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2022 Michigan Negative

Neg - OCOs 3 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

Neg - OCOs 3 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR
notes
Thanks a ton to Sam Gordon and Paul Wallace for their work this wave! Please email khirn10@gmail.com with any comments or concerns.
Many cyber affs---including OCOs and space---clearly have interactions with the ‘Article 5’ debate. I figured that 1acs should have the option of explicitly designing their plan to include an attempt at pressuring NATO to agree on appropriate Article 5 thresholds for what constitutes an armed attack with regards to cybersecurity. The aff/neg file is thus designed as a supplement, with defensible and distinct impact mods both for and against changing the threshold.
The DAs in this file are essentially deterrence and assurance, the links assuming the aff attempts to establish some cyberattacks as falling short of meeting the threshold of ‘armed attack’. The “Lower A5 Threshold” DA is meant for a hypothetical aff that lowered the Article 5 threshold, functionally saying “all cyberattacks are armed attacks and we will respond accordingly.” The aff material in “OCOs 3” doesn’t support this angle, but I could envision somewhat putting it together.
Case
Say No/Solvency---1NC
NATO will say no:
Revising Article 5 requires absolute consensus---that’s impossible on cyber
Jordan ‘14 [Klara; September 4; Senior Fellow and Assistant Director of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, LL.M from the Law School at the University of Groningen, Masters in Interdisciplinary European Studies from the Institute of Advanced European Studies, Law Degree from Matej Bel University; National Interest, “Would NATO Go to War Over a Cyberattack?,” https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/would-nato-go-war-over-cyberattack-11199]
Deliberations on thresholds triggering Article 5 could prove particularly thorny, given the transatlantic divide in views on what consequences are necessary to constitute an armed attack.
For example, the United States may be willing to consider a lower threshold than its less eager European allies for whom only grave uses of force are considered an armed attack. A state’s view of this threshold may well depend on whether it is the victim of an attack or a member called upon to fulfill its collective-defense obligation.
Additionally, Article 5 does not define the nature of that commitment. The treaty allows a member state to take whatever action it deems appropriate to assist an attacked ally—it decides how it will respond in collective defense. A member state may interpret its obligation to respond expansively or in a far more limited manner. So by viewing its Article 5 obligation in a limited way, a member could determine that it is not required to respond with kinetic force to assist an attacked ally, even in cases of destructive cyberevents.
Given the capability, doctrinal and policy divide between NATO members in the cyberarena, an ally might limit its response to entirely nonkinetic measures, such as rerouting Internet traffic through its national network, monitoring networks for future attacks, crisis-management support or diplomatic statements on behalf of the attacked ally.
On the other hand, if NATO determines a cyberattack amounts to an armed attack and invokes Article 5, and undertakes responsive action against an aggressor, member states are not limited to cyber-responses alone; they may also choose to employ kinetic force in the collective defense of the attacked member state. Adoption of this cyberpolicy provides NATO states a wider range of potential options with which they may respond in cases of destructive cyberattacks. NATO allies may respond with cyber- or kinetic tools, or a combination of both, a fact that may help to ensure an Alliance-wide response.
Regardless of the political weight presently attributed to NATO’s expected policy statement, law and policy are inextricably intertwined in the interpretation of Article 5, and the subtleties of its real-world application may make it difficult for the organization to offer the assurances certain allies are seeking with respect to their defense against cyberattacks. As a result, the policy could fall far short of its intended goals.
NATO states could, however, decide to make adoption of its new cyberpolicy a true game changer, to ensure that it becomes a useful framework for addressing the rapidly changing security challenges posed in the cyber-realm.
NATO nations might begin this process by reexamining the threshold requirement for Article 5 application in response to cyberattacks. States could agree, for example, that although some cyberevents may well cause consequential kinetic results (and some of a truly horrific nature), in the cyberworld, requiring kinetic consequences in order to trigger application of the collective-defense requirement does not fully reflect the types of serious crises cyberattacks can trigger.
They could determine, rather, that the appropriate Article 5 threshold in response to cyberevents might also be triggered by the far more likely consequences of large-scale economic disruption with corresponding national- and international-security implications.
