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2022 Michigan Evidence

Impacts - NATO Good Bad - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS

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NATO Good – TNWs Good – Top Level
Removing TNWs destroys alliance commitments and leads to WMD prolif.
Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 778-780. Accessed via UMich databases, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27695089, AK)
Possible consequences of a rupture with established arrangements
Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries, notably in Turkey and in some of the new allies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be deeply damaging to US credibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to European security to withdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. Withdrawing the weapons could be perceived as a signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to the security of NATO Europe.
Such a withdrawal would be inconsistent with the objective of assuring US allies, and not only in Europe. There are connections between the US deterrence posture in Europe and US security partners and interests elsewhere. Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO's nuclear posture and policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential hedging measures such as air and missile defences and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
The United States has been engaged in nuclear force cooperation with its allies in Europe since the 1950s, and this half-century of history has a certain political weight. If the United States unilaterally withdrew its remaining nuclear forces, the European allies would recognize that something fundamental had changed in their relationship with Washington. If the withdrawal was undertaken at the behest of the Europeans, US political leaders could for their part come to question the commitment of the European allies to bear their share of the risks and responsibilities associated with the alliance's nuclear deterrence posture. Withdrawal of the remaining US weapons could lead to an erosion of confidence on both sides. Some allied observers are concerned that depending on offshore and distant US central strategic systems to protect the European allies would not have the same political significance as continued allied involvement in risk- and responsibility-sharing.
NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements help to maintain a common security culture within the alliance and to prevent a division between the allies that possess nuclear arms and those that do not. The involvement of non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear-sharing arrangements creates a quality of engagement and solidarity distinct from that which would be feasible without that involvement. The political dynamics of the alliance might well change without US nuclear weapons in Europe—and not for the better, in the view of some allied observers. Over time the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies would almost certainly have less expertise regarding nuclear issues and less influence over (and less insight into) US policy-making.70 Some allied observers fear that with no US nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States might be less likely to engage in consultations with allies in defining doctrine and in making operational decisions.
In short, some allied observers are concerned that giving up the shared nuclear response capability could weaken the bonds that tie the NATO allies together as a security community. Because the US extended deterrent provides NATO with a capability that is jointly owned and operated, there is a high level of cohesion based on shared risks and responsibilities, particularly among the NATO DCA states. Moreover, some allied observers maintain, some current non-nuclear weapon-state NATO allies cannot be protected from aggression or coercion without nuclear deterrence capabilities. If the allies gave up the current nuclear sharing arrangements and relied solely on the strategic nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the alliance's nuclear deterrent posture could be seen as less credible by the non-nuclear-weapon-state allies, if not by potential adversaries. A security gap dividing the nuclear-weapon-state allies from non-nuclear-weapon-state allies could emerge in the perceptions of the latter group of countries. Indeed, if the British and French forces were reduced further, the political gap between the United States and most of its NATO allies in nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing could be widened.
Moreover, the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons remaining in Europe could be seen as a break with the historic transatlantic bargain whereby the United States plays a leading role in return for providing a security guarantee. It could contribute to launching a debate on the credibility of the US commitment to the collective defence pledge in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty at a time when the meaning of collective defence is being reconsidered, owing in part to the emergence of new challenges such as cyberwarfare. Some European allied observers hold that the complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would be interpreted, at least in some quarters of the alliance, as an ipso facto weakening of the credibility of the US extended deterrent. The implications for assurance of the NATO European allies could therefore be profound.
The consequences of the withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe would include the loss of the crisis management options provided by an alliance deterrent posture involving aircraft from multiple allies. This arrangement makes possible the transmission to adversaries of a political signal—one of a united and resolute alliance—distinct from a US (or British or French) national action. It is difficult to imagine an alternative to the current arrangements for nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing that would provide equivalent benefits for alliance cohesion as well as assurance and extended deterrence, but the examination of other approaches may well be an issue in the alliance's Strategic Concept review. In this review assurance and extended deterrence will be considered in a dynamic context involving other NATO policy challenges—including missile defence, relations with Russia, the meaning of collective defence in light of new risks, force transformation (including aircraft modernization), arms control and disarmament, and current operations, notably in Afghanistan. The tradeoffs that may be made remain to be seen.
NATO Good – Russia Deterrence
TNWs prevent a Russian nuclear first strike and aggression in the Baltics.
Bowman and Gabel 19 (Bradley Bowman, senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Andrew Gabel, research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 6-14-2019, "The US must deploy a sub-launched low-yield nuke," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/06/14/the-us-must-deploy-a-sub-launched-low-yield-nuke/, AK)
To address an important gap in America’s nuclear deterrent, the U.S. should deploy without delay a submarine-launched low-yield nuclear ballistic missile.
In its fiscal 2020 budget request, the Trump administration requested funding to deploy a low-yield SLBM in order to deter Russia’s potential employment of a low-yield nuclear weapon. Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified in February 2019 that this capability was “necessary to our strategic deterrence mission and will serve to disabuse any adversary of the mistaken perception they can escalate their way to victory.”
Sometimes characterized as “escalate to de-escalate,” Moscow has developed a war-fighting strategy and doctrine that emphasize the first use (or threat of use) of low-yield tactical nuclear strikes against conventional military targets. Such an approach would aim to coerce the U.S. and its NATO partners into backing down and accepting Moscow’s new gains achieved through aggression. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review assessed that this Russian nuclear strategy increases the chances of “dangerous miscalculation and escalation.”
