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2022 Michigan Counterplan

Impacts - Heg Bad - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW

Impacts - Heg Bad - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW.docx

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Hegemony Bad
1NC Shells
1NC Shells---Offense
1NC---China War
Heg causes US-China War – Thucydides’s trap
Goswami 22- is a Doctoral Scholar at Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P Jindal Global University. He holds a Masters in Development Studies from Indian Institute of Technology-Guwahati; and Bachelors in Political Science from University of Delhi, 2022. (Anubhav, “Balancing Grand Strategy for America to Offset Thucydides’s Trap with China”, Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 15 Number 2, Accessed 6/18/22)//jd
Hegemonic Grand Strategy in the Context of Thucydides’s Trap Alison’s work captured the attention of leaders in both Washington and Beijing. As a confidence-building measure, China laid out the concept of ‘New Type of Great Power Relation’ in 2013 based on cooperation; respect to each other’s core interests; and dialogue between Washington and Beijing. The concept emphasizes that the United States and other neighboring countries should respect the core interests of China, in other words acknowledging Beijing’s territorial Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss2/2 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.2.1983 7 claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.25 The United States distanced itself from Beijing’s proposed framework as Washington realized giving recognition to Beijing’s “core interest” would tantamount to legitimizing China’s disputed territorial claims as well as giving away lopsided concessions in East Asia.26 While United States is well within its right to protect its interests, China views Washington’s skepticism as arrogantly holding on to its primacy in the international system and denying a rising China her rightful place. China claims such attitude “dangerous or even irresponsible” because it can exacerbate both countries’ progress towards the apocalyptic Thucydides’s Trap, thereby, exploiting “perceptions of the trap by blaming the United States for trying to keep China down.”27 One of the reasons for China’s ability to peddle such a narrative is due to U.S. foreign policy stubbornly holding on to a hegemonic grand strategy even in a multipolar world. Christopher Layne defined U.S. hegemonic grand strategy as a “strategy of preponderance”–in simple terms–a strategy to maintain primacy in the world through preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power.28 With China already an established pole, Beijing expects Washington to share the economic-security dual leadership of the world. The key implication here is that China’s outward-facing policies will inevitably clash with United States’ preponderance or hegemonic status. In 2008, U.S. National Intelligence Council report argued that America should adjust its international ambitions and forgo continued primacy in favor of accommodating the rising powers in the interest of greater global governance.29 If the United States continues to pursue its hegemonic grand strategy, it will accelerate the conflict which might trigger the Thucydides’s Trap. The way for the United States to avoid the trap is neither to gravitate toward confrontation nor adopt a passive accommodation. Rather, there should be a shift in United States grand strategy that suits the multipolar world. Realist Interpretation of China’s Rise and the Likelihood of a Trap A realist interpretation of China’s rise is even more gloomy for the future United States-China relationship. Offensive realists claim that it makes “good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible to ensure one’s own survival.”30 Founder of offensive realism, John J. Mearsheimer writes, “fearful of other states, and knowing that Goswami: Balancing Grand Strategy for America Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022 8 they operate in a self-help world, states quickly realize that the best way to survive is to be especially powerful.”31 Therefore, offensive realists argue that a rising power like China will not stop at simply achieving ‘balance of power’ with United States but turning that balance in its favor. This makes the case for the emergence of a trap in their bilateral relationship even more likely. More worryingly, leadership in Beijing have increasingly come to believe that destiny is on their side. After the recent rupture of democratic norms in the United States as well her embarrassing departure from Afghanistan and the growing desire among American people to reduce their country’s footprint in the world; Chinese leaders are increasingly looking at America as a declining power. Underestimation of America’s capacity as well as her desire to retaliate could inspire Beijing to formulate super ambitious foreign policies regarding Taiwan or the disputed waters of South China Sea or the East China Sea that could force the Americans to intervene militarily. Various wargames drawn up by multiple studies in the United States opines that a violent confrontation between the U.S. and China could escalate from many sources of conflict like Taiwan, accidental collusion at sea, third party instigation, and trade which ultimately leads to one destination: a nuclear holocaust. The resurgence of China and its desire for irredentist overreach has put U.S. in a catch-22 situation. Maintain primacy or hegemony and it will only make Beijing more resentful towards America, fueling further Chinese revisionism in Asia. On the other hand, if the United States retreats from East Asia as a step towards abandoning hegemony, Beijing could interpret it as a sign of decline of American national power. Sensing weakness, China may next target the post-World War international order that has been carefully built by America and that has been so critical to preserving its national