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2022 Michigan Evidence

Impacts - Stratcon Updates - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

Impacts - Stratcon Updates - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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Strategic Concept Updates
Affirmative
Generic
SC Thumps – AI/Cyber/Disinformation
The SC commits member states to addressing cyber, AI and disinformation
Alex Kingsbury, 6-29-2022, Editorial Board member for the NYT "Opinion," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/29/opinion/nato-expansion-putin.html//DG
The discussion at the summit about a larger, stronger NATO is playing out against the backdrop of a new strategic-concept document for the alliance — a vision for its trajectory for the next decade. As recently as a year ago, that document was poised to focus more broadly on China, climate change and cybersecurity — important priorities to be sure, yet superseded by events on the ground that create an opportunity for the alliance to concentrate on its core mission of safeguarding freedom and security in Europe by political and military means. The updated strategy also rightly addresses newer forms of warfare, from cyber and artificial intelligence to disinformation. The changes to NATO will help European member states focus their attention on the security threats the continent faces, and it should also underscore that all members should pay their fair share. For years, American presidents have leaned on Europe to spend more on its own defense. NATO nations have a target of spending 2 percent of their G.D.P. on defense. Yet few nations meet that moderate threshold, which leads to the widespread sense that Americans have been subsidizing European defense and freeing those governments to spend more money on things like generous welfare benefits. Donald Trump, mercurial statesman though he was, wasn’t wrong to chide NATO partners for not carrying their share of the defense burden.
That triggers their perception links but doesn’t solve the aff – the SC is symbolic not operational
Ed Arnold 7-1-2022, Research Fellow for European Security at ISS "New Concepts but Old Problems: NATO’s New Strategic Concept," No Publication, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/new-concepts-old-problems-natos-new-strategic-concept//DG
How Much Does the Strategic Concept Actually Matter? Politically, the Strategic Concept and the unity it represents are very important. However, militarily and operationally, it is less significant. The 2010 Strategic Concept had been moribund since at least 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but of course NATO has still been operating effectively since. While a lot of effort has gone into building consensus for Madrid, in many ways the hard work starts now. There is a coherence issue. The Strategic Concept, as NATO’s strategy, comes after the two main plans – SACEUR’s Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and the future NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept – have already matured. There was tacit acknowledgement at the Madrid summit that many underlying operational plans would have to be revised. However, with NATO’s strategy transforming, mere tweaks to plans do not seem sufficient, and their core assumptions should be revisited. For NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept – how it fights in the future – it is imperative that analysis of Russia’s military performance in Ukraine now becomes the backbone for its development. Moreover, despite the collective might of NATO, it cannot do everything, and the commitment at the 2015 Warsaw summit to a ‘360-degree approach’ to security – both thematically and geographically – risks overstretch. In a hardening world, the Alliance must take the opportunity to go back to its roots and seek support from other actors, such as the EU. It is still expected that a NATO–EU joint declaration will materialise before the end of the year.
SC Thumps – Rapid Reaction Force
The DA is n/u – SC with NATO is at a record high – rapid reaction force increased eightfold
Stratfor 6/30
Stratfor Worldview, “Placing NATO’s New Strategic Concept in Context,”Jun 30, 2022 https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/placing-nato-s-new-strategic-concept-context
The updated Strategic Concept was announced during the June 29-30 NATO summit in Madrid. The Madrid summit was the first held since the alliance’s March 24 extraordinary meeting to coordinate a response to Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine. In response to these changing priorities and threat perceptions, NATO also announced changes in its force posture, including the expansion of its rapid reaction force and new U.S. deployments on Russia’s borders. NATO plans to increase the size of its rapid reaction force nearly eightfold by next year, from 40,000 to 300,000 troops, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States, in particular, plans to significantly expand its military presence in Europe. On June 29, President Joe Biden announced Washington will establish a permanent headquarters in Poland for the U.S. 5th Army Corps, send 5,000 additional troops to Romania, and increase rotational deployments in the Baltic states (namely, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). The United States will also send two additional squadrons of F-35 fighter aircraft to the United Kingdom, station additional air defense systems at bases in Italy and Germany, and increase the number of naval destroyers in Rota, Spain, from four to six. NATO’s so-called Response Force includes land, sea and air assets that are designed to be deployed quickly and wherever necessary in the event of an attack. The force numbered just 13,000 troops prior to Russia’s initial aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Despite identifying Russia as a “direct threat,” NATO declined even stronger action to deter and defend against Moscow. The updated Strategic Concept describes Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to security and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, as Moscow seeks to “establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation,” using “conventional, cyber and hybrid means against NATO and [NATO’s] partners.” The only other “direct threat” identified in the document is