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2022 Michigan Kritik

K - Cybernetics - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS

K - Cybernetics - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS.docx

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Cybernetics K Supplement—Wave 1—FMPS
Notes
Thanks to Ansel Ang-Olson, Arthur Guo, Cleo Shaw, Esther Liu, George Jabren, and Rajan Sandhu for doing fantastic work!
This file is intended to supplement the starter packet cybernetics K and includes very few of the cards from that file. Here’s a brief rundown of how this file is organized:
Topshelf: New links and impacts, different potential alternatives, new framework angles/pieces of offense
Blocks: Supplements to the blocks from the original file; if a block has the same name as one from the original file, then the cards in it are simply alternatives, not necessarily replacements
Answers: More answers; largely organized in the aff context, but (like the aff section of the original file) also useful for neg cards against cybernetics affs, like the one in this file
Bronze Night Aff: A cybernetics aff! See the notes section there for more. There is not a separate neg section; a framework file is being released separately, and there are plenty of substantive answers to the aff between the answers section in this file and the starter packet file. Additionally, more material that can be used on the neg against this aff (and other K affs) will be coming from our lab in wave 2!
Topshelf
Link—AI—Autonomous Weapons
The 1AC doesn’t “escape” the violence autonomous weapons, but rather ignores that the human machine is already an automated entity – try or die for the alt
Matviyenko 15 (Svitlana Matviyenko, University of Western Ontario, “LACAN’S CYBERNETICS”A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada) //ansel
*edited for gendered language
The use of “automaton” in reference to man can be traced to the work of William Cornwallis: in his Essayes of Certaine Paradoxes (1616), he compares human performance to the functioning of man-made mechanisms. “In the whole course and frame of Nature, we see that nothing is made for it selfe,” he writes and explains, “the sunne by his splendor to lighten all the world; by his warmth and heate, to cherish and comfort each livuing and vegetable thing” (G2). In such an interconnected universe of things, Cornwallis conceives the body as both attached to its surroundings and, at the same time, an autonomous system, an assemblage of interrelated parts linked by the invisible “bond of duty, of use or of service, by which it is indebted to other”: the foot to the eye, the hand to the foot, the mouth to the hand, the stomach to the mouth, the whole body to the stomach; the human beings to their dogs and to their oxen (G2-G3). “Let [man] but looke into himself,” Cornwallis wrote, “and see how his constitutiue parts are debters each to other, the soule doth quicken and giue life to the body, the body like an Automaton, doth moue and carry it selfe and the soule” (G3). Cornwallis’ depiction of the mechanism of the body as an automaton does not presume, however, that its attachment to the environment makes it what we call today an open system. Rather, it remains a system closed-on-itself, that functions independently of will, man’s conscious control, or any outside direction. In the French context, a similar intuition was expressed by Pascal, who used “automate” for “man that acts as a machine” in his posthumously published Thoughts in 1669. In this book, Pascal continued his earlier exploration of the idea of the natural order as “a homogeneous and autonomous whole, governed by laws, agreeing with a certain model, which derives its independence from one or more other orders,” which he identifies in Thoughts as the order of the body, the order of the mind or reason, and the order of the heart or of charity (#308, #933).
Is there any “attachment” or “connection” between an automaton and the environment? This issue was articulated by the seventeenth-century philosophers in terms or “agreement” or “correlation” between the “orders.” We can still say that, for Cornwallis, 71 the cause of automation was located both inside and outside the automated living or nonliving entity, but only in the sense that automation was seen as the effect of a higher law acting upon the automated entity from the outside, which was the same as the inner law operating within an automated entity. Modern science’s response to the questions raised about the relation between these orders or systems is to “mathematicalize” (Milner) the correspondence. The process that Lacan and, later, Jacques-Alain Miller identify as “suturing,” emerges as a mathematical technique for demonstrating the presence of determinism or, as Lacan speaks about it, a law without intention (Seminar II 295), that was supposed to ground man’s relation to the “new” world system of correlated, autonomous, and automated orders. The subject of science emerges not in the rupture between these automated inner and outer universes, but as this rupture, which, as Slavoj Žižek has noted, “involves no lived experience, consciousness, or any other predicates we usually associate with subjectivity” (597).
