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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - NATO Withdrawal CP - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ

AT - NATO Withdrawal CP - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ.docx

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Solvency---Russia
Solvency---Say No---2AC
US action alone is insufficient – Russia requires the removal of ALL NATO commitments to eastern Europe
Roth ’21 [Andrew, 12-17-2021, "Russia issues list of demands it says must be met to lower tensions in Europe," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato, smarx, AZM]
Russia has put forward a highly contentious list of security guarantees it says it wants the west to agree to in order to lower tensions in Europe and defuse the crisis over Ukraine, including many elements that have already been ruled out.
The demands include a ban on Ukraine entering Nato and a limit to the deployment of troops and weapons to Nato’s eastern flank, in effect returning Nato forces to where they were stationed in 1997, before an eastward expansion.
The eight-point draft treaty was released by Russia’s foreign ministry as its forces massed within striking distance of Ukraine’s borders. Moscow said ignoring its interests would lead to a “military response” similar to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
Vladimir Putin has demanded that the west provide Russia “legal guarantees” of its security. But the Kremlin’s aggressive proposals are likely to be rejected in western capitals as an attempt to formalise a new Russian sphere of influence over eastern Europe.
The demands, spelled out by Moscow in full for the first time, were handed over to the US this week. They include a demand that Nato remove any troops or weapons deployed to countries that entered the alliance after 1997, which would include much of eastern Europe, including Poland, the former Soviet countries of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Balkan countries.
Russia has also demanded that Nato rule out further expansion, including the accession of Ukraine into the alliance, and that it does not hold drills without previous agreement from Russia in Ukraine, eastern Europe, in Caucasus countries such as Georgia or in Central Asia.
Those proposals are likely to be viewed extremely negatively by Nato countries, in particular Poland and the Baltic states. They have warned that Russia is attempting to re-establish a sphere of influence in the region and view the document as proof Moscow is seeking to limit their sovereignty.
A senior US official said on Friday that the Kremlin knows that some parts of its proposals were “unacceptable”.
Solvency---Say No---1AR
Can’t solve – Putin wants complete disarmament at the border
Kirby ’22 [Paul; 5-9-2022; "Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?," BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589, smarx, AZM]
Ahead of the war, he demanded that Nato turn the clock back to 1997 and reverse its eastward expansion, removing its forces and military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance from 1997 and not deploying "strike weapons near Russia's borders". That means Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics.
In President Putin's eyes, the West promised back in 1990 that Nato would expand "not an inch to the east", but did so anyway.
Russia’s demands can’t be met – NATO says no
Rosenberg ’21 [Steve; 12-17-2021; "Russia Ukraine: Moscow lists demands for defusing Ukraine tensions," BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59696450, smarx, AZM]
In the proposals Russia sets out a series of radical demands, which require countries that joined Nato after the fall of the Soviet Union not to deploy troops or weapons in areas where they could be seen as a threat to Russia. Heavy bombers and warships would not be allowed in areas outside their national airspace or waters from which they could launch an attack.
That would mean Nato not playing any role at all in any of the three Baltic republics or Poland. And Nato would have to abandon any plans for Ukraine and Georgia to eventually join the Western alliance.
Russia asks for the impossible
Diplomacy is the art of the possible. Well it was… until now.
It's virtually impossible to imagine the US and Nato signing the draft documents Russian diplomats have drawn up, without considerable changes.
Russia demanding a veto on who joins the Alliance. A non-starter. Nato has said many times before that Moscow can have no say over who gets to be a member.
Solvency---Ukraine---Russia Cheats---2AC
Good faith negotiations with Russia are impossible---Putin uses peace talks as opportunities to regroup Russian forces.
Steven Erlanger 22, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017, 3/29/2022, “Peace Talks May be Little More than Russian Tactics, Analysts say,” https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/russia-ukraine-peace-talks.html, RH
BRUSSELS — As envoys made progress in peace talks on Tuesday, Russia offered concessions that signaled a more realistic course for the war in Ukraine, while indicating it is also in no hurry to end the conflict, according to diplomats and analysts.
Russia’s deputy defense minister, Aleksandr Fomin, presented the decision to “sharply reduce” military activity around the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, and the northern city of Chernihiv as a gesture “to increase mutual trust for future negotiations.”
“De-escalation is a euphemism for retreat,” said Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of War Studies at King’s College London. “Russia is adjusting its goals to reality, because war is quite empirical,” he said. “It’s not a ruse to say that they are concentrating on the Donbas, because in reality that’s all they can do.”
Some analysts say such an agreement would, at minimum, have to give Russia control of Mariupol, the besieged port city in Ukraine that is still somehow holding out, to create a secure land route between two areas that Russia occupies: Crimea to the west, and the Donbas to the east. And it would also, they say, have to cede control over the two administrative regions in the Donbas, Luhansk and Donetsk, which Mr. Putin has already declared to be independent republics.
Nor will Mr. Putin easily end the war, Mr. Heisbourg said. If he takes the area east of the Dnieper, “that may be enough for now, but he will rebuild his army and continue.”
