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2022 Michigan Counterplan

CP - EU CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

CP - EU CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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EU CP – BFHR
Notes
There are three versions of the CP
The EU unilaterally acts – internal net benefit of EU cohesion
The EU works with NATO – China net benefit
The EU works with the US – external net benefits
There are some aff answers, but tbh the best answers are probably the built in US-NATO coop key warrants in each aff.
All the DAs produced at camp so far are probably net benefits to most versions of the CP, so there’s a lot of flexibility as to what you want to go with it.
A lot of the solvency stuff can be taken from one module and applied to the other two – creative highlighting solves!
Thanks to Archan Sen from Eagan, David “‍” Sanico from Calvert Hall, Stephen Lewis from Damien, and Guy Bloom and James Donovan from Bronx Science for producing the file.
EU CP
1NC Shells
1NC—EU Unilateral
Text: The European Union should ____________________________________________________
The CP solves the entirety of case, revitalizes lagging EU leadership, solves CMR, and spurs innovation.
Csernatoni 19 [Raluca Csernatoni, PhD in International Relations from Central European University, 2019. The EU’s Technological Power: Harnessing Future and Emerging Technologies for European Security. Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe, 119–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2_6 DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]
Less than a century ago, Edmund Husserl’s warning words about Europe were more than farsighted: “the gravest danger menacing Europe is its lassitude” (quoted in Bauman 2014). Applied to the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), his words ring even truer. In the current climate of fiscal and economic austerity, recent debates on the EU’s security and defence capabilities have centred on Europe’s clear lag, warned against cuts in national defence budgets, and called for a new level of ambition and ‘pooling and sharing’ strategies for enhanced defence cooperation at the European level. Nevertheless, the case for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy is even harder to endorse in domestic debates over resources and priorities, especially concerning high-tech security technologies. The European defence sector contends with public finances under pressure from growing pension burdens, shrinking recruitment pools and states increasingly cautious about interventionist military operations or unwarranted military capabilities spending.
This chapter looks at the EU’s recent impetus to fund for serious military capacity build-up through dual-use and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous robotics. According to the European Commission, Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) “go beyond what is known!” and “[v]isionary thinking can open up promising avenues towards powerful new technologies” (FET 2018). FETs have been allocated a provisional budged of €2.696 million under the Horizon 2020, having three complementary lines of actions: FET Open funding projects on new ideas for radically new future technologies, including unconventional research and innovation collaborations and practices; FET Proactive nurturing emerging themes and establishing a critical mass of European researches in order to build new interdisciplinary research communities; and FET Flagships that are “1-billion, 10-years initiatives where hundreds of excellence European researchers unite forces to focus on solving an ambitious scientific and technological challenge” (FET 2018). The Work Programme of 2018–2020 (FET 2018–2020) under the Horizon 2020 started in 2016, highlighted among others a new generation of robotics technologies, human-machine interfaces and cooperation, cognition and AI as well as quantum computing and its advantages to solve challenging industrial and scientific problems such as the development of protocols, controls and benchmarking for real life applications (FET 2018–2020, pp. 34, 38).
The framing of FETs is particularly significant, because such technologies and the inter- and multidisciplinary research and innovation synergies that are prioritised by the European Commission are expected to transform “Europe’s science base into a competitive advantage”, as well as “initiate new lines of technology through unexplored collaborations between advanced multidisciplinary science and cuttingedge engineering” (FET 2018). Most importantly, they can have spill over effects in the areas of security and defence and in the case of civil-military applications in the security continuum between internal and external security in Europe. They likewise express an undeniable technologisation trend to push for high-tech multidisciplinary Research & Development (R&D) in areas of strategic and global competition. This is reflected in the EU’s policymaking that has been actively pursuing neoliberal strategies to also revamp a lagging behind European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the proliferation of discourses regarding the strategic and economic advantages of frontier or game-changing dual-use technologies (Csernatoni 2018, p. 190). To this end, the underlying goal is to ensure that Europe will have a leadership role “early on in those promising future technology areas able to renew the basis for future European competitiveness and growth” (FET 2018).
The EU is poised to tackle challenging global phenomena and major mutations engendered by a so-called fourth industrial revolution and a new age of ever more sophisticated technologies like cyber technologies, autonomous robotics and AI. Such game-changing technical advancements have important civilian and military applications in different areas, by creating new markets, triggering new cooperation in key industrial domains and transforming civil-military relations in Europe and the world. They galvanise a variety of actors and different levels of analysis, intertwining multidisciplinary research approaches and different technical, socio-political, economic and security fields. In this regard, scholarship should be focused on evaluating the geopolitical, policy, social, ethical and legal challenges of such technologies in a world increasingly driven by digital and automated technologies in all aspects of activity, including security and defence. ‘Big Tech’ and major leaders such as the USA and China, with Canada, Israel, France, Russia and the United Kingdom holding key positions in these fields, are currently driving the innovation agenda and arms race in AI-enabled and autonomous security technologies. However, a balance must be reached between such innovations and future technological artefacts that comply with democratic and legal requirements, social norms and ethical values and the EU could play a significant role in their meaningful governance.
