Neg - Cyber Space Assets - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ
Neg - Cyber Space Assets - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ.docx
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Neg AT: Case AT: Squo 1NC – Squo solves The aff became non inherent on June 29th whent NATO announced its Strategic Concept NATO 22, 6-29-2022, “NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf/billy 24. We will expedite our digital transformation, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance our cyber defences, networks and infrastructure. We will promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge. We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights. 25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security. 26. We will pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges to our security, as a national responsibility and a collective commitment rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We will work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. We will enhance our energy security and invest in a stable and reliable energy supply, suppliers and sources. We will ensure civil preparedness to provide for continuity of government, the delivery of essential services to our populations and civil support to our armed forces. We will boost our capacity to prepare for, resist, respond to, and quickly recover from strategic shocks and disruptions, and ensure the continuity of the Alliance’s activities. AT: China Adv 1NC – Article 5 Key Aff fails---only terrestrial retaliation can deter---otherwise China calculates mutual destruction to be net beneficial even if they’re rational, which they aren’t. James Lewis 13, Senior vice president and program director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace”, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Anti-satellite%20Weapons%20-The%20Stimson%20Center.pdf \\SYang In order to deter China from using ASAT weapons, China’s leaders would have to calculate that an ASAT attack would lead to an escalation of conflict or to damaging retaliation. In peacetime, Beijing would probably calculate that an ASAT attack might risk being seen as a casus belli. If so, it is unlikely that China’s kinetic or directed energy weapons would be used outside of conflict. If, however, Washington and Beijing are already engaged in an armed clash, the threat of the use of force in space is somewhat moot. Washington could, for example, threaten to escalate the conflict by warning that an attack on a satellite will result in the destruction of China’s space launch complex. Beijing may nonetheless calculate that at this stage of its military modernization, interfering with US satellites is worth any retaliatory interference with their own satellites, and that the risk of escalation in other domains is either low or acceptable. There is some evidence that Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk and overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks. China has little experience with the arms control negotiations that underpinned nuclear deterrence, has a different conceptual framework for conflict and international relations, and lacks the experience of the Cold War for interpreting American actions and signals. Chinese military concepts on “deterrence” differ significantly from US concepts, meshing Schelling’s ideas of deterrence and compellence in ways that encourage use and increase the risk of miscalculation.7 Deterring Chinese ASAT attacks during armed conflict would require threatening something other than China’s own satellites, since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not yet so dependent on space assets that the satellites’ loss would constrain their operations as much as the loss of American satellites would hurt US forces. In this situation, Chinese leaders may see an exchange of satellite attacks as working to their benefit. Only a credible threat to retaliate against a terrestrial target would change China’s calculus, but such threats bring the risk of escalation of conflict that would need to be weighed carefully. Responding to an attack on a military target in space or a military cyber network with an attack on the Chinese homeland would likely be seen by China as escalatory. Additionally, nationalist sentiment among the citizens of potential opponents like China or Iran suggests the most likely effect of US escalation unless it was sustained and broadly destructive, would be to reinforce support for the regime and for a continuation of the conflict. Belief shapes perception. The Kremlin believed that the United States was inherently aggressive and sought the destruction of the Soviet Union. Soviet political and military leaders debated whether the US investment in weapons was to retain a credible deterrent or to attain first strike capabilities. Paranoia also colors how authoritarian Chinese military leaders may underestimate risk and overestimate the utility of asymmetric attacks. regimes that lack domestic legitimacy view the United States. Cultural and linguistic differences also contribute to misinterpretation of deterrent messages. 1NC – Lasers Alt Cause Chinese laser attacks are an alt cause *Brian Chow and **Henry Sokolski 20, *Senior Physical Scientist and Professor at RAND Corporation and **Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 7/10/2020, “Op-ed | U.S. satellites increasingly vulnerable to China’s ground-based lasers”, Space News, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-satellites-increasingly-vulnerable-to-chinas-ground-based-lasers/ The Defense Intelligence Agency warned in January 2019 that China likely will field in 2020 a ground-based laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based sensors. By the mid-to-late 2020s it may field higher power systems that could damage the structures of non-optical satellites. How real is the threat? Analysts have already identified five Chinese laser bases. One in Xinjiang has four main buildings. One of these building is thought to be for tracking satellites, while equipment in the other three could be used to dazzle or disable satellite sensors. If the Xinjiang facility is representative of the other four, all five bases can be located and are vulnerable to aerial attacks. In addition to these bases, China