DA - Russia Relations - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW
DA - Russia Relations - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW.docx
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DAs – Russia Relations – CPWW – Michigan Summer Debate Institutes 2022 Notes How to Use this File This file presents multiple different scenarios for Russian influence being good around the globe. Each DA argues that the plan’s increase in NATO cohesion/strength/unity trades off with the motivations behind [x] country/region relations with Russia which is bad. The best way to use this file is to pick a region and use that section of the file for execution of the DA. There are 7 unique relations scenarios for you to choose from. The “generic link” at the top of the file can be used with all of the scenarios. Acknowledgments/Contact Information Thank you to Suditi C., Roan M., Surya K., Shae M., Rohan L., Samuel P., Sahil J., Res S., and Ian S. for all their hard work on this file. Please email walratca@umich.edu with any questions or concerns. Generic Relations Top Level 1NC – Generic Link Russia’s relations across the globe are driven by a desire to prevent NATO cohesion and strength – the plan’s implementation saps motivation for sustaining influence John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “8 The outlook”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22 The pattern of recent years indicates that in this situation, Moscow is more likely to increase activities abroad to make its presence felt. It has playgrounds close to home – in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine as well as further afield in Libya and Syria. Russia may also take another step closer to China at a time when tensions in US–China relations are increasing. In short, the scope for the collision of interests with western countries, including Germany, looks set to increase rather than decrease. Such an outcome is more likely because the Russian leadership appears undeterred by greater confrontation. There are four reasons for this. First, confrontation helps sustain the narrative at home that ‘the West’ is working to cut Russian down to size as part of a neocontainment policy, forcing Russia into a ‘besieged fortress’ posture. This putative external danger to Russia allows the leadership to take measures to protect itself against the real threat to its security – its own people. Second, more confrontation increases the Kremlin’s appetite for fishing in troubled waters, whether in areas vacated by the USA such as Syria, or in western countries themselves by interfering in their democratic processes to increase their societal divisions. This is part of the strategy to protect the Russian system by shaping the external environment to its benefit. Third, confrontation offers opportunities to expose the weaknesses of the EU and NATO and deepen estrangement between the USA and its European allies. Divisions within the EU on the issue of Russia offer potentially rich opportunities to Russian diplomacy. Fourth, Moscow recognises that confrontation intimidates European governments, encouraging them to find ways of talking more to Moscow rather than creating the means to deter its aggressive behaviour. Germany’s failure to invest in maintaining adequate defence forces after the end of the Cold War says much about its lack of a strategic mindset. It succumbed to a sense of a new peaceful era reinforced by the enlargement of NATO, which relieved Germans of the burden of being a frontier state as they had been for fortyfive years as a divided nation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In this seemingly benign environment, there was less obvious need for US security guarantees and Germany’s armed forces needed to focus primarily on out-of-area crisis management to the detriment of collective defence. This had profound implications for the size, structure, equipment and training of the Bundeswehr. In 2007, a senior British officer likened the Bundeswehr’s capabilities to those of ‘an aggressive camping organisation’.5 Since 2014, a defence planning process has been in place to rebuild the armed forces’ collective defence and deterrence capabilities. This will reach not completion until 2032, leaving a significant gap during which a key vulnerability is visible. During the Cold War, the US military had the ability to deploy forces to two major theatres at the same time and had enough reserves to deal with a simultaneous minor crisis. It can now only respond to one major crisis and one smaller emergency. Should the US have to deal with a major crisis in the Asia-Pacific region, European members of NATO at present would struggle alongside a smaller US force to maintain Europe’s defences if tested. The German government’s strategic assessments after the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were clear about the need to reinvest in defence but its leaders did not want to take this message to the public because it would be unpopular. Policymakers still use coded language to make the point. In a speech in October 2020, Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer spoke compellingly of Germany needing to be a ‘strategic giver’ rather than remaining a ‘taker’. It meant becoming a ‘hard, powerpolitical factor’.6 However, there was no mention of paying for this capability. Her message instead focused on the importance of preserving the transatlantic link significantly weakened over the past two decades, and particularly under the Trump presidency. The crisis of liberal democracy symbolised by Trump’s election in 2016 and the rise of populist forces in several western countries have been grist to the Kremlin’s mill. For this reason, Russia’s leaders feel that history is on their side. Putin boldly stated in 2019 that liberalism had outlived its purpose.7 Russia’s overconfidence derives partly from the fact that it has worked out how to target western weaknesses without provoking serious retaliation. Western countries have signally failed to study Russia’s vulnerabilities in the same way and apply pressure to them as part of a strategy to defend their interests. Behind its claims that it wishes to adapt the international system to new realities, Moscow has a backward-looking agenda. It seeks refuge in the past with