DA - Non Military Update - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
DA - Non Military Update - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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NON-MILITARY CP/DA UPDATES 1NC 1NC---OFF Oversight DA: Oversight’s up. Bipartisan Congressional investigations are widely used. Reynolds and Maehr 21 [Molly E Reynolds, Senior Fellow - Governance Studies; Naomi Maehr, Research Assistant, Governance Studies - The Brookings Institution; "Amid polarization, bipartisan oversight still exists in Congress"; Brookings; Published: 9-21-2021; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/09/21/amid-polarization-bipartisan-oversight-still-exists-in-congress/; KL] Since Democrats assumed unified control of government in Washington last January, many of Congress’s highest-profile investigations have been beset by partisan conflict. The House’s effort to investigate the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, for example, is now being led by a select committee that has only two Republican members—both named by Democrats. That move came after the House GOP leadership pulled its entire slate of recommended committee members in response to a refusal by Speaker Nancy Pelosi to empanel several proponents of the “Big Lie” about the 2020 election. But House committees’ oversight of the executive branch extends far beyond these headline-grabbing issues. Even amid House Democrats’ often contentious oversight of the Trump administration in 2019 and 2020, occasional bipartisan investigations emerged—and an early look at the 117th Congress to date suggests oversight can still be bipartisan even during high partisan conflict. Over the first six months of the 117th Congress (January-June 2021), House committees sent 128 letters to agencies and other actors as part of efforts to oversee the executive branch. Twenty-nine percent of these letters were bipartisan, meaning both the Democratic chair and Republican ranking member signed the letter. This is a noticeable increase in bipartisanship from the 116th Congress, where, in several comparable periods, the share of oversight letters that were bipartisan was much lower. For example, during the first six months of the 116th Congress (January-June 2019), House Democrats sent 363 executive branch oversight letters, of which only 7% were bipartisan. There are several possible explanations for this shift. With a Republican president in the White House in 2019, Republican ranking members may have been less willing to join oversight of a same-party president than they are now to conduct oversight of a Democratic president. The transition from a Republican president to a Democratic one may also be driving a drop in the number of executive branch oversight letters between the first six months of 2019, when 363 of these were sent by Democratic-led committees, and the first six months of 2021, when only 128 were. (This trend is consistent with historical evidence that indicates House committees are less interested in aggressive oversight of the same party that holds the House majority.) There is also reason to think that the COVID-19 pandemic may have influenced bipartisanship in oversight as well. After the start of the COVID-19 pandemic midway through the 116th Congress, there was more oversight of the executive branch but less bipartisanship in that oversight, possibly a result of the politization of the pandemic response. As House Democrats ramped up their oversight investigations into the Trump administration’s handling of COVID-19, the share of oversight letters that were bipartisan fell from 8% to 3%. The looming election in November 2020 likely contributed to this trend as well; Republicans who might have otherwise joined Democratic efforts to oversee the executive branch’s handling of the pandemic may have been more reluctant to do so in an election year. BIPARTISANSHIP IS NOT REALIZED EQUALLY In the period under study here, the majority of bipartisan oversight letters come from just a few committees. So far this year, the Committee on Oversight and Reform has sent the most oversight letters that are bipartisan, accounting for 65% of the total bipartisan letters sent by House committees. The Energy and Commerce Committee, the clear leader in bipartisan oversight in the 116th Congress, is tied for second place in the 117th Congress, having sent five bipartisan letters thus far. (While this relative decline may have several causes, one possible explanation involves turnover in the Republican ranking member position between the two congresses.) Having a few committees engage in most of the bipartisanship is consistent with the 116th Congress, where three committees sent roughly half (54%) of the 74 total bipartisan oversight letters. In both congresses, the large numbers of letters attributed to these committees largely stem from a few investigations in which many letters are sent at once. For example, 23 of the 24 letters sent by the Oversight and Reform Committee in the 117th Congress were a part of a single investigation into the functioning of federal inspectors general. When counting each of these “letter dumps” as one data point, House committees have started a total of 11 bipartisan inquiries so far in the 117th Congress. The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure is responsible for almost half of these investigations, conducting five distinct bipartisan inquiries throughout the 117th Congress to date. This variation in how often committees engage in bipartisan oversight may have several explanations, but it does not seem to be neatly related to how ideologically different the Democratic and Republican committee leaders are. When we use a conventional political science measure of members’ relative ideological position, the majority of bipartisan investigations are occurring in committees with neither the most ideologically similar nor the most ideologically different chairs and ranking members. Bipartisanship in congressional oversight is important not for some intrinsic reason, but because bipartisan