AT - Democracy QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ
AT - Democracy QPQ - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ.docx
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AT: QPQ CP – Democracy 2AC – Solvency – Turkey – AT: Democracy Erdogan uses democracy to further his authoritarianism – the counterplan only worsens democracy Massicard ’21 [Elise, Massicard is a political sociologist with research focusing on the political sociology of contemporary Turkey 5-17-2021, "Populism in Turkey: Towards the Demise of Democracy?," Cogito, https://www.sciencespo.fr/research/cogito/home/populism-in-turkey-towards-the-demise-of-democracy/?lang=en, St. Mark’s, AshritM] Behind the Success of the AKP The AKP, the Justice and Development Party, is undoubtedly on the demotic side. It originates from the Islamist movement, the long-standing pet hate of the Kemalists and military powers, and has long been ostracised from the legitimate political field. It has always had a clearly stated populist dimension. Having gained power in 2002 in the wake of the severe economic crisis of 2001, the AKP benefited from the widespread rejection of the established political classes and the establishment by large segments of society. It targeted the republican, secular elite, accusing it of failing to represent the people and holding democracy hostage. It promised to bring to power modest and conservative groups, which had long been prevented from accessing positions of power, and proclaimed itself a defender of the masses and of popular will, and therefore of democracy. It built its mobilisation discourse against westernised ‘elites’, along with their military and bureaucratic ‘bastions’, criticising them as limits to the popular opinions expressed in the ballot box. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, originally from the Islamist movement and one of the founders of the AKP, embodies this populism in several ways. He appears to be the first truly popular political leader, in touch with the values and hopes of his people. He promotes his modest social origins, even in his manner of speaking and body language. During his political ascension, and even upon gaining power, he accused the establishment of being authoritarian and oppressive. Condemned and imprisoned for a poem with Islamist intonations that he recited in 1998 as Mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan acted on this martyr status, oppressed by the military, bureaucrats and Kemalists … in fact all that is ‘anti-democratic’. With a solid electoral base since 2002, representing between 40 and 50% of votes expressed, Erdoğan has succeeded in incarnating the popular will with remarkable longevity. This massive support, resulting in repeated large parliamentary majorities, has enabled his party to make substantial modifications to the institutional balance. In particular, it has drastically reduced the army’s institutional power over political matters, all in the name of democracy, Growing Authoritarianism In 2013, two million Turkish citizens took to the streets, protesting in favour of preserving Gezi Park and inclusive, participative urban planning, and against a government they deemed intrusive and business-oriented. Thanks to his undeniable electoral popularity, Erdoğan, who was then Prime Minister, was able to reject the demonstrators’ claims, reasoning that in a representative democracy, the elected power cannot be called into question by demands from people in the streets, however many they might be. The head of the Turkish government thus opposed the authentic ‘people’, i.e. those who expressed themselves via the ballot box, and the hordes of çapulcu, i.e. looters who could make no claims of a representative or democratic nature. However, this ‘absolutism of national will’, to use the well-coined expression of political scientist and editorial writer Ahmet Insel, is also what has enabled and even justified the restrictions on pluralism, i.e. the regression of public liberties, notably with regards to opinion and expression. 1AR – Solvency – Turkey – AT: Democracy Turkey will use the counterplan’s “tailored democratic reforms” to reinstate populism and authoritarianism through appeals to democracy Li ’22 [May, 5-17-2022, "Rise of Erdogan and Democratic Erosion in Turkey," Democratic Erosion, https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/05/17/rise-of-erdogan-and-democratic-erosion-in-turkey/, St. Mark’s, AshritM] The popularity behind Erdogan even though Turkey is no longer considered a free country according to the Freedom House, is also at the core of the rise of populism and populist leaders such as Erdogan himself. The modern state of Turkey was built under leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who created a secular nation for the Muslim majority. Secularism allowed Turkey to break from its imperial past, creating a new national identity for Turkish citizens. This meant that Islam would no longer play a significant role in the policies and laws of the new modern state. While the goal of secularism