This, of course, would require all twenty-eight members to reconsider their long-established views on what constitutes an armed attack under international law, and to achieve consensus on a far more forward-leaning approach. This would, no doubt, be a hugely difficult undertaking. Nevertheless, the development of international law is a continuous process, and states and international organizations should move to adapt it to help meet changing threats.
Numerous allies are wedded to ambiguous cyber strategies and will refuse
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni ’18 [Mette; 2018; Reader in International Relations and a Fellow of Sidney Sussex College at Cambridge University, PhD in Political Science from the European University Institute; Philosophy & Technology, “Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention,” Volume 31, Number 3]
The Cult of the (Cyber) Offensive
International security scholars and military officials widely agree that cyberspace favors offensive operations (see Nye 2015a, b; Lonergan 2016; Sheldon 2011; Libicki 2009, 32–33; Clarke and Knake 2010; Vanca 2013; Saltzman 2013, 43; Lindsay 2015, 52; Lucas 2017, 127). According to traditional offense/defense theory, when offense holds the advance it is relatively easier to ‘move forward, destroy and conquer territory’ than to protect and defend it (Jervis 1978; Evera and Stephen 1984; Glaser and Kaufman 1998).Footnote10 Cyber experts list three main reasons why offensive strategies have an upper hand in cyberspace. First, as Sheldon observes, “attacks in cyberspace occur at great speed…putting defenses under immense pressure, as an attacker has to be successful only once, whereas the defender has to be successful all of the time” (Sheldon 2011, 98). Second, the prospect of launching attacks with relative anonymity (and therefore impunity) lowers the expected cost of offensive strategies in cyberspace (see Sheldon 2011, 98; Lindsay 2015). Third, physical distance is relatively inconsequential in the virtual world. Cyberattacks can emerge practically from anywhere, providing significant latitude for attackers to seize the initiative and catch defenders by surprise (Nye 2010; Sheldon 2011, 98). Another way of stating this point is that cyber technologies lead to great improvements in the mobility and reach of force—both factors held to increase offensive advantage (see Glaser and Kaufman 1998, 62).
The International relations (IR) theory points to four main strategic implications of offensive dominance. First, when offense is strong relative to defense, it becomes imperative for states to react quickly and resolutely to emerging threats, since even a small initial shift in the ratio of capabilities can cause a decisive shift in actors’ ability to prevail in a conflict (van Evera 1984, 64). In a cyber context, the compulsion to act and react fast is further amplified by the changing vulnerability of most cyber targets. Cyber weapons consist of complex software designed to exploit vulnerabilities residing in other software, such as computer operations systems or industrial control systems (Lucas 2017, 7). Unlike most conventional targets, a given cyber target may therefore only be vulnerable—and a cyber weapon aimed at that target only potentially effective—until the point at which a string of code is fixed or the target is replaced (DOD 2006, 3). The implication, according to many cyber experts, is that, “if you do not act quickly, you may not be able to act at all” (Vanca 2013, 26. See also Buchanan 2016; Lonergan 2016; Lindsay 2015, 56).
A second implication of offensive advantage is to encourage arms racing. As Glaser and Kaufman (1998, 48) explain, when offense is strong, states are likely to find that equally sized forces are inadequate to support a defensive strategy. Instead, they are likely to conclude that they require a substantial lead in military force to defend against attacks. This triggers a dynamic of competitive arms building, whereby even states that merely wish to defend the status quo strive to build up their military arsenals at a faster pace than their competitors in order to secure an adequate defense.
A third effect of offensive advantage is to increase rewards for striking first, thereby increasing the probability of preemptive or preventive attacks (Jervis 1978; van Evera 1984). In the cyber domain, incentives to attack enemies preemptively arise partly from the fact that actions in cyberspace move so fast that they leave little time for targeted states to mount a defense (Clarke and Knake 2010). The motivation to strike first may be further reinforced by the prospect of using carefully targeted cyber-strikes to neutralize an enemy’s conventional defense systems and thereby limit its retaliatory capacity (Saltzman 2013, 44). Indeed, many military strategists believe that preemptive strikes in the cyber domain are likely to bring decisive advantages on the conventional battlefield (see, e.g., Clarke and Knake 2010).