Let us consider Jean-Claude Milner’s summary of one of Alexandre Koyré’s theorems of modern science found at the basis of Lacan’s theory of science: Modern science holds that there is no boundary limiting its material domain. It supposes two things: (a) there exists nothing material that modern science cannot treat as one of its objects (in other words, the set of existent material objects, usually called a universe, is in principle coextensive with the set of objects of modern science); (b) both sets are mathematically infinite (hence the notion of the modern infinite universe as opposed to the closed world of Antiquity). (“Lacan and the Ideal of Science” 29) In other words, he argues that “a particular expression, a particular thought are modern only insofar as they belong to a system of thought in which a mathematized empirical science is possible” (Milner, “Lacan and the Ideal of Science” 29). This allows modern science to challenge the Euclidian conception of “space” and to articulate a theory of “place,” or analysis situs, to use the archaic name for topology, which began in the work of Leibniz. Before Leibniz, the question of space was approached by René Descartes, who already thought of it only in connection to the extended body, res extensa, or “corporeal substance,” one of the three substances of Cartesian ontology. According to Descartes, matter extends in length, breadth, or depth and it is precisely this property of matter that constitutes space: space only exists as a consequence of such extension. In his correspondence with English philosopher Henry More48 from the 1640s, Descartes agreed with him that “in the natural course of events there is no vacuum,” but he also noted that there was what could not be perceived, and reserved the full knowledge of the invisible part of the extended body for God. Despite his awareness of the divisibility of matter, Descartes posited the extended body as existing beyond the perception of man: “a body can retain its whole bodily nature without being soft or hard or cold or hot to the senses – indeed without having any perceptible quality,” he wrote; “all matter is completely imperceptible if it is divided into parts much smaller than the particles of our nerves and the individual parts are given a sufficiently rapid movement,” which, he noted further in the letter to More, “is in a manner circular” (Descartes, III 360, 363). Descartes’ theory of automation, however, was different from his conception of the machinic body When Descartes approached this topic in the 1640s, he offered a mechanistic conception of the body49 that, he believed, physiologically functioned in the same way for both Homo sapiens and animals, except that the latter were lacking in “thinking substance.” He conceived the movements of animals as “purely mechanical and corporeal,” depending “solely on the force of the spirits and the structure of … organs” that “can be called the corporeal soul” (III 365).50 For Descartes, animals were thus “natural automata”: …it is certain that in the bodies of animals, as in ours, there are bones, nerves, muscles, animal spirits and other organs so arranged that they can by themselves, without any thought, give rise to all the movements we observe in animals. This is very clear in convulsions, when the mechanism of the body moves despite the mind, and often moves more violently and in a more varied manner than usually happens when it is moved by the will. (Descartes, III 366) Even though human bodies could, when they were not guided by thought or their “incorporeal soul,” exhibit such behaviour, men were not automata, but machines or mechanisms. When he said, “God made our body like a machine, and he wanted it to function like a universal instrument, which would always operate in the same way in accordance with its own laws” (Descartes, V 163-164), he was not referring to human automatism, but the machinic organization of the body. As Dennis Des Chene has argued in Spirits and Clocks, the novelty of Descartes’ theory was in combining …the animal-machine with a new philosophy of nature, in which the actions of agents inferior to humans not only might but must be explained without reference to any “form” but extension or to any qualities but the modes of extension. Descartes had the formidable task of showing that the vegetative and sensitive powers of plants and animals are nothing other than the actions they exhibit by virtue of the “disposition” of their parts. (13) Thus, automata, for Descartes, were self-contained machines, closed systems; and as such, they could not be human. The openness and connectedness of the human-machine to the world was maintained by means of the non-physical res cogitans, the mental substance. By denying automata the capacity for mental functioning, he made a distinction between automation of the self-moving life or non-life forms and intelligence, an attitude which would dominate until the mid-to-late nineteenth century. At the same time, as Lorraine Daston reminds us, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century usage of the term “intelligence” …overlaps but does not coincide with its twentieth-century meaning. Both denote mental agility, particularly in problem solving and learning; but whether intelligence was inborn or acquired by education, unitary or multiple in its faculties, the property of individuals or of groups, these were oppositions which would not have been easily accommodated within the Enlightenment framework for understanding the mind. (191) Therefore, calculating machines, for example, would not qualify as “intelligent.” On the contrary, due to their automatic, or algorithmic, behavior, they were seen as the opposite of anything intelligent. The fascination with automata over the course of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth was the fascination with the “non-intelligent” behaviour of “dummies,” especially when these human-like and other automata demonstrated their sometimes uncanny proximity to human performance.
