K - Settler Colonialism - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB
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Settler Colonialism K––K Lab Note This file is the product of the work of Q, Anirv, Sheima/Nikki, Umar, Adela, Ethan, and Markos 1NC SHELL Settler Colonialism is the grounding force of the international – the understanding as colonialism as a domestic matter forgoes the way that Settler Colonialism was a project of domination in the name of civilizing the savage Davis 20 (Making a settler colonial IR: Imagining the ‘international’ in early Australian International Relations, Alexander E. Davis is a postdoctoral research fellow at La Trobe University's Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy, Australia. Review of International Studies (2020), https://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/publications/59daafa6-b580-4b7f-8c24-f4599ccaf5f5) // JLHS AA Sitting alongside themes of imperialism, internationalism, and realism in the study of Australian IR, was a stream of thought on race and empire that focused on settlement. For the history of international thought, this is significant. The control of territory by settlers is the foundational concern of the Australian state. This was therefore foundational to its international thought and its politics. The blurring of the international and the domestic, structured around racial categories and seeking to maintain and advance white supremacy, was a constitutive element of the founding of IR in Australia. This lines up closely with Vitalis’s findings in the US.105 Australia’s Others under IR’s gaze were primarily its nearest neighbours, its colonial projects, and those within: its own settlement, its immigration policy and its Indigenous population. Although dominated by a white man’s view of the world, there were contributions made by women throughout this period. Prior to Coral Bell’s taking up of a realist framework, though, these contributions were sometimes confined to subjects stereotyped as feminine. The settlement of the Northern Territory and the rest of Australia remained parts of Australian IR through the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin’s time as its primary publication outlet. The study of imperial affairs, based on the development of societies, was slowly shifting into the study of international affairs. At this moment in Australian IR, the two sat alongside one another: with articles on events in China and Japan placed next to discussion of the colonial development of Northern Australia and New Guinea. Imperialism and racial development politics sat alongside analysis of great power conflict in East Asia. The Second World War led to another reshaping of Australia’s international thought. The first IR department in the country was placed within Pacific Studies, which was intended to focus on both East Asia and Australia’s colonial projects. Still, race as an explicit subject of IR in Australia shifted, and the explicit maintenance of racial hierarchies moved into racialised psychological and cultural explanations of the irrationality of the postcolonial societies. This erasure made it more difficult to analyse race and racism, allowing them to continue unchecked. In terms of our disciplinary historiography, it led to the exclusion of empire and settlement as insufficiently international to be analysed. We might be tempted to think that, because settlement and land tenure are not viewed as ‘international’ today, we can simply erase them from our disciplinary memory. To do so is anachronistic. Colonial settlement was thought of as international affairs. It was a common topic, discussed thoroughly and regularly. Forgetting this effectively produces the excision of Australia’s settler colonial history from its international affairs. The connection between land, sovereignty, and settlement remains foundational to the international system. That a series of colonial questions of settlement sat alongside Australia’s early studies of its relationship with East Asia reflects the transition from a broadly colonial system to an international system. This transition was not simple or straightforward. It is not even complete. Australia has not decolonised. Neglecting this transition closes our eyes to the contemporary politics of race and hierarchy that postcolonial scholars of IR have repeatedly and forcefully emphasised. Australia’s contemporary international affairs, questions about its defence, Australia’s positioning inside or outside Asia, its relationship with Pacific island neighbours, its strategic culture, fears about foreign ownership of land, all look very different if we place them in this context. If we accept that settler colonial ideologies were a key element of the founding of Australian IR, a claim for which there is ample evidence, IR in Australia needs urgent critical reflection. Australian settlement means the dehumanisation and the genocide of existing populations. This continues today. Settler colonial Australian IR justified and argued for this, presenting it as natural and desirable. As Vitalis put it in the US context, ‘the history of ideas, institutions, and practices has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions’. 