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2022 Michigan Kritik

K - Racial IR - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS

K - Racial IR - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS.docx

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K—Racial IR—FMPS
This is similar to the imperialism K put out by the BFHR lab, but focuses more on the racialized epistemologies and motivations behind IR scholarship than on the external imperial outcomes of policy, and has a much more framework/scholarship-focused alternative. That said, the evidence between the two Ks very much overlaps, so you can use that file to supplement this one and vice versa.
This file was made possible entirely by the work of Cleo Shaw!
K---1NC
IR scholarship is founded on racial omission.
Lake et al. 21(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing””, CS)
The field of IR is grappling with renewed calls to reform its longstanding elision of race, manifested most recently in Foreign Policy(Bhambra et al. 2020, Shilliam 2020a, Zvobgo & Loken2020) and Foreign Affairs(Blain 2020). These interventions have since been complemented by various public speaker series, webinars, and discussion forums, each retrieving important contributions that criticize IR scholarship as silent on race. Those that expose and contest this silence aptly describe it as particularly tenacious in mainstream IR, especially research that appears in the discipline’s top journals. While new efforts are being made to take race seriously, such as Búzás’s(2021) piece in the 75th anniversary special issue of International Organization and the special issue calls on race by Security Studies and Security Dialogue, IR scholars are still coming to terms with a discipline that is historically reluctant to address questions of race. The notion that IR is colorblind has long been interrogated. Seminal critiques of this notion, of which the norm against noticing is a contemporary interpretation, lay bare the centrality of race and racism in the making of an intellectual and professional discipline. The mythology of a colorblind tradition in American IR was rendered explicit by early disciplinary work on the role of White supremacy in world making. To the forebears of this critique, what was often taken to be race neutral was, in practice, silence and evasion about the African presence in world politics. As Krishna (2001) explains, race constitutes a crucial epistemic silence around which modern IR is continuously made and coheres. For Krishna, contemporary IR discourse is predicated on a systematic politics of forgetting, an abstraction from the role of racialized violence in the construction of nation-states and the system they inhabit. As the discipline developed, the timeless problems of anarchy and the security dilemma came to define the core questions of IR in line with Cold War imperatives, making race irrelevant for many scholars. Relations between states, where material power and national interest shape behavior, were assumed to occur above the supposedly domestic issue of race. Intellectual commitment to the assumption of anarchy in world politics, however, was coterminous with the discipline’s willful amnesia about race. Indeed, while implicitly equating anarchy with the primitive, and equating the resulting state of nature with supposedly violent peoples outside Europe, scholars stripped anarchy of any notion of race and racism (Sampson 2002). For some, the norm against noticing reflects a common difficulty in accepting the idea that the “international” in international relations was imagined along the color line (Vitalis 2015).For critical theorists, forgetting race cannot be reduced to discomfort, disinterest, or unaware-ness among scholars (Sabaratnam 2020). By implication, the invisibility of race in IR was not accidental but designed. Similar observations have been made about the makeup of the IR as mostly White and male, an institutionalized feature that produces and reproduces itself (Doty1993; Henderson 2007, 2013; Lake 2016; Rutazibwa 2020). That which was made most visible in IR—its distinguishing intuitions and methodologies—is also that which conceals race, denying the possibility of its explanatory power.
Mobilizing NATO to save the planet is a racialized project that gets operationalized to inflict violence on the Other.
