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2022 Michigan Evidence

Impacts - China War Good Bad - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

Impacts - China War Good Bad - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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China War Good
2NC---China War Good
China war is inevitable---uncertainty from each side creates structural incentives that make war probable
Yoder, 1/28 Brandon K. Yoder, Ph.D., Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Centre on Asia and Globalisation, January 28th, 2019, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, Issue 1, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-019-09606-1, EO
This logic has not been well-recognized by either US foreign policymakers or scholars of US-China relations, however. On economic issues, the US adopted a strategy of unconditional cooperation for the first two decades of China’s rise. This strategy was not necessarily misguided. However, absent any degree of hedging by the US, China’s cooperation with the US-led economic order should have been seen as largely non-credible. A rising China had strong incentives to misrepresent any hypothetically-revisionist intentions it might have held, as long as doing so would elicit continued US accommodation that facilitated China’s rapid power gains. Yet many China experts took China’s cooperative behavior during this period at face value, ignoring its incentives to misrepresent and drawing overly optimistic conclusions that China truly shared American preferences for the international order [29, 32, 56, 61].
Even more troublingly, the Trump administration has recently expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile, and consequently begun to implement policies of escalating economic containment toward China. Yet this conclusion is also unwarranted: China’s revisionist behavior has been generally limited to its territorial disputes in the South China Sea, whereas its economic and institutional actions are either ambiguous or supportive of the US-led liberal order [31].
Ironically, the Trump administration’s emerging strategy of economic containment, which has been adopted due to ill-formed pessimistic beliefs about China’s intentions, lends considerable (though incomplete) credibility to China’s cooperative signals on economic and institutional dimensions. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic containment, this is a much more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation. Thus, current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty and updating their beliefs in response to China’s subsequent behavior, policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and are initiating what appears to be a strategy of unconditional containment.
Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and US-China Relations
The Thucydides trap is not a new concept – it is fundamentally equivalent to what Jack Levy referred to more than three decades ago as the preventive motivation for war [9, 42]. When a declining state knows that its preferences conflict with those of a rising state, war can occur due to the well-known “commitment problem,” which refers to a rising state’s inability to commit to not use its future power gains to exploit the declining state [13, 54]. Under complete information, there is always a range of peaceful bargains that both the riser and decliner would prefer to war, if the bargain could be guaranteed to endure into the future. However, as the rising state gains power its bargaining leverage would increase, giving it an ex post incentive to revise the settlement in its own favor at the decliner’s expense. Thus, when the power shift is sufficiently large, the declining state prefers a winner-take-all war in the present to the eventual settlement the riser will impose in the future if the decliner were to acquiesce to the power shift.
Note, however, that the commitment problem obtains only when the rising and declining states have sufficiently divergent preferences over the shape of the international order. If the rising and declining states have highly compatible preferences, the decliner sacrifices little by allowing the riser to gain power. This “benign” riser (from the decliner’s perspective) would simply use its power to maintain the same order that the decliner prefers. Conversely, however, if the riser’s preferences are highly incompatible with the decliner’s, then it will use its power gains to radically revise the international order in ways that are at odds with the decliner’s preferences. It is with this sort of “hostile” rising state that commitment problems obtain under complete information, yielding strong incentives for the decliner to initiate preventive war. Commitment problems do not obtain when the rising state is known to be benign ([36]:119; [67]).
This raises the question of what the decliner should do when it is uncertain about the compatibility of the rising state’s preferences with its own. As discussed below, this is the situation that characterizes contemporary US-China relations. It is this sort of uncertainty that lies at the heart of the security dilemma, the phenomenon by which conflict can occur even between states with mutually-compatible preferences due to misplaced (but rational) distrust of the other’s intentions. Under the combination of shifting power and uncertainty, commitment problems potentially obtain if the rising state turns out to be hostile. In this case, the decliner may not be willing to risk accommodating the rising state if the consequences of exploitation by a hostile riser outweigh the benefits of cooperation with a benign one. Instead, the decliner would initiate preventive conflict. Yet because there is some probability that the rising state is actually benign, this opens up the possibility of “tragic” conflict between truly compatible states. If uncertainty about the riser’s intentions cannot be overcome, or at least mitigated, a sufficiently large power shift would produce war even between rational states whose interests do not conflict at all.
A prominent subset of realist scholars has compellingly argued that this is often the case: large power shifts engender formidable barriers to the credibility of rising states’ cooperative signals, such that uncertainty about others’ intentions is intractable and declining states must make worst-case assumptions about rising states’ intentions [9, 12, 45, 53]. This is because hostile rising states have strong incentives to misrepresent their intentions while relatively weak, by mimicking the cooperative behaviors of benign risers and refraining from attempting to revise the international order. These realists argue that for hostile risers the costs of foregoing immediate revision are outweighed by the prospects of avoiding opposition from the decliner and attempting revision under a more favorable distribution of power in the future. As such, if cooperative signals are likely to be sent by both benign and hostile risers alike, such signals are non-credible, and declining states should remain highly uncertain about any rising state’s future intentions. This exacerbates the security dilemma, and gives declining states strong incentives to take preventive action even against risers that have exhibited cooperative behavior.