106 While Australian IR forgets its settler history, policies of dispossession and intervention, and the ‘civilising mission’, continue at home and abroad.107 Australian foreign policy, often wrapped in liberal idealism, normalises and affirms settler colonialism. We would need to engage deeply with Indigenous perspectives about Australia and the world to understand this in the present. Sadly, few, if any, such voices are in dialogue with IR in Australia. I can only conclude that the rot is particularly deep. Forgetting this history cleanses our thought of colonial violence and the settlement of Australia, making it impossible to reckon with. Addressing these issues requires more than a mild and unthreatening ‘diversification’ of the discipline’s voices, but a thorough and conscious effort to decolonise, which challenges our foundational assumptions. Settler violence threatens the entire planet with endless racist violence Mishra 18, MA @ Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (Pankaj, “The Religion of Whiteness Becomes a Suicide Cult,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/opinion/race-politics-whiteness.html)//BB (bless) In the years that followed, politicians and pundits in Britain and its settler colonies of Australia, Canada and the United States would jointly forge an identity geopolitics of the “higher races.” Today it has reached its final and most desperate phase, with existential fears about endangered white power feverishly circulating once again between the core and periphery of the greatest modern empire. “The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive,” President Trump said last year in a speech hailed by the British journalist Douglas Murray, the Canadian columnist Mark Steyn and the American editor Rich Lowry. More recently, Mr. Trump tweeted (falsely) about “large-scale killing” of white farmers in South Africa — a preoccupation, deepened by Rupert Murdoch’s media, of white supremacists around the world. To understand the rapid mainstreaming of white supremacism in English-speaking liberal democracies today, we must examine the experience of unprecedented global migration and racial mixing in the Anglosphere in the late 19th century: countries such as the United States and Australia where, as Roosevelt wrote admiringly in 1897, “democracy, with the clear instinct of race selfishness, saw the race foe, and kept out the dangerous alien.” It is in the motherlands of democracy rather than in fascist Europe that racial hierarchies first defined the modern world. It is also where a last-ditch and potentially calamitous battle to preserve them is being fought today. This “race selfishness” was sharpened in the late 19th century, as the elites of the “higher races” struggled to contain mass disaffection generated by the traumatic change of globalization: loss of jobs and livelihoods amid rapid economic growth and intensified movements of capital, goods and labor. For fearful ruling classes, political order depended on their ability to forge an alliance between, as Hannah Arendt wrote, “capital and mob,” between rich and powerful whites and those rendered superfluous by industrial capitalism. Exclusion or degradation of nonwhite peoples seemed one way of securing dignity for those marginalized by economic and technological shifts. The political climate was prepared by intellectuals with clear-cut racial theories, such as Brooks Adams, a Boston Brahmin friend of Roosevelt, and Charles B. Davenport, the leading American exponent of eugenics. In Australia, Pearson’s social Darwinism was amplified by media barons like Keith Murdoch (father of Rupert and a stalwart of the eugenics movement) and institutionalized in a “White Australia” policy that restricted “colored” migration for most of the 20th century. Anti-minority passions in the United States peaked with the 1924 immigration law (much admired by Hitler and, more recently, by Jeff Sessions), which impeded Jewish immigrants and barred Asians entirely. By the early 20th century, violence against indigenous peoples, immigrants and African-Americans reached a new ferocity, and nativist and racist demagogues entrenched a politics of dispossession, segregation and disenfranchisement. Seeking to maintain white power globally, Roosevelt helped transform the United States into a major imperialist power. Woodrow Wilson, too, worked to preserve, as he put it, “white civilization and its domination of the planet” even as he patented the emollient rhetoric of liberal internationalism that many in the American political and media establishment still parrot. At the post-World War I Paris Peace Conference, which Wilson supervised, the leaders of Britain, the United States, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada not only humiliated the many Asians and Africans demanding