DA - Turkish Politics - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
DA - Turkish Politics - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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Erdoğan Disadvantage NOTES The thesis of the DA is that Erdogan (the president of Turkey) is facing a lot of backlash now because of the economy. That normally would TKO the DA on uniqueness, but the trick is that the way he’s dealing that is ramping up anti-NATO rhetoric and actions to divert the attention of the Turkish public. The AFF would be a flip flop by having him accept American aid and cooperation, which would cause a) him not be able to campaign on this and b) cause his base to backlash. In order to regain support with his constituents, he will start a war with Greece which escalates. Links and thumpers — this DA is based around generic cooperation, most of the AT: Thumpers (in the link section) are also independent link arguments you can make. If you are trying to diversify, look there even if they don’t read the thumper One strength of the argument is that NATO cohesion is absolutely wrecked by a Turkey-Greece war. One weakness of this argument is that if Turkey says no to the plan, there is no DA link and there’s potentially a link turn. 1NC 1NC “Say yes” means Erdogan caves to a US-led NATO initiative. That wrecks his current political strategy that requires distancing from the West and absolute prioritization of the Turkish-led agenda Daou 6/22 — Mark Daou is a political activist and politician. He cites David Rigoulet-Roze, a Doctor of Political Science, teacher and researcher, who specializes in the Middle East region. “With an eye on re-election, Turkey’s Erdogan risks the ire of Western partners," France 24, 6-22-2022, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220622-with-an-eye-on-re-election-turkey-s-erdogan-risks-the-ire-of-western-partners, accessed 6-24-2022, WMK Between stalling Sweden and Finland’s bids for NATO membership and threatening a fresh military offensive against Kurds in northern Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to be capitalising on the world’s focus on Ukraine to strengthen Ankara’s geopolitical standing – even at the expense of NATO and Western partners. Such moves may be targeting a domestic audience ahead of June 2023 presidential elections, with Erdogan trying to galvanise nationalist sentiment as a worsening economic crisis threatens his popularity at home. In recent weeks, Erdogan has once again complicated Turkey’s relationship with its NATO allies – stalling Swedish and Finnish plans to join the bloc; threatening another military incursion into northern Syria; refusing to join Western sanctions against Russia; and reviving tensions with perennial rival Greece over the Aegean islands. The Turkish president seems keen to take advantage of the West’s focus on the Ukraine war, using bellicose rhetoric in defence of Turkey’s interests and imposing his own conditions on top of European and US priorities. Talks in Brussels on Monday on the latest NATO accession bids led to “clear progress” on some issues, a Finnish presidential aide said. But Turkey threw a spanner into the works – demanding Sweden and Finland take action against the "terrorists" of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) before approving their accession – ahead of next week’s NATO summit in Madrid. Erdogan is all too aware that Swedish and Finnish accession would be a landmark expansion for the transatlantic alliance, with both nations jettisoning their longstanding Cold War neutrality amid a re-emergent Russian threat. ‘Imposing his agenda’ Ankara sees both countries – and Sweden, especially – as too close to the PKK, which has been waging a guerrilla war in Turkey since 1984 punctuated by periodic ceasefires. A militant insurgency that dreams of an independent Kurdish state uniting southeastern Turkey, northern Syria, northern Iraq and a small slice of northeastern Iran, the PKK has been designated a terrorist group by both the EU and the United States. Erdogan says he wants “concrete” and “serious” steps from Sweden and Finland before he allows them into NATO. In effect, he wants them to bargain with him directly to get the green light. The Turkish president also wants Western countries to lift the restrictions on arms and technology exports imposed in late 2019 after a Turkish attack on Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) were instrumental in defeating the Islamic State group in Syria and a key ally of the US-led international coalition battling the jihadists. “By raising the prospect of a new offensive against Kurdish forces in northern Syria and threatening to block Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO applications, Erdogan is trying to show that he won’t compromise on Turkish nationalist causes – and that he can impose his agenda and priorities in the international arena,” said David Rigoulet-Roze, a Middle East specialist at the IRIS (French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs) think-tank