Platon 15(Mircea Alexandru, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, History ““PROTRACTED CONFLICT” The Foreign Policy Research Institute “Defense Intellectuals” and Their Cold War Struggle with Race and Human Rights”, CS) Marked for ableist language
The FPRI literature produced by Possony, Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and their constant collaborators argued that the only way to defend White Western Civilization against Communist “Oriental despotism” was the development out of a military confederation such as NATO of an Atlantic Union— a political confederation under American hegemony, and, as Possony argued as early as 1949, the creation of a world police (Possony 1949 , 1953 ). This institutional structure would allow “Western democracies” a virtual monopoly on technology, natural resources, and violence. As a Cold Warrior impatient with the “verbal magic” of the empty legal formulas of international organizations and agreements, Possony maintained that there was no other way to maintain peace than war and the increase of the capacity to wage war, defined as “the purge of the enemies of the new order” (1949, pp. 294-295). For Strausz-Hupé, the United States was “the most powerful nation of European stock” (1945, p. 108), a fact of enormous importance according to the theories of Third Reich geopolitician Michael Hess, quoted by Strausz-Hupé. Hess argued that only the “white race”—through its mastery of technology—was “truly ‘space-bridging,’” the other races being of the space-bound variety (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 91). That meant that both the geographical position and its technological prowess designated the United States as the main “arsenal” of an “international police force,” and as the master of the “nucleus” of great powers that would control the balance and the stability of the “new and universal order” after the defeat of the Axis powers (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 194-195). Quoting Karl Haushofer’s judgment that the United States “possessed all the geopolitical prerequisites” for achieving global hegemony, Strausz-Hupé warned that Haushofer had hoped that the Americans would eventually fail in their bid for world supremacy because they were “race-biologically retarded” and torn apart by internal racial tensions (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , pp. 66-67). The keen interest manifested by Strausz-Hupé, Possony, and Kintner for the role played by “race” during the Cold War seems to betray their fear that Haushofer was right and that lack of racial homogeneity would indeed compromise the U.S. bid for global leadership (Glaser and Possony, 1979 ). It is indeed difficult to understand Strausz-Hupé’s work without taking into consideration the way in which Nazi geopolitical theories informed his racialized approach to the Cold War (Crampton and Tuathaila, 1996 ; Raffestin et al., 1995 ). Nazi Geopolitik—with its concept of a dynamic frontier and perpetual international instability fostered by the dynamic of growing, expanding versus shrinking, and dying, states—was interpreted by Strausz-Hupé in terms of an opposition between the stable, “civilized order” of Europe and “the Asiatic aversion to fixed boundaries” (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 220). Europeans, Strausz-Hupé argued, could not be reasonably expected to forget the “pungent meaning of Asia” (1942, p. 91). Strausz-Hupé discovered some sense even in Hitler’s frenzied attacks on “Asiatic bolshevism” and warned that, since the history of Russia bore the mark of the Mongols and since Russia had inherited the role of Asian oppressor of Europe, the Cold War was merely another stage of the eternal clash of “men of the steppe against the man of the sown; the mounted horde against the dwellers of the city; mass against form” (1952, p. 82). These premises allowed FPRI intellectuals to defend both the legacy of old-fashioned European colonialism and new-fangled American imperialism by denouncing any anti-colonial movement or non-aligned state as an “Asiatic,” unruly, “primitive” threat against the “real,” civilized, democratic “New Order” dominated by the United States (Strausz-Hupé 1942 , p. 196). The United States led the Free World in a global struggle for the “preservation of the Western Community” (Strausz-Hupé 1952 , p. 3). Since this struggle was a psychomachia, a clashing of spiritual worlds, StrauszHupé rejected any “optimistic idea” about a meeting of the cultures and argued that only a “whole,” “unitary,” and pure Western culture could hope to successfully meet the challenge of the East. According to Strausz-Hupé, one of the ways in which the West could transform the “discrete whole” of European culture into a world culture was to abandon the antiquated and ultimately petty cult of national heroes and promote instead the “heroes of its common undertakings,” the conquerors and colonizers who were the true global heralds of the West: “The exploits of Cortes, Pizzaro, Clive, Stanley, Bugeaud, Lyautey, Rhodes, Muraviev were conquests on an Asiatic scale” (1952, pp. 7-8, 12-13). Western colonial expansion indicated a thriving Western culture (although the West was supposed to be at the same time essentially static, a victim of Asiatic restlessness). In order to defend this way of life, America had to vigorously embrace military, economic, and cultural imperialism, a benign form of imperialism whose weapons were not merely “military force or political coercion,” but also “anti-imperialist” discourses (Strausz-Hupé 1952 , p. 294). It also had to create an Atlantic Union and increase spending on propaganda in order to advance the vertical and horizontal integration of Western culture, that is to discourage the multiplication of people with lower IQ levels and to encourage the adoption of the same Weberian pro-capitalist Protestant values by the entire “Free World.” The creation of an Atlantic Union would be both the result and the safeguard of these efforts.