was intended to modernize Turkey, it also created a division between religious opposition within the population. Then came Erdogan, a charismatic politician who appealed to the conservative population of Turkey. Using the deep division between those who supported a secular Turkey and those who supported an Islam State, liberalist and conservatives, and different groups of nationalists, Erdogan was able to emerge himself as the “voice and hope of the people.” He targeted the secular elites and blamed them for the failures of the state and for failing to represent the people. The economic boom during his time in office has also greatly contributed to his popularity. As said by Baris Unlu, a former political science professor, “Many people supported the APK Party even though they weren’t supporters per-se because they were sick of pre-2002 Turkey.” In the 2016 attempted coup, Erdogan strategically used social media to appeal to the citizens. Appearing on people’s FaceTime, he urged people to “take to the streets and defend democracy.” On Twitter, his staff was putting out tweets on both his official account and public account calling for the public to rally. By using social media, Erdogan successfully manipulated the event to work in his favor to delegitimize his opposition. Images on his Twitter showed pictures of the rally as people defending democracy, rather than a revolt against his regime. No democracy internal and turn – Turkey can use the counterplan to bolster authoritarianism Cook ’19 [Steven A., 5-13-2019, "Turkish Democracy Can't Die, Because It Never Lived," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/13/turkish-democracy-cant-die-because-it-never-lived/, St. Mark’s, AshritM] The moves and countermoves of Turkish politics belie the notion that the country was a democracy or was democratizing until the AKP won its first election in 2002. Turkey, like a host of other countries, became proficient in some democratic practices, and its constitutions established what resembled democratic institutions, but few of its leaders ever demonstrated a commitment to democratic norms. Without it, cynicism and authoritarianism flourished alongside of, and even with the help of, democratic practices. 2AC – Solvency – Turkey – Lies Can’t solve the INB – Turkey lies – Erdogan promised reforms in 2021 Reuters ’20 [Reuters Staff, 12-26-2020, "Erdogan says Turkey will break economic 'triangle of evil' with reforms," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-economy-erdogan/erdogan-says-turkey-will-break-economic-triangle-of-evil-with-reforms-idUSKBN2900A9, St. Mark’s, AshritM] Erdogan promised a slate of judicial and economic reforms last month, leading to expectations of the possible release of politicians, including Kurdish ones, and human rights advocates from jail. But Erdogan’s recent comments on court rulings and criticism aimed at his government have fuelled scepticism about his pledge. Speaking via videolink at a ceremony in Ankara, Erdogan said 2021 would be “the year of democratic and economic reforms” and that efforts to present the reforms to parliament would move “as soon as possible”. “We hope to overcome troubles from economic attacks and the pandemic measures as soon as possible. By speeding up structural reforms, we are determined to form a system based on production and employment and breaking the interest rates, inflation and exchange rates triangle of evil,” Erdogan said. “We are not carrying out democratic reforms because anyone forced us to, but because our people deserve them,” he added. They didn’t happen. Freedom House ’22 [Freedom House, 2022, "Turkey: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report," https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2022, St. Mark’s, AshritM] Key Developments in 2021 In January, President Erdoğan appointed a political ally as the rector of Turkey’s top-ranking Boğaziçi University, prompting months-long protests by students and faculty that the police violently dispersed on multiple occasions. Erdoğan ultimately removed the rector in July, only to replace him the next month with a different political ally. In June, the Constitutional Court accepted a case to shut down the country’s second-largest opposition party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The charges accuse the HDP of having links to terrorism and threatening Turkey’s territorial unity. Meanwhile, arrests of HDP officials carried out during the year added to the thousands of party members who have been detained since 2016. In March, President Erdoğan unilaterally withdrew Turkey from the Istanbul Convention, an international treaty to combat gender-based violence, sparking outrage from domestic and international advocacy groups and foreign governments. Turkey’s opposition parties and most of the population remain opposed to the move, and civil society groups have attempted to appeal it as unconstitutional. Osman Kavala, Turkey’s most prominent political prisoner, continued to have his due process rights denied throughout the year. In January, an appeals court revoked his 2020 acquittal, ostensibly because some evidence had been excluded from court. Authorities rearrested him in February under newfound charges of allegedly aiding a coup attempt and supporting terrorism. As of the end of 2021, Kavala remained in detention, despite a 2019 order by the ECHR for his immediate release. 