AT - Russian Relations DAs - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW
AT - Russian Relations DAs - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW.docx
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DAs – Russia Relations – CPWW – Michigan Summer Debate Institutes 2022 Notes How to Use this File This file presents multiple different scenarios for Russian influence being good around the globe. Each DA argues that the plan’s increase in NATO cohesion/strength/unity trades off with the motivations behind [x] country/region relations with Russia which is bad. The best way to use this file is to pick a region and use that section of the file for execution of the DA. There are 7 unique relations scenarios for you to choose from. The “generic link” at the top of the file can be used with all of the scenarios. Acknowledgments/Contact Information Thank you to Suditi C., Roan M., Surya K., Shae M., Rohan L., Samuel P., Sahil J., Res S., and Ian S. for all their hard work on this file. Please email walratca@umich.edu with any questions or concerns. Central Europe-Russia Relations AFF Answers 2AC – UQ Central Europe is taking hardline stances against Russia’s advances in Ukraine – turns the DA. Tůma ’22 [Petr; visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council's Europe Center, a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East and transatlantic relations, previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC, posted as a Deputy Chief of the Czech Embassy in war-torn Syria and held the same position in Ramallah; 3-30-2022; "Central Europe leads the way in backing Ukraine. Here’s its game plan for what’s next."; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/central-europe-leads-the-way-in-backing-ukraine-heres-its-game-plan-for-whats-next/; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL] As the West scrambles to maintain its united front against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) member states of Central and Eastern Europe have led the way as some of the continent’s loudest moral voices, sending arms and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while receiving streams of refugees. But while neighboring Poland has perhaps been most visible—hosting both US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris in recent weeks while absorbing more than two million refugees—geography isn’t the only factor that determines who is a frontline state. Take the Czech Republic, for example: Though nestled in the heart of Europe and away from the EU’s eastern border, its new government—together with the three Baltic countries, Poland, and the United Kingdom—spearheaded weapons delivery for Ukrainians when most EU member states were still hesitating. It is also now home to around 200,000 Ukrainian refugees. So when Prime Minister Petr Fiala—along with his Polish and Slovenian counterparts, Mateusz Morawiecki and Janez Janša, respectively—traveled to Kyiv earlier this month to visit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it wasn’t just a powerful symbolic gesture. It was also a reflection of the region’s growing clout as a bridge between Brussels and Kyiv. I spoke to Tomáš Pojar, Fiala’s chief foreign-affairs adviser, who accompanied the delegation to Kyiv. Below are six major takeaways I distilled from our conversation—which can be also read as a guideline for Europe’s next steps for engagement toward Ukraine. Europe’s most important task is to continue providing Ukraine with military support, especially anti-tank and -aircraft weapons. Quantity and time matter here, and the coming weeks are likely to be decisive in the war. Ukrainians are committed, but can’t defeat the Russian military without Western support. Moscow needs to understand that Europe stands firmly behind Ukraine, ready to provide what is needed to wreck Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans. If Ukraine is properly equipped with more anti-aircraft weaponry, it can even create something akin to its own version of a no-fly zone (without, of course, achieving NATO-aided air superiority). Indeed, something similar is already happening in parts of the country’s airspace, where Russian planes and helicopters dare not enter. Military support is critical to any prospects for meaningful negotiation; if Putin sees the West hesitating, he is likely to press his advantage on the battlefield for quite some time. Europe must also continue pushing for stronger sanctions against the Kremlin, as efforts thus far seem to be quite effective. There are many options still available to the EU—not least in the field of energy—but as some member states call for restraint, the immediate task is to close loopholes, such as those facilitating sanctions evasion through third-party entities. And if needed, a sixth or even seventh sanctions package should be on the table. The key is to remember that continuing to do business with Russia enables the Kremlin to finance its war, thus creating a further burden that Europe will need to carry in the future—from accepting more refugees to paying for the stabilization and reconstruction of a devastated Ukraine. Ukraine needs a plan to rebuild. Beyond the immediate humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian people, Europe must already start thinking about postwar reconstruction. Even if we still don’t have a clear picture of the final scale of the wreckage (or even the final geographic extent of the country), an aid package on the scale of the Marshall Plan will likely be needed. At their summit in Brussels, European leaders discussed an EU recovery fund for Ukraine similar to one set up in 2020 amid the pandemic. The EU should organize a donor conference with NATO and partners from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. France, as the head of the European Council through the end of June, should start laying the groundwork now, to be continued by the Czech Republic when it takes over the rotating presidency later this year. The success of the reconstruction could, in turn, showcase the value of liberal democracy—especially if a new Iron Curtain falls across Europe. Kyiv must attain a meaningful framework for cooperation with the West, even though Ukraine’s entry into NATO seems unlikely. By now, it’s clear that Ukraine deserves EU candidacy; yet accession is a long process with many political and administrative hoops