The impact is a self-fulfilling prophecy---actors perceive other nations as more threatening, fueling escalatory actions.
Búzás 12(Zoltán I, Associate Professor at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame, “Race and International Politics: How Racial Prejudice Can Shape Discord and Cooperation among Great Powers”, CS)
Identity influences foreign policy behavior in several ways. It may serve as an ideological device to justify self-interested policies, it may influence the cost of policy options, it may restrict the menu of possible foreign policies, or it may provide foreign policy preferences.244 My approach is closest to the latter two. Identities influence action by narrowing the menu of foreign policy options and by giving actors “primary reasons for action” or providing them with “motivational and behavioral dispositions.”245 I link racial identities to behavior through a relaxed version of the “logic of habit.” 246 Once activated, racial prejudices embedded in racial identities shape threat perceptions and create behavioral dispositions habitually and relatively automatically. All else equal, racial identity shapes patterns of discord and cooperation as follows. Through the lens of their racial identity agents perceive racial others as more threatening, which facilitates discord and impedes cooperation. In turn, agents perceive those with shared racial identity as less threatening, which facilitates cooperation and impedes discord. In this view, “structures of identity that yield systematically biased perceptions” sustain enduring patterns of conflict and cooperation.247 The endurance of these behavioral patterns is supported by the self-fulfilling nature of prejudices. The perceiver acts unconsciously on prejudices, which elicits prejudice-consistent behavior from target agents, validating prejudices and reinforcing their impact on the behavior of the prejudiced agent.248 Although a relaxed logic of habit does not obviate the role of agency, rationality, and uncertainty, it reduces their significance. Agents may refuse to act on a particular prejudice if they recognize it as such, but since most of the time prejudices work unconsciously or are not recognized as prejudices, agents tend to act on them. States may still rationally calculate what their best options are. However, their agency will be constrained and rationality “bounded” as states will consider and act on a menu of foreign policy options limited by racial prejudices. This relaxed logic of habit does not exclude the logic of consequences where actors are driven by cost-benefit calculations, but it sets the parameters within which this latter can operate. Uncertainty plays a role in initial stages of threat assessment, but once racial prejudices are activated, they dissipate uncertainty by imposing a false certainty on threats. The process through which difference in racial identity predisposes agents towards discord is similar to that through which “misplaced certainty” facilitates conflict.249 In the absence of significant threats decision makers may nonetheless be certain that they perceive threats. This can give rise to a series of escalatory actions and reactions which can facilitate conflict.
The alternative is an epistemic rejection---refusing the attempt to racialize the international should start right here.
