited the Sudeten Germans as a strategic instrument to occupy Czechoslovakia paving the way for the Second World War. It is not a new strategic practice. Therefore, history repeats itself because the feeling of national integration cannot be easily suppressed.
The lack of an adequate European and American preventive strategy is a quasi-ally of Russia which pursues to restructure the international system and promote its revisionist strategy. The American and European expansionist policy offered Russia the pretext to put forward a preventive and then a revisionist policy in Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Ukraine. Moscow seized the opportunity to make its case by accusing the US and NATO of following an aggressive strategy that put Russian security at stake. While Russia argues that it is in defence, at the same time, it promotes its revisionist, even belligerent strategy, which partially induces a redistribution of power and the restructuring of the regional and international system in line with its hegemonic strategic goals.43 Whether this policy will be successful and to what extent, is something that only time can show. The War on Ukraine seems to be a cornerstone for the future structural changes in Europe and worldwide. Russia pursues to raise itself as a game-changer. The relevant question is the following: What structural changes the Russo-Ukrainian War could bring about?
*Russia revisionist.
Natsios 22 [Andrew S. Natsios, Former Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, 02-17-2022. “Putin’s New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?” https://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/195461/natsiosPutins%20New%20Russia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. DOA: 07-02-2022 //ArchanSen]
Putin has positioned himself and Russia as a culturally and religiously conservative alternative to western secular liberal democracies. This world view is described in Project Russia which is a curious, if alarming, collection of essays published in five-volumes as a semi- official government publication that describes the political ideology of the State, the Orthodox Church’s religious vision, geographic determinism, and social analysis shared by Putin and his circle of oligarchs who rule Russia. These essays form a strange amalgam of anti-democratic, reactionary, ultra-nationalist attacks on western democratic values, combined with an unhealthy dose of conspiracy theories, paranoia, xenophobia, and a defense of autocratic government and dictatorship.18 One view of Project Russia is that its publication simply reflects Putin’s understanding as a former KGB agent that a great power must have an ideology to defeat and undermine its rivals in propaganda battles. But a more sinister and alarming view is that the five volumes are Putin’s blue print for Russia’s grand strategy, evidence of a revisionist power seeking to overthrow the existing international order. If this interpretation of Project Russia is correct, it suggests a greater level of future conflict with the western democracies and international institutions. If Project Russia is a blue print and not just a propaganda tool, the risk of an accidental global conflagration between Russia and the NATO alliance is a real, even if less than likely, possibility.
Vladimir Putin must find ways of explaining to the Russian people why the country is so far behind the western democracies, as did his predecessors in the Soviet Union. Putin continues to pursue the Soviet strategy of keeping the memory of World War II alive to stir up Russian nationalism among the population but also as an explanation for Russia’s underdevelopment. The evidence suggests that this strategy faces increasing hurdles. Russia’s epic and very real sacrifices during World War II no longer have much resonance with the younger generation, who know little about the war, and the older generation, who tire of a war 70 years ago being used to explain Russian inability to match Western living standards today. Thus, what had been a powerful historical experience of collective suffering and sacrifice during World War II, has now become a fading memory which lacks the magnetic power it held over the Russian people during the Cold War.19
Undoubtedly, one of the motivations behind Putin’s attempt to regain Russia’s lost stature in the world, expand its sphere of influence, attack western democratic institutions, and annex the territory of its neighbors is driven by a need to avenge the supposed “secret conspiracy” among the Western democracies to collapse of the Soviet empire and humiliate Mother Russia.20 The Russian electronic media and Project Russia continue to propagate this and other conspiracy theories. The Russian government’s arming of the Taliban, reported by U.S. intelligence sources and by CNN, may be a response to U.S. military intervention in Syria against the Assad Government, an ally of Russia, but it could also be payback for the CIA’s arming of the Mujahideen fighting against the Russian military in Afghanistan during the 1980’s.21 Some in the Reagan Administration saws the arming of the Mujahideen as U.S. payback for Soviet support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.
Some of the history of the Cold War certainly involved the arming of U.S. and Russian client states against each other, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 U.S. policy changed to one of facilitating the integration of Russia into the international system and its conversion into a democratic capitalist system. Both the U.S. and Europe spent billions of aid dollars in programs in Russia from 1991 to 2012 to support these political and economic reforms. If they intended to destroy Russia, why would they have made these large investments? It is also the case that President George H.W. Bush went to great lengths to avoid dancing on the grave of the Soviet empire as it collapsed in order to avoid giving fodder to Mikhail Gorbachev’s critics.
