AT - Unilateral CPs - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
AT - Unilateral CPs - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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AFF Answers Cong Threats Answers 2AC – Solvency -- Congressional Threats Fail Congress is an illegitimate actor – structural problems destroy credibility. Mann and Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann is a 2012 FP Global Thinker and is a senior fellow at the Brookings institution and Norman Ornstein is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a weekly columnist at Roll Call, and co-author, with Thomas Mann of It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism, Norman Ornstein 12 [Thomas Mann, Norman Ornstein, 11-26-2012, Yes, Congress Is That Bad, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/26/yes-congress-is-that-bad/] Eric What has gone wrong? Two sources of dysfunction are central to the current impasse: The first is a mismatch between the checks and balances built into the U.S. system and the extreme polarization now separating the two major political parties. By constitutional design, U.S. policymaking moves slowly; the president cannot dictate what happens in Congress, and legislators use separate procedures in the House and Senate that then must be reconciled to write law. In the past, eventual compromise was the standard outcome, at least when some legislators worked across party lines. Not anymore. The Democratic and Republican parties have been moving apart ideologically since the 1970s, but in the past 10 years this has dramatically accelerated. For the first time in the more than three decades since National Journal began compiling vote ratings for the U.S. Senate, the tallies for the last Congress showed that there was not a single Democrat more conservative than the most liberal Republican; the center, in other words, cannot hold — because it has disappeared. Instead, American parties now resemble parliamentary parties: Party leaders crack the whip, and fewer members are willing to flout orders and compromise. The result: gridlock. The second major dysfunction has to do with the asymmetry of this polarization. The Republican Party has become the home of ideologically extreme insurgents who shun conventionally understood facts, evidence, and science, and scorn the very idea of working out compromises with a legitimate political opposition. This radicalized GOP is now willing to use all the levers in the constitutional system even if it means delay and deadlock. In a parliamentary system, a fiercely oppositional minority party is to be expected. In the American system, it cannot work. With the Republicans deciding to use the filibuster in the Senate as a routine tool of obstruction (they have resorted to the filibuster with a frequency in the last three years unprecedented in U.S. history), passing legislation now in effect requires not a majority but 60 votes out of 100. What’s more, any legislation that manages to pass under those conditions, taken without broad bipartisan consensus, divides the country and is seen by many as illegitimate or ill-advised. That is the story of Barack Obama’s first two years in office. Democrats, who were in charge of both the House and Senate, pushed through a wide range of measures from health-care reform to economic stimulus to financial regulation, but the minority made a concerted effort to delegitimize them. What came after was even worse: The 2010 midterm elections produced a divided-party government, genuine gridlock, and the least productive Congress in memory. This year saw the enactment of only 83 laws, a quarter of them naming post offices or making other symbolic acts. Of course, quality is more important than quantity (whatever else the famous "do-nothing" 80th Congress did, it passed the Marshall Plan). In the case of this 112th Congress, however, the quality is as abysmal as the quantity; the most significant public-policy action was the debacle surrounding the debt ceiling, which resulted in the first credit-rating downgrade in America’s history. Now, following that reckless hostage-taking of what should have been a standard legislative act, a totally unnecessary "fiscal cliff" looms, threatening another recession. The problems here are not redeemable with quick fixes because the divisions are tribal and the problems are as much cultural as structural. This lethal combination of forces has serious implications not just for America’s ability to solve its problems; it also poisons America’s standing in the world — its ability to project its values abroad, garner the trust and respect of allies, and serve as a role model for nascent democracies and a counterpoint to autocracies. Partisanship and the news cycle destroy effective threats. Warburg 21 [Gerry Warburg is a professor of practice of public policy at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, January 2021, “Congressional Accountability in Shaping United States Foreign Policies 1970-2020,” Center for Effective Policymaking, https://thelawmakers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Working-Paper-Congressional-Accountability-in-US-Foreign-Policy-1.pdf] Eric Research on this question, supplemented by interviews with leading policymakers, offer details that reveal how profoundly the policymaking environment has been altered.(30) First, there are ever fewer centrists elected to Congress from either major party, and those that remain find few electoral incentives for taking tough votes on international policy. Consequently, there are fewer Members prepared to place institutional prerogatives over partisan politics. In the late 1980s, there were a dozen liberal Republicans to ‘the left’ of conservative Democrats, often from southern states, and vice versa. In the last Congress, the most conservative senator in the Democratic caucus, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, was still ranked as more liberal than the most moderate Republican, Susan Collins of Maine.(31) Those who challenge party orthodoxy, or who reach across the political aisle to support a bipartisan compromise—or to defend the institutional prerogatives of Congress—are at greater risk of being defeated. As a consequence, Members of both parties have adopted a classic ‘blame avoidance’ strategy to dodge difficult votes while reserving the ability to blame the President for foreign initiatives gone awry.