self-determination; they also jointly defeated an attempt by Japan, their wartime ally, to have a racial equality clause included in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The exposure of Nazi crimes, followed by decolonization and civil rights movements, generally discredited quasi-scientific racism and stigmatized overt expressions of white supremacism. In our own time, global capitalism has promised to build a colorblind world through economic integration. But as revolts erupt against globalization in its latest, more disruptive phase, politicians and pundits in the Anglosphere are again scrambling to rebuild political communities around what W. E.B. Du Bois in 1910 identified as “the new religion of whiteness.” The intellectual white web originally woven in late-19th-century Australia vibrates once more with what the historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds termed “racial knowledge and technologies that animated white men’s countries and their strategies of exclusion, deportation and segregation.” Mr. Trump, for instance, has chosen Australia’s brutal but popular immigration policies as a model: “That is a good idea. We should do that too,” he said in January 2017 to Malcolm Turnbull, Australia’s prime minister at the time, as he explained his tactic of locking up refugees on remote islands. “You are worse than I am,” Mr. Trump told Mr. Turnbull. If right-wing Australian politicians were among the first to mainstream a belligerent white nationalism, the periodicals and television channels of Rupert Murdoch have worked overtime to preserve the alliance between capital and mob in the Anglosphere. Indulged by Mr. Murdoch’s newspapers, writers like Bernard Lewis, Niall Ferguson, David Frum, Andrew Sullivan and Andrew Roberts repeatedly urged American neoconservatives after the Sept. 11 attacks to take up the aging white man’s burden and quell mutinous natives. A broad range of figures in the Anglosphere’s establishment, including some of Mr. Trump’s most ostentatious critics today, contributed manure to the soil in which Trumpism flourishes. Cheered on by the Murdoch press, Tony Blair tried to deepen Britain and America’s “special relationship” in Iraq. Leaders of Australia and Canada also eagerly helped with the torture, rendition and extermination of black and brown brutes. Not surprisingly, these chieftains of white settler colonies are fierce cultural warriors; they are all affiliated with private donors who build platforms where political correctness, Islam and feminism are excoriated, the facts of injustice and inequality denied, chests thumped about a superior but sadly imperiled Western civilization, and fraternal sympathy extended to Israel, the world’s last active settler-colonialist project. Emotional incontinence rather than style or wit marks such gilded networks of white power. For the Anglosphere originally forged and united by the slave trade and colonialism is in terminal crisis today. Whiteness denoted, as Du Bois wrote, “the ownership of the earth forever and ever.” But many descendants of the landlords of the earth find themselves besieged both at home and abroad, their authority as overlords, policemen and interpreters of the globe increasingly challenged. Mr. Trump appears to some of these powerful but insecure men as an able-bodied defender of the “higher races.” The Muslim-baiting British Conservative politician Boris Johnson says that he is “increasingly admiring of Donald Trump.” Mr. Murray, the British journalist, thinks Mr. Trump is “reminding the West of what is great about ourselves.” The Canadian YouTube personality Jordan Peterson claims that his loathing of “identity politics” would have driven him to vote for Mr. Trump. Other panicky white bros not only virulently denounce identity politics and political correctness — code for historically scorned peoples’ daring to propose norms about how they are treated; they also proclaim ever more rowdily that the (white) West was, and is, best. “It is time to make the case for colonialism again,” Bruce Gilley, a Canadian academic, recently asserted and promptly shot to martyrdom in the far-right constellation as a victim of politically correct criticism. Such busy recyclers of Western supremacism, many of whom uphold a disgraced racial pseudoscience, remind us that history often repeats itself as intellectual farce. The low comedy of charlatanry, however, should not distract us from the lethal dangers of a wounded and swaggering identity geopolitics. The war on terror reactivated the 19th century’s imperial archive of racial knowledge, according to which the swarthy enemy was subhuman, inviting extreme and lawless violence. The rapid contraction of suffrage rights witnessed in early-20th-century America is now mimicked by Republican attempts to disenfranchise nonwhite voters. The Australian lawmaker who recently urged a “final solution” for Muslim immigrants was only slightly out of tune with public debate about immigration in Australia. Hate crimes continue to