Fourth, according to IR theory, when offense is strong relative to defense, the ability to deter attacks (as opposed to seeking to defend against them) becomes vital. Logically, in a strategic environment that is thought to favor offensive operations, the ability to deter aggressors hinges crucially on the ability to signal or demonstrate superior offensive capabilities. Hence, according to traditional offense/defense theory, the surest way to achieve effective strategic cyber deterrence is to develop strong offensive capabilities, which promise crushing retaliation against would-be attackers.
To sum up, conventional IR theory points to four strategic implications of cyber offensive advantage: (1) an emphasis on fast action, (2) a tendency towards arms-racing, (3) strong incentives for preemptive attacks, (4) a focus on boosting deterrence through enhancing offensive capabilities. These implications of cyber offensive advantage are not merely “theoretical.” The importance of taking fact action is emphasized in leading national cyber security strategies. According to the US “National Military Strategy for Cyberspace,”
Cyberspace affords commanders opportunities to make decisions rapidly, conduct operations, and deliver effects at speeds that were previously incomprehensible. In addition, increasing the speed of the policy and decision-making process potentially will yield greater effectiveness of cyberspace capabilities. (US DOD 2006, 4).
The perceived need to boost offensive capabilities as a means to strengthen deterrence is also clearly articulated in many strategic documents and in public statements by defense officials.Footnote11 Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander of the US Military Cyber Command, has repeatedly pointed to the need to “increase our capacity on the offensive side to get to that point of deterrence.”Footnote12 Similarly, in a press conference in April 2015, US Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh described the Pentagon’s goal of developing cyber weapons that could inflict “blunt force trauma” on an enemy in order to deter aggressors (see Ewing 2015). The Trump Administration has also signaled an aggressive cyber position. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly vowed to expand America’s offensive cyber capabilities—a commitment that has been followed up by plans for a 15% increase in military cyber-security spending in the DOD’s 2017 budget (see Gady 2017).Footnote13
Other nations appear to be drawing similar conclusions regarding the need to adopt more offensive cyber postures. Russia, Iran, and North Korea all have military units specifically dedicated to offensive cyber operations (NY Times 2016). Since 2005, China has begun to incorporate offensive computer network operations into its military exercises, primarily in comprehensive first strikes against enemy networks (Salzman 2013, 51), and the Chinese have recently admitted the existence of purely offensive cyber units in the PLA (according to Raud 2016, 20–21). The Germans have publicly disclosed that they are developing offensive cyber weapons (Limnéll 2013) as are Argentina and France. Even Denmark and the Netherlands have launched programs to develop cyber offensive capabilities (Paletta, Yadron and Valentino-Devries 2015).
In short, current political and military leaders focus overwhelmingly on improving their countries’ cyber offensive capabilities and appear to premise national cyber security strategies on a firm belief that defensive strategies are insufficient to deter enemies in cyberspace. This strategic environment is strongly reminiscent of the “Cult of the Offensive” that swept Europe in the decades prior to World War I.Footnote14 Much like political and military leaders prior to WWI, today’s decision-makers appear to display a “highly exaggerated faith in the efficacy of offensive military strategies and tactics” (Van Evera 1984). And, much like political and military planners prior to WWI, they tend to discount the power of political factors (including the rule of international law) which may favor defenders.