This barrier to credible signaling during power shifts has also been applied to contemporary US-China relations. For many realists, it is entirely possible that “China is just practicing common sense and behaving itself until it is a more powerful and consolidated entity” ([33]:203), and “pursuing a peaceful policy today in order to strengthen itself to confront the United States tomorrow” ([40]:14). As such, a common conclusion has been that “we cannot tell much about China’s future behavior, because it [currently] has such limited capacity to act aggressively” ([46]:385).
Chinese CRISPR causes extinction---global bioweapons war and irreversible infertility
Adrian Rauchfleisch and Marko Kovic 17 {Adrian Rauchfleisch, Ph.D. is a co-founder and on the board of directors of the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research. Marko Kovic, CEO of arscognitionis. 6-6-2018. “Careless CRISPR in China: How to regulate the unimaginable?” https://zipar.org/short-term-challenge/careless-crispr-in-china/}//JM
What is CRISPR all about? CRISPR (or CRISPR-Cas9) stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats which are “systems that can be programmed to target specific stretches of genetic code and to edit DNA at precise locations”.3 In short, researchers can permanently modify genes in living organisms with CRISPR. In the early 2000s scientists first started to name specific repeat regions in bacterial genomes CRISPR. Around 2010 scientists showed that together with the protein Cas9 it is possible to target specific DNA sequences and in 2012 researchers demonstrated that it is possible to delete or replace any gene in an organism’s genome.4 As happens often in the history of science, different research groups published their discoveries at the same time5. This lead to a fierce patent fight that has been decided only recently.6 7 The whole patent fight calls into question how useful such patents are. After all, the CRISPR technology is based on knowledge accumulated in various labs around the world and mainly financed through public resources.8 A CRISPR-monster born in China While the major discoveries and the first commercialization of the technology all happened in the West, China took the CRISPR stage in 2015, a year that has been called CRISPR’s “monster” year by the MIT Technology Review.9 This is not surprising, as China has since 2013 the second largest R&D spending in the world10 and CRISPR is an explicit priority area for the Chinese Academy of Sciences.11 In the years between the initial discovery and 2015 Chinese scientists have pushed the boundaries of science. In 2015 even the Chinese public became aware or CRISPR as the data of Chinese search volumes on the Chinese Internet illustrates.12 Scientists in China have successfully modified the genes of living organisms such as monkeys, dogs, and goats.13 A group of scientists in Shanxi province, for example, successfully created a new type of goat with longer hair (more Cashmere wool) and stronger muscle growth (more meat for food consumption).14 The biggest Chinese breakthrough to date also happened in 2015, when a group of Chinese researchers managed to edit human embryos for the first time.15 This move came not without criticism. In 2015, a number of scientists called for a moratorium because “genome editing in human embryos using current technologies could have unpredictable effects on future generations”.16 Relative search volume for “CRISPR” over time on China’s second largest search engine Qihoo 360. Peak in November 2015 and stronger attention afterward. The genetically edited embryos of the first Chinese experiment showed some unintended mutations. 17 Still, in 2016, CRISPR was tested for the first time in a person during a clinical trial in Chengdu.18 At the moment, externally applied gels and creams are tested in China to treat patients infected with the human papillomavirus.19 Of course, such simple applications of CRISPR could help to cure many diseases in the future. At the same time, the risk of CRISPR is great, both if the technology is used for criminal purposes as well as if benevolent applications of CRISPR yield unintended or at least undesirable outcomes. CRISPR as existential risk Saying that CRISPR is risky is not very controversial – assuming that new technologies are inherently risky is a common heuristic. However, labeling CRISPR as an existential risk might sound outright alarmist. But it is not: CRISPR is indeed an anthropogenic existential risk, but that does not mean that humankind is just about to be wiped out by it. Existential risks are risks that threaten the existence of humankind. Existential risks have a maximally great scope (all humans are affected, even future generations that would have existed if not for the adverse outcome) and gravity (the risk is terminal).20 In addition, existential risks have some probability, usually above zero. CRISPR is an existential risk both in civilian and in criminal or military applications. In the latter scenario, it is easier to understand why: Weaponized CRISPR is a potentially potent bioweapon that could do great damage whilst being very precise and accurate. A global CRISPR bioweapon war, if it ever came to that, would not produce the same levels of physical destruction as global nuclear war, but it might introduce cumulative hazards comparable to nuclear winter. The criminal and military application of CRISPR is somewhat salient in current risk analysis. For example, then U.S. director of national intelligence James Clapper declared CRISPR a global threat in February 2016, along other threats such as North Korean nuclear weapons21. Civilian applications of CRISPR are aimed at helping people, not killing them. However, unintended consequences of premature wide-scale introductions of CRISPR products might create existential risk. Imagine a thought experiment: If some pharmaceutical company were to introduce a CRISPR anti-aging cream that really works and makes people biologically younger, that product would be in extremely high demand almost immediately. Now imagine that that cream had an unintended side-effect: Irreversible infertility. The CRISPR