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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - Future Gens CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

AT - Future Gens CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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Aff
Alliances Deficit
Can’t solve alliances.
Howell & Pevehouse 11 [William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, both associate professors at the University of Chicago's Irving B. Harris School of Public Policy, “Chapter 1: Possibilities of Congressional Influence,” in While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers, Princeton University Press, 6-27-2011, p.27-29]
The Importance of Congressional Appeals/Dissent Because they are legally binding, legislation and appropriations passed by Congress directly impinge on a president’s discretion to wage war. Not surprisingly, then, opponents of a president’s war typically call on Congress to pass laws and cut appropriations. But the public debates that precede military actions also have important consequences for presidential power. Two stand out. By expressing dissent, members of Congress can weaken the presidents ability to credibly convey resolve to foreign allies and adversaries, and they can turn public opinion against him.73 Here, we briefly summarize both of these avenues of congressional influence. SIGNALING RESOLVE To the extent that congressional discontent signals domestic irresolution to other nations, the job of resolving a foreign crisis is made all the more difficult. As Kenneth Schultz shows, an “opposition party can under- mine the credibility of some challenges by publicly opposing them. Since this strategy threatens to increase the probability of resistance from the rival state, it forces the government to be more selective about making threats”—and, concomitantly, more cautious about actually using military force.74 When members of Congress openly object to a planned military operation, would-be adversaries of the United States may feel emboldened, believing that the president lacks the domestic support required to see a military venture through. Such nations, it stands to reason, will be more willing to enter conflict, and if convinced that the United States will back down once the costs of conflict are revealed, they may fight longer and make fewer concessions. Domestic political strife, as it were, weakens the ability of presidents to bargain effectively with foreign states, while increasing the chances that military entanglements abroad will become protracted and unwieldy. A large body of work within the field of international relations supports the contention that a nation’s ability to achieve strategic military objec- tives in short order depends, in part, on the head of states credibility in conveying political resolve. Indeed, a substantial game theoretic literature underscores the importance of domestic political institutions and public opinion as state leaders attempt to credibly commit to war.75 Confront- ing widespread and vocal domestic opposition, the president may have a difficult time signaling his willingness to see a military campaign to its end. While congressional opposition may embolden foreign enemies, the perception on the part of allies that the president lacks support may make them wary of committing any troops at all. The dangers of domestic political dissent are not lost on presidents and members of Congress. Indeed, for Bush (43) it constituted an important reason for seeking congressional authorization to use force against Iraq in the fall of 2002. In a Rose Garden ceremony on October 2, the presi- dent noted, “The statement of support from the Congress will show to friend and enemy alike the resolve of the United States. In Baghdad, the regime will know that full compliance with all U.N. security demands is the only choice and that time remaining for that choice is limited.”76 Then, in remarks eight days later on the House’s vote to authorize the use of force, the president proclaimed, “The House of Representatives has spoken clearly to the world and to the United Nations Security Council: The gathering threat of Iraq must be confronted fully and finally. Today’s vote also sends a clear message to the Iraqi regime: It must disarm and comply with all existing U.N. resolutions, or it will be forced to comply. There are no other options for the Iraqi regime. There can be no negoti- ations. The days of Iraq acting as an outlaw state are coming to an end.”77 By securing congressional authorization, it was supposed, the president could communicate his views and intentions more effectively to the international community that Iraq’s defiance of United Nations resolutions would no longer pass unnoticed.'8 In doing so, it was hoped, Saddam Hussein would finally relent to Bush's demands. Imagine what might have happened during the lead-up to and execu- tion of the Iraq War had Congress not authorized the use of force. Two outcomes seem plausible, even likely. First, the president would have had an even more difficult time assembling an international coalition in sup- port of military action. Recall, after all, that the president expressly sought congressional authorization in the hopes that it would improve the chances of later securing a UN Resolution in support of military action. Second, and in a more speculative vein, had Congress not authorized the use of force, the military operation itself might not have gone so smoothly. Dur- ing the early stages of the Iraq War, the U.S. military took pains to per- suade the enemy to lay down its arms and surrender, rather than fight and face certain death. Accompanying these claims were regular assurances that the United States would see this war through to the end, that it would not stop until the entire Hussein regime was dismantled. To substantiate these claims, Congress’s authorization was critical. For a moment, put yourself in the place of an Iraqi field officer in the spring of 2003. On the one hand, the United States military is bearing down upon you, threatening to kill you and every one of your comrades unless you abandon the fight. On the other hand, should you surrender prematurely, and should the United States fail to depose the Hussein regime, then you can expect to face the wrath of a spurned and spiteful ruler—as the southern Shi’a did a decade prior, after they had risen up in defiance of the Hussein regime only to be persecuted the moment that U.S. troops withdrew. Which option seems preferable critically depends on the likelihood that the United States will see the campaign to its end. For if you have reason to doubt the nation’s resolve, and Congress's refusal to authorize the use of force would buoy this concern, then the latter op- tion might be the right one—producing a longer, bloodier military conflict and raising the cost to an invading army. Similar concerns arose in subsequent years when the United States con- templated troop withdrawals from Iraq. Though the insurgency contin- ued to take its toll on U.S. forces, the president’s popularity waned, and calls for the Iraqi government to police its own state intensified. Bush nonetheless refused to set a firm timetable for troops to leave. And his rea- sons for doing so were plain enough. The president insisted that insurgents were watching U.S. politics closely and that a timetable would encourage the insurgents to “just go ahead and wait us out." Setting a fixed with- drawal date, Bush concluded, simply “concedes too much to the enemy.”79 Whether this prediction was accurate or not, its logic relied on the realization that others monitor U.S. politics generally, and Congress in particular, to gauge the nation’s resolve.