For both sides, said Robin Niblett, the director of Chatham House, the London research institution, “the negotiations are not serious, in the sense that negotiations now for both sides are a continuation of the war, not a solution.” Russia can concentrate on the east, and Ukraine will find it hard to move from its agile defense to serious counterattacks, he said. “And Putin hasn’t forgotten about Kyiv.”
Even if Mr. Putin can control and “settle” for another partition of Ukraine in the east, “Ukraine has to sign up for it, and if not, I don’t think we lift the sanctions,” Mr. Niblett said.
His colleague, Mathieu Boulègue, a French scholar who studies the Russian military, agrees that Russia is not negotiating in good faith, but “testing the waters and applying for time, to regroup and re-equip militarily and make more gains on the ground.”
The Russian military appears to have taken control of what might be called Phase 2 of a botched operation, he said, which should have been Phase 1. Taking Mariupol, the land bridge and the Donbas “would have been the grown-up military plan.” Modern warfare is half information warfare, Mr. Boulègue said, “and success is what you make of it,” especially in a repressive media environment as in Russia now.
The Russian forces’ inability to capture cities and keep territory is apparent after a month, he said, “so strategic goals have had to change.”
But to completely withdraw from Kyiv would allow the Ukrainians to reinforce the Donbas region and give them a significant victory, suggested Michael Kofman, director of Russia Studies at CNA, a defense research institution in Virginia, in a tweet.
Traveling in Morocco, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken also cast doubt on Russia’s pledge to reduce hostilities. “There is what Russia says and there’s what Russia does,” he said on Tuesday. “We’re focused on the latter. And what Russia is doing is the continued brutalization of Ukraine and its people and that continues as we speak.”
Russia did not stop fighting after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but actively supported the separatists in the Donbas, said Ian Bond, a former British diplomat in Russia and the head of foreign policy for the Center for European Reform. “I’m a skeptic about the Russians giving up on the war,” he said. “We’ve seen this movie before in 2014 and 2015. I view this as only a pause.”
Ian Garner, a historian of Russian propaganda, pointed out on Twitter that “Putin’s Russia — indeed, post-Soviet Russia — has been engaged in mucky, endless conflicts for years,” citing Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia in Georgia and the Donbas, all areas in other countries where Russian forces back separatist movements. “Not ended, maybe,” he said, but “in the intermission.”
Ukrainian and Western officials also suggested that Russia would be willing for a demilitarized Ukraine to join the European Union, so long as it forswore joining NATO or hosting any foreign forces.
But security analysts questioned the sincerity of such an agreement.
Mr. Bond said that the problem with Ukraine’s notion of neutrality is that so far none of the countries it wants to guarantee it would agree to do so. It would be like NATO membership with collective defense by another name, so highly unlikely, he said.
As for European Union membership, Mr. Niblett said, that would represent the largest danger to Mr. Putin, who helped stimulate the 2014 revolt in Ukraine when he forced the then-president, Viktor Yanukovych, to renege on a trade agreement with the bloc. If Ukraine joined now, Mr. Niblett said, the country would develop economically even faster, in contrast to Russia, “and you would end up with a South Korea next to a North Korea, and I can’t see Putin accepting that.”
Even more, he said, the European Union treaties contain a collective defense promise as well.
Solvency---AT: Relations---2AC
US-Russian relations are impossible – political principles, power ambitions, and long-standing conflicts prevent an effective relationship
Goldgeier ’21 [James; 04/06/21; Goldgeier, professor of International Relations at American University, doctorate in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, "U.S.-Russian Relations Will Only Get Worse," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-04-06/us-russian-relations-will-only-get-worse //smarx, AZG]
It is hard to imagine that U.S.-Russian relations could get much worse, but sadly, they are unlikely to get better anytime soon. Over the past two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin has defined his country’s interests in ways that are incompatible with the interests of the United States and its European allies. The latter believe that democracy, the rule of law, and the provision of security to eastern European countries enhance stability; Putin, meanwhile, considers the spread of democracy to be a threat to his regime and believes that having vulnerable neighbors enhances Russian security.
Any sustained improvement of relations between the United States and Russia beyond progress on arms control (such as the recent extension of the New START treaty) would require one of two concessions: either the United States shelves its foundational support for democracy and formally recognizes a Russian-privileged sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union or the Russian president decides his interests are not threatened by greater democracy in the region or by having fully sovereign neighbors. Neither is likely to materialize in the near future. The election of U.S. President Joe Biden, who has made support for democracy at home and abroad the centerpiece of his presidency, signals that the United States will not cease to champion traditional democratic values in Europe for at least the next four years. Meanwhile, as long as Putin remains in power, Moscow’s policy will continue to be marked by a fear of democracy and of the full sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors.
THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
U.S. decision-makers approached the post–Cold War world with a clear lesson from the American experience in the twentieth century. Like many others, they drew a link between U.S. disengagement from Europe after World War I and the onset of World War II just two decades later. They also saw the United States’ decision to remain in Europe in the face of potential Soviet aggression after the end of World War II as having saved Western Europe from a communist fate. For U.S. officials, then, continued American dominance over European security through NATO was necessary to keep the peace in the uncertain times following the Cold War. The outbreak of war in Yugoslavia exacerbated those fears, feeding the narrative that without the United States, nationalism was waiting to be unleashed and conflict could erupt anywhere in the region.