rise across the United States, Britain and Canada. More ominously, demographic, economic and political decline, and the loss of intellectual hegemony, have plunged many long-term winners of history into a vengeful despair. A century ago, the mere suspicion of being thrust aside by black and yellow peoples sparked apocalyptic visions of “race suicide.” Today, the “preponderance of China” that Pearson predicted is becoming a reality, and the religion of whiteness increasingly resembles a suicide cult. Mr. Trump’s trade wars, sanctions, border walls, deportations, denaturalizations and other 11th-hour battles seem to push us all closer to the “terrible probability” James Baldwin once outlined: that the rulers of the “higher races,” “struggling to hold on to what they have stolen from their captives, and unable to look into their mirror, will precipitate a chaos throughout the world which, if it does not bring life on this planet to an end, will bring about a racial war such as the world has never seen.” Thus we endorse diversality – an orientation that recognizes the hybridity of alternative epistemologies that focuses on building mutual connections to build new forms of international relations centered around recognition and not dominance Taylor 12 (Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America, Lucy Taylor, International Studies Review, September 2012, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 386-400 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23280307) // JLHS AA So far, I have focused on politicizing binaries and exposing the colonial wound. This is an important step but it imagines the debate to take place in terms of the colonizer and colonized; what is missing is an appreciation of mixed-ness or mestizaje, a social fact which is integral to theorizing the coloniality of power in the Americas. Here, we return to the colonial difference but emphasize the lived experiences of ‘‘transculturation’’ and ‘‘border thinking.’’ Particularly in Latin America, the colonial wound has generated significant indigenous organizations right across the region, which assert their dignity and political capacity (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Quijano 2008). In doing so, they reveal the existence of the ‘‘colonial difference,’’ marking it as a space of political contestation, but this disjucture is not experienced in the same way by the colonizer and the colonized. While the colonizer, installed in a dominant position, views it as a gap of miscomprehension and disdain, which ‘‘he’’ is not obliged to cross, the colonized must operate in a world dominated by Occidental institutions, languages, and rationales (Mignolo 2000: 64–84). The colonized must incessantly negotiate the colonial difference and reconcile the demands of a colonized reality with cultural meanings embedded in an indigenous worldview. Politicizing this mestizaje is key to decolonial politics, and Gloria Anzaldu´a’s notion of ‘‘border thinking,’’ a Latin American response to hybridity, offers significant insights (Mignolo 2000: 49–90; Anzaldu´a 2007). Anzaldu´a’s vision of hybridity is rooted not in the intricacies of intellectual debate or psychoanalysis but draws on her real-life experiences of living between the labels which attach to the binaries so essential to Occidental thinking. Anzaldu´a grew up and lived on the US–Mexico border: she was a Chicana feminist daughter of share-croppers, a Marxist indı´gena mestiza and seventh generation lesbian citizen of the United States (Keating 2009: 1–15). Living at the intersection of so many boundaries (geographical, sexual, political, linguistic, racial) did not leave her feeling incomplete or dismembered, though; her response was to say: ‘‘They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. You say my name is ambivalence?... Who me, confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me’’ (Anzaldu´a 1984; quoted in Keating 2009: 17). By asserting her completeness, she demonstrates the fallacy of the labels. Anzaldu´a borrowed a Nahuatl word to express the space that she inhabited between these tagged categories: nepantla or (roughly) the place at the broken edges. She explained the technique of border thinking in one poem: ‘‘Because I, a mestiza, continually walk out of one culture, and into another, because I am in all cultures at the same time, alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro,...’’ (Anzaldu´a 2007: 99) This vision of human agency derived from inhabiting border lands serves to disempower the idea of the border as a stopping point controlled by the state. That the state which she traversed in real life was the US–Mexico border only heightens the powerfulness of her critique and the subversive potential of her work for both IR and the Americas. Equally important, though, is the concept of transculturation, which indicates that processes of hybridity have not only shaped the lives of subaltern groups, but have also conditioned White
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