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2022 Michigan Topicality

T - Topicality Updates - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

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Topicality
Security Cooperation
Arms Sales
Arms Sales and Transfers require State Department involvement – that’s not Security cooperation
Congressional Research Service 22 [ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) serves as shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. CRS experts assist at every stage of the legislative process — from the early considerations that precede bill drafting, through committee hearings and floor debate, to the oversight of enacted laws and various agency activities. “Arms Sales - Congressional Review Process” https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=2a6ef852-069e-49f2-854a-0ee1f994aec4&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A65P5-8D21-JC11-13S0-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=299219&pdteaserkey=sr1&pditab=allpods&ecomp=rz2yk&earg=sr1&prid=a549e521-5a95-41d1-94bc-a9e81fa9f6e2]//LP
Congressional Review Process Informal Notifications The Department of State (on behalf of the President) submits to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee an informal notification of a prospective major arms sale 20 calendar days before the executive branch takes further formal action. An August 2020 State Department Office of Inspector General report explains that, in addition to the AECA formal notification process, 'the Department has by long-standing practice submitted a preliminary or informal notification of prospective major arms transfers in advance of their formal notification to the congressional committees of jurisdiction.'/3 The informal notification practice began with a February 18, 1976, letter from the Department of Defense making a commitment to give Congress these preliminary classified notifications./4 Beginning in 2012, the State Department implemented a new informal notification process, which the department calls a "tiered review," in which the relevant committees are notified between 20 and 40 calendar days before receiving formal notification, depending on the system and destination in question./5 * * * 1 Originally titled The Foreign Military Sales Act. 2 For more information, see CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities, by Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti. 3 Review of the Department of State's Role in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Department of State Office of Inspector General ISP-I-20-19, August 2020. 4 Letter of February 18, 1976 from Lt. Gen. H.M. Fish, USAF, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 5 Prior to giving such notice, the State Department transmits to the committees any license applications for commercially licensed arms sales as soon as the department receives them. The State Department does not provide the same notice regarding government-to-government foreign military sales. * * * During June 2017 testimony, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Tina Kaidanow described this process as a 'review period during which the Committees can ask questions or raise concerns prior to the Department of State initiating formal notification. The purpose is to provide Congress the opportunity to raise concerns, and have these concerns addressed, in a confidential process with the Administration, so that our bilateral relationship with the country in question is protected during this process.'/6 The State Department "generally will not formally notify an arms transfer if a member of Congress raises significant concerns by placing a hold during the informal review stage," the Inspector General report states, noting that "the Department is not precluded from proceeding with an arms transfer subject to a congressional hold."/7 Formal Notifications The AEA contains provisions for congressional review and disapproval of arms sales. The President may not proceed with a proposed FMS or DCS transaction if Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval within the statutory review periods described below. It is worth noting that a congressional recess or adjournment does not stop these review periods. Foreign Military Sales Section 36(b)(1) of the AECA requires the President formally to notify the Speaker of the House, as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 calendar days before issuing a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for an FMS-administered sale, enhancement, or upgrading of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more; the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more; or the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services valued at $200 million or more./8 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency transmits the notifications to Congress./9 In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the President must formally notify Congress 15 calendar days before proceeding with the sale./10 * * * 6 "Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy," Statement Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 15, 2017. 7 Department of State Office of Inspector General, August 2020. 8 The Letter of Offer and Acceptance is the legal instrument used by the U.S. government for FMS transactions. (See CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities.) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795) amended the Foreign Military Sales Act to add a $25 million dollar threshold for defense articles and services. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729) added major defense equipment with a $7 million threshold. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-113, 95 Stat. 1519) changed the $7 million threshold to $14 million and the $25 million threshold to $50 million. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-533, 94 Stat. 3131) added design and construction services with a $200 million threshold. 9 See E.O. 13637, "Administration of Reformed Export Controls," March 8, 2013. 10 For the Senate, these review periods appear to begin when the relevant Congressional notification notice is published in the Congressional Record.