its nostalgia for the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.8 When it talks of a new security order, it has in mind an old one. Ahead of the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Putin even proposed a summit of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to discuss global security issues. This, of course, did not include Germany, the country with the largest population in Europe and the fourth-largest economy in the world. The Russian leadership remains obsessed with the extent of US influence in international affairs as if Russia were an equal, and despite clear signs that Washington is returning to a new form of isolationism, demonstrated by its reduced interest in the Middle East. These paranoias continue to fuel the traditional goal of weakening the transatlantic link and returning Europe to its natural state in which Russia can exert greater political influence over the continent. In this respect, Trump’s disregard for NATO, his contempt for the EU and his tendency to treat Germany as an enemy rather than an ally made him Moscow’s accomplice in weakening transatlantic relations. His assault on Germany for its low level of defence spending and the hostility of his administration to Nord Stream 2 were a deeply unnerving experience for German policymakers that look set to recede to some extent under the presidency of Joe Biden. However, even if the atmosphere improves, a return to the pre-Trump status quo in Germany’s relations with the USA looks unlikely because too much has changed in the meantime. **INSERT SPECIFIC RELATIONS SCENARIO** 2NC – Generic Link Russia’s drive to establish global relations is only facilitated by decohesion of US and NATO policy John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “Introduction”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22 The premise of this book is that Russia in its current condition and configuration poses a serious threat to the stability of Europe. Russia’s authoritarian system is weak at home and yet strong enough to be a revanchist power, one able to fill power vacuums created by the USA and its allies in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Central America. Turning its back on Europe, Russia has moved closer to China, apparently ready to accept being its junior partner in the absence of allies to counter-balance Chinese influence. The focus of Russia’s leadership is on survival. It sees the restoration and upholding of Russia’s international status as essential to the process of securing its rule, prioritising it over the need to equip Russia for a new economic and political age dominated by climate change, digitalisation and other disruptive forces. The rise of Asia, the disorientation of the USA and its allies as well as the tarnishing of western values and the fractures in western societies all offer short-term gains for a Russian leadership fearful of reform at home but confident of its strength abroad. This has encouraged an ill-conceived policy of aggression towards Ukraine that could easily have triggered a wider European conflict in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and deliberately destabilised south-eastern Ukraine. In the process, Russia has needlessly made an enemy of a people with which it shares a strong cultural affinity, consolidating Ukraine as a political nation that no longer sees its future in close alliance with Russia. The ‘return’ of Crimea to Russia is meagre compensation for forcing Ukraine on to a pro-western path of development and seriously aggravating relations with the EU and NATO. Moscow’s flat-footed reaction to revolution in Belarus in the summer of 2020 pointed again to poor decision-making and limited crisis management capabilities. The Lukashenka regime had been living on borrowed time for years beforehand and danger was looming. Further misjudgements of this kind are likely to increase rather than decrease as the Russian system closes further in on itself in pursuit of greater resilience to outside threats. Central Europe-Russia Relations 1NC – Central Europe Relations 1NC – Russian Probing Scenario Central Europe-US relations are on the brink now which leaves the room for Russian influence David Hutt ‘21, is a political journalist based between France and the Czech Republic, reporting on European political affairs and EU-Asian relations, “In Central Europe, Biden Can Build on Trump’s Record”, World Politics Review, 2/17/21, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29428/in-central-europe-biden-can-build-on-trump-s-record Today, the United States’ relations with Central Europe are at an inflection point. Much of the recent media coverage in the region has focused on how Washington’s influence might wane if President Joe Biden picks a fight with the governments of Hungary and Poland, whose leaders had cultivated close ties with Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump. On the campaign trail, Biden bemoaned the recent trajectory of democratic decline and the erosion of checks and balances on executive power in those countries. Meanwhile, illiberal leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski are suspicious of Biden’s pledges to make human rights and the rule of law key pillars of U.S. foreign policy, viewing such efforts as affronts to their sovereignty. As the Atlantic Council’s Petr Tuma noted in December, some observers in Central and Eastern Europe also fear that after a period of “intensified cooperation” under Trump, America could revert back to the era of President Barack Obama, “when many believed Washington (initially) sacrificed the region’s interests in the name of a reset with Moscow.” In reality, though, Biden has given no sign of any such attempt at a reset, signaling he will take a tough approach toward Russia. And even as Biden seeks to reorient U.S. foreign policy away from his predecessor’s approach, the Trump administration has actually left a solid foundation of trust and cooperation for Biden to build upon in Central Europe. Since 2017, all of the leaders from the “Visegrad Four”—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland—have visited Washington, while Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, toured each of their capitals. U.S. trade with the region is up across the board, and Washington