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2022 Michigan Negative

Neg - Baltics - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

Neg - Baltics - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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**Neg**
Cyber Advantage
1NC---No Retal
NATO can’t retal!
Rowland Manthorpe 22 [Rowland Manthorpe, 6-28-2022, "Could the Russian cyber attack on Lithuania draw a military response from NATO?", Sky News, https://news.sky.com/story/could-the-russian-cyber-attack-on-lithuania-draw-a-military-response-from-nato-12641986, DOA: 7-18-2022 //ArchanSen]
The Lithuanian government says it is simply enforcing European Union sanctions on goods, but Russia has responded with outrage, saying it is being stopped from accessing its sovereign territory. Russia promised to respond in a way that would "have a serious negative impact on the population of Lithuania". Then, a few days later, came this cyber attack. Does that mean Russia attacked a NATO member? Not so fast. For a start, the group that claimed responsibility denies any connection to the Russian state, saying it is "not affiliated with any law enforcement authorities". The Russian government has long used third-party criminal groups to conduct hacks and cyber attacks, so it would not come as a surprise if it was involved. Nevertheless, on the surface at least, its hands are clean. Then there's the nature of the attack. Reports so far suggest that it's a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, a crude attack which involves throwing huge amounts of traffic at a website until it is forced offline. The attack has been described as "massive", which is technically true, because in order to work a DDoS attack has to be large, but that doesn't mean it will have a massive effect. DDoS attacks are so common that most websites nowadays have protection against them as standard. Even if an attack does work, it won't steal any data. It's a blunt force instrument, little more. Less worrying than we are often led to believe Cyber attacks aren't like physical attacks, where the size of the damage roughly corresponds to the size of the assault. Online, being "massive" doesn't really mean that much. Ditto "intense", another word used to describe the attack. This is one reason why, for all the frightening rhetoric that surrounds them, many experts believe that cyber attacks are generally much less worrying than we are often led to believe.
Cyber---No Nuke War
No nuclear escalation. They don’t benefit from it.
Lanoszka 19 [Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo. Previously, he taught at City, University of London and has held fellowships at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dartmouth College. His research on alliance politics, theories of war, and European security has appeared in International Security, Security Studies, International Affairs, Survival, and other academic journals. He holds a PhD from Princeton University; 8-21-2019; "Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance in the Baltic Region"; No Publication; https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.22/; KL]
Would Nuclear Coercion Be Effective Against the Baltic Countries and NATO?
Russian attempts at nuclear blackmail will likely be ineffective. First, as many analysts point out, Russia does not need to use nuclear weapons in order to conquer the Baltics. The force ratios already heavily favor it, even with NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence being regionally deployed since 2017 (Lanoszka & Hunzeker 2019; Shlapak & Johnson 2016). Second, threats to use nuclear weapons lack believability. Not only would it deepen Russia’s isolated international status, it would also most likely precipitate the very thing that Russia would prefer to avoid: greater involvement by the United States. Why would it risk its own complete destruction for the sake of taking three Baltic countries, especially when Kaliningrad already gives it access to the Baltic Sea? Third, a sudden move against the Baltic countries would be offensive in nature. It would not involve Russia having its back up against the wall. If the United States were to attack Russia, then nuclear weapons use could be expected. As stated earlier, Russia would be peculiar if it allowed hostile forces to attack it successfully using conventional military weapons.
MAD.
Lanoszka 19 [Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo. Previously, he taught at City, University of London and has held fellowships at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dartmouth College. His research on alliance politics, theories of war, and European security has appeared in International Security, Security Studies, International Affairs, Survival, and other academic journals. He holds a PhD from Princeton University; 8-21-2019; "Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance in the Baltic Region"; No Publication; https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.22/; KL]
Implications for Baltic Security
Given these parameters of the security environment in the Baltic region, what are the prospects of nuclear coercion? Recall the three points made earlier. First, escaping MAD is extremely difficult and costly. Even when the United States enjoyed nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, its leaders did not believe that they were invulnerable to a devastating riposte. Second, leaders might still think that they can leverage coercive advantages from their nuclear weapons. Third, despite these beliefs, nuclear coercion does not have a good track record, with its effectiveness highest when the circumstances are defensive and extreme.