engagement on an issue can be a signal that members are fulfilling their institutional role as a counterweight to the executive branch. To be sure, some of the bipartisan oversight work undertaken in the 117th Congress is likely the result of Republicans rediscovering an interest in checking a Democratic president. But a willingness of Democrats to investigate policy implementation by an executive branch controlled by their own party—and to do so in a way that sees some Republicans joining them—is an important indicator of Congress taking its institutional responsibilities seriously. The current era of hyperpartisanship means that there are fewer high-profile issues that compel members of both parties to conduct thorough investigations together. But, as the emerging congressional attention to the withdrawal from Afghanistan indicates, they do emerge occasionally. Whether Congress can build on some of the trends in bipartisanship discussed here and follow through on the initial indication of bipartisan interest in serious oversight remains to be seen. Military-led assistance entrenches DoD militarization, devastating oversight. It expands human rights abuse, incoherent foreign policy, and inefficiency. Turns case. Bergmann and Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College; Alexandra Schmitt, a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance"; Center for American Progress; Published: 4-22-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/; KL] Contributes to the militarization of foreign policy The current security assistance system contributes to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Militarizing foreign policy entails the increasing use of the military to solve foreign policy challenges and results in a bloated DOD budget with more resources and authority. Researchers describe it as a phenomenon whereby “the military more and more becomes the primary actor and face of U.S. policy abroad,” leading to a cycle in which the DOD requires and receives significantly more resources than any other foreign policy agency and is thus increasingly relied on to solve U.S. foreign policy problems.62 There are several elements of a militarized foreign policy in today’s security assistance system, but primarily, the DOD’s control of significantly more security assistance resources puts the Pentagon—rather than diplomats—in the driver’s seat in policymaking. The Pentagon’s significant resources also distort the face of U.S. security assistance on the ground. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official, warned, “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas. If American engagement wears a uniform … that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.”63 Recipient countries can utilize this to their advantage; foreign officials may more eagerly seek to follow through or make progress on DOD requests or priorities, such as going through with a significant military exercise or a ship visit, while ignoring or slow-rolling State Department requests or priorities, such as releasing a dissident or altering an economic regulation. And if the interlocutor that matters in relations with the United States is the military, the subject that matters is defense. The Pentagon’s priorities can therefore end up carrying more importance with partners than the State Department’s broader foreign policy concerns, making combatant commands more powerful than any diplomat. When the State Department is deprived of resources, or cut out of the decision-making process entirely, diplomats cannot effectively weigh in on whether a proposed sale or package makes sense given a range of other nonmilitary concerns that may exist in a bilateral relationship. In short, money is power, and the DOD has the money. The net effect is that U.S. foreign policy is less coherent, with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign policy concerns. For example, the DOD’s U.S. Africa Command posture review is being conducted with little to no coordination with the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.64 Yet the United States still has serious security and geopolitical interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is “an important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you’re doing a disservice to the larger strategic objectives.”65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized solutions. Perpetuates the status quo in security relationships The current security assistance framework at the State Department and the DOD often perpetuates the status quo by creating incentives to continue providing assistance to the same partners. Between congressionally mandated allocations to large security partners in the State Department’s FMF assistance and specific authorities created for certain countries, there are often few built-in incentives to reexamine a partner’s record or backsliding. And when reviews are done, there is strong resistance to shift funding due to the potential fallout. Rarely is the top consideration the effectiveness of assistance. In an interview with the authors in June 2020, Anthony Wier, a former deputy assistant secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs, explained, “Right now, the best predictor for what we propose to spend this year is what we proposed last year – in other words, the whole system is basically just drifting from year to year.”66 This greatly affects the perception of other U.S. security assistance partners. Countries know that the United States is unlikely to cut assistance, even despite bad behavior, in order to avoid harming a bilateral relationship. Recipients take note of such reluctance to pull aid even when gross abuses occur and thus ignore U.S. chastising on bad behavior. As long as the United States is unwilling to cut off assistance or move funds elsewhere after a country commits actions that U.S. officials oppose, security assistance will provide no foreign policy leverage. Harms democratic progress and enables human rights violators Current security assistance policy, divorced from other