to jump through. While Ukrainians must understand that there are no shortcuts, Kyiv should still get something soon. That’s why the European Union needs to invent a fast-track special partnership for Ukraine as part of the bloc’s overall reinvention for the post-post-Cold War period. But this new format needs to be credible: The effects of a protracted EU accession process are already on display in the Western Balkans, where countries have started searching for alternative patrons while backsliding on their reforms. Europe should offer asylum and humanitarian protection to Russian soldiers ready to surrender. Today, those who don’t want to fight their Ukrainian neighbors face three awful options: death, captivity in Ukraine, or a harsh prison sentence in Russia. Europe needs to offer an alternative, something similar to temporary humanitarian asylum. Such proposals would be more appealing to young soldiers than to officers, and even in the best-case scenario, the number who would avail themselves of the opportunity won’t be in the thousands. But even hundreds matter: It represents a powerful humanitarian gesture—a hand extended to a demoralized Russian military. The positive impact of the three prime ministers’ trip to Kyiv underscores the importance of having a diplomatic presence on the ground. Any EU member states that withdrew their diplomatic corps from Ukraine should consider sending them back to Kyiv. This is not just a gesture of solidarity: I was stationed in war-torn Syria when Damascus was shelled daily between 2013-2015, and while diplomatic work was difficult, it was still possible—and very much worthwhile. The picture we got on the ground was different and far more nuanced from the mediated images the rest of the world was getting. In Syria, the West left for good political reasons; in Ukraine, it should return as soon as possible. Is the East the new West? As Ivan Kravstev and Stephen Holmes noted in their 2019 book The Light that Failed, Eastern Europe had been mostly imitating the West since 1989. In the post-Cold War period, the chief aim in the East was to become—politically, economically, and socially—the new West. It was a mostly one-way stream of influence. But now that’s partly changing. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are becoming more relevant and inspiring, as their once-hardline stance on Russia is becoming increasingly mainstream. Consider—in parallel to the Czech takeaways from Kyiv—Morawiecki’s recently published ten-point plan to “save” Ukraine. He focuses mainly on restrictive measures against Russia and proposes concrete steps that can be implemented almost immediately. They include, among other options, cutting off all Russian banks from SWIFT, blocking Russian ships from EU ports, suspending visas for all Russians, and a total ban on the export of technologies that can be used for war. Ukraine has forced Central Europe to move with caution due to Russia’s aggression – they’re not moving closer to Russia. Wigura & Kuisz ’22 [Karolina; sociologist and historian of ideas; Jaroslaw; a political analyst who is writing a book about Poland’s illiberal turn; 3-25-2022; "America Thinks the War Is About Ukraine. Russia’s Neighbors Disagree."; NYTimes; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/opinion/nato-russia-poland-europe.html; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL] WARSAW — The symbolism was striking. On March 12, two weeks into Russia’s brutal bombardment of Ukraine, the leaders of France and Germany held a joint call with President Vladimir Putin. Just days later, three prime ministers from post-Communist Europe — Polish, Czech and Slovenian — traveled to Kyiv by train, despite the danger. This divergence exposed a sharp divide in how Eastern and Western NATO member states view the war in Ukraine. For Western countries, not least the United States, the conflict is a disaster for the people of Ukraine — but one whose biggest danger is that it might spill over the Ukrainian border, setting off a global conflict. For Central and Eastern European countries, it’s rather different. These neighbors of Russia tend to see the war not as a singular event but as a process. To these post-Soviet states, the invasion of Ukraine appears as a next step in a whole series of Russia’s nightmarish assaults on other countries, dating back to the ruthless attacks on Chechnya and the war with Georgia. To them, it seems foolhardy to assume Mr. Putin will stop at Ukraine. The danger is pressing and immediate. While the West believes it must prevent World War III, the East thinks that, whatever the name given to the conflict, the war against liberal democratic values, institutions and lifestyles has already started. Both positions have merit. But Mr. Biden’s visit to Poland on Friday, a day after an emergency NATO summit, is a vital opportunity to forge a common understanding. Both sides, West and East, must present a united front against Russian aggression. The alternative is disarray and destruction. At the root of the divide is history. Across centuries, Central and Eastern Europe have experienced the chilling effects of Russian imperialism. From czarist Russia to the Soviet Union, many countries through the region had their independence stamped out, their societies oppressed and their cultures marginalized. The trauma caused by the cyclical loss of territory and statehood is one of the most important elements of collective identity across the region. Many Central and Eastern Europeans share an anxious sense of themselves, a nervous sovereignty. Their independence, restored with such great effort after 1989, could easily be lost again, as the 20th century proved all too painfully. In the tragic fate of Ukraine, and earlier of Chechnya and Georgia, they see not only their own traumatic past but also their possible future. “We will be next” is the phrase on many lips. In this febrile atmosphere, NATO’s cautious steps look to many Central and Eastern Europeans like an echo of the phony war of 1939, when France and Britain undertook only limited military actions and did not save their eastern ally, Poland. At that time, too, horrible stories from bombed Warsaw and other cities filled the media. Yet the allies were determined not to be drawn in too deeply. Their military inaction temporarily delayed the spread of the war across the globe, but did not stop it. NATO’s