Can Russia Escape MAD?
Russia would face tremendous hurdles if it were to try to overcome MAD. To do so, its current modernization program would be inadequate since it would need to launch a bolt-from-the-blue first strike against all three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad. Specifically, Russia would have to enhance its submarine warfare capabilities significantly in order to track and to kill American (and British) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines that could launch SLBMs against Russian targets. It would need capabilities for destroying hardened ICBM sites located across the United States and striking airbases before nuclear-armed bombers can take off. It would also need to develop a sophisticated air defense system to destroy any incoming long-range, stand-off nuclear missiles that the United States is hoping to get for those bombers. In a strategic exchange, Russia must achieve all of these tasks before U.S. nuclear weapons rain down on Russian cities and military sites. Since the 1970s at least, the United States has been developing impressive counterforce capabilities due to improvements in remote sensing, guidance systems, data processing, communication, and other computing technologies (Lieber & Press 2017: 18–32). That Britain and France have their own nuclear arsenals also complicates Russian targeting.
Escaping MAD does not appear to be a goal behind the motivation of Russia’s modernization program (Podvig 2018). To the contrary, Russian military strategists are acutely aware of their country’s inferiority relative to the United States and NATO. As chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov recognized in the early 1980s that a revolution in military affairs was afoot. Conventional weapons gained effectiveness thanks to advances in guidance systems and information processing. He and his colleagues began to appreciate that Warsaw Pact forces could soon lose their long-held advantages with regard to the conventional balance (Adamsky 2010: 28–32). The Cold War ended within a decade and Russia oversaw the rapid deterioration of its armed forces throughout the 1990s. The modernization programs overseen by Putin and his defense ministers have served to rectify the neglect during those years (Renz 2016). Nevertheless, Russian military theorists write extensively of the unfavorable strategic balance. Retired General Makhmut Gareev (2016), current Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (2014), S. G. Chekinov, and S. A. Bogdanov (2011), and current Commander of the Western Military District A. V. Kartapolov (2015) have all opined how Russia has lagged behind the United States and the West in its ability to fight non-traditional wars – that is, wars in which information and proxy conflicts play major roles.
Cyber---No Baltics War
No Baltic war.
SIAS 22 [Dragonfly's Security Intelligence & Analysis Service (SIAS); 3-28-2022; "Baltics"; Dragonfly Intelligence; https://www.dragonflyintelligence.com/news/baltics-impacts-of-ukraine-conflict/; KL]
In particular, they have asked us what the likelihood is of Russia invading Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, and to a lesser degree what the likely knock-on effects are on these countries from a prolonged conflict in Ukraine.
Our top line forecasts for the Baltic states are as follows:
It is highly unlikely that Russia will initiate an invasion of any of the Baltic states in coming months, particularly while its military is engaged in Ukraine.
At more than 300km at their closest, it is very unlikely that the fighting in Ukraine will lead to any inadvertent military escalation or accident in the Baltic states.
There is a reasonable chance of a military accident in countries directly bordering Ukraine involving NATO and Russian forces, but we anticipate that both would seek to de-escalate quickly in this event.
In the longer term, citizens in the Baltics are highly likely to feel the brunt of Western sanctions and Russia’s economic retaliation, with high gas prices and drops in trade volume directly impacting businesses and households.
Zero means or motive.
SIAS 22 [Dragonfly's Security Intelligence & Analysis Service (SIAS); 3-28-2022; "Baltics"; Dragonfly Intelligence; https://www.dragonflyintelligence.com/news/baltics-impacts-of-ukraine-conflict/; KL]
Military implications
Our interstate conflict risk ratings for the Baltic states are low. All three are NATO members, and so the rest of the alliance are bound to them by Article 5 on collective defence. Russia has shown little to no aggressive intent or presented any kind of genuine military threat towards the Baltics in recent years, nor since the invasion of Ukraine. And with a significant proportion of its forces now inside Ukraine (and sustaining major casualties), Russia probably lacks the resources to commit an invasion-scale force to the Baltics, at least any time soon.