*Russia revisionist.
Malmgren 6-3 [Harald Malmgren, 6-3-2022, "Putin's war is just beginning", UnHerd, https://unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]
Putin talked at length about the historic tragedy of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also added that the Soviet Bloc was the wrong model for what Russia needed. He made an impassioned explanation that what Russia really needed was a new Peter the Great. He talked almost lovingly about Peter’s attempts to upgrade Russia’s institutions and education system from 1682 to 1725. He argued that after the total collapse of the USSR, it had become necessary to rebuild a Greater Russia under the leadership of a new version of Peter.
Peter, he told me, had set in motion the magnificent strengthening of Russia completed by Catherine the Great: the establishment of Novorossiya, or Imperial Russia, spanning all of the Baltic Sea, the Nordics and Poland, as well as the peoples and nations to the west and to the south to the Azov and Black Sea. He then made it clear he did not think the Soviet Bloc was the right model to achieve this, and what he longed for was a return of Imperial Russia, not Soviet Russia.
Reflecting on this early interaction with this clearly ambitious young man, I was reminded of Putin’s path from being Deputy Mayor of St Petersburg to serving under President Yeltsin in Moscow. In 1996 Yeltsin asked the Mayor of St. Petersburg, Professor Sobchak, to come to Moscow and lead the drafting of a new Constitution for the new Republic of Russia. Sobchak asked his protégé, Putin, to come along.
In Moscow, Yevgeny Primakov, Yeltsin’s Prime Minister, had been known for years as “the Soviet Union’s Kissinger”. I had known him since the Eighties. It was he who first introduced me to Putin in 1992 as a man likely to be important in Russia’s future. Primakov initially appointed Putin as head of the FSB, but soon after asked him to take on the more comprehensive role of Secretary of the State Security Council, effectively placing him in charge of shaping the new Russian Republic’s foreign policy. It was said at the time that Primakov’s proposal filled Putin with a noticeable ecstasy, that fate had gifted him with the opportunity to live his dream of reshaping Russian history.
Never one to shy away from an opportunity, Putin immersed himself in every aspect of Russia’s standing in the world. He did, however, pay particular attention to the potential for nuclear weapons to intimidate other nations. He published a new doctrine of nuclear threats, known as “Escalate to Deescalate”. The public airing of this doctrine was meant to show that he was seriously considering selective use of nuclear weapons not only inside Ukraine but in future conflicts with Baltic Sea neighbours.
By 1999, the time had come for Yeltsin to step down. A new constitution had been approved, and Russia was ready for a new leader. Several candidates appeared, but Sobchak, father of the constitution, and Putin, the man designated to deal with foreign leaders, emerged as favourites. I recently asked people who were there at the time how the competition was resolved, and was told Sobchak made the choice. He said he was an academic, but not a man who would be good at managing a nation. He admitted he thought “Vlad” was a man of action, just what Russia needed at that moment. So Putin was appointed Prime Minister, and four months later elected President.
This elevation was extraordinary. To Putin, who dreamed of a return to Imperial Russia, it must have felt like fate had chosen him to be a second incarnation of Peter the Great — a 21st-century Tsar, or even Emperor. This self-perception may well have led him to embrace Xi Jinping, the other self-perceived 21st-century Emperor.
1AC---New Baltics Cards
Baltics invasion is coming within the year – Russia views it as an easy dub.
Grady 6-16 [John Grady, editor of Navy Times, retired director of communications for the United States Army, 6-16-2022, "Baltic States Need More NATO Forces to Deter a Russian Invasion, Says Estonian Official", USNI News, https://news.usni.org/2022/06/16/baltic-states-need-more-nato-forces-to-deter-a-russian-invasion-says-estonian-official, DOA: 6-30-2022 //ArchanSen]
Despite the Kremlin’s heavy losses in invading Ukraine, the Russians are “going to come back stronger” in a year or so to threaten the Baltics, Estonian Ministry of Defence Permanent Secretary said on Thursday.
Speaking at a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment event, Kusti Salm said that even given Moscow’s rising number of casualties, destruction of armored forces and depletion of precision-guided weapons, the Kremlin can still mass fires as it is showing in fighting in eastern and southern Ukraine.
He called NATO’s “trip-wire” strategy and even its “forward presence” in limited numbers obsolete in light of Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.
Because the Baltic nations are on Russian borders and small, they could be quickly overwhelmed in a full-scale Russian invasion.