Actor
Security Cooperation on Cyber, AI, or Biotech requires Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration or Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics action
DoD 16 [Pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, provisions in various National Defense Authorization Acts, and administrative practices relevant to certain security assistance authorities administered on behalf of the Department of State, this issuance establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the administration of security cooperation to encourage and enable allied and partner nations to apply their military capabilities and capacities, consistent with U.S. strategy, priorities, and defense objectives “DoD Directive 5132.03: DOD POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO SECURITY COOPERATION” https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD_513203_on_Security_Cooperation.pdf]//LP
2.6. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (DTSA). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DTSA: a. Develops DoD technology security policies related to foreign transfers of defense-related articles, services, and technologies. b. Builds technology security capabilities of U.S. allied and partner nations to increase interoperability and protect critical technology and information. c. In coordination with DoD Component heads, provides the security cooperation enterprise with information on allied and partner nations’ willingness and ability to protect sensitive U.S. information and technologies and how that may affect DoD security cooperation efforts. d. In coordination with Director, International Cooperation, Office of the USD(AT&L), prioritizes and pursues policies and defense agreements required to facilitate transfer of defenserelated articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations, including development of DoD anticipatory policies to support accelerated timelines to transfer such items to support security cooperation priorities. 2.7. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L): a. Establishes and maintains policies for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs, including international armaments cooperation (e.g., collaboration in science and technology; research, development, test, and evaluation; and acquisition, in-service, and logistics support (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements)), to support security cooperation goals. In coordination with the USD(P), leads the development of policies and procedures for the transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to foreign countries, and co-chairs the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, to ensure such policies and procedures comply with national laws and regulations, including technology security and foreign disclosure requirements. c. In coordination with the USD(P) and the Department of State, identifies, prioritizes, and pursues defense acquisition-related agreements required to facilitate the cooperative development, acquisition, and transfer of defense-related articles, services, and technologies to allied and partner nations. d. Engages with industry to provide DoD priorities for allied and partner nation capability investments. e. Ensures that appropriate security cooperation activities are entered into G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities. f. Manages and administers those Title 10, United States Code, programs for which the USD(AT&L) has responsibility, consistent with security cooperation priorities. g. Coordinates on security cooperation policy guidance and theater campaign plans.
Any department can do Security Cooperation as long as they can justify it and the DoD agrees
US Code 18 [United States Code Annotated; last amended Aug. 13, 2018; Title 10: Armed Forces, Subtitle A: General Military Law, Part I: Organization and General Military Powers, “Security Cooperation,” Chapter 16 https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=36d1e120-61e0-4d13-85f2-d432af69ca97&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fstatutes-legislation%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A8T8B-MS12-D6RV-H0B2-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=6362&pdteaserkey=sr20&pditab=allpods&ecomp=rz2yk&earg=sr20&prid=298b0942-ad47-415b-a269-8b26a8cf67ae]//LP
§ 385. Department of Defense support for other departments and agencies of the United States Government that advance Department of Defense security cooperation objectives
(a) Support authorized. Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense is authorized to support other departments and agencies of the United States Government for the purpose of implementing or supporting foreign assistance programs and activities described in subsection (b) that advance security cooperation objectives of the Department of Defense.
(b) Foreign assistance programs and activities. The foreign assistance programs and activities described in this subsection are foreign assistance programs and activities that—
(1) are necessary for the effectiveness of one or more programs of the Department of Defense relating to security cooperation conducted pursuant to an authority in this chapter; and
(2) cannot be carried out by the Department.
(c) Annual limitation on amount of support. The amount of support provided pursuant to subsection (a) in any fiscal year may not exceed $75,000,000.
(d) Notice and wait. If a determination is made to transfer funds in connection with the provision of support pursuant to subsection (a) for a program or activity, the transfer may not occur until—
(1) the Secretary and the head of the department or agency to receive the funds jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a notice on the transfer, which notice shall include—
(A) a detailed description of the purpose and estimated cost of such program or activity;
(B) a detailed description of the security cooperation objectives of the Department, including the theater campaign plan of the combatant command concerned, that will be advanced;
(C) a justification why such program or activity will advance such objectives;
(D) a justification why such program or activity cannot be carried out by the Department;
(E) an identification of any funds programmed or obligated by the department or agency other than the Department on such program or activity; and
(F) a timeline for the provision of such support; and
(2) a period of 30 days elapses after the date of the submittal of the notice pursuant to paragraph (1).
