Aff - OCOs 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
Aff - OCOs 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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Aff---OCOs 2---BFHR Notes Thanks a ton to Chanden Climaco, Brandon Yang, and Marshall Green for their work on this file. Wave 2 of OCO’s aff/neg builds upon the starter pack OCO’s aff/neg file --- the NSA and Cybercom Tradeoff DA’s are designed to ideally apply to as many cyber affs as possible. The NSA DA in this file doesn’t reproduce every card in the starter pack. The aff section includes AT: new disads, a new zero-days mod, and various aff patchwork updates. Please email khirn10@gmail.com with any questions or concerns OCO Aff Updates Case Zero-Days Good---1AC NATO OCO doctrine solves zero-day vulnerabilities---intel sharing improves warfighting outcomes, while disclosure enables allied to protect vulnerable networks from attacks Fiddler 15. Marilyn Fiddler - Marshall Scholar, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford; Summer, 2015; “Regulating the Zero-Day Vulnerability Trade:A Preliminary Analysis”; I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 11, 405. https://www.academia.edu/37789953/Regulating_the_Zero-Day_Vulnerability_Trade_A_Preliminary_Analysis //BY 2. Analysis of NATO as an Institution for Zero-Day Trade Discussions NATO is an influential body, and, if it addressed trade in zero-days, its policies would have global importance. NATO has been relatively successful in addressing new collective defense challenges, so it may have the institutional flexibility to take on zero-days. NATO membership maps well with participants in the zero-day market, including countries with notable buyers and sellers. Additionally, because NATO is a collective defense organization for allies, conceptions of the underlying security problem and opinions about approach may be more aligned than among states not engaged in collective defense. Given the difficulties of other forms of international cooperation, achieving consensus among allies might be strategically attractive. NATO has developed a focus on cyber defense, and zero-days are relevant to that agenda. Not only could trade in zero-days facilitate attacks against NATO networks, but the stockpiling behavior of member states also leaves other members vulnerable. Key NATO members, such as the United States and United Kingdom, are purchasers of zero-days. 327 NATO's commitment to cyber defense has resulted in the development of a cyber policy- and decision-making structure and processes that could also be used to address the zero-day issue without significant alteration. Despite this institutional base, NATO would have to experience a policy shift before addressing zero-days. Zero-days are inherently [*479] exploitable: although they have significant implications for cyber defense, they are also closely tied with offensive capabilities of member states and the potential for NATO offensive capabilities. NATO, as an organization, is currently not positioned to discuss offensive cyber issues and has demonstrated wariness of an expanded cyber mandate. Still, as demonstrated by Libya and Russia's actions in Crimea, cyber is an increasing reality of security threats facing NATO. NATO must address cyber capabilities, not just passive cyber defense. Zero-days, as a technology that overlaps both categories, could be a useful place to start this shift. If this shift occurred, NATO could use its existing structure to foster guidelines for addressing zero-days. The Cyber Defense Management Board (CDMB), which implemented the 2011 Action Plan, could be a starting place for discussions about zero-day policy. NATO could do this in several ways, including using CDMB to increase transparency and information sharing about zero-day issues within member states. For instance, NATO could establish zero-day a threat-sharing program, in which governments share information about the nature of the zero-day threats they face. This kind of program would probably be least resisted by member states, but NATO could go further. NATO could institute a group disclosure program: when one member stockpiles a vulnerability, it could also disclose the vulnerability to a NATO clearinghouse. NATO members could then protect themselves against that vulnerability or make use of it. NATO could also push for harmonized purchasing policies, perhaps agreeing that NATO members will only purchase or stockpile certain vulnerabilities from certain countries or suppliers. Allied cyperwarfare enables rapid crisis response and the use of OCO’s in warfighting Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14703] In comparison, the zero-days used in cyber weapons require the US to constantly discover new vulnerabilities to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. Holding a specific zero-day does not guarantee that the vulnerability will remain unpatched for a prolonged period of time by the targeted state.59 Complicating this is the fact that undetected vulnerabilities, once acquired, are rarely used immediately given the time and resources it takes to construct a cyber attack.60 In the time between acquisition and use, a patch for the vulnerability may be released, whether through routine patches or a specific identification of a security hole, rendering the vulnerability obsolete. To minimize this, America deploys several zero-days at once in a cyber attack to increase the odds that at least one (or more) of the vulnerabilities remains open to provide system access.61 Multiple backdoor entry points are preferable given that America cannot be absolutely certain of what vulnerabilities the target system will contain62 despite extensive pre-launch cyber attack testing63 and customization.64 A successful cyber attack needs a minimum of one undetected vulnerability to gain access to the target system. Each successive zero-day that works adds to the strength and sophistication of a cyber assault.65 As one vulnerability is patched, America can still rely on the other undetected vulnerabilities to continue its cyber strike. Incorporating multiple undetected vulnerabilities into a cyber attack reduces the need to create new cyber attacks after each zero-day fails. Stuxnet, a joint US-Israel operation, was a cyber attack designed to disrupt Iran’s progress on its nuclear weapons program.66 The attack was designed to alter the code of Natanz’s computers and industrial control systems to induce “chronic fatigue,” rather than destruction, of the nuclear centrifuges.67 The