Nobody agrees – attribution alone collapses the aff
Jackson ’16 [Received his juris doctor degree from George Mason University School of Law and is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Infrastructure and Protection at the George Mason University School of Business [Stephen, 8/16/2016, “NATO Article 5 and Cyber Warfare: NATO’s Ambiguous and Outdated Procedure for Determining When Cyber Aggression Qualifies as an Armed Attack”, George Mason Center for Infrastructure Protection & Homeland Security, https://cip.gmu.edu/2016/08/16/nato-article-5-cyber-warfare-natos-ambiguous-outdated-procedure-determining-cyber-aggression-qualifies-armed-attack/]
Article 5 is useful for assessing state and non-state actions used in traditional warfare. However, the NATO allies drafted Article 5 in light of the technology and tactics of the World War II era. While NATO continued to successfully adapt Article 5 to the evolving challenges post-Soviet Union, it cannot properly invoke the principle of collective self-defense against cyber attacks without at least new definitions for the various forms of cyber events. In particular, without unambiguous guidelines for identifying from where a cyber attack originated, NATO will face difficulty in both locating the origin of a cyber attack and determining whether the cyber attack was sanctioned by the host nation. Also, without proper definitions for the various forms of cyber attacks, NATO will likely encounter unnecessary debate between NATO allies over any cyber attack against a NATO country. Furthermore, without removing ambiguity in identifying cyber events that equate to a traditional armed attack, the North Atlantic Council will face difficulty in deciding upon a proper and proportionate armed response in accord with the principles of jus in bello.
Currently, almost every NATO ally has an individual national security and defense strategy related to cybersecurity.[12] These strategies vary in detail and scope, and lack uniformity in defining the elements of which cyber attacks warrant an aggressive response. Some scholars argue that the International Court of Justice accurately determined that collective self-defense is triggered when an act “inflicts substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state,” even if the attackers used non-traditional weaponry like airplanes or cyber attacks.[13] For instance, this “scale and effects” test does not adequately address the technical differences between using cyberspace to create either a kinetic disruption to a power plant or the potential to dismantle an entire financial infrastructure with zero physical effects. The potential for a single cyber attack to result in major disturbance, with or without any physical element, is sufficient to warrant specific guidelines. However, as long as the North Atlantic Council assesses individual cyber attacks on a case-by-case basis without predetermined specialized rules, the various interests of all 28 NATO nations will pose obstacles for a swift and efficient NATO response.
AT: Caroline/Proportionality/Imminence---1NC
The plan’s criteria are useless, gutting norms and causing escalation
Titiriga Remus 13 Assistant professor Inha Law School, 100 Inharo, Nam-gu Incheon 402-751, Korea. "Cyber-attacks and International law of armed conflicts; a “jus ad bellum” perspective." https://media.neliti.com/media/publications/28802-EN-cyber-attacks-and-international-law-of-armed-conflicts-a-jus-ad-bellum-perspecti.pdf
The opposing side argues that the reference to ‘inherent’ right of self-defense preserves ancient customary law, which allowed the anticipatory action.33 Proponents of a broad reading of self-defense invoke the 1837 Caroline incident and suggest that in the nuclear era States cannot be expected to wait for a ‘first strike’. However the majority of scholars reject the precedent value of the Caroline incident based on the fact that it precedes the actual interdiction for the use of force. 34They warn of the risk of escalation that results from accepting anticipatory actions. We think that the latter reason should prevail in the case of cyber-attack and as such, anticipatory self defense should be clearly banned. ii) Interceptive self defense If an armed attack is incipient or is on the verge of beginning, the intended victim may not wait powerlessly for the inevitable blow. The attack can be legitimately intercepted. In fact interceptive (different from anticipatory) self-defense seems to be acceptable under the Charter.35 The theme of interceptive self-defense is pertinent to a computer attack when the intrusion into a computer network has been discovered, although it is not yet lethal to persons or destructive of property (using Schmitt’s analysis). The issue is to determine whether the intrusion may reasonably be seen as a first step of an unavoidable and developing ‘armed attack’. This is a very difficult matter of evaluating and interpreting information available at the time of action (including warnings, intelligence reports and other data). 4. New Horizons and Challenges In the following section we will lance a debate about possible use of cyber means as self-defense or over the boundaries of the classical international paradigm (armed force or armed attack). There are numerous theoretical and practical challenges to be relived in this exploratory topic. 4.1 Computer Attacks as Means of Self Defense If a preceding armed attack (or a computer attack qualified as ‘armed attack’ –according to Schmitt’s analysis) occurred, the possibility to use the computer attacks as legitimate defense seem obvious (legitimate defense allows the use of all military means against an aggression therefore the cyber means should be included). However there are two substantive constraint

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