(32) In fact, several powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairmen have lost their re-election bids. The list includes William Fulbright of Arkansas, Frank Church of Idaho and Charles Percy of Illinois. Many incumbents now fear primary election challenges more than general elections. Primary voters defeated relative moderates such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) in 2010, while Trump critic Bob Corker, a popular Tennessee Republican retired unexpectedly in 2019. The muchnoted ‘sorting out’ of parties has significantly increased party-line voting while dis-incentivizing would-be champions of the institution of Congress.(33) This has occurred most notably on domestic issues such as health care—not a single Republican voted for Obamacare, even after Democrats accepted scores of GOP-sponsored amendments. Stimulus spending and tax cuts also became party-line votes in the House. Yet, it also happened on issues like the Iran nuclear pact, where Republicans voted en bloc against an agreement that had been supported by U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence leaders, five United Nations Security Council partners, including key European allies, as well as Russia and China. This party-line voting on security matters and the failure to defend institutional prerogatives “makes it easier for future administrations to just ignore the will of Congress,” Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) observes, “it means there’ll be less and less bipartisanship in defending Congress.(34) In this hyper-polarized legislative environment, bipartisan coalitions to sustain Washington’s international policy initiatives are very difficult to achieve. This harms U.S. national security interests. Former GOP Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen graphically describes the difficulty of passing even a routine State Department authorization in this environment: “The House Foreign Affairs Committee mark-up on the State Department funding bill suffered from dozens of amendments that were simply about social engineering and political messaging. When you try to bring a bill like that to the floor, with so many divisive social issues, you get a ‘No’ from leadership.”(35) Similarly, nonpartisan efforts to defend the institution of Congress have been weakened. As one former House leader and veteran appropriator, Vic Fazio of California, recently testified, “The job of the minority is now to make sure that the governing majority accomplishes little or nothing.”(36) A second factor in Capitol Hill’s decline has been the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the rise of social media. Both have made nuanced positioning on breaking foreign developments more difficult. Flip comments by inveterate Twitter users crowd out more thoughtful analysis. Hard line positions are rewarded by voters and locked in early by earned media coverage. The President of the United States boasted by Tweet in 2019 about nominating a poorly qualified, controversial Director of National Intelligence, then counting on the press to ‘vet’ him after the presidential announcement.(37) Legislators also spend far less time in Washington working together. Bipartisan CODELS (“congressional delegations”) making fact-finding missions overseas, have been cut back. In the Senate, leaders have doubled the number of committee assignments while reducing the number of substantive bills given consideration. Consequently, recent research has shown, that there is greater policy diversification and less specialization.(38) Legislators are increasingly generalists, fewer are specialists in foreign or defense policy. The development of policymaking expertise, especially in foreign policy, an area deemed of less interest to voters, is punished rather than rewarded. In addition, term limits on committee chairs—a reform initiative from decades past—has further reduced the development of expertise necessary to stand up to a unified executive branch front led by the President. A third factor is that the marquee foreign policymaking committees, panels that once wielded the power to check presidents, have themselves declined. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Exhibit A here. The committee was once a panel led by vigorous challengers to presidential authority. William Fulbright used it to build a national case against the Vietnam War expanded by his political ally, fellow southern Democrat Lyndon Johnson. Frank Church used the panel to build the case for nuclear arms control and the Panama Canal treaties, while checking CIA excesses. Republican Jesse Helms pressed from his leadership position on the panel to curb U.S. support for international organizations.(39) Such was the high esteem of the panel that Senator Jack Kennedy’s father, eager to prepare for the 1960 presidential contrast, implored then-Senate Majority Leader LBJ to grant his son a seat on the panel in the 1950s, blocking a more senior political rival, Estes Kefauver. In the last Congress, the committee was led by a quiet isolationist from Idaho, Jim Risch, who is not held in high regard by foreign policy experts on both sides of the aisle. The Senate panel that once seated Dick Lugar, John Kerry, Chuck Hagel and Barack Obama still attracts White House aspirants. Ted Cruz of Texas, Rand Paul of Kentucky, and Marco Rubio of Florida all joined the panel prior to their own presidential campaigns. But this panel, and its House counterpart, are now deemed by most legislators less desirable than in previous eras. The House committee still attracts some legislators committed to a strong institutional role for Congress. But it also has Members enamored of foreign travel and well-supported by interest groups with a stake in international matters. In the House, where Members face voters every two years and are more tied to parochial districts, getting Members to serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee has been a challenge for party leaders.(40) The reason why these two key authorizing committees have lost much of their luster and influence is clear: they rarely pass any significant legislation. In fact, few major committees of Congress act less on legislation. With no significant treaties coming before the Senate in the last decade, the Foreign Relations panel garners less public and press attention. With no authorization debates, it has legislative power over fewer funds and programs. In the void left by decades of failing to pass even an annual authorization bill for the State Department, the committees and their public education functions, even their champions and leaders concede, are less relevant.(41) Today the work of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees, which employ several dozen senior staff experts on bilateral relationships and regional security challenges, is often “eviscerated by four appropriations subcommittee clerks, who are not foreign policy experts,” as one veteran legislator laments.