Neg - AI Logistics Updates - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS
Neg - AI Logistics Updates - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS.docx
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Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS Non-Democratic Country PIC 1nc TEXT: The United States federal government should substantially increase its artificial intelligence military logistics with Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom Expansion of non-democratic governments of NATO states diminishes alliance credibility and risks a slide to global authoritarianism Jonathan Katz and Torrey Taussig 18, "An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO," Brookings Jonathan Katz is director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) based in the Washington, DC, office. Torrey Taussig was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. 7-10-2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/, accessed 6-21-2022//cpd There is also significant democratic backsliding among NATO member states. The cast of illiberal characters—who are leading the charge in the wrong direction—includes the recently reelected and empowered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) Party in Poland, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz Party. Each has proven more than willing to repress free media, dismantle checks and balances, demonize political opposition, clamp down on civil society, and diminish the rule of law. America’s democratic system and norms under President Trump are also under duress; as a result, Freedom House downgraded the country’s score on the basis of weakening political rights and civil liberties. Despite these alarming developments, NATO leaders have relegated democratic backsliding to the backburner. Opponents of making the case for democracy within NATO might argue that pushing Ankara, Warsaw, and Budapest too hard on their commitments to good governance will exacerbate already tense divisions in the alliance. Others might say that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of a contentious democracy discussion at NATO. Yet this is a counterproductive approach with current and potential costs to NATO’s future. Here are three security-based reasons why the United States and NATO should care about democratic backsliding, and actions the alliance can take to address them. 1Russia is already benefiting from and effectively leveraging its relationships with Hungary and Turkey to exacerbate discord within Europe and NATO. Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin see one another as allies in their disdain for the European Union and Orbán has courted Russian financial and political support as he builds an illiberal democracy in Hungary. Russian propaganda also finds fertile ground in Hungarian media. A 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted that Russian state-owned media content “by Sputnik and RT is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in Hungary.” The report cited Orbán as the EU and NATO’s most supportive leader of Putin’s worldview and leadership. Acting as the Russian “camel’s nose under the tent,” Orbán is thwarting Ukraine and NATO’s partnership efforts by blocking the Ukraine-NATO Commission from meeting at the upcoming summit. In Turkey, Erdoğan has rattled the NATO alliance by pursuing a deal to purchase the S-400 missile system from Russia. In addition to hurting NATO’s ability to cooperate on security, the system is also not compatible with NATO’s defenses. Through arms and energy deals, Putin uses Turkey as a wedge to divide NATO. Similarly, Erdoğan might see his deals with Putin as a way to free Turkey from Western leverage, particularly as European states push back on his brand of authoritarian politics by cutting EU pre-accession funds. After winning the recent twin parliamentary and presidential elections, an emboldened Erdoğan will likely become an even more problematic partner for NATO. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies. Other illiberal and populist governments, including Italy’s new anti-establishment government, could follow suit in enhancing their partnerships with Russia, creating future intelligence-sharing and cohesion problems for the alliance. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies, including electoral process and open information spaces. 2There is a strong link between democratic governance and security gains. Liberal democracies have historically been less likely to experience intra- and interstate conflict, generate refugees, and harbor violent extremists. They are also better at maintaining transparent institutions, civilian control of the military and intelligence services, and working together on confidence-building measures, all of which are core features of NATO’s ability to collectively defend its members. On the other hand, corruption and insecurity grow under politicized institutions and poor rule of law. This hurts NATO’s renewed efforts to combat terrorism, as military and security communities have long acknowledged the connection between corruption and the existence of criminal networks, traffickers, and terrorists within state borders. Corruption also opens space for Russian kleptocratic networks close to Putin to operate and gain influence. For example, in 2014 Orbán awarded Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear company, the sole contract to build two nuclear plants in Hungary in exchange for a 10 billion euro loan from Moscow. The Hungarian parliament, dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz Party, then passed a rushed vote to keep data from the nuclear deal confidential for 30 years in the name of “national security.” The deal diminished transparent economic competition within the European Union and solidified Hungary and Russia’s energy ties. 3Distrust among allies hurts alliance interoperability. The PiS Party’s assault on independent media and the Constitutional Court, including efforts last week to summarily force out 27 Polish Supreme Court justices, have isolated Poland from France and Germany, diminishing trust among the European nations. This could make it increasingly difficult for Washington to gain consensus on joint decisions, communications, and operations. If NATO is dedicated to building resiliency along Russia’s periphery by placing multi-national battalions in Poland, then it should not ignore the accountable institutions that would strengthen this joint effort. A slide to worldwide Digital Authoritarianism is