in Paris. Moreover, Erdogan is “trying to compensate for his disastrous management of the Turkish economy, to shore up his electoral base and mobilise voters ahead of the forthcoming elections, which look rather complicated for him”, Rigoulet-Roze continued. ‘Like a poker player’ With both presidential and parliamentary elections coming up in a year’s time, Erdogan’s geopolitical chess game with the West could well offer him an electoral boon. A German Marshall Fund poll published in April showed that 58.3 percent of Turks see the US as the “biggest threat” to Turkey’s “national interests” while 62.4 percent believe European countries want to “divide and disintegrate Turkey as they had the Ottoman Empire in the past”. An even bigger number, 69.8 percent, believe European countries have helped strengthen separatist organisations like the PKK. “Erdogan is a real political animal; he acts like a poker player on the world stage,” said Rigoulet-Roze. “But there’s often a domestic agenda lurking behind his games with the West – and his various postures in the global arena are nothing more than a response to domestic problems and a reflection of his desire to keep his grip on power.” The Turkish president is more than happy to pursue policies with an eye on the domestic agenda even if it means irritating the West – as witnessed in recent years by the decision to drill in disputed parts of the Mediterranean and the controversial purchase of an S-400 missile system from Russia. Erdogan makes such moves on an “ad-hoc” basis, Rigoulet-Roze said, instead of working from an overarching strategy. “For the most part, they’re provocative acts – Erdogan knows he can’t burn bridges with the West or remake the world on his terms.” Indeed, Erdogan is all too aware that the EU is still Turkey’s largest trading partner (it is part of the customs union) and that the US became Turkey’s third-largest export market in 2020. ‘Extremely vulnerable’ More recently, Erdogan has refused to join Western sanctions on Russia. Ankara does not want to “antagonise Russia” because the beleaguered Turkish economy is “extremely vulnerable” to a loss of Russian wheat and energy supplies, according to Howard Eissenstat, a Turkey specialist at St. Lawrence University in New York and the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, speaking in a March interview. Erdogan also riled Western leaders over the past few weeks by hosting Venezuela’s autocratic far-left President Nicolas Maduro for talks on June 8; neither the EU nor the United States recognises Maduro’s regime as legitimate. A further provocation to the West came in early June, when the Turkish president announced he would end regular bilateral meetings with the Greek government aimed at building co-operation after decades of antagonism between these historic enemies. Ankara claims that Athens is stationing troops on Aegean islands near the Turkish shore in violation of peace treaties and has threatened to reopen a debate on ownership of the islands. “On the surface it sometimes looks like Erdogan is the master of this game against the West – but in reality he’s testing them each time, seeing how far he can go, seeing if he can make some sort of geopolitical win on the regional chessboard or an economic win to try and relieve the financial pressure Turkey is under,” Rigoulet-Roze said. “Erdogan’s position isn’t as comfortable as it looks, because he risks really antagonising all the other NATO members and making Turkey the black sheep of the alliance.” Erdogan is trying to make Turkey a great power again – on the global as well as regional stage. “Erdogan is very nostalgic for Ottoman imperial grandeur, which has a profound resonance in the contemporary Turkish psyche – this idea that Turkey must once again be recognised as a great power, even if it can’t have an empire,” Rigoulet-Roze said. “Unfortunately for Erdogan, reality constrains these ambitions, because Turkey’s considerable economic difficulties mean it can’t afford to be isolated.” Over the previous two decades, Erdogan’s moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has won and kept power because it “assured Turks of sustained improvements in living standards”, Rigoulet-Roze said. But that reputation for economic competence is gone, putting Erdogan at odds with millions of transactional voters he has relied on for support. Hence his diplomatic overtures to the wealthy Gulf petro-monarchies he previously scorned. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began his first official visit to Turkey on Wednesday, with several agreements expected between the two Middle Eastern powers. Erdogan went to Saudi Arabia at the end of April after three and a half years of vexed relations between Ankara and Riyadh following the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. For all his troubles, Erdogan knows that Turkey’s geographic location – at the crossroads of Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East – makes it essential to the West from a strategic perspective. The Cold War is long gone, but the factors that motivated NATO to make Turkey the only Middle Eastern member of the Alliance in 1952 have not gone away. As much as Erdogan’s threats to the Swedish and Finnish accession bids rile NATO members, they know they need to engage with him. But while much remains the same, the nature of Turkish politics has changed a great deal since the Cold War, Rigoulet-Roze observed. Back then, Turkey was “secular, anti-communist, pro-Western and pro-European; things have become very different since Erdogan and the AKP took power, making Turkey into a nation dominated by an Islamo-nationalist party that is, at the very least, non-aligned”. NATO cooperation decimates Erdogan’s support Tremblay 22 — Pinar Tremblay Professor in the Economics department at California State Polytechnic University - Pomona (Brendan Tremblays mom lol) "Turkish public support for NATO declines," Al-Monitor, 3-8-2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/turkish-public-support-nato-declines, accessed 6-20-2022 WMK Public opinion also seems to support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s policy on the conflict. Indeed, perceptions of NATO in Turkey are rather negative, even at a time when countries like Finland and Sweden are considering joining the organization. While there have not been polls on support for NATO since the invasion began, in recent years Turkey has consistently ranked as having the lowest support for NATO among member states. In January 2022, Metropoll polling agency released an interesting finding. When asked the question, "In its foreign policy, should Turkey give priority to Russia and China or to the US and the EU?” 39.4% opted for the Russia and China options, while 37.5% said the EU and the US. And recent statements by various figures seem to indicate sentiments are not changing. For example, a Turkish businessman known for his outspoken love for Erdogan traveled to Moscow last week, where he described NATO as a “cancer.” Speaking to Russian media, Ethem Sancak, who is a former member of Erdogan's ruling party, also accused NATO of supporting coups against the various Turkish governments, including the 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan’s government. Sancak also claimed that Turkey “did not know” that the combat drones supplied to Ukraine by Turkey “would be used like this" against Russia. So far, there has been no comment on Sancak’s remarks from ruling party officials in Turkey. Yet anti-NATO sentiment is prevailing in large segments of Turkish society from both sides of the political spectrum. Erkan Bas, the leader of the leftist Turkey Workers Party (TIP), also described the alliance as a terrorist organization while he was calling for peace in Ukraine. The sentiment has been growing steadily in the last decade. Indeed, at a time when foreign policy experts question whether Erdogan’s “both Russia and Ukraine are our friends” policy is sustainable, there are divisions within the ruling party bigwigs as well. While Erdogan’s son-in-law’s family, the manufacturer of the Bayraktar drones supplied to Ukraine, openly supports Ukraine and stands up against the invasion, Erdogan’s ultranationalist allies rally for Russia. Not much support for NATO comes from Islamists, ultranationalists or leftists. Rather, anyone who might dare to make a positive comment about NATO could be placed under the label “pro-American” or a “foreign agent.” Indeed, 2019 PEW research reveals that the Turkish public has the lowest favorable ratings of NATO among member states, with only 21% of those polled stating a positive view of the alliance. In the same year, non-NATO member countries such as Ukraine and Sweden held 53% and 63% favorable ratings of the organization, respectively. There is only one non-NATO country, Russia, where the public holds a less favorable rating of NATO than Turkey, with 16%. The Turkish public’s low-level approval of NATO has been consistently the lowest among member countries since 2011, according to PEW, ranging between 15% to 25%. PEW’s findings confirm left and right uniting in their disdain of NATO. What are the causes of this unfavorability of the organization? Political scientist Burak Ozpek told Al-Monitor one of the potent reasons is the lack of credible information about NATO in the news. “Populist politicians and even academics appear on TV making rather childish and slogan-styled comments about international relations. Media is overrun by these appearances. We do not hear the facts. We do not hear NATO is a security alliance. We do not hear Turkey is a long-time member. We do not hear the benefits of being a NATO member. In the last couple of years, anti-American rhetoric is on the rise in Turkish politics and authoritarian tendencies find support in Russia,” Ozpek told Al-Monitor. “All the marginal voices about NATO and conspiracy theories have become mainstream. Hence, now the invasion of Ukraine is not perceived as a smaller state being attacked by a stronger one, but rather a battle between NATO and Russia.” Erdogan