CP - Advantage CPs - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW
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Advantage CPs Net Assessment Office The USFG should work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to… - creates a new net assessment office in full consultation with allies - develops practice to ensure that strategic insights are linked to North Atlantic Council discussions Solvency – Cohesion The CP solves best for cohesion – 1AC author de Maizière and Mitchell, 2020 - Former German Defense Minister and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Thomas and Wess, November 25, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf Acc. 4/12/22 TA] GH-PJ NATO should consider creating a new net assessment office, composed of both military and civilian staff and reporting directly to the Secretary General, with the mission of examining NATO’s strategic environment on the basis of agreed threats and challenges across the whole spectrum of military and non-military tools. Such a capacity would be differentiated from, and augment, the tools that NATO has developed in recent years; including the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), Policy Planning Unit (PPU), and the routine meetings of the senior staff policy board for purposes of horizon scanning and strategic anticipation. A net assessment function, in constant and full consultation with all Allies, would bring a systematic methodology distinct from horizon scanning. It would exist to analyse the organisation’s strengths and options for consideration by Allies on the basis of a holistic assessment of perspectives and tools, and contribute directly to mitigating differentials in Allies’ threat assessments that form a foremost impediment to political cohesion. NATO should develop a practice to ensure that the insights developed by its suite of strategic tools—the JISD, PPU, senior staff policy board, and any new net assessment capability—are better linked to the political discussions in the NAC. This would be to continue the process of adaption to a new strategic environment in which political and non-political tools must be coherently used. NATO needs to be as politically ready as it is militarily. As such, it should institute a practice of periodic wargaming, net assessment presentations, and threat scenarios in the NAC and/or Military Committee (MC), incorporating new data techniques and technologies in visualisation. These should include presentations of scenarios that assess the consequences of NATO’s potential political inaction in a crisis. The US has a net assessment office – expertise can increase effectiveness US Department of Defense, No Date "Office of Net Assessment," United States Federal Government, https://www.defense.gov/About/office-of-the-secretary-of-defense/office-of-net-assessment/ GH-PJ Since its founding in 1973, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) has continually provided long-term comparative assessments of trends, key competitions, risks, opportunities, and future prospects of U.S. military capability to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. ONA’s work is conducted in accordance with written guidance by the Secretary of Defense, as well as DOD Directive 5111.1. ONA’s mission and worldview have remained largely unchanged in its 40+ year history. ONA products include internally-produced assessments which represent years of detailed analysis. These assessments are highly classified, tightly controlled in distribution, and provide strategic-level management insights for the Secretary of Defense and other senior DOD leaders. Several such assessments have been completed since 2017. The office also produces and commissions shorter studies, less formal assessments, and topical memos, to support its research or in response to requests from the Secretary or senior DOD or Congressional leadership. These studies include historical analysis, alternative futures, and more speculative work about the possible character of military conflict in the future. ONA research on the character of future warfare since 2000 formed the diagnostic basis of the most recent National Defense Strategy. An ONA-sponsored study helped inform Congress’ decision to reverse the Budget Control Act in 2017. On several occasions since 2016, ONA work has been used in briefings to the President. Though the Department does not publicly disclose the entire scope and nature of ONA's research, the office has produced and distributed hundreds of unique works to individuals across the U.S. government since 2015. ONA products, both externally commissioned and internally written, are read by or briefed to the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretaries of Defense, the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commanders. ONA work is also shared widely with other government agencies, including with the National Security Council staff, the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department. Solvency – China Net Assessment key to deter Chinese aggression and win great power competition Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton, 11-19-2020, "The Department of Defense Needs to Relearn the (Almost) Lost Art of Net Assessment," https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/11/19/the-department-of-defense-needs-to-relearn-the-almost-lost-art-of-net-assessment GH-PJ The art of net assessment helped the United States win the Cold War when insightful analysts including Andrew Marshall and Eliot Cohen used it to identify points of leverage for U.S. strategy. In the Cold War’s aftermath, Andrew Krepinevich’s outstanding net assessments revealed the emerging Revolution in Military Affairs and its precision-guided weapons regime. But in the years since, net assessment has largely fallen into disuse as a tool to publicly guide defense planning. As an approach that looks for potential opportunities by holistically exploring a competition, net assessment would seem well-suited to the combination of capable adversaries and looming budget constraints facing the United States. Yet, outside a few external and internal Department of Defense studies, net assessments are not helping shape the debate about how to affordably advance U.S. and allied security interests. The most important of these interests, as described by defense leaders, is deterring aggression by China and the PLA. China-India-Pakistan war draws in the US and goes nuclear James Rupert, 5-19-2022, "Our Next ‘Unthinkable’ Crisis: Nuclear War in Asia?," United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/our-next-unthinkable-crisis-nuclear-war-asia GH-PJ The British Empire’s withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 left unresolved issues of statehood and borders — and the Himalayan frontiers of China, India and Pakistan have since formed a persistent, unhealed wound. The three nations have clashed in dozens of confrontations, from full-scale, conventional wars to Himalayan border skirmishes and armed standoffs, terrorist attacks or air strikes. India-Pakistan conflicts have escalated since Pakistani terrorists attacked Mumbai in 2008, killing or injuring hundreds of Indians. The India-China border conflict has flared since 2020, including its worst violence in 45 years. The risks of sudden violence in the region were dramatized in March when India’s military accidentally launched an unarmed, supersonic missile 75 miles into Pakistan. Luckily, the missile’s crash killed no one, and it came in a moment of relative calm in the two countries’ volatile relations. Less noticed outside the region is China’s and India’s continued buildup of military infrastructure and capabilities along their disputed border, including a recent shift of Indian troops to to that zone. While the rivalries, periodic clashes and armed capacity of the three nations have sharpened over 15 years, policies to protect strategic stability “didn’t really move along with the changes,” said Vikram Singh, an Asia security policy specialist at USIP. Fundamentally, “there is an absolute lack of strategic engagement among the three powers about how they would manage escalation,” and rising uncertainty about “how crises might spiral,” he said. “I think what we’ve seen in Russia and Ukraine gives us reason to think hard about the unthinkable.” Singh spoke at USIP alongside others among 19 Asia and nuclear security specialists who conducted the study, published this week. The report analyzes recent years’ evolution of the conflicts and offers recommendations for U.S. policymakers. “We see an evolution, both in terms of the capabilities” of the rival states, notably “more and different types of weapons of technology,” and perhaps more importantly, in deteriorating relationships, “particularly between India and China, and India and Pakistan,” said Daniel Markey, a scholar and policy practitioner on South Asia and USIP advisor. These evolutions lead “to possibilities for even the potential of nuclear use in the region that are very worrisome,” he said. Analysts from the USIP-convened Senior Study Group on Strategic Stability in Southern Asia discussed specific evolutions that are increasing the risks. One is that China is significantly expanding its nuclear arsenal, which is expected to reach “up to 700 deployed warheads within the next five years,” said Lynn Rusten, who leads efforts to reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons at the nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative. Another problem is that the return to power of Afghanistan’s Taliban creates new space for violent extremist groups bent on attacking India through Pakistan. Such attacks have been a frequent trigger for India-Pakistan military clashes. Southern Asia has gradually become a theater of rival alliances — between the United States and India on one hand and China and Pakistan on the other, a polarization that has been accelerated by the global strategic rivalry between China and the United States, noted Yu n Sun, an expert on Chinese foreign policy at the Stimson Center. Multinational Observer Controller Teams Solvency – Interoperability The USFG should work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to… - increase multination representation in JMRC OC teams - integrate all NATO allies into OC teams - create a multinational OC team - recognize OC training as a career enhancing assignment - create a unified command structure to coordinate the roles of allies The plan solves for interoperability – prefer our ev since its has specific mechanisms for solvency and the best warrants Colonel Paul W. Fellinger, March 2013, "Enhancing NATO Interoperability," United States Army Strategy Research Project, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589208.pdf GH-PJ The EUCOM Posture Statement refers to the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) in Grafenwohr, Germany as a “strategic asset” and the “linchpin for achieving vital theater objectives meeting the comprehensive security cooperation mission”. Further it “enables a broad range of multinational training events that ensures U.S. and partner nation forces are well-prepared...for global contingencies.”42 The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels Germany, subordinate to the JMTC, is the U.S. military’s only combat training center in Europe. Located in eastern 18 Bavaria, it has been a maneuver training center since 1938 when it was first used to train German units preparing for combat. Since the 1950’s, the JMRC trained American infantry and armor maneuver battalions to combat the threat of the Warsaw Pact. Most recently, the JMRC has hosted Maneuver Rehearsal Exercises (MRXs) for units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq.43 These units have comprised a mix of NATO forces. Other training exercises have included 1200 personnel from 18 different counties conducting Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT) and Police Mentor Liaison Team (POMLT) training for deployment to Afghanistan.44 According to Mr. Chris Irwin, the JMRC Protocol Officer, since 2005 the installation alone has hosted over 170 foreign flag officers, Chiefs and Ministers of Defense, and parliamentary level civilians. In that same time representatives from nearly 50 countries visited the center to observe some aspect of the training environment.45 Although each visit had a separate agenda the number of foreign visitors demonstrates JMRCs importance as America’s allies strive for greater interoperability. A critical aspect of any training event at the JMRC is the feedback facilitated by the eight Observer Controller (OC) Teams assigned to the Operations Group. Each team is comprised of hand selected American commissioned and non-commissioned officers who have successfully served in tactical unit of the same type and size of the organization they are tasked to observe. Feedback is provided to units in the form of both informal and formal AARs and is designed to allow the rotational unit to learn from their actions. The goal is that a unit, regardless of nationality, departs the JMRC better trained than when it arrived and prepared to fight and win in a combat zone. The AAR is a sensitive event: the unit members should feel that they can learn from their 19 mistakes without