No chance of accidents.
SIAS 22 [Dragonfly's Security Intelligence & Analysis Service (SIAS); 3-28-2022; "Baltics"; Dragonfly Intelligence; https://www.dragonflyintelligence.com/news/baltics-impacts-of-ukraine-conflict/; KL]
The proximity of Russian airstrikes and anti-aircraft fire to Ukraine’s borders with Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (all NATO members) means there is a risk of a military accident there, albeit a low one. Our three main scenarios for such an event include a Russian military aircraft violating NATO airspace, Russia striking a NATO country-flagged vessel in the Black Sea, and Russian projectiles fired in Ukraine landing in NATO territory (see P-14-03-22-EU/EA-1 for a detailed breakdown of these scenarios).
Of these, a Russian aircraft crossing into NATO airspace is the most likely to affect the Baltic states. Russian jets often made such incursions prior to the conflict, prompting NATO to start the Baltic Air Policing initiative in 2004. We have not seen reports of any incursion there since the invasion. But even if such an incident happened, we anticipate that their militaries would refrain from shooting a Russian aircraft down and only scramble their jets to escort it away. This is what Hungary did when an unidentified military drone from Ukraine crossed its airspace on 10 March.
Even if any of these scenarios occurred, we still anticipate NATO and Russia would very probably try to prevent tensions from escalating into a wider conflict. But it is likely that NATO would deploy more forces on its eastern flank and member states in the region adopt some emergency measures, with potential operational impacts for organisations based there. In the absence of precedent, we assess that this would plausibly range from military deployments temporarily disrupting operations at airports, increased checks on goods and people on the borders, up to national states of emergency and closures of airspace.
Russia won’t use ethnic justifications.
SIAS 22 [Dragonfly's Security Intelligence & Analysis Service (SIAS); 3-28-2022; "Baltics"; Dragonfly Intelligence; https://www.dragonflyintelligence.com/news/baltics-impacts-of-ukraine-conflict/; KL]
One outlier scenario that clients have raised with us relates to Moscow alleging violations of the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltics to justify a military intervention. This is what it did ahead of the invasion of Ukraine in February, as well as in Crimea in 2014. Russian speakers account for around 34% of the population in Latvia, 30% in Estonia, and 8% in Lithuania. But we assess that this scenario is extremely unlikely at this stage. Russia’s influence over Russian ethnic minorities in the Baltics has declined in recent years, particularly after the authorities shut several Russian-language media outlets after 2014.
Modeling Advantage
SQ Solves
SQ Solves
Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania 2021 (06/18/2021, “Baltic energy security issues at the centre of US attention” https://enmin.lrv.lt/en/news/baltic-energy-security-issues-at-the-centre-of-us-attention)
“Strengthening energy sector cybersecurity preparedness remains a national security priority for all countries,” said Vice-Minister of Energy Albinas Zananavičius at the second meeting of the transatlantic high-level working group that took place on 15-17 June in Washington, DC (USA). According to Mr Zananavičius, the need to focus efforts on strengthening competencies in this area is confirmed by the still frequent cases of attacks by hostile countries against national energy infrastructure. This working group for strengthening cooperation between the United States and European countries in the field of energy cybersecurity was established during the second meeting of the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) that was held in Vilnius in 2019. The working group is chaired by Lithuania and the United States, and other member nations – Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria and Croatia – participate in its activities. “Cyber-attacks on energy infrastructure are a cross-border threat. They pose equally serious concern about the security of our energy infrastructure on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, we must work together by sharing both good practices and lessons learned in this area,” said Mr Zananavičius, inviting the countries participating in the working group to continue the work started. One example of a cyber-threat is the attack on a top US fuel supplier a month ago. Progress in implementing the working group’s action plan was also discussed during the meeting. The countries mutually agreed that the Cyber Strike Workshop held by experts from the US Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory this March-April was very useful in strengthening the cyber security competencies of experts working in the energy sector. This is one of the first examples of successful collaboration in this format. The members of the working group agreed to continue their cooperation in implementing the objectives set out in the action plan. For example, one of the most important goals for Lithuania and the other Baltic States is to strengthen cyber security capabilities for their synchronisation with the continental European network. During the visit, Mr Zananavičius also met with representatives of the US Administration, Department of Energy, State Department and Congress, as well as with energy companies operating in the field of liquefied natural gas and green energy technologies such as hydrogen. During the meetings, the Vice-Minister of Energy presented the energy security situation in the region and Lithuania’s goals in strengthening energy independence and security. US representatives reaffirmed their support for Lithuania in pursuing greater energy independence and energy security. The US will continue to support energy security issues in Europe that require special attention, including natural gas diversification and Nord Stream 2, as well as nuclear safety in the EU neighbourhood.