starts a diversionary war against Greece to regain popular support Choulis et al. 21 — Ioannis Choulis Assistant Lecturer Department of Government, Marius Mehrl Postdoctoral Researcher at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science, University of Munich. Kostas Ifantis is Professor of International Relations, Department of International, European and Area Studies, Panteion University of Athens. (2021) Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020, Defence and Peace Economics, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2021.1933312 WMK Despite not being a top security priority, Greek-Turkish relations are still regarded as a serious external threat in Ankara (Gürsoy 2017:6). The Aegean dispute, especially contests over territorial waters and airspace, is present in every Turkish National Security Policy Document (Gürcanli 2014). Moreover, a series of surveys between 2017 and 2019 reveal that 43.2% of Turks consider Greece a threat to Turkey and 59.7% oppose mending the Greek-Turkish relations (Aydin et al. 2020:66–69). The importance of Greece in Turkish strategic considerations is also evident from the increased number of airspace violations throughout the last decade. Violations of the Greek-claimed airspace offer significant benefits to Ankara, both internationally and domestically. In the international arena, the continued Turkish objection to the status of the Aegean islands will be helpful for future negotiations or arbitration since they act as a proof of Turkish claims in the region. Additionally, airspace violations bring the issue of territory on the bilateral agenda to force Greece to acknowledge the dispute over the island status and engage with it. What’s more, airspace incursions serve as Ankara’s direct challenge to Greek sovereignty over the area and are seen as part of long-term planning to ‘Finlandize’ Greece and Cyprus (Williams 2010; Ifantis and Triantaphyllou 2018). Internationally, the airspace violations thus serve as a tool to project Turkish sovereignty claims on the contested territory. Domestically, the incursions may allow the ruling party to gain points with its constituents. Particularly in the last years, the AKP has become challenged electorally and had to accept the ultranationalist MHP as junior coalition partner (Ulgen 2018). Likewise, the Turkish economy has stagnated and inflation is soaring. In such times of domestic challenges, governments have an incentive for diversionary behaviour, and given the historic rivalry, Greece is a particularly likely target for Turkish acts of diversion (Mitchell and Prins 2004; Mitchell and Thyne 2010, Tir 2020). To that end, Mehrl and Choulis (2021) find that the number of Turkish incursions in the Greek-claimed airspace increases when leader approval ratings are low. Incursions into the contested airspace may thus also serve as acts of diversion for Ankara, benefitting its domestic position. Turkish incursions in the Greek claimed airspace also enable the Turkish armed forces to gather data on Greek air defences, such as response times, that may be useful for future military endeavours. Consequently, as long as the risk of an escalatory response is sufficiently low, the costs of Turkish airspace incursions, namely operational costs and potential accidents, are outweighed by the benefits. Greece war goes nuclear – accidental and intentional escalation is likely Psaropoulos 18 (John Psaropoulos, independent journalist based in Athens, with two decades of experience covering Greece, Cyprus and southeast Europe. Freelance correspondent for Al Jazeera International, NPR, the Daily Beast and others; “Greece vs. Turkey: Are We Headed for an Intra-NATO War?”; Washington Examiner; 3/28/18; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/greece-vs-turkey-are-we-headed-for-an-intra-nato-war kp) The Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey hosts one of the world’s highest concentrations of high-tech weaponry. Sixty-seven surface ships and two dozen submarines are deployed on a body of water the size of Lake Superior. The two air forces command 448 fighter jets armed with smart bombs and guided missiles. On land, 832 heavy tanks and more than 2,500 lighter artillery vehicles—as much tank firepower as in all the rest of Europe combined—could rapidly be brought to bear along a Greek-Turkish border only 105 miles long. These arsenals, built up over decades and constantly modernized, were not merely a boon to U.S. and German defence contractors. Western policymakers wanted to believe that loyalty to NATO’s mission of containing the USSR, rather than regional rivalries, motivated this exemplary level of Greek and Turkish defense spending. After the Soviet Union collapsed, good diplomacy and Turkey’s EU aspirations made it possible, most of the time, to overlook the downsides of an arms race between uneasy neighbors. Recently, however, the Aegean has become a dangerously narrow sea. For decades, Turkish military aircraft have r
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