Public Good
Security Cooperation must work towards overall public good
Van Ness 08 [Peter Van Ness is a Visiting Fellow, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/anu/0002776/f_0002776_1944.pdf]//LP
The future material gains from cooperation for all parties are potentially immense, especially with respect to investment, trade and technology transfer for the collaborative development and marketing of Russian energy resources. Meanwhile, the US and China would maintain their institutional ties in the region (for China, most importantly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN+3; and for the US, its bilateral security ties with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Australia), but in Northeast Asia, the most potentially volatile region in Asia, they would work together. Other countries in the Asia–Pacific may wonder about how such a new institution in which they do not directly participate will affect them. Seen in realist terms, those governments might worry that the security arrangement had been designed as a conspiracy against them. But cooperative security provides a different understanding. Multilateral security cooperation by a group of states in one region not only enhances their own security but also produces a public good of strategic stability for the larger community of nations. ASEAN has shown the way. The cooperative-security design in ASEAN has been built on a network of economic and political ties and strategic dialogue. If the Six Party Talks on Korea can now achieve as much as ASEAN already has achieved for its member-states (i.e., to make inter-state war among any of its members unthinkable), all countries in the region would benefit. Other countries in the region like Australia would not directly participate in the new institution, but they would benefit from the strategic stability and shared security achieved by the new, multilateral cooperative-security consortium—a public good.
Artificial Intelligence
AI v Autonomous
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous systems are distinct
Sagramsingh 19 [Raine Sagramsingh is a recent graduate of the FAMU-FSU College of Engineering. She graduated summa cum laude with a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering. She was an active member of the Florida State University Center for Leadership and Social Change’s Service Scholar Program. Raine completed internships with the Air Force Research Lab and Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems.https://wise-intern.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Raine_S_-FinalPaper.pdf]//LP
The terms in which the international community discusses lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) can at times be ambiguous as there is an absence of a common vocabulary and common understanding of the terms autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI). LAWS are weapons systems that apply lethal force independently, with freedom from human control. AI has many subfields including machine learning, data mining, speech recognition, and image processing. Policymakers frequently refer to any of the subfields of AI as AI. By grouping these various terms together under the umbrella of AI, the term is frequently misused by technical experts, policymakers, and the general public. As advances in technology lead to increased autonomy in systems, the terms AI and autonomy are frequently used together. Despite their relationship to each other, it is a mistake to use these terms interchangeably. Currently, the international discussion does not define the technical characteristics of LAWS, hindering the development of public policies, laws, and practices related to the use of autonomy and AI in weapons systems. To improve understanding of the technical characteristics of autonomy and AI in LAWS, this paper aims provides the following recommendations. Recommendation 1: Classify the level of autonomy and intelligence in current weapon systems. Members of the international discussion on LAWS should evaluate where current weapon systems fall on the spectrum of intelligence and autonomy and should consider which of those should or should not be a part of the continuing discussion. Recommendation 2: Limit the use of the term Artificial Intelligence. While potential exists for fully-autonomous intelligent weapon systems, they are not a current reality. Using the term AI to refer to machine learning, computer vision, natural language processing, and many other fields of study limits the development of public policy because there is no individual evaluation for their potential positive or negative impact on LAWS. Recommendation 4: Distinguish autonomous systems from autonomous intelligent agents. An autonomous system does not imply the use of AI, whereas autonomous intelligent agent does. These terms represent significantly different technologies that warrant separate discussion. Recommendation 5: Distinguish between semi- and fully-autonomous systems. To make progress developing public policies regarding LAWS, the discussion must distinguish semi-autonomous systems from fully-autonomous systems. Regulating the two technologies with the same set of policies ultimately will be unsuccessful.
AI has to problem solve not complete a task
Ball 20 [Inertial Sense has released the following article explaining the difference between autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) as the two concepts relate to robotic systems. Inertial Sense is the developer of LUNA, an automated navigation software platform designed for robotics companies who want to make their existing fleet unmanned and automated. https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/2020/11/artificial-intelligence-vs-autonomy-for-mobile-robotics/]//LP
Artificial Intelligence vs. Autonomy Artificial intelligence applications and autonomy are both valuable tools in the industrial environment. These technologies can be used independently or can work together to achieve the desired results. Here’s an easy way to breakdown the differences between the two: autonomous robotics = task completion and AI = problem-solving. Autonomous robotics systems are designed for use in predictable environments to complete tasks within a specific, usually pre-planned, environment. Sensors are of critical importance in providing robots with detailed and accurate information about their location within the domain. Autonomous robotics systems rely on these sensors to navigate their environments and to perform their tasks quickly and effectively. Autonomous devices and systems can be powered by conventional software or by AI systems that allow them to learn and adapt as they operate. Artificial intelligence is defined by Yale University as “building systems that can solve complex tasks in ways that would traditionally need human intelligence.” This typically involves machine learning technologies and the use of highly advanced sensors to coll

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