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2022 Michigan Kritik

K - Final K Supplement - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS

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**Final Supplement – FMPS**
**Kritik Updates**
Rupture K Link – Pragmatism Swiss Army Knife
Embrace pragmatism – fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism are the most effective instruments to navigate both abstract theory and the political world. They’re compatible with revolutionary visions but defense misconceives pragmatism as a defense of actual pragmatists.
Jack Knight & James Johnson 11. Jack Knight is professor of political science and law at Duke University and the author of Institutions and Social Conflict. James Johnson is associate professor of political science at the University of Rochester and former editor of Perspectives on Politics. “The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism”. Princeton University Press 2011. 8/22/11. Chapter 2. 25-28. GJII
Pragmatism “narrowly conceived” is a philosophical view that consists of “a set of arguments about knowledge, meaning and truth.”1 That said, pragmatists are an unruly lot. They disagree among themselves about various philosophical and political issues.2 We are uninterested here in adjudicating these disputes. Our concern is less with policing pragmatism and its boundaries than with advancing a conception of democracy that derives considerable motivation from its pragmatist bearings but that will prove compelling whether or not one embraces pragmatism. We consequently distinguish between the general, relatively ambiguous concept of pragmatism and the particular conception of pragmatism that we endorse. In so doing, we embrace what Dewey calls “the pragmatic rule” which holds that “in order to discover the meaning of [an] idea ask for its consequences.”3 As we formulate and defend our conception of pragmatism, we are especially concerned with highlighting its consequences for thinking about political institutions in general and democratic political arrangements in particular.
Our characterization of pragmatism explicitly is reconstructive. We do not claim that this or that classical or contemporary pragmatist actually adopts a position of the sort we outline. We do, however, draw upon the resources that those classical and contemporary pragmatists offer as we formulate our own defensible pragmatist position. Our enterprise is distinctive in large part because other pragmatists either have not made the sorts of argument we advance, have derived different implications from positions we might share, or would resist the more general position that we reconstruct from particular arguments. We are, in any case, interested here less in engaging in a full-scale debate with these writers than in relying upon them, as foil or as warrant, for the conception that we reconstruct.
At the most abstract level, one might depict pragmatism as one variety of instrumentalism in that it conceives of beliefs, conceptions, theories, and so forth as tools humans use to navigate the natural and social world.4 This portrait, while perhaps accurate, is too general to be useful. In order to discern the consequences of pragmatism, we need a more fine-grained conception. Here we understand three commitments as central to pragmatism.
First, pragmatists are committed to fallibilism. 5 This commitment has two implications. It means that pragmatists recognize that even those beliefs about which we are most convinced may turn out to be false. It also means that whatever certainty we may attain requires that we actively organize experience in such a way that our beliefs are challenged.6 This requirement is not nearly so onerous as it might at first seem. In a sense, we have no other option. For pragmatists insist that the social and natural world is marked by considerable indeterminacy.7 As a result, individuals and groups necessarily will confront unforeseen contingencies that will challenge their ostensibly settled beliefs and judgments.8 Fallibilism simply requires that when faced with such problematic circumstances, we prove ready and willing to revise our beliefs should they prove mistaken or erroneous.
Second, pragmatists are committed to anti-skepticism. 9 While any of our beliefs may prove false, it is not possible for us to suppose that they all are false. As Peirce insists, “complete doubt” is impossible, a mere philosophical pretension. Peirce did, however, countenance the sort of “real and living doubt” that is generated by problems we encounter in experience and that prompts us to try to settle our beliefs. This is “real doubt” precisely insofar as we have reason to question our beliefs. For pragmatists, then, both doubt and belief must be justified.10
Finally, pragmatists are committed to consequentialism. This comes through clearly in the “pragmatic rule” just mentioned. There, Dewey distills the advice of Peirce, who urges pragmatists to “consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”11 The classical pragmatists arguably considered this advice to be general and took its relevance to the philosophical problems surrounding the concept of “truth” only as one specific instance of its broader applicability.12
Pragmatists also commonly endorse holism in the sense that they see beliefs and conceptions as forming interconnected, more or less coherent webs. This view applies to pragmatism itself. Fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism are themselves interrelated. Start with fallibilism. It is clear that if any of even our most confidently held beliefs might be false in the pragmatist sense of being useless or self-defeating, they also must be revisable. This raises the issue of what bounds, if any, constrain our ability to question and revise our beliefs. One temptation here is thoroughgoing skepticism or relativism.13 Pragmatists resist this temptation. Instead they embrace an anti-skeptical position that limits both the nature and scope of doubt. It is plausible to see this combination of theoretical commitments as among pragmatists’ unique intellectual contributions.14
Fallibilism and anti-skepticism each sustain the pragmatist commitment to consequentialism. Pragmatists see the social and natural world as fraught with contingency. As a result, even our most fundamental beliefs inevitably will be called into question and potentially proven false. What is important is how individuals and communities respond to the resulting tensions and strains, to the real doubt that unforeseen contingencies generate. Peirce famously identified several ways of settling beliefs—the methods of tenacity and of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science. And while he himself insisted that the majority of mankind would forever resolve doubt via the method of authority, he insisted that the experimentalism central to science afforded the surest way to fix or settle belief.15 For experimentation represents the most reliable way of generating solutions to problematic situations. And we assess the results of properly conducted experiments in terms of their actual or anticipated consequences. We take this commitment to be general in the sense that it applies, for example, not just to theoretical concepts, but to public policies and to social, economic, and political institutions as well.16
This claim may seem surprising, given the propensity of some prominent contemporary pragmatists to insist regularly and loudly that pragmatist philosophical commitments have no identifiable political consequences. Indeed, something of an odd, imperfect, and ultimately uncomfortable convergence has emerged on this point.17 Richard Posner, for instance, holds that “philosophical pragmatism . . . lacks any political valence and thus is equally compatible with reactionary and revolutionary social visions.”18 Similarly, Richard Rorty intones: “Philosophy and politics are not that tightly linked. There will always be room for a lot of philosophical disagreement between people who share the same politics, and for diametrically opposed political views among philosophers of the same school. In particular, there is no reason why a fascist could not be a pragmatist in the sense of agreeing with pretty much everything Dewey said about the nature of truth, knowledge, rationality and morality.”19 In what follows, we focus on the role that interpretations of the philosophy and politics of Martin Heidegger play in sustaining what we refer to as the Posner-Rorty consensus.