worse than extinction! Di Minardi 20 “The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’,” BBC Future, 15th October 2020 https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence//cpd Though global totalitarianism is still a niche topic of study, researchers in the field of existential risk are increasingly turning their attention to its most likely cause: artificial intelligence. In his “singleton hypothesis”, Nick Bostrom, director at Oxford’s FHI, has explained how a global government could form with AI or other powerful technologies – and why it might be impossible to overthrow. He writes that a world with “a single decision-making agency at the highest level” could occur if that agency “obtains a decisive lead through a technological breakthrough in artificial intelligence or molecular nanotechnology”. Once in charge, it would control advances in technology that prevent internal challenges, like surveillance or autonomous weapons, and, with this monopoly, remain perpetually stable. If the singleton is totalitarian, life would be bleak. Even in the countries with the strictest regimes, news leaks in and out from other countries and people can escape. A global totalitarian rule would eliminate even these small seeds of hope. To be worse than extinction, “that would mean we feel absolutely no freedom, no privacy, no hope of escaping, no agency to control our lives at all", says Tucker Davey, a writer at the Future of Life Institute in Massachusetts, which focuses on existential risk research. “In totalitarian regimes of the past, [there was] so much paranoia and psychological suffering because you just have no idea if you're going to get killed for saying the wrong thing,” he continues. “And now imagine that there's not even a question, every single thing you say is being reported and being analysed.” “We may not yet have the technologies to do this,” Ord said in a recent interview, “but it looks like the kinds of technologies we’re developing make that easier and easier. And it seems plausible that this may become possible at some time in the next 100 years.” AI and authoritarianism Though life under a global totalitarian government is still an unlikely and far-future scenario, AI is already enabling authoritarianism in some countries and strengthening infrastructure that could be seized by an opportunistic despot in others. “We've seen sort of a reckoning with the shift from very utopian visions of what technology might bring to much more sobering realities that are, in some respects, already quite dystopian,” says Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, a bipartisan non-profit that develops national security and defence policies. In the past, surveillance required hundreds of thousands of people – one in every 100 citizens in East Germany was an informant – but now it can be done by technology. In the United States, the National Security Agency (NSA) collected hundreds of millions of American call and text records before they stopped domestic surveillance in 2019, and there are an estimated four to six million CCTV cameras across the United Kingdom. Eighteen of the 20 most surveilled cities in the world are in China, but London is the third. The difference between them lies less in the tech that the countries employ and more in how they use it. What if the definition of what is illegal in the US and the UK expanded to include criticising the government or practising certain religions? The infrastructure is already in place to enforce it, and AI – which the NSA has already begun experimenting with – would enable agencies to search through our data faster than ever before. In addition to enhancing surveillance, AI also underpins the growth of online misinformation, which is another tool of the authoritarian. AI-powered deep fakes, which can spread fabricated political messages, and algorithmic micro-targeting on social media are making propaganda more persuasive. This undermines our epistemic security – the ability to determine what is true and act on it – that democracies depend on. 2nc – turkey ai bad Turkey expanding digital authoritarianism into AI greenlights further human rights abuses and anti-democratic control Fatma Timucin 21, “8-BIT IRON FIST: DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: THE CASES OF TURKEY AND HUNGARY”, 8 July 21, https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/42417/1/10337574.pdf//cpd Unfortunately, in the last decade, Turkey has garnered international attention with its violation of free media. As stated in the literature (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020), her track record in media freedom has been far from perfect since the 1990s. Governments have displayed consistent patterns of restriction and punishment for opposition outlets as well as apparent favoritism towards pro-government ones. The remaining content opted for appealing to the relatively stable opposition voter base. The electoral success of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) back in 2002 failed to signal a deviation from this path in its early years. As 2021 marks their 19th consecutive year in government, we can observe a steady increase in media pressure over AKP’s time at the helm of parliament. The key argument of high political and societal polarization stands (Çarkoğlu, Baruh, and Yıldırım 2014). In addition, another process we must observe is the democratic backsliding Turkey has experienced over the last two decades (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020). Indubitably, consequences of the accelerating authoritarianism are evident, with Turkey now being dubbed as “the largest prison for journalists” (Eski 2019). Turkey, especially the “New Turkey” Erdoğan declared after the 2011 legislative election victory, paints an illustrative example of media violations. Admittedly, Turkey’s shortcomings in media freedom precede Erdoğan and his party. The media has, notoriously, stayed in line with a multitude of governments and changed its discourse in accordance. Sensitive topics relating to ethnic and religious minorities were unanimously avoided. 