terrorism. This harsh language represents a fundamental reversal from the document’s previous iteration in 2010, when NATO said it sought “a true strategic partnership” with Russia and would “act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.” The updated Strategic Concept also removes any mention of the 1998 Russia-NATO Founding Act governing relations between the alliance and Russia, which the 2010 version reaffirmed. But in the 2022 document, NATO says it is willing to “keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency,” which indicates a desire to maintain the spirit of and compliance with the 24-year-old pact. The new NATO troops that will soon be deployed to Poland and the Baltic states will also continue to rotate throughout the alliance’s Eastern European members to avoid running afoul of the Founding Act, in which NATO pledged not to permanently station combat troops on the Russian border. On June 29, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Celeste Wallander said the U.S. 5th Army Corps’ permanent stationing in Poland will be staffed by headquarters officials, not combat troops, and would thus not violate the U.S. understanding of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Officials in countries such as France and Germany have said the Founding Act should be preserved, while some, particularly in Eastern Europe and the United States, had called for the alliance to consider formally disavowing or suspending the agreement to remove restraints on NATO force posture. But the new strategy will still fuel Russia’s concerns about NATO’s expansion and prompt Moscow to increase its military presence in the Baltic region. NATO's impending troop movements do not contradict the alliance’s stated desire to maintain the possibility of dialogue with Moscow. They do, however, contradict Russia’s desire for a decreased NATO presence on its periphery, which Moscow expressed prior to invading Ukraine in February. Increased NATO forces in Poland and the Baltic states — not to mention Sweden and Finland’s impending admission to the alliance — will thus still push Russia to increase its nuclear and nuclear-capable weapons systems in the Baltic area and eventually base many more conventional forces there as well. The 2022 Strategic Concept also reaffirms the decision of the 2008 Bucharest Summit that said Ukraine and Georgia will one day be NATO members, adding that “decisions on membership are taken by NATO allies and no third party has a say in this process” in a clear jab at Russia. While this does not portend any concrete or imminent action regarding Georgia and Ukraine’s membership aspirations, it will still increase tensions with Russia, which could use the reaffirmation of the policy to help justify an escalation of the war in Ukraine and/or destabilization measures in Georgia or Moldova. China’s first-ever mention as a strategic “challenge” also reflects NATO’s new concerns with Beijing’s growing influence in Asia. The 2010 Strategic Concept did not once mention China nor the Indo-Pacific region, but the 2022 document devotes significant space to China, whose “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge NATO interests, security and values”, and says “the Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” This represents a long-awaited change of tone toward China. The alliance’s statement in the 2022 document that it will “strengthen cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests” will likely raise eyebrows in Beijing. However, the updated Strategic Concept also makes clear that it “remains open to constructive engagement to build reciprocal transparency” with China. The 2022 Strategic Concept highlights new cybersecurity, climate change, authoritarian governance and other non-military threats as well. Climate change was mentioned only once in the 2010 Strategic Concept. But in the 2022 version, it is mentioned 11 times, including the ambitious statement that NATO should “become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Additional attention is also given to cyberattacks. The alliance reaffirmed its longstanding policy that a “single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space” could prompt NATO to trigger its Article 5 mutual defense clause — another measure directed first and foremost toward Russia and China and intended to deter cyberattacks causing physical damage, as otherwise the alliance would be skeptical of triggering Article 5 because of a cyberattack. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept on several occasions notes the challenge to the alliance’s interests and values posed by advancing authoritarianism — a threat not acknowledged directly in 2010.
AT SC Solves Deterrence
The concept doesn’t overwhelm ongoing failure to solidify an effective deterrent posture
Hans Petter Midttun, 6-30-2022, "NATO’s Strategic Concept-2022: names Russia as threat, deletes key commitment to act on this threat," Euromaidan Press, https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/06/30/natos-strategic-concept-2022-names-russia-as-threat-deletes-key-commitment-to-act-on-this-threat//DG
When NATO is no longer willing to employ military power to “escalate to de-escalate,” it might be failing as a military alliance. It is reflected in the new strategic concept as it steps away from its commitment to “stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security”;in its failure to act on Russian violations of international law since 2008; in its failure to respond to the Hybrid War Russia has conducted against NATO and EU members since 2014; and not least, in its failure to respond resolutely to the ongoing attempt to subjugate Ukraine through the use of both military and non-military force. NATO fails to counter the Russian “fait accompli” strategy, using the threat of nuclear escalation as a means to secure freedom to use military force as an integrated part of its increasingly more aggressive foreign policy. As a result, Russia is openly threatening Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Norway. And the Alliance takes another step backward. Today, Lithuania and Kaliningrad. Tomorrow, Norway and Svalbard. NATO has, however, recognized that the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. That’s a hugely important first step towards acknowledging the Russian strategic messaging of being at war.