Veto
Congress vetoes instantly
Michael B. Rappaport, 10, director of USD’s Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism, November, 2010, “REFORMING ARTICLE V: THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AMENDMENT METHOD AND HOW TO FIX THEM”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20788836.pdf?acceptTC=true
Now, consider a different amendment provision. This provision allows Congress to amend the Constitution, subject to ratification by state legislatures or conventions, but it provides no other amendment method. Thus, it gives Congress a veto on any amendments. This provision would also make the Constitution less reflective of popular views and less desirable. Given the desire of political entities to maintain and expand their power, Congress is unlikely to allow the Constitution to be amended to limit its power. Moreover, because Congress tends to adopt the perspective of the federal government generally, Congress might not be quick to limit the power of the other branches of the federal government.62 Thus, if a change in values or circumstances were to require additional limitations on Congress or even on the federal government, it is unlikely that an amendment adopting those changes would be passed. Moreover, if Congress were to abuse its power, no constitutional reform would be forthcoming. Over time, then, one would expect the Constitution to become increasingly distorted normatively. The Constitution would fail to add needed checks on Congress and the federal government, but would grow to include additional limitations on the states (and perhaps the President). Finally, consider the existing Article V provisions. We can see that it is [are] largely the same as the one described immediately above that permits only the congressional amendment process. Given the defects in the convention process, it is as if that process does not exist. Thus, the same normative distortions that apply to a constitution with only the congressional amendment procedure--a bias in favor of Congress and the national government, and against the states--apply to the existing Constitution. The one exception to this claim is that the national convention process would be available if matters ever turned catastrophic. At that point, the state legislatures might be willing to risk a runaway convention and the other costs to address genuinely overriding problems. But absent this extraordinary situation, the national convention process would not be employed and the Constitution would exhibit serious normative problems. My argument that the failure of the national convention method undermines the constitutional amendment process by preventing certain amendments from being enacted is confirmed by our constitutional history. The dominant pattern of constitutional amendments reveals an amendment process that has neither placed checks on Congress or the federal government, nor provided protections to the states. Instead, it has often expanded the federal government's power or taken actions that have been largely orthogonal to the federal government's interests.
Delay DA
Delay DA of 203 years
Chism 5 [Chism, National Archives education specialist, 2005, The constitutional amendment process.(teaching content). Kahlil Social Education 69.7 (Nov-Dec 2005): p373(9)]
Even though the steps can be described briefly, actual ratification can take much longer. Some amendments, such as the 27th (Congressional pay increases), took many years to complete the ratification process. It was proposed by James Madison in 1789, but not ratified until 203 years later. This amendment required that any change in the salary of members of Congress only take effect after the next general election (so lawmakers were not voting to increase their own salaries). Congress ratified other amendments in short order, such as the 18th (Prohibition), which took little more than a year. The length of time depends upon the gravity of the issue the amendment is intended to address, the intensity of public sentiment concerning the issue, and whether or not a time limit for ratification was written into the amendment during the proposal stage.
