Aff - Digital Cyclops 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
Aff - Digital Cyclops 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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Aff – Digital Cyclops 2 – BFHR 7wk 2AC---C/I---HW v. SW Only a software based analysis can provide a better understanding of technology in the world Frabetti 14 (Federica Frabetti PhD - MRes and PhD in Media and Communications at Goldsmiths, University of London, “Software Theory”, Rowman and Littlefield International Ltd, Pages xv-xix, 2014, MG) This ambivalence—one could even say, this circular movement—between the technical and the social seems to me to characterize the whole field of software and code studies. Individual academic contributions can choose to privilege one term over the other, but ultimately they turn to the technical in order to explain the social, and then revert to the social in order to explain the technical. Representative of a stronger emphasis on the technical aspects of new technologies are studies such as Nick Montfort and Ian Bo- gost’s 2009 book on the Atari video computer system, entitled Racing the Beam, which has been positioned as the inaugural text of platform studies. Overlapping with software studies, platform studies pays particular attention to the specific hardware and software systems on which ‘expressive computing’ (another name for Manovich’s ‘cultural software’—that is, software applications for video games, digital art, and electronic literature) is based. Montfort and Bogost recommend ‘delving into the code’ and giving ‘serious and in-depth consideration [to] circuits, chips, peripherals and how they are integrated and used’ in order to make sense of new media.22 Also intent on the functional unpacking of technology is the classical work of Alexander Galloway, Protocol (2004), which offers a welcome counterargument to the widespread discursive use of digital networks as metaphors of horizontal connectivity and intrinsic political empowerment. By unpacking the hierarchical workings of ‘real’ networks, which are functionally based on layers of software that ‘wrap up’ the contents of communication, Galloway also unpacks and critiques the rhetoric of freedom that surrounds digital networks. For instance, he demonstrates how protocols incorporate (‘embed’) censorship and other mechanisms of distributed control, and how these technical characteristics embody a logic of governmentality which he ultimately associates with the military origins of the Internet. ‘Distributed networks’, Galloway states, ‘are native to Deleuze’s control society.’ 23 In sum, for Galloway, discovering the control mechanisms which found the technical functioning of networks is a way to complicate the political discourse on networks inside and outside the academy. Although Galloway’s approach remains very important and politically meaningful for the cultural study of software, it also runs the risk of positioning the technical as the ultimate truth, as showing what ‘truly’ lies behind any discourse on technology (celebratory or otherwise). In the end, this approach rests on a strategy that draws on technical explanation as a way to reach a ‘deeper’ understanding of technology—an understanding supposedly located ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ the social. This ‘quest for depth’ in the analysis of software, which positions software as the truth of new technologies while also intertwining software with issues of ‘power’ (or ‘biopower’), ‘control’ and ‘governmentality’, is also present in more socially orientated studies of software, such as David Berry’s 2011 book, The Philosophy of Software. For Berry, in order to understand the way in which one experiences software today and to develop a ‘phenomenology of software’, software studies need to ‘unpack’ software, to understand what it ‘really does’, to reach a technical grasp of it.24 Yet, again, this process of unpacking leads to the analysis of the practices of production, usage, and consumption that shape and are shaped by software. Importantly, according to Berry, such a deeper understanding of software—which, for instance, unmasks the decisions made by big corporations such as Google with regard to their software—is ultimately an emancipatory practice, because it leads individuals to better-informed political decisions. An analogous emancipatory aim characterizes Robert Kitchin and Martin Dodge’s book, Code/Space (2011), which investigates the way in which software shapes social space by enabling ‘forms of automation, the monitoring and controlling of systems from a distance, the reconfiguring and rejuvenation of established industries, the development of new forms of labor practices and paid work, the reorganization and recombination of social and economic formations at different scales’ and many other innovations.25 Kitchin and Dodge develop the idea of ‘automated management’ in order to explore how software enables a whole new range of movements and transactions across space while also automatically and systematically capturing and storing data on these transactions, thus bringing about new opportunities for personal and collective empowerment which are also new possibilities for regulation and control. The intertwining between digital technologies and power is also at the core of the articulated analysis of software offered by Wendy Chun in her recent book, Programmed Visions (2011). Chun argues that computers, and particularly software, ‘embody a certain logic of governing or steering through the increasingly complex world around us’, which she calls ‘the logic of programmability’. 26 Programmability gives users a sense of empowerment by ultimately incorporating them into the logic of a machine that they do not fully understand but feel somewhat in control of. In other words, we feel empowered by software because we feel in control of something we do not have a grasp of. In fact, Chun argues that our fascination with software resides precisely in the fact that we do not understand it. Instead, we view it as something hidden, obscure, difficult to pin down, and generally invisible, which nevertheless generates visible effects in the world (for instance, lights flickering on a screen or the functioning of telecommunication networks). Rather than aiming at dispelling the mysteriousness of software, she analyzes how software functions as a ‘metaphor of metaphors’ in a number of discourses and fields of knowledge precisely because of its relative obscurity. She writes: ‘[Software’s] combination of what can be seen and not seen, can be known and not known—its separation of interface from algorithm; software from hardware—makes it a powerful metaphor for everything we believe is invisible yet generates visible effects, from genetics to the invisible hand of the market; from ideology to culture.’ 