In the last few years, the emergence of new technologies has stimulated worldwide debates on their uses, risks and potential benefits. Emerging autonomous technologies are a set of smart technologies that are rapidly converging and are often interrelated, connected or fully integrated, such as AI, machine learning algorithms, deep learning, cyber networks and robotics (European Commission 2018a, p. 5). Such technologies are creating new synergies in key industrial domains at national, European and transnational levels, encompassing a host of implications for both civil and military objectives. In the European context, EU institutions and agencies such as the European Commission, European Parliament and European Defence Agency (EDA) have been taking part in discussions surrounding their R&D and governance, by creating the impetus to strengthen market growth, competitiveness, innovation and regulation in these sectors.
EU strength prevent global conflict and transnational threats---extinction
Dr. Rosa Balfour 19, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, MA in History from Cambridge University, MSc in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science, Senior Advisor to the European Policy Centre, Associate of LSE Ideas, “The European Foreign Policy in a Hostile Environment”, The Progressive Post, 4/11/2019, https://progressivepost.eu/debates/next-economy/european-foreign-policy-hostile-environment
In a brittle world without enduring strong international alliances, the debate on Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has gained new resonance, but it should not shadow the EU’s unique key international assets in the global economy and multilateral order. Working with global networks to promote norms and public goods is key to push back on nationalism, the rise of geopolitics and transactionalism.
Strategic autonomy’ and ‘complementarity with NATO’ usually appear in the same sentence in the European debate – the latest doctrinal iteration to be found in the EU Global Strategy of June 2016. The ensemble reflects Europe’s need to rely on its transatlantic relationship for security and territorial defence, empowering it to carry out foreign policy too. The EU’s greatest foreign policy achievement of enlarging to Central Europe after the Cold War, pursued in tandem with NATO expansion, is testimony to this pairing.
Since the end of 2016, the US President’s international preferences undermine directly or indirectly Europe’s security. Whether it is the insistence on greater burden-sharing, US action in the Middle East, or trade disputes with China, current US policies put Europe’s security – already challenged by Russian action in Eastern Europe and the Middle East – at risk.
European leaders have started to question whether the transatlantic relationship needs to be preserved no matter what, or whether Europe should emancipate from it. The debate on ‘strategic autonomy’ is animating recent efforts in the field of security and defence. It refers to the ability to make and carry out decisions on defence, to conduct military operations autonomously, and to have the industrial capabilities to do so. Even if this level of strategic autonomy were agreed upon, it would take a generation for Europe to affect the world stage.
The focus on strategic autonomy speaks to present insecurities in European societies, but not to the EU’s international legitimacy where, possibly, the European Union has better opportunities to develop means of political autonomy which befit its history and international identity. The emerging debate on economic sovereignty is addressing for the first time the degree to which the EU can make political use of some of its economic and financial tools, such as the Euro as an international currency. After all, the EU and its Member States remain the world’s largest trade bloc and donor.
On the multilateral stage, Europe faces an increasingly hostile environment but remains the best hope to pursue universal principles, such as human rights and the rule of law, which underpin the resilience of that multilateral system. How to partner with other countries and actors around the globe to push back on attacks to international order is no longer a second order priority.
If the way ahead appears clear, achieving it is a tall order. The rationale for collective action for the EU seems obvious – the ‘politics of scale’, or to be stronger together rather than weaker apart – but historically difficult to achieve. The multiple threats and risks on Europe’s doorsteps have only minimally bridged the strategic divergence that continues to beset the continent, and the rise of the populist radical right is beginning to undermine existing European external policies, not to speak of a higher level of ambition.
Looking at global politics from a non-European perspective, how Europe’s friends and partners around the world will welcome a bid for greater autonomy – politically, economically, and strategically – still needs to be seen. The EU’s worldview that it has acted as a ‘force for good’ is not uncritically accepted. After all, that ethical stand was also possible thanks to the EU’s belonging to a stable and hegemonic West.
If Europe wants to engage with the world and simultaneously strengthen its strategic identity it needs to square some circles. Without giving into the facile critique that realism and geopolitics render multilateral principles obsolete and warrant hard-nosed politics, Europe should leverage its assets, which are irrevocably embedded in multilateralism and cooperation. Climate change, conflict prevention and mediation, and an open and fairer international trade system are among the assets that the EU can concretely work towards globally.