foreign aid considerations, hampers pursuing this values-based policy and does not effectively elevate human rights and democracy concerns in the decision-making process. This is dangerous because the United States ends up supporting autocratic regimes with serious governance and stability challenges. Yemen, for example, received more than $300 million in security assistance through the DOD’s train and equip authority between 2010 and 2015, yet researchers documented human rights abuses perpetrated by the government and possible diversion of U.S. aid.67 Worse still, the perception that U.S. aid was fueling conflict led much of the Yemeni public to believe that the United States was primarily responsible for the destruction of the Saudi-led coalition in the current war.68 Today, the conflict in Yemen is the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. An overly militarized security assistance policy makes it harder to support emerging democracies. Building up security forces without accompanying reforms to strengthen civilian oversight can lead to coup-proofing or consolidation around a political leader, rather than the development of a competent force.69 Often, these impacts are not prioritized by security assistance practitioners; for example, the DOD’s relative spending on building up partner security institutions, such as the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, was $32.6 million in fiscal year 2019, compared with $1.9 billion of overall spending.70 At the same time, the DOD’s investment in institutional capacity building far exceeds the State Department’s investment in these efforts—an example where the State Department will have to incorporate and improve on the DOD’s practices. While U.S. laws technically prohibit providing security assistance to units found to violate human rights—the Leahy laws—the provisions are riddled with loopholes and are too weak to effectively prioritize human rights in U.S. security assistance.71 Offices and agencies responsible for elevating human rights in U.S. foreign policy, such as the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, are too often cut out of the decision-making process for security assistance programs—especially those run out of the Pentagon. At the same time, the Pentagon maintains its own security assistance accounts, such as Section 127e, that are not required to conduct human rights vetting and operate with little transparency—furthering opportunities to militarize foreign policy.72 And often, such as in the case of Egypt, security assistance is accompanied by paltry amounts of democracy, human rights, and governance funding (DRG), or certifications on human rights are waived entirely, to make providing arms more palatable.73 These small DRG funds or certification stops do little to change the underlying political challenges or are sometimes even hampered by the regime the United States is funding. Inhibits congressional oversight By creating two separate security assistance bureaucracies—one at the State Department and one at the DOD—there is no uniform oversight of security assistance by Congress. DOD security assistance residing in Title 10 is a relatively tiny piece—comprising about 2 percent of the overall DOD budget—of the oversight jurisdiction for the Senate and House Armed Services committees and DOD appropriators. Meanwhile, the assistance under State Department authorities comprises a far more significant proportion of the State Department budget—about 15 percent—and therefore can be subject to more expert attention. Congressional staff are expected to review a continuous flow of piecemeal security assistance notifications from the executive branch and track reports about the myriad authorities. Many congressional staff report being unable to keep up with reviewing even the biggest program, and reports—even those made public—are rarely reviewed in any depth.74 Moreover, these committees rarely talk to each other or coordinate over specific security assistant programs. They also jealously guard their jurisdictions and have a poor track record of communication, let alone cooperation.75 As a result, security assistance rarely gets a vetting before the public eye. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held two hearings on security assistance in the last 10 years—and tends to focus on the foreign policy dimensions of the most problematic partnerships.76 Congressional notification requirements are not uniform and only mandated for certain types of authorities, making it impossible to see a “full and authoritative accounting” of U.S. security assistance funding around the world.77 Contributes to an inefficient bureaucracy and coordination nightmare Because of the patchwork of existing authorities to provide security assistance, there are multiple systems for U.S. officials in Washington and on the ground in embassies to manage. For the security assistance system to work effectively, U.S. officials at the State Department, the Pentagon, and in the field need to closely coordinate—but this does not always happen in the current structure. Military officers conducting and implementing security assistance have to juggle multiple security assistance programs with different types of reporting requirements, human rights vetting standards, and administrative barriers, while also being beholden to two chains of command—the ambassador and the combatant command—with sometimes divergent perspectives. Nuclear war. Congressional oversight pacifies decision-making without wrecking flexibility. Waxman 19 [Matthew C. Waxman, Liviu Librescu Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and an adjunct senior fellow for Law and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations; "War Powers Oversight, Not Reform"; War on the Rocks; Published: 11-19-2019; Accessed: 6-24-2022; https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/war-powers-oversight-not-reform/; KL] Moreover, focusing only on formal congressional action obscures the more subtle but substantial w
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