operates several satellite laser ranging stations. These have been used to determine the orbits of satellites and space debris but could be used to damage U.S. and allied satellite sensors. Of the world’s 50 satellite laser ranging stations, five fixed stations are in Shanghai, Changchun, Beijing, Wuhan and Kuming. Two Chinese satellite laser ranging stations are mobile. The ranging system at the Shanghai station uses a laser with a relatively low average power of 2.8 watts. The wattage at other stations are most likely the same or lower. Another laser of 60 watts at the Shanghai station has been used routinely to measure space debris. Calculations show that a 1-watt laser has 1 in 1,000 chance to cause permanent damage to a sensor, while a 40-watt laser would double the chance. These odds are low but likely to increase. In the near term China’s top priority is to deny America and its allies imagery with high resolution of 10 centimeters or better. Fortunately, to damage a satellite’s optical elements such as pixels and filters, an offensive anti-satellite laser would have to be located within roughly 10 kilometers of what one wants to take a picture of. What should Washington do to counter sensor-damaging lasers? First, it should determine how many of the Chinese targets it wants to take pictures of that have a laser base or fixed satellite laser ranging station within roughly 10 kilometers. There are probably only a few such laser-protected targets. Second, our military and intelligence analysts need to estimate the risks and costs of snapping pictures from space of these laser-protected targets (i.e., the chance of our satellites’ sensors being damaged and what their repair or replacement costs might be) and the benefits of getting such imagery. Such an analysis would likely recommend that the United States and its allies: Take pictures whenever possible during peacetime, as the chance of damage is far higher during crisis. Update imagery less frequently, because fewer trips mean less chance of being hit. Use as low a resolution for imagery as much as possible, as low-resolution sensors and their satellites are cheap and numerous compared to dedicated military imagery satellites Third, the United States should secure imagery of all needed resolutions, including 10 centimeters or better, any way it can using commercial and dedicated military systems during peacetime, crisis and wartime. Once it has a diversified group of imagery providers, laser damage to a few of our sensors would become far less valuable to our adversaries, leading them not to initiate such attacks in the first place. Finally, the United States should extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in February 2021, to keep its formal prohibitions on interference with national technical means of verification (including sensor-carrying satellites) in force. To the extent that Washington can bring China into arms negotiations with the Russians, it should focus on getting Beijing formally to agree to this prohibition. The U.S. government will need to do more in the years ahead. Today, Chinese lasers must be located within roughly 10 kilometers of whatever Washington wants to snap pictures of to have any hope of beaming into American satellites’ telescope openings and damaging their sensors inside. Mid-decade, though, when Beijing acquires higher powered lasers, at least one of China’s lasers will be in range to damage several of our low earth orbiting satellites every day. As a result, Washington will not only have to make our satellite constellations resilient and harden some satellites’ exteriors and sensors, it must be prepared to disable China’s laser systems if they attack our satellites. During this same period, the United States will also have to pay attention to Chinese satellite laser ranging stations and high power lasers that will have gone mobile. Because these mobile systems are likely to be dual-use, they cannot be banned. Instead, the United States and its allies should disadvantage any hostile use with diplomatic measures that would afford warning of such. This could best be achieved by pushing for an international agreement to register all mobile dual-use lasers (including their locations), require their operators to announce their planned movement a month in advance, and demand their movements be broadcast in real time. 2NC – Lasers Alt Cause China developed laser technology and are inclined to use them – satellite attacks inevitable Chris Zappone 21; Digital Foreign Editor at The Age and Sydney Morning Herald, Published: 8-9-2021; "Space lasers and the new battlefield emerging under China’s anti-satellite tactics"; Sydney Morning Herald; Accessed: 6-30-2022; https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/space-lasers-and-the-new-battlefield-emerging-under-china-s-anti-satellite-tactics-20210804-p58ft2.html)//Pen-SY Space lasers are a real thing, even if they’re not generally made to blow up passing satellites. Designed to damage or disable sensor equipment on orbiting satellites, ground-based lasers can help hide a nation’s activities. Photography from satellites, for example, has been key in helping reveal the extent of Beijing’s detention of Muslim Uighurs in western China. Weeks before the Federation of American Scientists produced analysis showing missile silos being built in western China, US-based analysts – drawing attention to anti-satellite lasers in Xinjiang – warned that US satellites, the kind that could keep an eye on China’s military, were “increasingly vulnerable to China’s ground-based lasers”. Sydney-based space analyst Chris Flaherty said that when it came to lasers, “dazzling”, or interfering with a satellite’s camera, and “blinding”, permanently damaging a satellite, “are the prime technologies that are deployable right now”. The technology gives a country the power “to deny a satellite’s ability to operate, to shut it down or to damage it – without creating space debris”. Michael Duitsman of the California-based James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies said the laser facility in Xinjiang was thought to have been started as far back as 2009. It “significantly predates both the Uighur cultural genocide and the current missile silo construction,” he said. Inspecting images from earlier this year, Duitsman