interests. Rewriting the rules of the current international world order to its benefit is an essential part for any aspiring hegemon and China has always held a grudge against the current one. Critics of Thucydides’s Trap argue that war between America and China is unlikely, either due to Chinese civilizational belief of peaceful rise and co-existence or due to nuclear weapons that guarantees Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).32 There are also criticism that Thucydides Trap promotes iron law of inevitability of war between two competing nations.33 Rather it’s the performance of leaders and dynamics of decision-making (acting in the interest of their citizens and aided by Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss2/2 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.2.1983 9 insights from Thucydides’s History), they say, that determines the path to an eventual war.34 There are also arguments that these dynamics of decision-making that can impact China and the United States’ foreign policy decisions which may trigger the Thucydides’s Trap also leaves open the possibility of a United States-China war due to psychological misperceptions. These psychological misperceptions can be mitigated by rising powers giving sufficiently credible cooperative signals that should remove uncertainty about the riser’s intentions in the mind of the declining state.35 However, in real world situation, credible cooperative signals rarely fall so neatly as credible or cooperative to the declining states. In the run up to the First World War, repeated assurances by the Germans about its naval built-up failed to dissuade the fears of the British. From the prism of offensive realism, British act of counter-arming the Royal Navy is a predictable move to accumulate more power in order to preserve its security and primacy in the open seas. Finally, there are the optimists who totally discard the possibilities of war by claiming that war between China and the United States is not a viable option for both countries in formulating policy toward each other. Factors like the huge gap of comprehensive power between China and the United States, the close economic ties and security cooperation between China and U.S. allies, the flourishing cultural and people-to-people exchanges among all related countries, and the changing public attitude toward war, will drive China and the United States to seek resolution to their disputes by peaceful means.36 However, realist argument of relative gains does not make for such an optimistic assessment. States pursue relative gains over others which necessarily makes international relation a zero-sum game in which China’s gain is inevitably a loss for America. At the more immediate future, the battle for relative gains will break out over cornering advantages in maritime domain, cyber spying or hacking, the shadow of A2 or AD and Air Sea Battle, and a closer strategic alignment between competing nations.37 To that effect, changes are already happening on ground with China pursuing aggressive maritime policies, to which United States is responding by drawing up support from likeminded nations to uphold the freedom of seas (Quad and AUKUS). On the other hand, China is shoring up support in its own way by courting and coaxing Russia and other authoritarian nations by fanning illiberal policies at home and abroad. Beijing is also increasing its defense Goswami: Balancing Grand Strategy for America Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022 10 spending to develop an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) plan that “entails missile, air, and sea forces capable of neutralizing U.S. bases as far away as Guam, and searching out and destroying U.S. naval battle groups in the region that might engage Chinese forces.”38 Both sides will try to accumulate relative gains as much as possible under the logic of offensive realism to tilt the balance of power in their favor. Right now, the scale is tilted in favor of the United States. However, a question begets here. If China manages to narrow the gap in their respective national powers in future, then what will be the reaction and response of the American leadership and people at the slow death of their superior position in the world? Sparta had to face this dilemma 2500 years ago, so did the British twice in early part of 20th century and the Americans themselves for fifty long years in the previous century. In an analysis of the last 500 years, Graham Alison claims that out of the 16 cases of rising versus ruling power case, 12 has been settled by war. Statistics like that are quite unhelpful for optimists.
US-China war goes nuclear – wargaming proves
Pettyjohn and Wasser 22 – has a PhD and an MA in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia and a BA in history and political science from the Ohio State University and Wasser holds an MS in foreign service, with distinction, from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and a BA in international and global studies from Brandeis University, 5/20/22 (Stacie L and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear)//jd
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. GEARING FOR BATTLE China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. A fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives.
1NC---Econ Decline
Heg is unsustainable and causes long-term economic decline
Layne 12 [Layne, Christopher, Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and the Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His fields of interest are international relations theory, great power politics, U.S. foreign policy, and grand strategy., “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, Texas A & M University, https://www.carlanorrlof.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/This-Time-Its-Real-The-End-of-Unipolarity-and-the-Pax-Americana.pdf]//AA
Revisiting the 1980s’ Debate on American Decline: The ‘‘Declinists’’ Were Right Of

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