Rupture K Link – Ballot
Asking for the ballot is a double turn.
Rita Dhamoon 05. Professor at the Department of Political Science in the University of British Columbia. “Beyond Inclusion Politics: Reconstituting the Political Order”. 6/2/5. https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Dhamoon.pdf. GJII
Furthermore, inclusion discourses can potentially relativize and trivialize differences (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The CAPAR goes to some length to avoid this. It cites the Ethnic Diversity Survey which found that nearly 50 percent of Blacks reported discrimination or unfair treatment compared to 33 percent of South Asians and 33 percent of Chinese respondents (Heritage, 2005: 8); it acknowledges that in exploring “the different experiences of ethno-racial and ethno-cultural groups and to provide meaningful statistics on racism, race must be compared with other factors such as gender, age, education and income” (Heritage, 2005: 9); and it specifically identifies the value of intersectional analysis because of the particular “issues affecting Aboriginal women, racial minority women, and migrant, immigrant and refugee women” (Heritage, 2005: 27). Yet despite these measures, it is striking to note that the plan conflates racism with colonialism and anti-Semitism, thereby undermining the ability to address differences. Whilst the plan acknowledges particular kinds of experiences -- such as employment discrimination against ethnic groups, disproportionate numbers of Indigenous people in prisons, and attacks against Jewish synagogues -- it does not name these as racism, colonialism and anti-Semitism. Thus even though the plan lays out a working definition of racism (Heritage, 2005: 7-9), it fails to identify the differing forms of racialized, colonial and anti-Semitic experiences. This is important, for instance, because of the ways in which Indigenous people are addressed in the CAPAR without reference to historical and on-going colonial legislative acts that are racially oppressive, including for the example the Indian Act which continues to be used by the state to control status determination and band membership.4 Though Indigenous peoples are racialized in ways similar to people of colour through white supremacy, the attempted erasure of Indigenous bodies, knowledge, resources and land is distinct from the racism faced by people of colour in Canada. As Lee and Cardinal state, “By not recognizing hierarchies in categorical difference, strategies of inclusion contribute to the erasure of inequality by pluralizing differences and ignoring power and resource differentials” (Lee & Cardinal, 1998: 226). The role of power should be critical in any analysis of racialized, ethnic and/or cultural identities and relations, and yet is strangely neglected in the CAPAR. Instead, the plan articulates inclusion through a discourse of collective unity. One of the three objectives of the CAPAR is “to strengthen social cohesion through antiracism measures” (Heritage, 2005: 10). The conclusion reiterates this point in which it is stated that the priorities of the CAPAR “enhance the value of Canadian citizenship by strengthening our social bonds, and making our shared values more relevant to contemporary life in Canada” (Heritage, 2005: 56). In particular the plan highlights the role of Citizenship and Immigration Canada in integrating immigrants. Whilst the framing of integration presents ways to include otherwise excluded peoples, the discourse of inclusion masks the ways in which integration itself can be wrought with conformist and assimilationalist tendencies. Whilst the necessity to develop bonds of social cohesion and shared values and citizenship should be an important feature of the political order, mechanisms of inclusion can also potentially erase differences that some groups want to maintain. Many Indigenous leaders made this argument following the 1969 White Paper which suggested that erasing the requirement of status for Indians would bring this group of Indigenous people to the same level of citizenship as other Canadians. As Indigenous activist and scholar Harold Cardinal (1969) argued shortly after the White Paper was published, while First Nations people have historically been excluded because of their status they also depend on their legal status as ‘Indians’ to assert treaty rights and make claims of self-determination.5 Inclusionary goals, in other words, presume that integration is desirable but without fully accounting for the fine line between integration and assimilation. That is not to say that the CAPAR promotes a model of forced assimilation. Rather, the plan expresses the desire for inclusion through what Richard Day calls ‘seductive integration’ (2000: 9). Day argues that dominant groups create a society in which excluded Others are implicitly seduced into dominant norms, values and structures because their chances of political, economic and social success are dependent on integrating (or being included) into the core. As such, inclusion is framed for the benefit of racialized Others rather than as a way to demand forced conformity; if ethnic and racial minorities become included into mainstream society through participation in dominant practices and structures, or so the argument goes, they will reap material benefits. This not only overestimates the potential of inclusion to eliminate repressive and productive forms of power (where one outcome is racism), but it also underestimates the ways in which inclusion enables the state to manage the ‘strangeness’ of Others through indirect measures. Put differently, inclusion does not necessarily end racism and at the same time it allows the state to regulate racialized Others by bringing those on the outside into the core.