A “bloodless” war between machines is impossible – the technological nature of LAWS guarantees alternatives that target non-military objectives
Wilson 20 (Neil Wilson, Master’s at Utrecht University, “Understanding the Battle for AI in Warfare through the Practices of Assemblage: A Case Study of Project Maven”, Utrecht University, 8/2/20, https://studenttheses.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12932/37392/Neil%20Wilson%20MA%20Thesis%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) // EL
2.1. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and AI in Warfare Debate relating to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) is a mile wide but an inch deep - vast but as-yet unsubstantiated. Ample discussion surrounds the potential political, legal and moral repercussions of deploying LAWS but there is little theoretically-informed analysis of their development. Given the revolutionary potential of such technologies, there is an urgent need to rectify this imbalance. Political challenges posed by the deployment of LAWS on battlefields are numerous. Unlike nuclear weapons, LAWS would require no hard-to-obtain materials and be relatively cheap to develop, leading some to fear a global robot arms race. Even those contending that “arms race” framing risks escalating rivalries nevertheless agree on the need to manage the proliferation of these technologies. In particular, the risk of LAWS proliferating among non-state actors seeking to “level the playing field” is severe. Even among democratic states, LAWS would overcome the “bodybag” problem and thus lower the threshold for going to war. In such a scenario, however, the obvious attraction of using LAWS - a ‘bloodless’ war between machines - is misguided. A change of footsoldiers does not alter the fundamental objective of war: “imposing and enduring costs to reveal relative capability or resolve.” In the absence of human soldiers to impose costs upon, belligerents may seek alternative means to demonstrate their resolve, e.g. by targeting non-military objectives and civilians. Indeed, as drones have enabled the removal of soldiers from battlefields, the inability for enemies to directly reciprocate violence has instigated fears of “blowback” by other means. Political concerns aside, the legal questions raised by LAWS are momentous. Formal and informal rules have guided conduct in warfare for as long as it has been carried out. Over time, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has steadily evolved to keep up with the development of new methods of warfighting, as evidenced by bans on the use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, anti-personnel landmines and blinding laser weapons. Throughout history, however, IHL has been developed under the assumption that human intelligence is guiding conduct in combat, not artificial. As existing treaties make no reference to LAWS, it is unclear if they can be banned under the current legal framework. Nevertheless, because it is impossible to confidently predict the outcomes of commands on complex AI systems, there is a possibility of LAWS running afoul of IHL. Can a robot be entrusted with the ability to discriminate between legitimate targets and civilians? If it fails, who can be held accountable? Some fear LAWS subverting the Hague Convention if they can act autonomously but not assume responsibility for the consequences. The ethics of using LAWS are fraught. At first glance, there is obvious appeal in using robots to do the “dull, dirty and dangerous” work in war as in civilian life. A robot never gets tired, stressed or traumatised. Their dispassionate nature, immune to the intoxicating effects of adrenaline, may even reduce the risk of civilian harm in conflict. From this perspective, if LAWS lessens the danger to soldiers and civilians alike, some suggest utilising them is not only judicious but an ethical imperative. Even if LAWs could perfectly adhere to IHL and reduce harm to both combatants and civilians, many question whether they should. As a simple matter of dignity, some insist that taking a human life should involve a human decision. “Delegating the decision to kill to algorithms,” according to Rosert and Sauer, “is inhumane and unacceptable under any circumstances.” A compelling argument, but potentially relativised by the fact that there are many different interpretations of human dignity and many ways it can be violated - technological or otherwise. The