Gani and Marshal 22(Jasmine, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Jenna, PhD Political Science, Queen Mary University of London, “The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations”, CS)
Given the historical and ongoing mutual complicity between knowledge producers and policy-makers in upholding imperial and racial orders, we now consider the responsibilities, possibilities and challenges faced in altering the nature of that nexus. Doing so requires turning to what Danso and Aning call an ‘episteme of alternativity’;41 and the primary way for academics to enact this would be to draw on anti-colonial practice and legacies, rather than imperial competition, as the foundation of their theorizing. Thus, in his article, Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh forefronts global South policy-makers and focuses on the nuclear order (a topic that is typically associated with realist IR) to demonstrate how it can be approached through an alternative, critical epistemology.42 Disrupting the ‘Great Power gaze’, Mpofu-Walsh asks what the politics of non-proliferation looks like from the perspective of the global South, especially the African continent as the sole nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). There, denuclearization is fundamentally linked to decolonization. Thus anti-colonial goals, rather than hegemonic/imperialist competition, are at the root of both policy and theorizing. How different would IR knowledge and theories on nuclear weapons be if African praxis and the importance of NWFZs were taken seriously? Turning to the Middle East, Gani similarly argues in her article that the inclusion of non-western history and voices—from policy-makers to activists and scholars—in think-tank discussions can mitigate the latent colonialism that shapes western policy.43 Nevertheless, even with an incorporation of non-western practice and knowledge in policy making and scholarly theorizing, multiple perspectives that are marginalized even in the local context, owing to class or gender, may continue challenge such patterns is by adopting a more expansive reading of what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and indeed ‘practice’. In doing so, we can dismantle some of the constructed and false hierarchies between elite ‘knowledge’ and ‘research’ on one hand, and local ‘tradition’ on the other.45 The former is assumed to be objective, reliable and associated with western (and western-validated) universities; while the latter is viewed as subjective, unscientific and commonly associated with Indigenous, racialized, grassroots communities. Assumptions about who counts as a true knowledge producer or ‘expert’ is not only elitist but heavily racialized and gendered. Definitions of who counts as a ‘practitioner’ are equally narrow, so that scholars or policy-makers may place much weight on the views and actions of state, global governance and corporate practitioners, but do not view as equal practitioners those involved in everyday practice in their communities—those who in fact sustain their ecology, livelihoods, security and identities, all while having to navigate the impact of top-down policies.46 Both the articles by Jan Wilkens and Alvine Datchoua-Tirvaudey on climate justice, and by Althea Rivas and Mariam Safi on the organizing and practices of Afghan women, share knowledge from non-elite local communities and challenge the above binaries and hierarchies. In their article on climate justice in the Arctic and the Mediterranean, Wilkens and Datchoua-Tirvaudey explain that academic– practitioner knowledge exchange has often been a contributing factor in continued climate injustice.47 The existing patterns of this knowledge exchange on climate governance are dependent on hierarchies of knowledge, namely, the valorization of western/‘scientific’ knowledge production at the expense of the needs and knowledges of the Indigenous and local communities most affected by climate change (i.e. the community-based practitioners, rather than the institutional/state ones). Moreover, the spaces where such knowledge exchange takes place are often exclusionary (in who is invited, in the parameters of discourse and/or in the extortionate costs of participating), producing an intra-elite debate.48 Having identified these racialized patterns, they offer a corrective decolonial strategy for ethical climate governance, founded on practice-based knowledge and diverse ways of knowing that bring in those excluded insights. The article by Rivas and Safi also provides an example of how the academic– practitioner nexus can be ‘decolonized’, one in which everyday knowledges of Afghan women, in all their diversity and complexity, are centred in peacebuilding efforts.49 Their article, co-written by an academic and a local practitioner, offers a methodology of how to take into account the internal hierarchies of positionality, interests and knowledges that are always present when engaging with grassroots communities for the sake of ‘research’. Rivas and Safi also demonstrate the importance of registering and valuing the unlooked-for, atypical knowledges from below, such as the subtle observations offered by Afghan women in rural areas that, contrary to wider assumptions, reflect their political engagement and interest. Caution against extractivism in the search for such local knowledge exchange is at the forefront of both the above contributions.50 Thus academics should remain reflexive in what the purpose of their research is, and who really benefits. Moreover, a praxis of decolonizing such research necessarily entails taking time in a way that is at odds with the current culture of speedy and multitudinous productivity in academia: the rapid churning out of articles from ‘the field’ should raise appropriate questions about how, why and for whom that research is being conducted.
Links
Link---China
Images of a violent Chinese Rise enforce a racialized narrative with a Western-centric model.
Lake et al. 21(David, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Bianca Freedman, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego, D.G. Kim, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, “Race in International Re

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