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2022 Michigan Affirmative

Aff - PGMs - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

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PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED
Notes
Thanks to Sam Church and Devin Lai (Aff) and Alex Huang and Eleanor Barrett (Neg) for their work on this file!
Please email khirn10@gmail.com with any questions or concerns
1AC
1AC – Arms ADV
Contention one is ARMS.
War in Ukraine highlighted key shortfalls in US-NATO precision munition supplies – only increasing supplies prevents inevitable conflict
Mahnken 22 – Thomas G. Mahnken is president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a senior research professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. (Thomas G. Mahnken, "The US needs a new approach to producing weapons. Just look at Ukraine.," Defense News, 4-26-2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2022/04/26/the-us-needs-a-new-approach-to-producing-weapons-just-look-at-ukraine/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)
The war in Ukraine has offered vivid testimony of the effectiveness, and the high usage rate, of modern precision weapons. Ukraine has so far been fortunate to receive a massive supply of such munitions from the United States, Britain and other NATO states.
Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told Congress the West has delivered 60,000 antitank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons to Kyiv. Weapons such as the Javelin anti-tank guided weapon and Stinger surface-to-air missile played an important role in halting Moscow’s initial offensive and forced the Russian leadership to scale back its expansive objectives. However, it has become increasingly apparent such weapons are neither cheap nor available in unlimited numbers. Indeed, the United States has reportedly provided Kyiv one-third of its overall stockpile of Javelins.
Unless things change, and soon, the United States may be far less fortunate in a future conflict. Put bluntly, although the United States and its allies have been able to resupply Ukraine, the United States cannot count on similar help should the roles be reversed. U.S. allies’ stocks of precision weapons are limited, and they may have an urgent need for these munitions in a future coalition conflict.
The United States will also need large numbers of longer-range weapons like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) that are not as widely available as the Javelin and Stinger are today. It is thus imperative for the United States and its allies to both increase their munitions capacity and adopt innovative approaches to munitions production.
The war in Ukraine is but the most recent reminder that 21st century warfare is munitions intensive. As NATO found out in its 2011 air campaign over Libya, and as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates discovered in their war against the Houthis in Yemen, military operations against even relatively unsophisticated adversaries can require the use of large quantities of precision weapons. As recently as 2015, the U.S. Air Force ran dangerously low on Hellfire air-launched missiles in its campaign against ISIS.
The effectiveness of precision weaponry against invading Russian forces has been impressive but has also highlighted the fact that the current U.S. munitions infrastructure is not robust enough to support a high-intensity, protracted conflict against a major adversary such as Russia or China. In fact, in 2019 the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy panel warned of the inadequacy of the current munitions base and highlighted the need to expand and sustain it.
Similarly, the requirement for greater investment in munitions is a recurring finding of wargames and strategic choices exercises that the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has conducted over the course of years. The current U.S. munitions production base lacks capacity, and manufacturing methods are not always tailored to the needs of 21st century warfare. For example, it reportedly takes 18-24 months to manufacture a production run of Stinger missiles. Too often, the capacity of the industrial base rests on second-tier suppliers with even more limited capacity and supply chains that are vulnerable to disruption.
The United States should consider its munitions requirements in coordination with key allies and partners. The United States needs to do more to meet its own munitions needs but may also need to supply allies with large numbers of munitions as well. It is in America’s interest to have sufficient munitions capacity to be able to supply frontline states without having to draw down its own stocks to perilously low levels. Some U.S. allies, such as Australia, are making considerable investments to build up their own munitions industry, but more needs to be done.
The Defense Department needs to analyze U.S. and allied munitions requirements for 21st century warfare, both for Ukraine and beyond. The ongoing war with Russia offers a valuable set of data, but a war against China may have very different requirements: the need for many long-range weapons, for example, as well as for lots of anti-ship missiles. How many munitions do we and our allies require, and of what type? To what extent must our current production capacity be expanded to meet that demand? How many munitions and of what types need to be stockpiled, and what sort of surge production capacity is needed on top of that? Would it make sense to stockpile certain long-lead-time components, such as seekers, and if so, where?
Transforming the U.S. munitions base will take time and investment and would benefit from innovative approaches to yield greater capability and capacity while reducing unit cost. The need to expand the munitions base offers an excellent opportunity to bring new firms into the defense industrial base. The task of fielding modern precision weapons is much more achievable than, say, building a next-generation combat aircraft, and new entrants can bring innovative design and manufacturing approaches to the table, such as modular or multi-mission designs. The Defense Department should also consider innovative approaches to precision weapons, such as the adoption of loitering munitions and guided projectiles that can be purchased in large numbers at low cost for both offensive and defensive missions.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted lethality of modern precision weapons on the battlefield, but also the fragility of the current munitions base. The United States cannot enter the next war with inadequate stocks of precision munitions, nor would it be acceptable to cut off allies from resupply in order to husband limited stockpiles for its own defense. Rather, the United States needs to work with its close allies to both increase their collective munitions stockpiles and production capacity while also adopting innovative approaches to munitions production
Allies agree that now is key to prepare for the next conflict
Clark 22 – Maiya Clark is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for National Defense. (Maiya Clark, "The War in Ukraine Continues; Can the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?," Heritage Foundation, 4-30-2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)
The conflict has, however, given rise to silver linings. Many of our allies are waking up to the need to boost their defense spending.