But the United States also sought to reassure first the Soviets and then the Russians that the West would not take advantage of the end of Moscow’s domination of eastern Europe to undermine the former superpower’s security. When U.S. President Bill Clinton informed Russian President Boris Yeltsin in September 1994 of plans to move forward with NATO enlargement, he said, “I don’t want you to believe that I wake up every morning thinking only about how to make the Warsaw Pact countries a part of NATO—that’s not the way I look at it. What I do think about is how to use NATO expansion to advance the broader, higher goal of European security, unity and integration—a goal I know you share.”
That quote succinctly summarizes the differences between the United States and Russia during the Yeltsin presidency. For the United States, NATO was the right instrument to achieve European stability and security because it enabled the United States to remain in charge. The U.S. president argued as much and sought to prove that he was not trying to harm Russia by exploiting the Warsaw Pact’s collapse. But American leadership was precisely what made NATO the wrong instrument from Russia’s perspective. Yeltsin, although he might have agreed with Clinton’s objective of fostering European unity, did not share his American counterpart’s belief that NATO was the best means to achieve it—nor did any other top Russian official. Under the U.S. leadership of NATO, junior partnership would have been the best available option for Russia. But given Russian opposition to such an arrangement, it was ultimately left out of the Europe that the United States sought to build through the alliance.
Yeltsin had staked his political fortunes on bringing his country into the West. Since his domestic political battle with Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning months of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had sought to win favor by being more pro-Western, pro-democracy, and pro-market than the Soviet leader. He was too weak to oppose American policies, so he took what he could get—not just financial assistance from the United States, its allies, and international financial institutions but also symbols that he was being treated like an equal. These included the NATO-Russia Founding Act—which established a partnership between the West and Russia as invitations to join the alliance were extended to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—and Russian participation in the G-7 group of advanced industrialized democracies, creating the G-8.
By the end of the 1990s, it seemed that for all the challenges in relations between the United States and Russia (most notably over NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign of Serbia on behalf of the Kosovars), the United States and Europe had managed to overcome Cold War divisions and stave off the worst of nationalism in Europe. Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic was no longer able to unleash terror in the western Balkans; the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO and others were soon to follow; the European Union was moving forward with its own expansion across Europe; and Russia still seemed oriented toward the West. In November 1999, Clinton visited his alma mater, Georgetown University, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was, in a sense, the valedictory of his effort to build on President George H. W. Bush’s vision of a Europe “whole and free.” Clinton reminded his audience that he had set out to “do for the Eastern half of Europe what we helped to do for the Western half after World War II.” As for Russia, he argued, its “transformation has just begun. It is incomplete. It is awkward. Sometimes it is not pretty, but we have a profound stake in its success.”
Clinton also declared, “Now we are at the height of our power and prosperity.” He meant it as a confirmation that the United States was capable of shaping global affairs to its liking. After all, he had made the notion of the United States as the “indispensable nation” a hallmark of his presidency. Unfortunately, the belief that the United States was at the height of its power and prosperity turned out to be a prophecy, as others, including Russia, gained more power, and the United States’ ability to dominate those countries declined dramatically.
RUSSIA’S RETURN
Reflecting on the 1990s, Putin saw humiliation for Russia. He believed that the West was working to impose its vision of world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” Putin declared. “As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.”
Putin was not suggesting that he wanted to re-create the USSR. But rather than seek to integrate Russia into the West as his anti-Soviet predecessor had done—which inevitably meant relegating Russia to the role of junior partner to the United States—Putin sought to build an independent great power, one that could engage with the West on its own terms and dominate its immediate neighborhood. Early in Putin’s presidency, his policies were not necessarily antagonistic but sought to free Russia from Western, and especially American, interference.
From an American perspective, NATO enlargement, the 1999 Kosovo war, the 2002 unilateral American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), the 2003 Iraq war, and support for the 2003–5 “color revolutions” in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine were discrete policies. U.S. officials saw themselves not as harming Russian interests but rather as fostering democracy and the rule of law across central and eastern Europe, protecting the Kosovars from Milosevic’s brutal regime, creating the ability to defend the United States and its allies from Iran’s ballistic missile threat, eliminating the possibility that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could threaten the world with weapons of mass destruction, and supporting reformers trying to build democracy in fragile states.
Reflecting on the 1990s, Putin saw humiliation for Russia.
The Russian perspective starkly differed. Officials in Moscow watched the United States not only keep its Cold War alliance but expand it, incorporating territory formerly controlled by the Soviet Union, including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. When NATO went to war against Serbia in 1999, it did so over Russian objections and without going through the UN Security Council—where Russia’s status as a permanent member would have allowed it to veto the action. A mere four years later, NATO went to war against Iraq, again without Security Council authorization and again brushing aside Russian (as well as French and German) opposition. Many in Moscow viewed the United States’ departure from the ABM Treaty as degrading Russia’s nuclear deterrent (particularly after the George W. Bush administration announced its plans to build a mis

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