has signed new security pacts with Poland and Hungary. And all except Budapest have backed Washington’s pressure campaign against the controversial Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. During his first weeks in office, Biden has focused more on reassuring Western European partners, holding calls with the leaders of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as well the NATO secretary general. But having served as the main interlocutor for Central and Eastern Europe as vice president under Obama, Biden knows well the region’s strategic importance. Its natural aversion to Russian influence tends to suit U.S. interests. And China, America’s main strategic competitor, has built up its investment and influence in the region, backed by a powerful section of the Central European political elite. Improving relations with the region won’t require a great deal of heavy lifting from Biden’s administration—a rare benefit as it faces numerous intractable problems across the world. In fact, in many policy areas, Biden can largely pick up where the Trump administration left off. Renewed focus on European cohesion for NATO undermines Russian influence in Central Europe – continued attempts to exclude Russia leads to violent probing to re-establish influence Anatol Lieven ’22, is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Russia Belongs at the Center of Europe”, Foreign Policy, 2/10/22, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/10/russia-europe-ukraine-west-security-council/ The Western attempt to expel Russia from Europe has failed. That there was such an attempt was always implicit in the strategy of seeking to admit every European country but Russia into NATO and the European Union. In this context, the NATO slogan “A Europe Whole and Free” is an explicit statement that Russia is not part of Europe. But as French President Emmanuel Macron has reminded us, Russia is part of Europe and is simply too big, too powerful, and too invested in its immediate neighborhood to be excluded from the European security order. A continued strategy along these lines will lead to repeated Russian attempts to force its way back in. At best, this will lead to repeated and very damaging crises; at worst, to war. A structure needs to be created that can defend the interests of NATO and the EU while at the same time accommodating vital Russian interests and preserving peace. The solution lies in a modernized version of what was once called the “Concert of Europe.” The current security order has reached its limit. Until 2007-2008, the expansion of the EU and NATO appeared to have proceeded flawlessly, with the admission of all the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe and the Balkans, as well as the Baltic states. Russia was unhappy with NATO expansion but did not actively oppose it. Then, however, both NATO and the EU received decisive checks, through their own overreach. At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, in 2008, the United States and its allies, though denied an immediate Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia because of the opposition of France and Germany, procured a promise of those countries’ eventual membership. Seen from Moscow, this created the prospect that NATO would include countries with territorial disputes (and in the case of Georgia, frozen conflicts) with Russia; that (as in the Baltic states) NATO would give cover to moves to harm the position of local Russian minorities; and that NATO would expel Russia from its naval base at Sevastopol and from the southern Caucasus. Later that year, the Russo-Georgian War should have sounded the death knell of further NATO expansion, for it demonstrated beyond doubt both the acute dangers of territorial disputes in the former USSR and that in the last resort Russia would fight to defend its vital interests in the region, and the West would not fight. This is being demonstrated again today by the repeated and categorical statements from Washington and Brussels that there is no question of sending troops to defend Ukraine; and if NATO will not fight for Ukraine, then it cannot admit Ukraine as an ally. It is as simple as that. The rise of China is the other factor that makes the exclusion of Russia unviable. For this project was developed at a time when Russia was at its weakest in almost 400 years and when China’s colossal growth had only just begun. This allowed the West possibilities that today have diminished enormously, if as seems likely China is prepared to strengthen Russia against Western economic sanctions. The EU too has reached the limit of its expansion eastward. On the one hand, there is Ukraine’s size (44 million people), corruption, political dysfunction, and poverty (GDP per capita that’s one-third of Russia’s). Perhaps more importantly, EU expansion to eastern Europe no longer looks like the unconditional success story that it did a decade ago. Romania, Bulgaria, and other states remain deeply corrupt and in many ways still ex-communist. Poland and Hungary have developed dominant strains of chauvinist and quasi-authoritarian populism that place them at odds with what were supposed to be the core values of the EU—and that in some respects bring them closer ideologically to the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin. After this experience, there is no chance that the EU will admit a country like Ukraine in any foreseeable future. An acknowledgment of these obvious truths (which are acknowledged in private by the overwhelming majority of Western officials and experts) should open the way to thinking about a new European security architecture that would incorporate NATO and the EU while reducing the hostility between these organizations and Russia. We should aim at the creation of this new system as part of the solution to the present crisis, and in order to avoid new ones. Attempts by Russia to re-gain influence in Central Europe result in hybrid war that undermines the entire alliance – turns and outweighs the aff Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR_2019_online_final.pdf Despite Russian conventional threats along the eastern borders of NATO, Moscow has deployed a wide range of non-traditional weapons in its grand strategy t
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