There are too many question marks – SCOTUS would take years to determine if it’s legitimate
Olson, 16 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies and is known for his writing on the American legal system (Walter, “An Article V Constitutional Convention? Wrong Idea, Wrong Time”, CATO Institute, 1/5/2016, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/article-v-constitutional-convention)//RCU
Some of these ideas are better than others—Gov. Abbott’s 92-page report (PDF) is rather erudite, and lays out its arguments skillfully even if I do not find all of them sound—but every such scheme to stage an Article V convention should come with a giant ACME brand stenciled on its side. If it doesn’t just sit there doing nothing, it’s apt to blow up on the spot. The detonation that skeptics most fear is what’s called a runaway convention, in which the delegates called together to, say, install term limits or revamp campaign finance decide to venture into other areas as well, and perhaps start proposing whatever new amendments they think might be a good idea. Hence Justice Antonin Scalia’s brusque dismissal: “I certainly would not want a constitutional convention. Whoa! Who knows what would come out of it?” Some respected scholars who favor a convention argue that strict instructions would deter the assembled delegates from venturing beyond the velvet rope. But if that cannot be made a legal requirement, it winds up more like an honor code. “Congress might try to limit the agenda to one amendment or to one issue, but there is no way to assure that the Convention would obey,” wrote the late Chief Justice Warren Burger. Don’t believe Scalia or Burger? Go ahead and read the instruction kit for a convention, such as it is, in Article V of the U.S. Constitution. It’s quite brief. Here’s the full relevant text: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress… Note what this does *not* say. It says not a word expressly authorizing the states, Congress, or some combination of the two to confine the subject matter of a convention. It says not a word about whether Congress, in calculating whether the requisite 34 states have called for a convention, must (or must not) aggregate calls for a convention on, say, a balanced budget, with differently worded calls arising from related or perhaps even unrelated topics. It says not a word prescribing that the make-up of a convention, as many conservatives imagine, will be one-state-one-vote (as Alaska and Wyoming might hope) or whether states with larger populations should be given larger delegations (as California and New York would surely argue). Does Congress, or perhaps the Supreme Court, get to resolve these questions—the same Congress and Supreme Court that the process is aimed at doing an end run around? If the Supreme Court resolves them, does it do so only at the very end of the process, after years of national debate have been spent in devising amendments that we find out after the fact were not generated in proper form? Justice Burger described the whole process as “a grand waste of time.” One reason is that after advocates get the process rolling by convincing two-thirds of states, or 34, itself a fairly demanding number, the amendments that emerge from a convention do not get ratified unless three-quarters of states ratify, or 38, a quite demanding number. Put differently, it takes only 13 states to refuse to act to kill any of these ideas, bad or good, in the end. Sorry, Cenk and Marco, but so long as we have a nation fairly closely divided between Blue and Red sentiment, there will be at least 13 states skeptical of some systemic change so big that you had to go around the backs of both Congress and the Supreme Court to pull it off. If you’re a progressive who thinks the populist winds blow only in your favor, reflect for a moment on the success of Donald Trump. If you’re a conservative to whom radio call-ins resound as the voice of the people, consider that state legislatures confronted with the hard legal issues a convention would raise might turn for advice and assistance to elite lawyers (yikes) or even law professors (double yikes).
CP takes forever – Delay is an impact for lives.
Chism, National Archives education specialist, 2005 (
The constitutional amendment process.(teaching content). Kahlil Social Education 69.7 (Nov-Dec 2005): p373(9). )
Even though the steps can be described briefly, actual ratification can take much longer. Some amendments, such as the 27th (Congressional pay increases), took many years to complete the ratification process. It was proposed by James Madison in 1789, but not ratified until 203 years later. This amendment required that any change in the salary of members of Congress only take effect after the next general election (so lawmakers were not voting to increase their own salaries). Congress ratified other amendments in short order, such as the 18th (Prohibition), which took little more than a year. The length of time depends upon the gravity of the issue the amendment is intended to address, the intensity of public sentiment concerning the issue, and whether or not a time limit for ratification was written into the amendment during the proposal stage.
Constitution DA
Wrecks the constitution
Lucas 16 – James W. Lucas is an attorney in New York City and member of the New York Bar., June 2nd 2016, "To Originate the Amendment of Errors: Reforming Article V to Facilitate State and Popular Engagement in Constitutional Amendment by James Lucas :: SSRN," No Publication
Madison was right – a convention is procedurally unworkable. In its time the Philadelphia convention of 1787 was not unusual. Many states had then recently held conventions and other assemblies to write state constitutions and address other matters, and the convention at Philadelphia had seemed to come off well.109 Of the framers, only Madison sensed that another national convention would be a far more difficult matter when left as procedurally vague as in Article V. Scholars and advocates have spilt much ink confidently announcing their numerous and contradictory solutions to these multitudinous issues. However, state legislators who are charged with the constitutional duty to actually decide whether to summon a second convention have time and time again emerged from the jungle of unresolved procedural questions to find themselves, not in the promised land of constitutional reform, but rather at the edge of a dangerous precipice whose base is shrouded in clouds of uncertainty. These legislators have repeatedly shied away from taking the leap into the unknown. No one can really assure these state legislators what constitutes a proper application for a convention, whether, how or to what extent Congress would count their applications, whether the convention could be limited as to subject matter, or who would go to the convention, how they would be selected and, most critically, how their votes would be counted. There can be no assurance that the federal Congress and/or courts will not control how these issues are decided or, conversely, if there is any predictable mechanism with certain authority to sort out all of these fundamental issues. Instead, there is a real possibility of the kind of constitutional confrontations predicted by Professor Tribe in testimony before the California state legislature. (Here “constitutional” does not mean technically legal under the Constitution, but rather fundamental political conflicts which could tear the very fabric of the governmental system created in 1787.) These are confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court and the states, and the Congress and the convention itself if it ever came into being.110 After surveying these issues during the first great convention drive of recent years in the 1

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