political, ethical and legal concerns raised are troubling but overwhelmingly speculative. Are we jumping the (autonomous) gun? Such preoccupation with the future use of killer robots may obscure meaningful debate about their present day development. A few notable contributions from Lewis, Taylor and Verbruggen are to be commended for grappling with the development of these systems, but this remains an under-theorised field. Presumably owing to its novelty, Project Maven has thus far evaded serious academic scrutiny. One notable exception comes from Suchman, however it nevertheless engages primarily with the deployment rather than development of this technology. Common to these conjectural, dystopian perspectives on the future of warfare is the assumption that if LAWS technology exists, it will be used. Not a dramatic leap of faith but nevertheless it seems prudent to question what is driving the demand for these technologies in this domain; thereby drawing the line between where we stand and where some fear we are heading. LAWS will only be deployed, presumably, if there is some strategic, operational and/or tactical need for them. Understanding this will elucidate a fuller picture of why and how they are being developed. To satisfy this curiosity, we turn to the growing field of scholarship on remote warfare.
Link—AI—Ethics
The aff’s search for ethics ignores the way algorithms inevitably shape our assumptions and forward technological manipulation
Amoore 20 (Louise Amoore, Professor of Political Geography at Durham University, “Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others”, Duke University Press, 8/30/20, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1800782) // EL
Ethics of Algorithms At first sight, the potential for violent harm precipitated by algorithms that learn to recognize human propensities appears to be a self-evident matter for critique. Surely, one could say, the ethical terrain of the algorithm resides in the broader political landscape of rights and wrongs, good and evil. After all, one could readily identify a set of rights, already apparently registered as belonging to rights-bearing subjects, that has been contravened by algorithms that generate targets, adjudicating which people may peaceably assemble, or which people are worthy of credit or employment, and on what terms. Indeed, on this terrain of delineating the rights and wrongs of algorithmic actions is precisely where many critical voices on the harms of the algorithm have been heard. Writing in the New York Times, for example, Kate Crawford identifies machine learning’s “white guy problem,” arguing that “we need to be vigilant about how we design and train machine learning systems.”10 The dominant critical perspectives on algorithmic decisions have thus argued for removing the “bias” or the “value judgements” of the algorithm, and for regulating harmful and damaging mathematical models.11 Within each of these critical calls, the ethical problem is thought to dwell in the opacity of the algorithm and in its inscrutability, so that what Frank Pasquale has called the “black box society” is addressed through remedies of transparency and accountability.12 In sum, the rise of algorithmic power in society has been overwhelmingly understood as a problem of opaque and illegible algorithms infringing or undercutting a precisely legible world of rights belonging to human subjects. In such a framing, there is an outside to the algorithm—an accountable human subject who is the locus of responsibility, the source of a code of conduct with which algorithms must comply. To call for the opening of the black box, for transparency and accountability, then, is to seek to institute arrangements that are good, ethical, and normal, and to prevent the transgression of societal norms by the algorithm. Yet, when people gathered to protest on Baltimore streets, or when Facebook users’ data fueled the political and commercial models of Cambridge Analytica (figure I.3), legible rights to peaceable assembly or to electoral due process were not violated primarily by illegible algorithms. Rather, the means by which people could appear in a political forum, the conditions of their appearance, and the capacities they had to make a recognizable political claim in the world were subject to algorithmic regimes of what Michel Foucault calls truth telling and wrongdoing.13 In short, wha

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