Concept is ambitious, not material---actual implementation is a work in progress
David M Herszenhorn, 6-30-2022, Correspondent for Politico "From Madrid summit, NATO steps into more dangerous era," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/ussr-allied-leaders-russia-conflict-dangerous-cold-war-nato//DG
“I was present at the NATO summit adopting the former strategic concept — I was foreign minister — and then we had the aspiration of a partnership,” Støre said. But citing “the daily destruction, the extraordinary brutal use of military force” in Ukraine, the Norwegian leader added, “In 2022, I think, you know, nobody doubts the seriousness of the situation.” Among the most crucial decisions taken by leaders at the summit were plans to strengthen NATO’s so-called force posture, including with ambitious plans to be able to mobilize as many as 300,000 troops within 30 days. There was some confusion and disagreement about when such a capability might be achieved, but the resolve among allies to bolster their presence on the eastern flank was not in the slightest doubt The new model is about “more assured availability” of forces from allies, said one senior NATO official. “More readiness, more exercising, more preparation for the locations that these forces might have to deploy to — particularly in defense of the alliance — so that is the heart of what is new. “It’s a work in progress,” the senior official added. “We will continue to work with allies over the next year or so to identify the forces that can be attached to this model and to populate the model. But we know the forces exist … So this is an exercise of pre-identifying forces, which can be linked to defense plans.”
AT SC Solves – Disinformation
Doesn’t solve a coherent response---declarations are different from action
Tomasz Chłon, 5-16-2022, Former ambassador of Poland, director of NATO information GLOBSEC, https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NATO-and-Countering-Disinformation-ver1-spreads.pdf
At the same time, the West has yet to prepare a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated response to Russian disinformation. It is up to nations to fully utilise NATO’s potential. A response practice has been developed and seen partial success within some states and Euro-Atlantic institutions, but it has not yet been translated into a real common policy or strategy. At national levels, political declarations and agreed action plans are still not fully implemented in too many instances. Western states approach disinformation in varied ways due to differences in history, regional security, wealth, education, media quality, political and legal culture and – most importantly – the current state of their relations with Russia. As a rule, some states prefer bilateral approaches that safeguard national prerogatives. This may change now following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
AT Russia Encirclement Turn
Concept commits to a 260k boost in force posture – eastern flank has never been more united
David M Herszenhorn, 6-30-2022, Correspondent for Politico "From Madrid summit, NATO steps into more dangerous era," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/ussr-allied-leaders-russia-conflict-dangerous-cold-war-nato//DG
“I was present at the NATO summit adopting the former strategic concept — I was foreign minister — and then we had the aspiration of a partnership,” Støre said. But citing “the daily destruction, the extraordinary brutal use of military force” in Ukraine, the Norwegian leader added, “In 2022, I think, you know, nobody doubts the seriousness of the situation.” Among the most crucial decisions taken by leaders at the summit were plans to strengthen NATO’s so-called force posture, including with ambitious plans to be able to mobilize as many as 300,000 troops within 30 days. There was some confusion and disagreement about when such a capability might be achieved, but the resolve among allies to bolster their presence on the eastern flank was not in the slightest doubt The new model is about “more assured availability” of forces from allies, said one senior NATO official. “More readiness, more exercising, more preparation for the locations that these forces might have to deploy to — particularly in defense of the alliance — so that is the heart of what is new. “It’s a work in progress,” the senior official added. “We will continue to work with allies over the next year or so to identify the forces that can be attached to this model and to populate the model. But we know the forces exist … So this is an exercise of pre-identifying forces, which can be linked to defense plans.”
Negative
Squo Solves – AI/Biotech
“Defense Innovation Accelerator” for the North Atlantic reserves 1 billion for tech innovation – US contributing unprecedented access
Harper 6/30
Jon, Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, “New $1B NATO innovation fund will back wide range of emerging tech” JUN 30, 2022
https://www.fedscoop.com/new-1-billion-nato-innovation-fund-will-back-wide-range-of-emerging-technology/
NATO leaders on Thursday officially launched a $1 billion innovation fund that will invest in companies working on a slew of dual-use technologies with great military potential. Billed as the world’s first “multi-sovereign” venture capital fund involving 22 nations, it is intended to make long-term investments in startups and other entities developing emerging technologies that the alliance is interested in including artificial intelligence, autonomy, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement; novel materials; energy; propulsion and space. “This fund is unique,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said during a signing ceremony at a summit in Madrid where alliance leaders inked a letter of commitment pledging to support the initiative. “With a 15-year timeframe, the NATO Innovation Fund will help bring to life those nascent technologies that have the power to transform our security in the decades to come, strengthening the Alliance’s innovation ecosystem and bolstering the security of our one billion citizens.” The summit was attended by President Biden, his alliance counterparts and other world leaders. Together with the new Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), the fund will help the alliance “harness the best new technology for transatlantic security,” Stoltenberg said at a press conference Wednesday. The DIANA initiative will provide innovators access to facilities that they can tap into, including more than 60 test centers across Europe and North America. DIANA “will support NATO’s efforts to boost interoperability and ensure that every Ally has access to cutting-edge technological solutions for military needs,” according to a White House fact sheet released Wednesday. The United States will contribute to that initiative by facilitating access to U.S. test centers and other technology “accelerator sites” in the “extensive and diverse U.S. innovation sector,” according to the White House. During the summit, NATO also unveiled a new Strategic Concept that emphasized the need to adopt emerging technologies to improve the alliance’s defense capabilities.
Squo Solves – Cyber Security
Concept solves cyber---increases capability, mitigates impact of attacks thru resilience, coordin

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