cream would, almost certainly, still be in extremely high demand, resulting in a precipitous drop in overall fertility. This could result in the loss of humankind’s reproductive capacity and thus in the (gradual) extinction of humankind. The existential risk of CRISPR (and similar technologies) is typical of the dilemma of human progress: The more technologically mature humankind becomes, the greater anthropogenic human risks become Gene editing race between China and the US In 2017, after China had taken the CRISPR lead, it was time for the US to push the boundaries. Just recently, results of an experiment from scientists in the US were published: The scientists involved in the experiment also modified genes in human embryos, just as their Chinese counterparts did, but this time, apparently no mutations occurred.22 The technology and research race between the two nations can best be illustrated with the number of publications originating in each country. Since 2002, when Jansen et al.23 coined the term CRISPR in their paper, 6,942 scientific papers were published up to now.24 Most papers originated from US institutions (2890) followed by Chinese (919), German (413) Japanese institutions (390). Even though CRISPR research is dominated by institutions situated in the US and China, it is a technology used all over the world. One major reason is the rather low cost of the procedure.25 It is even possible to buy a “DIY Bacterial Gene Engineering CRISPR Kit” to do your own gene editing at home.26 However, this kit only allows using the most basic form of CRISPR. Colour intensity indicates the number of papers originating in a specific country. We used the country of the institution of the corresponding author of a paper. Data from Web of Science – own visualization. How to regulate the unimaginable It is very likely that we just got a first glimpse of what will be possible in the future. After the first experiment in China with human embryos, scientists from all around the world gathered at a global summit in Washington DC in 2015.27 Unsurprisingly, it was difficult for the participants to reach an agreement as every country regulates research differently. In the end, a statement by the organizers “stopped short of calling for a ban on editing human embryos and germ cells for basic research”.28 In cases where the work of scientists affects society as a whole, governments usually start to regulate research. In the case of the US, for example, a majority of people is worried about the idea of gene-edited babies.29 In democratic societies, citizens can influence regulations and public debates about opportunities and threats are possible. In Switzerland, we had a national vote in 2016 about genetic testing of embryos.30 The majority approved to modify the law on medically assisted reproduction. However, in authoritarian countries, such decisions are made top-down without open public debates.
2NC---CF---T/L
Err neg---all of their evidence comes from the position that civilian deaths are unacceptable, but all we actually need to win is that it doesn’t cause extinction
Matthew Kroenig 17 {Matthew Kroenig is an associate professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Summer 2017. “The Limits of Damage Limitation.” https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/667398}//JM
In “Should the United States Reject MAD?” Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter argue that the United States should forgo a damage-limitation capability against China’s strategic forces.1 To arrive at this conclusion, however, they underestimate the advantages of a [End Page 199] damage-limitation strategy and do not even consider more feasible and desirable policy options for a strategic equilibrium with China. When these steps are corrected, it becomes clear that the United States should not forgo this capability. Rather, it should preserve its damage-limitation capability and quantitative nuclear superiority over China, while accepting the inevitability of China’s possession of an assured nuclear retaliatory capability. Glaser and Fetter begin by making the conceptual mistake of searching for an arbitrary threshold for meaningful damage limitation. In doing so, they underestimate the value of limiting damage in the event of nuclear war. Glaser and Fetter are correct that completely denying China’s nuclear deterrent is increasingly difficult if not impossible as China expands and modernizes its arsenal, but this is an unnecessarily high bar. Damage limitation is better conceived of as a continuous, not a binary, variable. There is no magical threshold beyond which the ability to limit damage in a nuclear war ceases to matter. Any U.S. president would want to protect as much of the country as possible in the event of a nuclear exchange, and any damage-limitation capability (even far below the threshold set by Glaser and Fetter) would therefore be valuable. To argue otherwise, one would have to argue that saving millions of American lives is unimportant or politically irrelevant, which is an untenable position.
We’d Win-
Models---it would only take 7% of our nukes---assumes their warrants
Heginbotham 15. [Eric; 2015; principal research scientist at MIT’s Center for International Studies and a specialist in Asian security issues, PhD in political science from MIT, former senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he led research projects on China, Japan, and regional security issues and regularly briefed senior military, intelligence, and political leaders; “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html]
For several years, U.S. military publications have suggested that China is working on MIRVing ICBMs.37 The 2015 DoD report on Chinese military power stipulates, for the first time, that MIRVed missiles have been deployed operationally, specifically on the CSS-4 Mod 3 (a modified version of the DF-5A).38 In both our high and low estimates, therefore, we posit that number of Chinese CSS-4s (DF-5As) remains unchanged at 20, but that half of the force has been MIRVed, with each of the MIRVed missiles carrying three w

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