said there had been some construction in the support area for the laser, as well as modification at one of the buildings. Concerns about the use of lasers used this way in a future space conflict are spreading. The prospect of a contest for space dominance between China, the US and Russia prompted the US to create the Space Force in 2019. Last month, Defence Minister Peter Dutton announced Australia would begin exploring options for Space Electronic Warfare, because it’s a capability that doesn’t “create debris or damage the space environment”. Flaherty said to better understand China’s intentions with lasers aimed at satellites, one need only look at the example Russia provides. In 2018, Russia unveiled its Peresvet laser system and positioned it near mobile units of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In doing so, it can temporarily blind passing satellites overhead from taking pictures. Flaherty said “any superpower that has important strategic assets ... will deploy a laser”. US-based China space analyst Dean Cheng believes Beijing would likely have installed them to frustrate the satellite photography of its military bases and equipment. “It would not be surprising if the Chinese wanted to limit Indian ability to see into Tibet,” said Cheng. He said lasers could be used to protect one of China’s missile silo fields, as well as naval and air bases that could be used in an invasion of Taiwan. But the ability to use lasers against satellites is well known by space-faring powers. “What is more problematic is that the West relies more on space for the conduct of military operations, so effective anti-satellite systems work much more to the benefit of” Russia or China, which focus their military closer to their own regions, Cheng says. Economically, the West has more to lose in such a scenario because widely adopted Western technologies such as GPS have evolved to rely on peaceful access to space. Simply raising questions about China’s capabilities to disrupt a rival nation’s satellites is part of the new game, one that differs from the Cold War rivalry. The physical distance of orbit makes it hard to know with certainty whether an outage of a satellite happened as a cause of an accident, or if something was the result of hard-to-detect aggression. For example, in 2006, China used a laser that temporarily blinded a US military reconnaissance satellite. “The action temporarily blinded the satellite but caused no permanent damage, leading to speculation that China may not have been intentionally trying to interfere with the satellite,” said US congressional testimony in 2019. Like the ambiguity of attributing the origin of a cyber attack, the cause of a problem in orbit is hard to determine as the satellite passes 200 kilometres overhead at a speed of 25,000 km/h. Messing with a rival’s satellites in orbit in ways that can easily be misinterpreted, using lasers, or some other directed energy, is a change from the Cold War. Back then Russian or American interference with each other’s satellites could easily be interpreted as a prelude to a nuclear launch, and so was something to generally avoid. Today, while the nuclear risk hasn’t gone away – as China’s missile silo building proves – technology has evolved, orbits have grown much more crowded, and so has the willingness of some space powers to court risk. China, among others, has been on a mission to build space power since it – and the world – witnessed volleys of US satellite-guided bombs raining down on Iraqi troops during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. “The Gulf War set off the next technology trend for countries to catch up,” Flaherty said. Since then, many more satellites and nations have entered orbit, producing data and services we rely on daily: GPS, space-based timing for transactions, Google maps, precise weather data for agriculture. If China or another power used lasers aggressively against orbiting satellites, it’s no longer about two superpowers facing off like during the Cold War space race, said Flaherty. 1NC – No Attack Chinese cyber threats are overblown – the U.S. is far more advanced in its cyber and military capabilities and the lack of coordination in the Chinese military decks its ability to launch a major satellite cyber attack Jon R. Lindsay 15, an Associate Professor at the School of Cybersecurity and Privacy at the Georgia Institute of Technology with a joint appointment in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs and the School of Public Policy, “Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat,” May 2015, Policy Brief, Quarterly Journal: International Security, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/exaggerating-chinese-cyber-threat The secrecy regarding the cyber capabilities and activities of the United States and China creates difficulty in estimating the relative balance of cyber power across the Pacific. Nevertheless, the United States appears to be gaining an increasing advantage. For every type of purported Chinese cyber threat, there are also serious Chinese vulnerabilities and growing Western strengths. Much of the international cyber insecurity that China generates reflects internal security concerns. China exploits foreign media and digital infrastructure to target political dissidents and minority populations. The use of national censorship architecture (the Great Firewall of China) to redirect inbound internet traffic to attack sites such as GreatFire.org and GitHub in March 2015 is just the latest example of this worrisome trend. Yet prioritizing political information control over technical cyber defense also damages China's own cybersecurity. Lax law enforcement and poor cyber defenses leave the country vulnerable to both cybercriminals and foreign spies. The fragmented and notoriously competitive nature of the Communist Party state further complicates coordination across military, police, and regulatory entities. There is strong evidence that China continues to engage in aggressive cyber espionage campaigns against Western interests. Yet it struggles to convert even legitimately obtained foreign data into competitive advantage, let alone make sense of petabytes of stolen data. Absorption is especially challenging at the mo
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