(42) It should be noted, this phenomenon obtains on most legislation, not just on national security matters. General Pressure Answers Pressure CP---Fails---Top Level Pressure fails---politics and self-interests. Andrea Gilli 17. Post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Analysis.” Washington Post. 2-3-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/03/europe-may-not-be-able-to-expand-its-defenses-like-president-trump-wants/?utm_term=.82d774c6d808 //EM 2) European countries pay more in defense overhead — All armed forces require military bases, training facilities, and administrative support. So in a continent with several small, national armed forces, overhead necessarily absorbs a higher fraction of resources than in the United States. A solution for Europe would be to share some military assets and functions. In recent years, there have been important bilateral and multilateral initiatives in this respect — but there are strong political limits as well. Countries have no guarantees their partners ultimately will support them in a military crisis. Thus, if sharing turns into a lock-in, countries run the risk of having access to fewer military capabilities than they might need. This explains why the width and depth of past initiatives have been generally limited. However, this comes at the cost of intra-alliance inefficiency and thus an inferior capacity to generate military capabilities. An E.U. Defense Union could address these problems, but efforts to set this up face many of the same challenges: Why should a country tie its destiny to others? How can it ensure that its interests will be respected? And what tangible benefits would it observe in the short term, beside loss of jobs and income, following base closures and defense industry consolidation? 3) Implementing defense cooperation in Europe won’t be easy — Some analysts think that by promoting cooperation among NATO allies, any U.S. retrenchment from Europe would help address existing problems, but there are strong reasons to be skeptical. With Europe’s limited funds to spend on defense, large cooperative projects will be difficult to launch. In the past, countries in Europe abandoned cooperative projects because of their negative domestic implications for jobs, technological know-how or military exports. In an age of austerity, amid a refugee crisis and high youth unemployment, this mind-set is unlikely to change anytime soon. And some countries may have little interest in cooperation. They may operate in completely different environments — Mediterranean vs. North Sea, for example. Or they perceive a different strategic threat at home — think Russia vs. the Islamic State. Some countries may even have a strategic interest in leaving unaddressed some capability gaps — to compel proximate allies to come to their defense. This was Finland’s military strategy during the Cold War. Pressure CP---Fails Threatening to cut-off aid pushes countries closer to Russia and fails to create concessions for the US. Jessica Trisko Darden 17. Assistant Professor of International Affairs at American University’s School of International Service and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “President Trump wants to pressure allies by cutting foreign aid. That never works.” Washington Post. 8-25-2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/25/president-trump-wants-to-pressure-allies-by-cutting-foreign-aid-that-never-works/ //EM In his speech this week on his plans for the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, President Trump said he will use the threat of withdrawing foreign aid to put pressure on Pakistan to better support the American mission. Despite proposing dramatic cuts to the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development budgets, the Trump administration still requested $740 million in foreign aid for Pakistan, so this threat carries significant weight. Then, just one day later, news broke that the State Department is withholding $195 million in military aid for Egypt and has revoked another $95 million in foreign aid, seeming proof that we are willing to use aid as leverage. But history shows that foreign aid is a poor way to get what we want. Threatening to cut off aid is almost certain to fail in bringing about political change in Egypt, Pakistan or any country that the United States has a strategic interest in supporting. U.S. foreign aid has long been held out as a carrot to reward countries that embrace democracy and free markets. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a foreign aid agency created under George W. Bush, awards funds only to countries that are undertaking liberal political and economic reforms. During the Cold War, increased aid was also offered as a potential reward to failing states such as El Salvador. During a visit there by then-Vice President George H.W. Bush at the height of the country’s civil war, El Salvador was promised a massive increase in military assistance in exchange for the removal of military leaders suspected of human rights abuses and greater restraint by the government-aligned “death squad terrorists” who had killed thousands. While death squad killings did decline, the lull in violence was short lived. According to Human Rights Watch, there were 1,900 political killings and disappearances in El Salvador only a year after Bush’s visit. Promises of aid didn’t stop the violence, but Congress still approved the Reagan administration’s $61.7 million aid request to resupply the Salvadoran military, which was apparently running out of bullets. The cutoff of aid has also been used as a stick — either threatened or enforced — to motivate countries to get back on track with U.S. objectives. In 2010, U.S. military aid to several Pakistani military units was cut as punishment for human rights abuses, including at least 300 extrajudicial executions in the Swat Valley. In a war for “hearts and minds,” killing civilians doesn’t help. But the Obama administration undermined the impact of the cuts by simultaneously negotiating a $2 billion counterterrorism package with Pakistan. The following year, the Obama administration suspended 40 percent of the $2 billion package in an attempt to secure greater cooperation from the Pakistani military in fighting against the Taliban — the very same thing Trump threatened. Why does aid fail to change governments’ behavior? One of the reasons is that we give most of our foreign aid to countries that are strategically important to the United States — nations like Egypt and Pakistan. We need their continued cooperation on a range of issues, and this ultimately limits the amount of pressure we can apply. Sometimes there are developments beyond o
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