Cap K – Link – Feminism
Feminism fails – it encourages a “leaning in” to the accumulative tendencies of capitalism
*does not link to vulnerability
Fraser 13 (Nancy Fraser, professor of philosophy and politics at the New School for Social Research in New York, “How feminism became capitalism's handmaiden - and how to reclaim it”, The Guardian, 10/14/13, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/feminism-capitalist-handmaiden-neoliberal) // EL
As a feminist, I've always assumed that by fighting to emancipate women I was building a better world – more egalitarian, just and free. But lately I've begun to worry that ideals pioneered by feminists are serving quite different ends. I worry, specifically, that our critique of sexism is now supplying the justification for new forms of inequality and exploitation. In a cruel twist of fate, I fear that the movement for women's liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would explain how it came to pass that feminist ideas that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly expressed in individualist terms. Where feminists once criticised a society that promoted careerism, they now advise women to "lean in". A movement that once prioritised social solidarity now celebrates female entrepreneurs. A perspective that once valorised "care" and interdependence now encourages individual advancement and meritocracy. What lies behind this shift is a sea-change in the character of capitalism. The state-managed capitalism of the postwar era has given way to a new form of capitalism – "disorganised", globalising, neoliberal. Second-wave feminism emerged as a critique of the first but has become the handmaiden of the second. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the movement for women's liberation pointed simultaneously to two different possible futures. In a first scenario, it prefigured a world in which gender emancipation went hand in hand with participatory democracy and social solidarity; in a second, it promised a new form of liberalism, able to grant women as well as men the goods of individual autonomy, increased choice, and meritocratic advancement. Second-wave feminism was in this sense ambivalent. Compatible with either of two different visions of society, it was susceptible to two different historical elaborations. As I see it, feminism's ambivalence has been resolved in recent years in favour of the second, liberal-individualist scenario – but not because we were passive victims of neoliberal seductions. On the contrary, we ourselves contributed three important ideas to this development. One contribution was our critique of the "family wage": the ideal of a male breadwinner-female homemaker family that was central to state-organised capitalism. Feminist criticism of that ideal now serves to legitimate "flexible capitalism". After all, this form of capitalism relies heavily on women's waged labour, especially low-waged work in service and manufacturing, performed not only by young single women but also by married women and women with children; not by only racialised women, but by women of virtually all nationalities and ethnicities. As women have poured into labour markets around the globe, state-organised capitalism's ideal of the family wage is being replaced by the newer, more modern norm – apparently sanctioned by feminism – of the two-earner family. Never mind that the reality that underlies the new ideal is depressed wage levels, decreased job security, declining living standards, a steep rise in the number of hours worked for wages per household, exacerbation of the double shift – now often a triple or quadruple shift – and a rise in poverty, increasingly concentrated in female-headed households. Neoliberalism turns a sow's ear into a silk purse by elaborating a narrative of female empowerment. Invoking the feminist critique of the family wage to justify exploitation, it harnesses the dream of women's emancipation to the engine of capital accumulation. Feminism has also made a second contribution to the neoliberal ethos. In the era of state-organised capitalism, we rightly criticised a constricted political vision that was so intently focused on class inequality that it could not see such "non-economic" injustices as domestic violence, sexual assault and reproductive oppression. Rejecting "economism" and politicising "the personal", feminists broadened the political agenda to challenge status hierarchies premised on cultural constructions of gender difference. The result should have been to expand the struggle for justice to encompass both culture and economics. But the actual result was a one-sided focus on "gender identity" at the expense of bread and butter issues. Worse still, the feminist turn to identity politics dovetailed all too neatly with a rising neoliberalism that wanted nothing more than to repress all memory of social equality. In effect, we absolutised the critique of cultural sexism at precisely the moment when circumstances required redoubled attention to the critique of political economy. Finally, feminism contributed a third idea to neoliberalism: the critique of welfare-state paternalism. Undeniably progressive in the era of state-organised capitalism, that critique has since converged with neoliberalism's war on "the nanny state" and its more recent cynical embrace of NGOs. A telling example is "microcredit", the programme of small bank loans to poor women in the global south. Cast as an empowering, bottom-up alternative to the top-down, bureaucratic red tape of state projects, microcredit is touted as the feminist antidote for women's poverty

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