stationed permanent forces in Poland – prefer the Defense Secretary’s confirmation. Strozewski 6-29 [Zoe; correspondent at Newsweek, citing Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; 6-29-2022; "U.S. establishing permanent troops in Poland amid fears of NATO-Russia war"; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/us-establishing-permanent-troops-poland-amid-fears-nato-russia-war-1720384; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL] The U.S. will station its first permanent forces on NATO's Eastern flank, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced Wednesday, as fears mount over a potential war between Russia and the 30-member alliance. In a Twitter thread detailing several new commitments from U.S. President Joe Biden to bolster security in Europe, Austin said that the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters and a field support battalion will be stationed in Poland, which shares a border with non-NATO member Russia. "These forces – the first permanent U.S. forces on NATO's Eastern Flank – will improve our command and control capabilities, interoperability with NATO, and management of prepositioned equipment," the Defense Department said in an accompanying fact sheet. "This action builds on the central role Poland has played in supporting NATO's combat credible deterrence and defense posture.” Officials such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov have issued warnings in recent months against NATO expansion or perceived threats from the alliance that they say could endanger Russia's security, even as their own country continues its monthslong assault on Ukraine. The new European security commitments from Biden that Austin announced on Wednesday, as well as NATO's invitation for Sweden and Finland to join its ranks, might further fuel Russia's ire and feelings of vulnerability against the alliance. Putin has cited the prospect of NATO expansion as one of his reasons for justifying the war in Ukraine, though the move seemed to backfire when Sweden and Finland announced their intention to join the alliance after Russia's invasion. Russia has also warned against any direct NATO involvement in the war, and taken issue with the weapons and supplies some member countries have funneled into Ukraine. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a self-exiled Russian oligarch and Kremlin critic, warned during an interview with the France-headquartered television network Euronews last month that Putin could eventually wage war on NATO if Ukraine does not win the current war. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in a video address to NATO's summit in Madrid this week that Putin's aggression could spread beyond Ukraine's borders and into a NATO country within a year. Despite the prospect of Russian aggression, some of NATO's recent actions indicate that the alliance is not shying from bolstering its own strength and assisting Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Monday that the number of NATO troops on high readiness will increase more than sevenfold, the largest boost since the Cold War. He also said that NATO members will agree on a "strengthened assistance package" for Ukraine that includes anti-drone systems and secure communication. 2AC – China Thumper China’s refusal to condemn Ukraine has accelerated Central Europe’s shift away from Russia. McCarthy 6-30 [Simone; correspondent for China for CNN Digital Worldwide; 6-30-2022; "Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy"; CNN; https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊] China’s concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. “China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a ‘systemic challenge’?” ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. “We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China,” he said, adding that NATO should “stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe.” But that rhetoric – blaming NATO for “disruption” in Europe – is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China “very quickly and very clearly lined itself up – at least in words, not so much in deeds – with Russia,” while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging “democracies versus autocracies” narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. “In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift,” Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China’s economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation’s relations with Taiwan. 2AC – Cyber Thumper NATO has already increased cybersecurity defense with Ukraine – thumps the DA. Hakmeh & Naylor 3-7 [Joyce; a senior research fellow for the International Security Programme at Chatham House; Esther; a research analyst at the International Security Programme; 3-7-2022; "How the tech community has rallied to Ukraine’s cyber-defence"; Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/07/tech-community-rallied-ukraine-cyber-defence-eu-nato; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL] In response to the Russian threat, there have been unprecedented efforts by private and government entities – and even individuals – to support Ukraine’s cyber resilience. Responding to cyber-attacks and building national cyber resilience has never been – and will never be – the sole responsibility of governments. It requires a whole-of-society approach grounded in international cooperation efforts. For the first time since its inception, the EU rapid cyber response team, with capabilities to detect and respond to a variety of threats, and headed by Lithuania, was deployed to help defend against cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine. The Romanian national cybersecurity agency and a cybersecurity company called Bitdefender launched a public-private partnership to provide pro bono technical support and threat intelligence to Ukraine’s government, businesses and citizens for “as long as it is necessary”. NATO, which has been working for a number of years with Ukraine to increase its cyber defences, signed an agreement a few weeks before the invasion aimed at enhancing cyber cooperation with Ukraine. The tech community leveraged its resources and knowledge to expose cyber-attacks and threats, and limit their spread. Shortly after WhisperGate, Microsoft shared technic
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