precision of Stuxnet ensured that all other control systems were ignored except for those regulating the centrifuges.68 What is notable about Stuxnet is its use of four zero-day exploits (of which one was allegedly purchased)69 in the attack.70 That is, to target one system, Stuxnet entered through four different backdoors. A target state aware of a specific vulnerability in its system will enact a patch upon detection and likely assume that the problem is fixed. Exploiting multiple vulnerabilities creates variations in how the attack is executed given that different backdoors alter how the attack enters the target system.71 One patch does not stop the cyber attack. The use of multiple zero-days thus capitalizes on a state’s limited awareness of the vulnerabilities in its system. Each phase of Stuxnet was different from its previous phase which created confusion among the Iranians. Launched in 2009, Stuxnet was not discovered by the Iranians until 2010.72 Yet even upon the initial discovery of the attack, who the attacker was remained unclear. The failures in the Natanz centrifuges were first attributed to insider error73 and later to China74 before finally discovering the true culprits.75 The use of multiple undetected vulnerabilities helped to obscure the US and Israel as the actual attackers.76 The Stuxnet case helps illustrate the efficacy of zero-day attacks as a means of attaining political goals. Although Stuxnet did not produce immediate results in terminating Iran’s nuclear program, it helped buy time for the Americans to consider other options against Iran. A nuclear Iran would not only threaten American security but possibly open a third conflict for America77 in the Middle East given Israel’s proclivity to strike a nuclear Iran first. Stuxnet allowed the United States to delay Iran’s nuclear program without resorting to kinetic action.78 Solves rogue state prolif Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14703] Actively seeking to exploit and plant vulnerabilities helps the United States maintain a competitive advantage. Nuclear or conventional weapons, once developed, can remain dormant yet functional until needed. In comparison, the zero-days used in cyber weapons require the US to constantly discover new vulnerabilities to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. Holding a specific zero-day does not guarantee that the vulnerability will remain unpatched for a prolonged period of time by the targeted state.59 Complicating this is the fact that undetected vulnerabilities, once acquired, are rarely used immediately given the time and resources it takes to construct a cyber attack.60 In the time between acquisition and use, a patch for the vulnerability may be released, whether through routine patches or a specific identification of a security hole, rendering the vulnerability obsolete. To minimize this, America deploys several zero-days at once in a cyber attack to increase the odds that at least one (or more) of the vulnerabilities remains open to provide system access.61 2.4. One Attack, Multiple Vulnerabilities Multiple backdoor entry points are preferable given that America cannot be absolutely certain of what vulnerabilities the target system will contain62 despite extensive pre-launch cyber attack testing63 and customization.64 A successful cyber attack needs a minimum of one undetected vulnerability to gain access to the target system. Each successive zero-day that works adds to the strength and sophistication of a cyber assault.65 As one vulnerability is patched, America can still rely on the other undetected vulnerabilities to continue its cyber strike. Incorporating multiple undetected vulnerabilities into a cyber attack reduces the need to create new cyber attacks after each zero-day fails. Stuxnet, a joint US-Israel operation, was a cyber attack designed to disrupt Iran’s progress on its nuclear weapons program.66 The attack was designed to alter the code of Natanz’s computers and industrial control systems to induce “chronic fatigue,” rather than destruction, of the nuclear centrifuges.67 The precision of Stuxnet ensured that all other control systems were ignored except for those regulating the centrifuges.68 What is notable about Stuxnet is its use of four zero-day exploits (of which one was allegedly purchased)69 in the attack.70 That is, to target one system, Stuxnet entered through four different backdoors. A target state aware of a specific vulnerability in its system will enact a patch upon detection and likely assume that the problem is fixed. Exploiting multiple vulnerabilities creates variations in how the attack is executed given that different backdoors alter how the attack enters the target system.71 One patch does not stop the cyber attack. The use of multiple zero-days thus capitalizes on a state’s limited awareness of the vulnerabilities in its system. Each phase of Stuxnet was different from its previous phase which created confusion among the Iranians. Launched in 2009, Stuxnet was not discovered by the Iranians until 2010.72 Yet even upon the initial discovery of the attack, who the attacker was remained unclear. The failures in the Natanz centrifuges were first attributed to insider error73 and later to China74 before finally discovering the true culprits.75 The use of multiple undetected vulnerabilities helped to obscure the US and Israel as the actual attackers.76 The Stuxnet case helps illustrate the efficacy of zero-day attacks as a means of attaining political goals. Although Stuxnet did not produce immediate results in terminating Iran’s nuclear program, it helped buy time for the Americans to consider other options against Iran. A nuclear Iran would not only threaten American security but possibly open a third conflict for America77 in the Middle East given Israel’s proclivity to strike a nuclear Iran first. Stuxnet allowed the United States to delay Iran’s nuclear program without resorting to kinetic action.78 Extinction Kassenova 20 (Togzhan Kassenova – nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. <KEN> "The Exploitation of the Global Financial Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/04/exploitation-of-global-financial-systems-for-weapons-of-mass-destruction-wmd-proliferation-pub-81221) 1. WMD PROLIFERATION AS A SECURITY RISK1 Weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - present a persistent risk to the U.S. and international security. If a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, like the one tested by North Korea in 2013, is dropped in Washington, DC, a fireball of almost 500 feet in radius will cover the city.2 The radiation will reach such high levels within a half a mile radius that 50-90% percent of people could die without medical help – some of them within hours. When it comes to preventing WMD proliferation, we need to be conscious of both state and non-state actors. North Korea continues to procure sensitive goods for its nuclear and missile program in defiance of sanctions. Iran is procuring missile-related goods. Agents working on behalf of Syria have sought chemical goods on the commercial market. Several groups, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, demonstrated interest in acquiring a WMD capability. We do not have a full picture of who might be interested in obtaining a WMD capability in the future. 