1980 coup provided a window of opportunity as the media expressed more diversity thanks to democratic transition (Bayram 2010). Similar to Latin America (Guerrero 2014), a wave of deregulation in the early 1990s resulted in further commercialization (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020) and led to “captured liberal” media. It is necessary to mention here that the literature on political communication refers to both direct (or classic) and indirect censorship (Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015) over media in its “captured” aspect. Hence, with 22 the direct and indirect censorship media is now facing, Turkey’s media freedom has hit an unprecedented low. The following chapter aims to describe the process of the Turkish case of digital authoritarianism under AKP’s rule regarding tools and strategies mentioned in the previous section. Three strategies are essential: media ownership and leverage of government founded upon crony relationships, censorship and bans on alternative media, intimidation of its users by abuse of legislative framework, and lastly, employment of manipulation by trolls and bot accounts. 3.1 Media Ownership: Creating a Government-Friendly Media Landscape by Crony Capitalism As is the case with the general populist rhetoric, Erdoğan and AKP came to power as challengers to the existing regime and status quo. As a prominent party figure, Erdoğan has explicitly been vocal about his distaste in media since the beginning, for its being owned by the “elite” and maintaining the status quo. Another factor of utmost importance in shaping this attitude was Erdoğan’s experience in Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). Existing media outlets held Erdoğan and RP in a negative light. This was made evident with the four months imprisonment sentence Erdoğan received due to reciting a poem in 1997. Media coverage regarding the adjudication showed apparent enthusiasm about the unfolding of events, with the most memorable headline being “He will not be able to become even a headman” (Radikal 1998). This headline became a central piece of Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric in underlining “the people’s” triumph over the preceding regime in later years. In combination, the two motives mentioned above propelled AKP and Erdoğan to replace the media with a pro-government one. Control over traditional media has set the stage for AKP’s digital authoritarianism. As the media became tied to conglomerates owning several pro-AKP outlets, said outlets’ news sites became a projection of their traditional counterparts. In tandem with the increasing control, ‘professional’ digital media became dominantly in favor of the government. 23 Figure 3.1 Democracy Index Scores DemocracyIndexOverallScore Turkey’s descend into competitive authoritarianism came gradually. As Figure 11 shows, it is not unique in this aspect that each of the four countries mentioned throughout this thesis has experienced a slight but consistent decrease in their democracy scores over the last fourteen years. AKP’s media control was no different, a ‘patient struggle’ against the conventional media (Aladağ 2013). Between 2014 and 2018, the asymmetry in media ownership in pro-government and opposition was made official. This clear government bias was the consequence of a series of changes that took place since 2002. By buying outlets and shifting ownership to businessmen with close ties to the government, AKP has laid the ground for what came to be called havuz medyası by its opposition. 2nc – hungary ai bad Hungary’s digital authoritarianism creates positive feedback loops of democratic backsliding Fatma Timucin 07-08- 21, “8-BIT IRON FIST: DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: THE CASES OF TURKEY AND HUNGARY”, 8 July 21, https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/42417/1/10337574.pdf//cpd The case of Hungary has garnered recent scholarly attention regarding its democratic trajectory in the latest years. As 2021 marks Victor Orbán’s eleventh year holding the position of Prime Minister, Hungary has turned increasingly authoritarian. The country has accomplished an unfortunate first, as it is the only non-democratic member of the EU since 2020 (Repucci 2020). In turn, several NGOs, international organizations, and member countries have issued demands of political sanctions on Hungary in an attempt to reverse the democratic backsliding it is facing. Orbán’s regime can be characterized by populism and national conservatism. As a distinguishing quality, Orbán openly advocates for an ‘illiberal state’ in advancing national conservatism. His shift to right-wing became apparent in his first term in office between 1998-2002. Following two elections favored the Socialist Party, resulting in a drastic change in the government. However, Orbán’s Fidesz managed to keep its popularity in later years, and coupled with the Socialist’s decreasing voter support, won the election by a landslide in 2010. The subsequent decade has solidified Orbán’s grip on power as Fidesz constituted the majority in the parliament after his coalition with Christian Democrats. This allowed Orbán to pass several constitutional and legislative reforms. The consequences of said reforms spell out a perfect example of the “executive aggrandizement” (Bermeo 2016) pointed out in democratic backsliding literature. Simultaneously, Orbán expanded his influence, blurred the boundaries of executive decision-making, and grasped the popular vote. His maintaining of popular support is linked to several causes in the literature, such as the weak democratic tradition as a result of the post-soviet context (Krygier 2019), deepening of social cleavages (Palonen 2009), and rising Euro-scepticism resulting from a clash of values (Furedi 2017). An overlooked factor of Orbán’s success lies in his gradual capture of the media network, resulting in an enormous asymmetry in pro-government and opposition narratives. Although recent scholarly work aimed to fill the gap in the literature (Fabry 2020; Serdült 2020; Zgut et al. 2020), the issue was raised only after Hungary became a competitive authoritarian regime. 41 An extensive recollection of Orbán’s attitude towards media is hard to come by. In contrast, with many of his populist counterparts, Victor Orbán openly targeted free media since he assumed office. Independent media outlets shrank in numbers and the variety of content they can offer over time. In his crusade against opposition voices, Orbán instrumentalized takeovers as well as restriction and persecution of journalists. One of the last remaining independent media outlets, Index.hu, was met with a change of staff on the grounds of political motivation (Index 2020) in Fall 2020. Calls for the EU to intervene and protect freedom of speech through political pressure were made (IPI 2020), although there is no action taken insofar. In building control over the media, the ca
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