feeling as if they are being belittled, humiliated, or at risk of being relieved. It is particularly sensitive for foreign armies who have not experienced AARs in the past. For the AAR to be an effective learning tool requires rapport building and proficiency across a broad range of technical and tactical skills. As foreign units rotate through the training center it also requires a greater degree of cultural empathy and an understanding of foreign weapons and tactics. OCs develop themselves professionally through interaction with rotational units and through discussion with other officers and NCOs assigned to the center. Most OCs depart the JMRC to re-join regular Army units where their expertise often sets them apart from their peers. Many OCs depart having initiated relationships with their rotational counterparts that endure.46 Currently OC teams are comprised of only American personnel: there are limited opportunities for other countries to integrate into the existing teams. To further develop interoperability and subject matter expertise amongst our NATO allies there needs to be more multinational representation on the OC teams. A gradual integration of our NATO allies into the teams would develop deeper understanding, cultural awareness, and ensure interoperability into the future. It is also mutually beneficial for the United States Army and any army that participates: allied officers and non-commissioned officers will leave the training center with a greater understanding of how to integrate into the planning and execution process of the U.S. Army. The first phase of this integration would assign NATO officers to key billets within the organization. This would include the Deputy Commander of the Operations Group, a position normally held by an Army senior lieutenant colonel. This assignment would place him as second in command of JMRC, and should be for a period of not less than 2 years. Integration would continue to the OC teams where alliance officers would assume executive officer positions, normally reserved for senior Army majors. Figure 2: Example of Key Position Integration. The second phase of this integration is the creation of a multi-national OC team where American commissioned and non-commissioned officers man only half of the authorized positions available. Over time, as countries see the benefit of this integration, NATO officers and NCOs could fill any position within any team. NATO observer controllers would have the opportunity to develop lifelong relationships, understand the complexities of developing training exercises, facilitate learning through the AAR process, and gain greater understanding of operating in a multinational force. 21 Figure 3: Example of Integrated Maneuver Observer Controller Team. Service as an OC should be recognized throughout NATO as a career enhancing assignment for those selected. Attendance and successful graduation from the required OC Training Academy training should serve as NATO professional military education for junior officer and senior non-commissioned officers. Two years of successful service on an OC team should result in the award of a skill identifier and NATO qualification badge. Future assignments should, as much as feasible, include service in NATO integrated units like those assigned to the NATO Response Force (NRF). Integration of the best officers and non-commissioned officers by our NATO allies into the existing structure at JMRC is a great investment in the future of NATO, and builds interoperability from the bottom up. This investment of officers and NCOs 22 demonstrates commitment to the alliance that later translates to resolve, trust, and more effective operations when deployed together. Technology not key to interoperability – consensus and agreement first – unified command structures solve best Larson ’04 – Larson, Eric V., Interoperability of Coalition Air Forces: Lessons Learned from U.S. Operations with NATO Allies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB117.html. GH-PJ Interoperability problems may occur at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, tactical, and technological. Military planners tend to think of interoperability as a technical and tactical concern. However, interoperability may also be affected by disagreement over the political objectives of a military operation, such as whether to pursue total destruction of an adversary or some agreed-upon level of damage to his forces. Problems at one level can affect interoperability at other levels. For example, the absence of secure communication among allies can increase the risk of aircraft attrition. This problem can exacerbate political differences over the number of acceptable casualties. Allies must recognize and address the fundamental sources of interoperability problems. In cases where political motives are misaligned, no amount of technological improvement will mitigate the problem. For example, in Somalia, disagreement between allies over the purpose of the mission led to a chain of command that proved incapable of preventing or mitigating the consequences of a downed helicopter. Consensus at the strategic and operational levels will make tactical and technical problems less likely and easier to resolve when they arise. Successful operations require flexible organizational structures, doctrines, and procedures. NATO allies often face uncertainty about what missions will be needed, which countries will participate, and what types of forces each country will contribute. Potential disruptions in interoperability can be mitigated through a unified command structure to coordinate the roles of various countries. Standing organizations devoted to planning, training, and exercising coalition forces can provide continuity between operations. These elements should be lubricated by the ready availability of liaison officers to overcome cultural and linguistic barriers and to facilitate information flow between allies. These case studies have supported PAF work to improve U.S.-NATO interoperability in the areas of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Ukraine Intervention The USFG should work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to… - increase supplies to Ukraine while preventing escalation - establish a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace - bolster forward presence around Ukraine - take a strong nuclear deterrence posture towards Russia - increase economic sanctions against Russia Solvency - Russia Plan is key to end Ukraine quickly and stop escalation Richard D. Hooker, Jr., 4-21-2022, "Climbing the ladder: How
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