“Deterrence by denial,” Salm said Wednesday, cannot be achieved by a battalion of NATO troops in his country or any other Baltic member of the alliance. He called it “a joke” that “the second largest nuclear nation would be deterred by a battalion.” The presence “has to be at the divisional level” to “be able to project power across the Russian border.”
Squo ammunitions aren’t enough.
Emmott 6-15 [Robin Emmott, 6-15-2022, "The Baltic states want more NATO. They won't get all they seek", Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltic-states-want-more-nato-they-wont-get-all-they-seek-2022-06-15/, DOA: 6-30-2022 //ArchanSen]
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of combat-ready NATO forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid.
It will not happen, interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show.
This is partly because the proposals come as the NATO alliance faces a slew of demands not seen in decades: from countering Russia and China in the Arctic to quelling Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel, and tackling new frontiers in space.
Since Russia invaded, the U.S. Congress has approved extra funds and the Pentagon sent F-35 stealth fighters, as well as attack helicopters, to Estonia; Britain doubled its force presence at Estonia's Tapa military base to around 1,700 personnel.
But for many people in the region, which has been occupied by both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and which lies within striking distance of a Russian garrison at St. Petersburg, that is not enough. For instance, 84.6% of Latvian respondents to a Benu Aptiekas/Gemius poll in May said they were highly anxious about Russia's invasion.
"The fact that we could be in danger, it's been on the table all the time," said Dzintra Bungs, 82, head of the Latvian Occupation Museum Association in Riga. "It is very important that we have woken up, and that all Europe awakes."
The Baltics, with a combined population of just over six million, want the alliance to boost its pre-Ukraine invasion presence of around 5,000 multinational soldiers by as much as tenfold, as well as adding air and maritime defences.
1AC---Ukraine
The tide has turned – Russia is going to win the war.
Davis 6-22 [Daniel Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army, 6-22-2022, "Russia May Win the War in Ukraine", 19FortyFive, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/06/russia-may-win-the-war-in-ukraine/, DOA: 7-4-2022 //ArchanSen]
On Sunday, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said “nobody knows” how long the Russian war in Ukraine might last, but, he added, “we need to be prepared for it to last years.” Retired Army General Jack Keane told a Fox & Friends audience on Monday that Ukraine had the ability, will, and troops to win the war. All they lacked, he claimed, “is the weapons to do it.”
The historical record and a growing mountain of evidence, however, suggest that such claims are unrealistically optimistic, as there is a growing possibility that the Ukrainian Army may be months away from losing the ability to defend the country.
If the two sides do not end the war through negotiations in the coming months, it is likely – not just possible – that Ukraine will lose the war.
It is time to strip off the rose-colored glasses much of the West has worn when looking at Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and acknowledge the cold, hard truth: the Russians are on course to win. The longer we traffic in the fiction that Ukraine still has a chance, the more Ukrainian civilians will be killed, the more cities will be destroyed, and the higher the probability that Russia seizes yet more territory before a negotiated settlement can end the fighting – potentially including Kyiv. You’d never know that, however, listening to high-ranking current and former officials in the West.
PMGs are key to get the upper hand.
Magnuson 6-15 [Stew Magnuson, 6-15-2022, "", No Publication, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]
Ukraine has a message it wants to convey to the U.S. defense industrial base and the government.
The war-torn nation desperately needs artillery and artillery rounds, but what can truly give it the upper hand over its Russian invaders are long-range precision weapons such as armed Predator drones, loitering munitions and the multiple launch rocket system.
Denys Sharapov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of the defense in charge of procurement, support for weapons and equipment, and Brig. Gen. Volodymyr Karpenko, land forces command logistics commander, spoke with National Defense Editor in Chief Stew Magnuson and other reporters through an interpreter in the Ukraine Ministry of Defense’s booth at the Eurosatory conference in Paris on June 15.
PGM sales on June 29th prove their effectiveness, thump every DA, but don’t solve the aff.
Schmitt and Ismay 7-1 [Eric Schmitt is a senior correspondent covering national security for The New York Times. John Ismay is a Pentagon correspondent in the Washington bureau, and previously served as the At War reporter covering armed conflict for The New York Times Magazine. 7-1-2022, "Advanced U.S. Arms Make a Mark in Ukraine War, Officials Say", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/01/us/politics/himars-weapons-ukraine.html, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]
The most advanced weapons that the United States has so far supplied Ukraine are making an impact in their first several days on the battlefield, destroying Russian ammunition depots and command centers, American and Ukrainian officials say.
Ukraine’s military had eagerly awaited the arrival of the first batch o

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