27 Although critical of those approaches of software studies that view knowing software as ‘a form of enlightenment’, in her own analysis Chun still combines historical-cultural narratives (for instance, the history of programming languages) with technical explanations (for instance, the exposition of how digital circuits work) in order to complicate her cultural account of technology and particularly of software. This political commitment with the analysis of software has been taken further by a number of studies on software which draw on neomaterialism, media archaeology, and object-oriented philosophy.28 In their quest for thinking software as a material entity or process which spreads into economics, politics, and—again—the whole logic of control society as an ‘immanent’ force understood in a Simondonian and Deleuzian sense, these studies tend to ‘ontologize’ software as the condition of possibility of contemporary life, and to privilege software studies as a master discourse capable of making visible the foundational but otherwise invisible, hidden, embedded, off-shored, or forgotten nature of software and code. And yet, one could ask: To what extent can software and code be privileged in this respect? On what basis can they be said to constitute the conditions for revealing the truth of human life or society?29 So, to recap, not only is the number of existing studies of software still relatively limited, but these studies also give an account of software that is based on the analysis of the processes of software production, reception, and consumption combined with the technical exposition of how software ‘really’ works (either as a technical artefact or as the all-pervasive logic of control societies). Although I recognize that the above perspective remains absolutely relevant to the political and cultural study of technology, I suggest that this approach should be supplemented by an alternative, or I would even hesitantly say more ‘theoretical’, and yet more ‘direct’, investigation of software—although I will raise questions for both these notions of ‘theory’ and ‘directness’ later on. As I have suggested above, in order to understand the role that new technologies play in our lives and the world as a whole we do need to shift the focus of analysis from the practices and discourses concerning them to a thorough investigation of how new technologies work, and, in particular, of how software works and of what it does. And yet, in Software Theory I propose an investigation of software that takes historical-cultural and technical narratives as a starting point, rather than as a final one, and I suggest that these narratives should be problematized rather than treated as explanatory. Such an investigation of software will help me to problematize the intertwining of the technical and the social aspects of software which currently preoccupies Software Studies. At the same time, I will refrain from making any sweeping ontological claims about what software is and will instead engage in a critical examination of the alleged relations between ‘software’/’code’ on the one hand and ‘ontology’ and ‘materiality’ on the other hand, as conceptualized by cultural theorists of computation such as Katherine Hayles. This is why earlier on I suggested that the title of this book, Software Theory, hints at a different engagement with theory from what Lev Manovich had in mind.30 Let me now explain how such an investigation of software can be undertaken. Counter-interpretation – reject debating the Hardware called by the resolution and instead teams must debate over Software Hui 19 (Yuk Hui PhD - juror of the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy and Culture since 2020, and initiator of the Research Network for Philosophy and Technology since 2014, teaching in various institutes including Goldsmiths College, Leuphana University, Bauhaus University, Strelka Institute Moscow, Chinese Academy of Art, and City University of Hong Kong, “Recursivity and Contingency”, Rowman and Littlefield International, Pages 238-241, January 2019, MG s/o PFox) The destruction of all organic life points to the only possibility for the survival of the human, which is the separation between body and mind, between hardware and software. This metaphor of software and hardware is technological, but it is also not a metaphor because it is a research agenda that covers everything from dietetics, neurophysiology, genetics, and tissue synthesis to particle physics, astrophysics, electronics, information science, and nuclear physics. 57 The search for the separation between thinking and organic life is a response to the prospect of solar catastrophe, since the central question is, how is it possible to survive without an organic form of life? Or, as Lyotard puts it: “[H]ow to provide this software with a hardware that is independent of the conditions of life on earth?” 58 This is a negative organology, or an extreme humanism. It is negative since it is based on a total negation of the organic and on the belief that there is a possibility, no matter how small it might be, of replacing the organic body with an inorganic artifice for the survival of thinking. Lyotard, through the incarnation of a female interrogator called Him, implicitly goes back to the recursive structure of organization and the possibility that such a recursive algorithm could be independent from the organic body: Most of all: [human]’s equipped with a symbolic system that’s both arbitrary (in semantics and syntax), letting it be less dependent on an immediate environment, and also “recursive” (Hofstadter), allowing it to take into account (above and beyond raw data) the way it has of processing such data. . . . Isn’t that exactly what constitutes the basis of your transcendence in immanence? 