2AC – Say No – General The CP fails – Turkey, Poland, and Hungary say no due to structural factors and external pressure isn’t sufficient Bechev ’22 [Interview of Dimitar Bechev by Ferenc Laczo, 2-22-2022, "The competitive element in competitive authoritarianism is still very pertinent. Dimitar Bechev on Turkey Under Erdogan," Review of Democracy, https://revdem.ceu.edu/2022/02/22/the-competitive-element-in-competitive-authoritarianism-is-still-very-pertinent-dimitar-bechev-on-turkey-under-erdogan/, St. Mark’s, AshritM] Ferenc Laczo: While you underline in the book that tilting the playing field was Erdogan’s way of surviving and prospering in politics, you also insist on long-term structural and institutional forces behind the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. What would you say are the main reasons behind the quite dramatic democratic decline in the country leading to the rise of competitive authoritarianism? How special or different is the Turkish regime as compared to other countries frequently cited these days when it comes to the subject of democratic decline, such as Russia, Poland, Hungary, or Serbia, to take examples only from Central and Eastern Europe, but you may, of course, wish to compare the country more globally too? Dimitar Bechev: That’s a great question and I could spend hours upon hours delving into it. Turkey never had a perfect democracy. Even in the best of days, there were many conflicts and deficiencies that tainted the image of Turkish democracy, such as polarization within society, the prevalence of what Turks would call the deep state (even if the term is contested), the nationalist undercurrents in Turkish politics, the history of violence, and the culture of winner takes all, which has been quite systematic. At a certain stage, it became a matter of survival for Erdogan. The conclusion he drew around 2007-08, when AKP was threatened with closure, was that to persist on top he needs to defeat the opposition and shoot down the alternatives. Power sharing, a coalition culture was never in the cards. The idea that there is no real exit became a self-fulfilling prophecy and I think this applies to this day. Another factor beyond path-dependency and Erdogan’s persona is the weakening pull of the EU, which is something we could observe also within the EU. Even though the situation is very different in Poland and Hungary, suffice to say that once you become a member, the external anchor doesn’t have the same impact on domestic affairs. The same thing happened in Turkey for a different set of reasons, because the prospect of membership weakened with the Cyprus issue and especially after Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in France in 2007. The dismantling of checks and balances and the external anchor being dismantled partly because of the EU itself led to the system we currently have in Turkey. Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Portugal and the Baltic countries say no OR fail to implement democratic reforms Paul Poast, Political Sciene @ UChicago, and Alexandra Chinchilla, Political Science @ UChicago 20, “Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO,” International Politics, Volume 57, Issue 3. NATO has a curious view of itself. The preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty listed ‘democracy’ as a ‘founding principle’ even though Portugal, a founding member, was under the authoritarian Estado Novo regime when the treaty was signed. Neither Turkey nor Greece, the frst two countries to join NATO following its formation, was suspended from the alliance during periods of authoritarian backsliding. One might assert that these seemingly hypocritical exceptions to the democratic principle were driven by Cold War necessities. Indeed, compare the language used in the 1968 NATO Strategic Concept—a periodically revised document of NATO’s strategic priorities—and the post-Cold War 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts. Whereas the 1968 document contains zero uses of the word ‘democracy’ (or variations, such as ‘democratic’), it has 28 uses of the word ‘deterrence.’ In contrast, the 1991 document contains 5 mentions of ‘democracy’ and just 6 of ‘deterrence,’ and the 1999 document contains 12 mentions of both terms. When NATO countries agreed to expand the alliance, NATO’s 1995 ‘Study on Enlargement’ noted ‘encouraging and supporting democratic reforms’ as a core tenet of expansion (NATO 1995). Hence, it appears that one of NATO’s post-Cold War strategies was to fnally take seriously its democratic principles (NATO 2018). Given that NATO documents clearly demonstrate that democratic development became a core mission of NATO after the Cold War, how well has it fulflled this mission? Although some key post-Cold War expansion members, notably Poland and Hungary, have backslid on democratic reforms, has the post-Cold War NATO expansion fostered democratic development more broadly in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space? The existing scholarship on this question offers mixed answers. Gibler and Sewell (2006, 429) maintain that ‘the expansion of NATO eastward… aided the creation of a peaceful environment for democracy to survive.’ According to them, NATO reduced levels of external threat and provided much-needed bargaining leverage with Russia to resolve border issues and remove Russian troops from Eastern European states. In contrast, Dan Reiter (2001) expressed skepticism nearly two decades ago: ‘NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in Europe…. [E]nlargement did not contribute much to democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999, and the promise of NATO membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries currently awaiting a decision on their request for membership.’ Reiter then highlighted the ‘risks of further enlargement’ vis-a-vis Russia as pointing toward holding of on further expansion. Mearsheimer (2014) argues similarly that by antagonizing Russia, NATO expansion threatened the prospects for democratic development in Ukraine. Poast and Urpelainen (2018) ofer a middle-of-the-road argument. Exploring the post-Cold War experience of the Baltic states, they argue that these states’ nascent democratic regimes were underpinned by actions and efforts taken by the states themselves, along with Nordic assistance, well before NATO membership was even a possibility. NATO membership did not harm the prospects of democratic development, but it also did not directly foster the peaceful environment necessary for democracy to fourish. NATO’s role was, at best, indirect. We seek to adjudicate among these three views on the NATO–democracy relationship. We do so by focusing on the 2004 NATO expansion that brought in the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We focus on the states that joined NATO in 2004 because they represent the ideal test of NATO’s influence on democracy. The states that joined NATO in 1999—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—could be hard tests of the democratization theory, given that they were selected for membership ahead of their peers partly because they were more democratic and therefore more ready for membership than other states. Reiter (2001) argued, for example, that these three states democratized quickly well before the prospect of NATO membership. The states that did not make the first cut at NATO enlargement but were later brought into the alliance should be where NATO would have the strongest effect on democracy in prospective members. In addition, now is an ideal time to reevaluate these claims, for two reasons related to data availability. First, for the seven states that joined NATO in 2004, more years have now passed since NATO entry than passed between their regime transition and NATO entry. Second, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project is now producing measures of regime type that not only well capture the core components of democratic systems, but also offer a measure that is more refined than the commonly applied Polity Project data. We leverage these two data advancements to consider a tricky empirical counterfactual: Was NATO expansion critical to the development and survival of democracy in the 2004 expansion states?1 This is an enormous question with too many angles to be fully explored in a brief article. But we can show how the available data ofer insights into it. We begin by reviewing the process of post-Cold War NATO expansion, and the way in which it relates to democratic development, by reviewing the main arguments for NATO infuence on democratization drawn from the literature. Throughout this section, we refer to examples from the experience of new NATO member states, with a lengthier example drawn from the Baltic states’ experience of gaining NATO membership. Reviewing the Baltic states’ experience introduces terms and concepts, such as the Membership Action Plan (MAP), that will be used in our main analysis. The Baltics are also representative cases of how NATO’s security guarantee provided a powerful incentive for new regimes to seek membership in NATO. The next section presents our analysis of how NATO membership infuenced democratic development within the 2004 expansion states. We begin by explaining why we use the Liberal Democracy Index score from the V-Dem Project to capture the state of democratic development within a country. We then present regression analysis suggesting that gaining NATO membership had little influence on a country acquiring or keeping democratic institutions. Instead, we find the anticipation of European Union (EU) membership, not NATO membership, had the largest influence on democratic development. 1AR – Say No – Hungary Vague conditions ensure Hungary says no or circumven
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