No modeling
Rehighlighting ---- No modeling, their ev says so
Dana 7-12 (Joseph, Joseph Dana is the former senior editor of Exponential View, a weekly newsletter about technology and its impact on society. He was also the editor-in-chief of emerge85, a lab exploring change in emerging markets and its global impact. Masters in European History/Jewish Philosophy @ Central European University. “Cyberattacks in Baltics foreshadow future of war”, https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/cyberattacks-in-baltics-foreshadow-future-of-war/)LR
As the fighting in Ukraine drags on, another conflict is taking shape elsewhere on Russia’s periphery. This borderless conflict is aimed at destabilizing the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but can and likely will expand to engulf others. Last month, Lithuanian government and public service Web portals were hit by a sustained cyberattack from Russian hackers. The attack was a response to Lithuanian enforcement of a European Union sanctions package on goods traveling to and from Kaliningrad, a Russian territory located between Lithuania and Poland. In taking responsibility for the attack, Russian hackers promised that more would be forthcoming. “The attack will continue until Lithuania lifts the blockade,” a spokesman for the group told Reuters. “We have demolished 1,652 Web resources. And that’s just so far.” The Baltic states have been on the front lines of cyber warfare for decades. As the first countries to establish independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, they have remained decidedly anti-Russian in their posture and thus have borne the brunt of Russia’s increasingly sophisticated cyber offensive. In 2007, the Estonian parliament, several ministries, media institutions, and banks suffered a series of severe cyberattacks over the country’s stance on relocating a Soviet-era monument in the capital Tallinn. Officials in the Baltics viewed the attack as a precursor to an offensive that could knock out power grids and make the country in essence ungovernable. The severity of the offensive, which lasted 22 days, forced Estonia to set up measures to insulate the country from digital warfare. The approach was simple: Put as many government services and systems on private, secure networks and beef up cybersecurity. Such a model wouldn’t work in every country. Still, given their small sizes and large information-technology sectors, the Baltic states offer a blueprint for how cybersecurity systems can be built to withstand the vulnerabilities of our technological age. The silver lining of this defensive posture is that Baltic citizens live in digital republics, as The New Yorker once described Estonia. By investing in complex digital infrastructure, the Estonian government enables citizens and residents to conduct most of their lives online. They can sign and access virtually all government services digitally using their unique Estonian digital identity, a system that was established in 2002. Countries in the Middle East, such as the United Arab Emirates and Israel, are paying particular attention to how the shifting contours of cyber warfare and defense strategies unfold. Whatever happens, cyberattacks will define the future of conflict, and the steps taken by the Baltic states to defend against Russian aggression should be watched closely for clues on how that future will play out.
EU
EU-NATO P3 CP---1NC
EU-NATO-P3 solvency advocate
Lété and Pernik 17. Bruno Lété is a senior fellow for Security and Defense Policy in the Brussels office of The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Piret Pernik is a research fellow at the International Centre for Defence an

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