59 The notion of recursivity is raised here, but Lyotard does not explore the relation between recursivity and reflective judgment further. He did not understand the concept of recursion, just as he had already dismissed information theory in cybernetics for its “triviality” earlier in his The Postmodern Condition. Here he is prepared to reject this thesis by invoking Hubert Dreyfus, whose What Computers Cannot Do? A Critique of Artificial Reason (1972) challenged the research in artificial intelligence (AI) of that time as being too Cartesian in the sense that AI reduces intelligence to a very limited way of knowing. This could be briefly explained with what in classical AI or “Good Old-Fashioned AI” (GOFAI) is called the frame problem, which is about the AI’s description of the world. In order to know an event or an environment, the AI will have to produce a huge amount of descriptions. However, it remains very difficult to contextualize these descriptions. It is Cartesian because, in this form of knowing, everything is merely present-at-hand in the sense of Heidegger, while it ignores the fact that in the preoccupations of everyday life Dasein encounters situations that are ready-to-hand and have to do with embodiment and intuition. The rejection of reducing thinking to a binary form is also a rejection of the separation between body and mind. The philosopher, who is challenged in this dialogue, is also a phenomenologist. He has to defend the importance of the body and of sexuality, since without the body and without sexuality, can thinking exist at all? Brassier has nicely summarized the perspectives of the two interrogators: one for which the inseparability between thought and its material substrate necessitates separating thought from its rootedness in organic life in general, and the human organism in particular; another according to which it is the irreducible separation of the sexes that renders thought inseparable from organic embodiment, and human embodiment specifically. 60 If becoming system presents a negativity for Lyotard, this is because it is based on a negative organology, which ignores the question of life and existence. And if Lyotard here invokes this negativity, it is because he wants to think through the question of resistance, as he asks in his introduction: “[W]hat else remains as ‘politics’ except resistance to this inhuman?” This resistance is also inhuman since the negative inhuman doesn’t occupy the totality of this concept. Like the sublime, the inhuman also has its double, as Lyotard emphasizes: “The inhumanity of the system which is currently being consolidated under the name of development (among others) must not be confused with the infinitely secret one of which the soul is hostage.” 61 The inhuman is truly posthuman in the sense that it considers the dissolution of the human as messages, waves, particles, and cells. However, the inhuman is not transhuman. Although the inhuman shares the negativity of the transhuman— that is to say, it is imprisoned by the fanaticism of development or technological singularity—at the same time it resists such negativity not by rejecting a humanmachine hybridity but by rejecting the tendency imposed by a transhumanist ideology that is motivated by the anticipation of the solar catastrophe and desire of inorganic immortality. What is meant by “the infinitely secret one of which the soul is hostage”? Ashley Woodward identifies the double of the inhuman by suggesting that the negative inhuman can be identified with nihilism, and further that art is the second sense of the inhuman. 62 However, I have strong reservations about this second observation since this is too narrow and it does not seem to be what Lyotard was referring to, though it is interesting here to consider in art the potential of overcoming the determination of the system. If the soul is the hostage of the inhuman, it is because the inhuman is like its preindividual reality as well as its call. It is like water to fish: Even though the latter live in the former, it remains transparent to it. This inhuman cannot be reduced to calculation and to representation. The possible explanation of seeing an intimacy between art and the inhuman is that art sends the system back to a primordial creativity in order to undo the totalization of the system. It is clearer when we refer to Lyotard’s reading of Augustine. However, instead of discussing his The Confession of Augustine, I will instead make a short-cut by referring to an episode of a TV program called Apostrophes that was broadcast on the January 9, 1981. I transcribe part of the lengthy conversation below. JFL: You remember that in the eleventh book that you cited, and that you remember, those confessions, there is this formula, it is a god more interior in myself than me, that is what I make allusion to, what Wilson searches, it is that, isn’t it? There is something in me which is more interior in myself than me, well, this what I call the inhuman, I have the right, it is perfectly clear, in fact, because it is just something with which I will never arrive at having . . . Interrogator: Vulgarly, when we employ the word inhuman, we think about the horrible, appalling, cruel, and detestable, we don’t think about interior being which unfolds . . . JFL: You do it on purpose! Interrogator: But I am not philosopher, I am journalist, I am a bit flat. 63 Lyotard sometimes refers to this inhuman “which is more interior in myself than me,” as la chose or the child, which carries within it the antidote to the negative inhuman. However, these two inhumans are not completely separate, since the latter is also partially a condition for the former, without which the positive inhuman remains merely an element of theology, meaning that there is only one mode of rationalization of the Unknown through God. The logical sense of the inhuman is exemplified in Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gödel, since both logicians refused the subordination to positivism. Like Gödel, who shows the incompleteness of any logical system in terms of proof, for his part Wittgenstein “did not opt for the positivism that was being developed by the Vienna Circle, but outlined in his investigation of language games a kind of legitimation not based on performativity.” 64 The positive inhuman is that which resists systematization and reduction to calculation. The question is, how can we articulate the question of the inhuman, which is not hermeneutic, and not reflexive, without returning to theology or mysticism? Focusing on playing the game of debate with ZERO specific end point enables psychic violence, eliminates Otherness, and creates disaffective behaviors Halpern 14 (Orit Halpern - associate professor in Sociology at Concordia University in Montréal, “Cybernetic Rationality”, Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, 4 July 2014, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1600910X.2014.923320, MG s/o PFox and Townes) Affective logics What the cybernetic reformulation of logic as ‘psychotic’ permitted was an abandonment of ontological concern with the past and the present in the interest of focusing on future interactions. These models measured not what is happening, but prepare us for what will happen as a result of finding patterns of past data, that ironically are devoid of historical temporalities. The transformation in truth claims and epistemology opened a new frontier for study – subjective interactions in environments with incomplete infor
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