To do so it needs to engage flexibly with global actors, focusing more on multilevel networks including civil society rather than on the traditional partnerships between governments, some of which are no longer benign or useful. Both will require a dose of humility in listening to non-European world views and of pragmatism in seeking appropriate strategies and paths forward.
Last but not least, if Europe wants to imagine its own history of prosperity, democracy and peace as still relevant to the debates taking place in the rest of the world, it also needs to think about the global future sustainability of welfare, taking progressive politics outside national boundaries and engaging in a more global and open debate about public common goods.
1NC—EU-NATO Coop
Text: The European Union should ____________________________________________________
EU-NATO coordination relieves semiconductor dependencies on Asia via coordinated security efforts from the EU.
De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤
Such an approach to procurement could prove particularly helpful given the rising threats coming from vulnerabilities in the global supply chain. The COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled Western countries’ strong dependency on Chinese supplies, both in the medical and technological fields (though the supply issues around personal protective equipment were addressed relatively rapidly).75 A recent study by the Mercator Institute for China Studies identifies 103 categories of electronics, chemical, mineral/metal, and pharmaceutical products in which the EU is critically dependent on imports from China.76 At the same time, as economies worldwide have started to recover from the pandemic and embark on ambitious investment plans to boost innovation in their national industries, the demand for semiconductors — crucial for building microchips, which are essential in any modern technology — has increased and become one of the central issues of the U.S.-China competition. This issue is further complicated by geopolitical concerns; a large proportion of semiconductor manufacturing occurs in Taiwan.77 The U.S. and the EU have recently begun initiatives to increase the domestic production of microchips. In June, the U.S. Senate passed the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, which allocates $52 billion toward the effort.78 And the EU followed suit with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen committing to a similar amount.79 The U.S. and EU discussed the issue during their inaugural Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, in September 2021.80 These discussions represent a first step toward breaking the ice on trans-Atlantic cooperation, particularly related to developing new technologies that are vital for enhancing geopolitical and economic security. But the main takeaways are that the U.S. and the EU are facing the same challenges and that the EU has increased its geopolitical ambition and range of interests. So far, there is no similar dialogue platform between NATO and the EU — a fact that hinders inter-institutional cooperation in the procurement domain. In fact, if NATO and the EU develop different standards, it could lead to duplication and hinder logistical and strategic interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space. For this reason, it is especially important for NATO and the EU to establish deeper communication on procurement and the definition of common standards. Increasing connections and synergies between industrial clusters within the trans-Atlantic space, particularly for materials such as semiconductors and microchips, would decrease dependence on geopolitically risky supply chains. Moreover, developing common standards when it comes to procurement, data privacy, and weaponry components would facilitate technological exchanges as well as the interoperability of equipment (be it artificial intelligence or more traditional military supplies) across the NATO-EU space. Given the increasing importance of new technologies for economic development, industrial advancement, and innovation, the only alternative to a shared approach in the trans-Atlantic space would be increased competition among allies and reduced interoperability — which would inevitably create more advantages for competitors to exploit.
Asian control over semiconductors causes Chinese tech leadership.
Maire 21 [Robert Maire is the last man standing in terms of writing with tremendous depth and breadth about the art of making computer chips. There is no one else communicating the issues of the industry with his level of expertise and perspective., 10-07-2021, "The U.S.-China battle for dominance will be determined by the virtually invisible semiconductor chip — The Technology Letter", Technology Letter, https://www.thetechnologyletter.com/the-posts/the-us-china-battle-for-dominance-will-be-determined-by-the-virtually-invisible-semiconductor-chip, DOA: 6-25-2022 //ArchanSen]
Much as atoms are the building blocks of matter, semiconductors are the fundamental building blocks of the modern technology world. Chips enable and compose the internet, computers, smart phones, transport, healthcare, finance, manufacturing, and all the world’s data.
The ability to lead and control the design and manufacture of chips determines who dominates globally in all of these areas, and new, yet unknown, applications. Wars today are won by information, command and control. He who has the best information and the ability to use it, wins.
Intelligence gathering and analysis is increasingly based on technology assets and artificial intelligence rather than humans. That includes facial recognition, satellites, drones, data mining and encryption.
Advanced airplanes, ships, submarines and space operation are all dependent on advanced semiconductors for their war-fighting systems. Having the newest generation of AI chip will make the win/lose determination in a dogfight, code breaking, and data mining.
The entire internet, from optical cables to routers and satellites, runs on semiconductors. Today we are worried about an externally sourced hacking of the network, but what if the internet were hacked from the inside out by the very chips it is composed of? N

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