Germany has decided to buy F-35s from the U.S. and pledged an increased defense budget, exceeding NATO’s 2%-of-GDP target. Poland has moved to increase its defense spending as well, with the goal of reaching 3% of GDP by 2023.
To some degree, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has served as a stress test for the West’s defense industrial base. From that has come a growing recognition that, for too long, America has underestimated the amount of munitions and platforms required in modern warfare.
Due to the complexity and time required to manufacture today’s precision weapons, we must start thinking now, before a war breaks out, about whether America has enough weaponry to sustain a conflict.
The AI arms race with Russia is only escalating – applying that tech to PGMs is the next frontier.
Suciu 20 – Peter Suciu is a defense writer and journalist for the National Interest. (Peter Suciu, "Coming Soon: AI-Powered Jam-Resistant Munitions," National Interest, 12-5-2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/coming-soon-ai-powered-jam-resistant-munitions-173858, Accessed 6-18-2022, LASA-SC)
Since antiquity once a weapon was developed there were soon methods to counter it. Just as the shield and armor were meant to protect a soldier from swords and spears, today there are now countermeasures designed to stop smart munitions, which were first developed during the Second World War.
While the United States has continued to develop even smarter bombs, including laser- and GPS-guided bombs, the latest efforts include those that could select targets automatically when dropped from an aircraft. Such smart munitions could maneuver in flight after being launched, but efforts have continued to counter such measures and this has included the use of jamming technology.
In what is part of a seemingly never-ending “arms race,” Russia is now reportedly developing software that is designed for use in precision munitions of defensive and offensive weapons. According to a report in TASS last week, Tecmash Group, which is part of the state tech corporation Rostec, has developed new analytical software that utilizes artificial intelligence (AI) for smart munitions that could make the weapons resistant to electric warfare systems including counter-measures.
“The next-generation munitions with the function of artificial intelligence are the most effective means of destruction in a present-day battle,” Rostec Industrial Director Bekkhan Ozdoev said via a statement provided by the company's press office.
“One of the developers’ key tasks was to make the ‘smart’ core invulnerable to electronic warfare systems,” Ozdoev added. "The new software outshines Russian and foreign versions in terms of the munition's protection and renders the operation of electronic warfare systems ineffective.
The system was developed by the Novosibirsk Research Institute of Electronic Devices, which specializes in creating short-range avionics systems for munitions. Its new software could provide increased capabilities for precision munitions used by both defensive and offensive platforms. It also utilizes a new system of radio-electronic protection, which increases the accuracy of striking targets in a jamming environment. According to the press office, it allows receiving detailed information on the targets under active jamming with changing intensity.
This is just the most recent tech “upgrade” of smart munitions that Moscow has focused on. Last year, the Russian military announced the development of an improved smart bomb and the aircraft that carried the weapon. The SVP-24 was described as a system that could transform unguided conventional bombs into precision-guided weapons, similar to the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).
The US and NATO need to step up smart PGMs to ensure Russia does not.
Allen 22 – Director, AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program. (Gregory, "Russia Probably Has Not Used AI-Enabled Weapons in Ukraine, but That Could Change," CSIS, 5-26-2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-probably-has-not-used-ai-enabled-weapons-ukraine-could-change, Accessed 6-19-2022, LASA-SC)
In March, WIRED ran a story with the headline “Russia's Killer Drone in Ukraine Raises Fears About AI in Warfare,” with the subtitle, “The maker of the lethal drone claims that it can identify targets using artificial intelligence.” The story focused on the KUB-BLA, a small kamikaze drone aircraft that smashes itself into enemy targets and detonates an onboard explosive. The KUB-BLA is made by ZALA Aero, a subsidiary of the Russian weapons manufacturer Kalashnikov (best known as the maker of the AK-47), which itself is partly owned by Rostec, a part of Russia’s government-owned defense-industrial complex.
The WIRED story understandably attracted a lot of attention, but those who only read the sensational headline missed the article’s critical caveat: “It is unclear if the drone may have been operated in this [an AI-enabled autonomous] way in Ukraine.” Other outlets re-reported the WIRED story, but irresponsibly did so without the caveat.
WIRED’s assessment that Kalashnikov claims the KUB-BLA “boasts the ability to identify targets using artificial intelligence” is based on two main pieces of evidence: a Kalashnikov press release about ZALA Aero’s “Artificial Intelligence Visual Identification (AIVI)” capabilities for its unmanned aircraft, and the original Kalashnikov press release announcing the KUB-BLA in 2019.
However, these two pieces of evidence are less than they seem.
The Russian-language AIVI press release never mentions the KUB-BLA or military applications. Instead, it describes a ZALA Aero machine-learning AI drone product line that is marketed to industrial and agricultural sectors. Incorporating modern machine-learning AI into military applications is significantly more difficult than in industrial or agricultural applications. Modern machine-learning AI using deep neural networks offers the opportunity for incredible gains in performance, but that performance depends on having lots of training data during development. Moreover, that training data needs to closely resemble operational conditions.