2. How Proliferation Networks Operate Stealing or buying a ready-made weapon is a next to impossible feat. The main path to a WMD is to procure components, material, and technology and then build a weapon. Because most goods usable in a WMD program are dual-use in nature, with indispensable civilian purposes, they are available on the international commercial market. The international community attempts to minimize the risk that trade in dual-use and military goods entails. The international export control regimes and national export control systems are designed to regulate trade in sensitive items by requiring traders to obtain licenses. Additionally, the international and unilateral sanctions regimes target known proliferators. The goal of proliferators and their agents is to acquire goods that can contribute to WMD programs without being caught. Proliferators and their networks continue to defy both export controls and sanctions. Proliferation networks come in all sizes and shapes. They can be small or large, loose, or more organized. Those buying WMD-related goods can be directly connected to proliferator states, or they can do it purely for profit by inserting themselves into the illicit market to make money. Proliferators have perfected methods that help them stay under the radar.3 One of the standard techniques they use is to buy goods that are slightly below the controlled threshold. This means that unless exporting companies are incredibly vigilant,4 they would not apply for an export license and subject transaction to government scrutiny. However, these slightly inferior goods can still be used for nefarious purposes. There is another method proliferators use to avoid government oversight and licensing—they pretend they are ordering goods for a domestic company. In such cases, supplier companies do not have to apply for licenses. To avoid export controls and sanctions, proliferators lie about the end-use and end-user and hide behind front and shell companies all the time. They never declare that they are buying components for North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s missile program, or Syria’s chemical arsenal. For example, they can tell a supplying company they need goods for scientific research or other peaceful purposes. In 2006, an Iranian company ordered sensitive bioresearch equipment from Norway purportedly for a scientific laboratory. On closer look, an attentive Norwegian supplier determined that the equipment Iranians sought was technically superior to what would be necessary for a civilian lab and that it did not fit the physical layout of the laboratory.5 Increasingly, shipping companies and vessels are used prominently in sanction evasion. For example, Iran and North Korea falsify documents, reflag vessels, and switch off automatic identification systems to avoid being discovered in the process of illicit transfers of goods.6 Supplier companies that provide goods to proliferators can be complicit or not complicit. Larger companies have resources to implement strong internal compliance programs that help them detect any suspicious orders. But some companies, especially smaller ones, do not have resources to invest in compliance and remain negligent. In some cases, supplier companies or individuals within know precisely what they are doing. They do it either because of ideology (to support a sanctioned state) or for profit. In one notorious case, a U.S.-based company MKS Instruments sent pressure transducers to its subsidiary in China after duly applying for a U.S. export license, thinking that the goods would be used in China. The co-opted employee of the MKS Instruments’ subsidiary ordered transducers from an unsuspecting parent company and pretended they would be used by Chinese companies but planned all along to ship those goods to Iran.7 Pressure transducers can be used in uranium enrichment centrifuges, making possible the production of fissile material that can also be used in a nuclear weapon. Proliferators prefer to buy good quality goods – mostly from the U.S., European, and Asian suppliers. This means that in most cases, they have to pay for those goods through the formal financial system, making financial institutions part of their proliferation schemes. Zero-Days Good---2AC Zero-days key to cyber warfighting Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14703] The Internet has made information seeking easier given its lax security structure that privileges offense over defence. Where the US once relied on its own ingenuity to support its national security innovations, it can now also purchase the necessary tools keep up with its peer competitors in cyberspace. Buying zero days in the vulnerabilities market thus serves a dual purpose: it takes away potential attack tools from its adversaries while building America’s own cyber arsenal. The problem, however, is that zero days may not work when you need them. Unlike nuclear or conventional weapons, there is no guarantee that an acquired zero-day can remain dormant yet functional. As a result, the US must consistently discover and collect zero-days to maintain a deployable cyber arsenal. America, despite its cyber superiority, cannot credibly threaten to use crushing cyber power to defeat its adversaries without revealing part of its capabilities. Compounding this problem is the fact that a cyber attack alone, while disruptive, is survivable at this time. America is thus experiencing a shift in its security strategy, albeit incrementally. What previously worked in the physical domain does not necessarily translate into successful primacy in the electronic domain. Although Cold War models of deterrence by denial and retributi
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