The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission specifically addressed a scenario in which Moscow used false reports of atrocities against Russian populations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to justify an invasion of these NATO member countries under the guise of a “peacekeeping” mission. In this scenario envisioned by the commission, “As U.S. and NATO forces prepare to respond, Russia declares that strikes against Russian forces in those states will be treated as attacks on Russia itself — implying a potential nuclear response.”
Would Moscow actually use a low-yield nuclear weapon against NATO conventional forces responding to Russian aggression in the Baltics? Facts and prudence do not permit ruling that out. NATO leaders would be forced to decide whether Moscow was engaging in a nuclear bluff. If the fear of Russia’s potential use of a low-yield nuclear weapon prevented a NATO response, Russian President Vladimir Putin would achieve his leading grand strategic goal — the effective end of NATO as a collective-defense alliance.
Yet, if NATO did honor Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and responded by sending conventional forces to push Russian forces out of NATO territory, Moscow might be tempted to employ low-yield nuclear weapons if it thought it could get away with it. It seems certain that some Russian military planners would assess that the U.S. would not risk global nuclear war by responding to Moscow’s tactical nuclear strike with a high-yield nuclear weapon, thereby increasing the chances Moscow might employ a low-yield attack in the first place.
Such a scenario may seem far-fetched and too horrible to contemplate for many Americans, but a review of Russian nuclear strategy and doctrine makes clear that the Kremlin views nuclear weapons differently. As the Nuclear Posture Review confirms, “Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use.”
In short, assuming Moscow would not employ low-yield nuclear weapons in this manner — and making defense policy decisions based on that assumption — would be both dangerous and unwarranted.
Critics argue that the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons on submarines would spark or exacerbate a nuclear arms race. Moscow has already taken tangible steps toward an arms race: The Kremlin began a comprehensive and aggressive modernization of its nuclear arsenal years ago. Today, Russia already possesses a stockpile of up to 2,000 active nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
The question is whether the U.S. will respond appropriately to protect Americans — or unilaterally constrain its response and ignore Russia’s nuclear activities.
Others claim that a low-yield SLBM is unnecessary because the U.S. already has air-deliverable low-yield nuclear capabilities. That argument ignores increasingly advanced Russian air and missile defense capabilities, as well as the distinct challenges a U.S. low-yield SLBM would present to Russian military planners.
Critics also suggest the deployment of a low-yield nuclear weapon on submarines would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. In reality, fielding a low-yield SLBM would allow the U.S. to more reliably respond at the same nuclear escalatory level. Without low-yield SLBMs, the U.S. could be forced to rely on vulnerable low-yield delivery systems, not respond with nuclear weapons at all or use a larger nuclear warhead.
Based on a perceived reluctance of the U.S. to risk global nuclear war, this could lead Moscow to believe that its use of tactical nuclear weapons might not elicit an effective nuclear response by Washington. That belief — and not the deployment of a U.S. low-yield SLBM — represents the greatest risk for increasing the likelihood of nuclear war.
TNWs are key to deter Russian authoritarianism.
Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 759-760. Accessed via UMich databases, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27695089, AK)
Continuing assurance roles for US nuclear forces in Europe
The assurance roles for US nuclear forces in Europe appear to include the following: to serve as a hedge against Russian recidivism; to deter regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); to provide an alternative to considering dependence on French and/or British nuclear forces; to offer an alternative to the pursuit of national nuclear forces; and to supply evidence of the genuineness of US commitments. Each of these roles deserves a brief discussion.
Hedge against Russian recidivism
The alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept dropped the 'strategic balance' language concerning NATO-Russia relations found in the 1991 Strategic Concept. It nonetheless included subtle references to the alliance's continuing responsibility to hedge against the risk of backsliding in Moscow, given Russia's long-term power potential, particularly its nuclear forces:
Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists... The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.12
In July 2002 Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State, offered a rare public acknowledgement that one of the factors defining the US nuclear posture must be the continuing need for a hedge against potential adverse developments in Russia. In Powell's words, 'there are nuclear-armed nations out there, particularly Russia, [and] even though it is a new relationship, a new partnership—they will have nuclear weapons for many, many years to come, and one cannot predict the future with certainty. So therefore it is wise for us, in view of that ... to give us a hedge.'13 It is noteworthy that US President Barack Obama included a reaffirmation of US extended deterrence commitments in his speech on nuclear disarmament in Prague in April 2009: 'As long as these [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies—including the Czech Republic.'14
The role of the alliance's nuclear posture as a 'hedge against Russian backsliding' is generally not explicitly articulated in public statements by NATO or its member nations in part because of the interest in promoting cooperation with Russia in various areas, including the campaigns against terrorism and WMD proliferation. However, this rationale remains pertinent and meaningful to allies, despite differences in threat assessments. Allies in Eastern and Central Europe are especially concerned about trends in Russia towards more authoritarian and assertive rule. Russian officials have declared that certain new allies have made themselves potential targets for nuclear attack by supporting US missile defence plans.15 The NATO allies have agreed that Moscow's use of force against Georgia in August 2008 was 'disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration'.16 Officials of various allied nations have expressed concerns, though they have been cautious in their public remarks. For example, in December 2008 the President of Estonia affirmed the need for NATO's deterrent posture in the light of the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict without explicitly mentioning that conflict:
The fact that NATO is serious about its security has proved to be a powerful deterrent. Indeed, only an actor as irrational as AI Qaeda has dared to gamble with an attack against the world's strongest conventional, nuclear, economic, and political organization ... As this summer showed us, the reasons for NATO have not disappeared, but have in fact returned, if not with a vengeance, then certainly with a strong taste of revanche.17
NATO Good – TNWS – Deterrence
TNWs are key to deterrence---they link US nukes together.
Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 768-769. Accessed via UMich databases, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27695089, AK)
The US nuclear weapons presence in Europe as a link to US strategic nuclear forces
The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces t

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