In general, it is much easier to get such training data from commercial customers than from an enemy military, especially if friendly weapons systems and sensors do not often come within range of enemy ones. The most mature military AI applications are ones like satellite reconnaissance: even in peacetime, satellites get to take a lot of pictures of Russian and Chinese military forces, and those pictures can be digitally labeled by human experts to turn them into training data. Training data is what machine learning AI systems learn from. The combination of a learning algorithm and training data is how AI systems learn to recognize what is in the image. But training data is generally application-specific. Satellite image recognition training data only helps build satellite image recognition AI. One cannot magically use labeled satellite image data to train an AI for a robotic drone’s targeting computer (at least not with today’s technology).
Getting enough of the right sort of training data to incorporate modern AI into, say, a robotic tank’s targeting computer, is a much tougher technical challenge. It is not impossible in principle, but in practice, there are far fewer opportunities to collect the right sort of training data.
This is not to say Russia has not tried. In the past, Rostec and Kalashnikov executives have not been shy about their attempts to develop weapons that successfully combine modern AI and combat autonomy, so it would be odd if they had succeeded in doing so with the KUB-BLA and not disclosed it in their marketing materials. Kalashnikov has been heavily promoting the KUB-BLA for both Russian and international customers.
What does Kalashnikov say about the KUB-BLA specifically? The 2019 KUB-BLA announcement states that the system has two means of delivering the drone and its explosive warhead to target coordinates: “The target coordinates are specified manually or acquired from [the sensor] payload targeting image.”
The vague latter description is what led many to assume KUB-BLA was using AI. However, “payload targeting image” is consistent with how many other precision-guided munitions and drone loitering munitions work, including ones that do not use any advanced AI capabilities. A Rostec executive specifically described the KUB-BLA as a Russian “domestic analogue” to the Israeli-built Orbiter 1K drone, which looks nearly identical. The Orbiter 1K comes with a ground control station where human operators monitor the video coming from the drone’s sensor and select targets directly from the video feed.
In other words, a human has already selected the target prior to the drone attacking it, and the drone is only autonomously maintaining target lock and navigating to the target, not autonomously selecting and deciding to engage targets. Autonomy over decisions to “select and engage targets” is the specific standard in U.S. Department of Defense policy as to what qualifies as an “autonomous weapon system.” Fire and forget munitions—which is the standard term used to describe not only the Orbiter 1K, but also heat-seeking missiles like the Javelin and Stinger—do not qualify as autonomous weapons. Those heat-seeking missiles do not use modern deep neural network machine learning, but they do use thermal image processing algorithms that were once considered state of the art. They, and many more systems like them, have been in use for decades by dozens of militaries around the world.
It is possible that the KUB-BLA received some kind of lethal AI-targeting upgrade prior to being used in Ukraine, but that is doubtful. Neither WIRED nor anyone else has provided evidence that this is the case. If the weapon did have those capabilities, it is unlikely that Kalashnikov would fail to mention them. The company has bragged about KUB-BLA’s recent use in Ukraine, and in the past Kalashnikov has openly talked about seeking to develop a “fully automated combat module” based on AI deep neural network technology.
In sum, there is little reason to believe that Russia is using AI-enabled autonomous weapons in Ukraine, yet. That is the good news. The bad news is that, if Russia’s unlawful war in Ukraine drags on, Russia has the intent and likely has the means to deploy autonomous weapons, with or without advanced AI.
Regarding means, a recent report by Russian news outlet RIA Novosti interviewed an unnamed Russian military source that is worth quoting (via Microsoft’s automatic translation) at length:
Russian reconnaissance and reconnaissance-strike UAVs will receive a digital catalog with electronic [optical and infrared] images of military equipment adopted in NATO countries. This will allow them to automatically identify it on the battlefield and create a map of the location of enemy positions directly onboard the device, which will be broadcast to the command post. . . . It is formed due to neural network training algorithms, which makes it possible to accurately determine the samples of equipment in a wide variety of environmental conditions, including with a short exposure (the technique is visible for several seconds or less), as well as when only part of the sample falls into the field of view of the drone—when, for example, only part of any combat vehicle is visible from cover.
As mentioned above, collecting adequate training data remains a significant hurdle for many military AI development projects. While the invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster in many ways for the Russian military, NATO has provided weapons and equipment to Ukraine that offers the best opportunity yet to collect operational training data for new AI models and more diverse military AI applications. The anonymous quote suggests that Russia’s military is taking this opportunity seriously.
Of course, domestic opposition to the war has caused an exodus of tech workers from Russia, and the sanctions levied against Russia have left it with major shortages of the semiconductor chips needed to make advanced AI systems. These are major challenges, but advanced AI is not required to endow weapons with all types of lethal autonomous capabilities, only a willingness to delegate decisions and freedom to military machines. The Israeli-built Harpy autonomous weapon, which can loiter in the air over a battlefield for hours while searching for enemy radar emissions to attack, dates back to t

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