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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - State Partnership Program CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

AT - State Partnership Program CP - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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AFF
2AC---Theory
Reject 50-state fiat on NATO topic-
1---Topic education –
A. Distracts from “security cooperation” key debates.
B. We already had two domestic policy topics in a row, no new education.
2---Fairness – no comparative solvency evidence, aff literature doesn’t assume uniform state foreign policy.
3---Illogical. No judge controls both FG and states. AND, their interp allows any-non FG actor, which leads to object and abuse international fiat
2AC---Solvency---Oversight
SPP fails---confusion and lack of oversight render the program ineffective.
GAO, 12 (United States Government Accountability Office, May 2012, accessed on 7-3-2022, “Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners”, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-548-highlights.pdf, HBisevac)
Many State Partnership Program stakeholders, including State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and combatant command officials, cited benefits to the program, but the program lacks a comprehensive oversight framework that includes clear program goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress against those goals, which limits the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and Congress’ ability to assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources. The benefits described by all stakeholders focused on the program’s contributions to meeting their specific missions, such as building security relationships, providing experience to guardsmen, and supporting combatant commands’ missions. Goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress are necessary for management oversight, and National Guard Bureau officials told GAO that they recognize the need to update the program’s goals and develop metrics and have initiated efforts in these areas. Officials expect completion of these efforts in summer 2012. Until program goals and metrics are implemented, DOD cannot fully assess or adequately oversee the program.
State Partnership Program activity data are incomplete as well as inconsistent and funding data are incomplete for fiscal years 2007 through 2011; therefore GAO cannot provide complete information on the types and frequency of activities or total funding amounts for those years. GAO found that the multiple data systems used to track program activities and funding are not interoperable and users apply varying methods and definitions to guide data inputs. The terminology used to identify activity types is inconsistent across the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau. Further, funding data from the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commands were incomplete, and while the National Guard Bureau provided its total spending on the program since 2007, it could not provide information on the cost of individual activities. Although the National Guard Bureau has initiated efforts to improve the accuracy of its own State Partnership Program data, without common agreement with the combatant commands on what types of data need to be tracked and how to define activities, the data cannot be easily reconciled across databases.
The most prominent challenge cited by State Partnership Program stakeholders involved how to fund activities that include U.S. and foreign partner civilian participants. Activities involving civilians, for example, have included subjectmatter expert exchanges on military support to civil authorities and maritime border security. Although DOD guidance does not prohibit civilian involvement in activities, many stakeholders have the impression that the U.S. military is not permitted to engage civilians in State Partnership Program activities and some states may have chosen not to conduct any events with civilians due to the perception that it may violate DOD guidance. DOD and the National Guard Bureau are working on developing additional guidance and training in this area. Until these efforts are completed, confusion may continue to exist and hinder the program’s full potential to fulfill National Guard and combatant command missions.
2AC---Solvency---Fails
SPP fails
Dickerson 13, Lieutenant Colonel @ US National Guard (Jeffrey, “Shifting State Partnership Program Resources to the Asia-Pacific Region,” US Army War College, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589403.pdf)//BB
Some critics come from Congress, who raised concerns over SPP’s effectiveness, conformity to federal law, nesting with TSCPs, and encroachment upon or conflicts with DoS and USAID interests, responsibilities, and programs.48 In a 2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, congressional researchers noted that the program suffers from written assessments “limited in scope” and focused on “outputs… rather than outcomes”49 The report also noted that “the SPP has no dedicated statute authority”50 of its own and uses several different statues within United States Code (U.S.C.) to authorize SPP activities. These statues range from Title 10 U.S.C. (Armed Forces), to Title 32 U.S.C. (National Guard), to Title 22 U.S.C. (Foreign Relations and Intercourse).51 The 2011 CRS report provided several options for Congress to consider: (1) consider a Directive Type Memorandum regarding SPP funding, (2) direct periodic evaluations, (3) require centralized approval of SPP activities, and (4) codify the SPP in law. 52 Still, the report acknowledged SPP’s ability to build enduring relationships; capitalize upon unique civilian skill sets of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen and the dual state and federal status of the National Guard; remain engaged with high and low priority nations; and develop unique relationships between states and foreign countries.53 Despite the issues outlined in the CRS’s report, a 15 subsequent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report characterized the SPP as “a force enabler for the combatant commands”. 54 In May 2012, the GAO conducted an investigation into SPP and found several problems. They identified a lack of comprehensive oversight that clearly defined and outlined the program’s goals, objectives, and measures of performance. There was insufficient data available for an assessment, to include management of funding from 2007-2011, multiple data management systems, inconsistent program terminology between the GCCs and National Guard Bureau (NGB), and challenges with funding civilian participation in the program.55 The GAO, therefore, found that neither Congress nor the DoD can quantitatively assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.56 Thus, the GAO made the following recommendations to the DoD in May 2012: develop an oversight process to measure program effectiveness and standardize data management; develop specific guidance for funding civilian participation in the program; and develop additional training for SPP Coordinators and Bi-Lateral Affairs Officers.57 In an effort to address the Congressional concerns, NGB began implementing a more formal process for assessing the program’s goals, and tracking program funding in accordance with the recommendations in the GAO’s report. NGB has also initiated a more comprehensive and formal training process for Bi-Lateral Affairs Officers and SPP Coordinators, 58 but the ability to quantitatively assess the program has yet to be Reached.
2AC---NB---DoD
Funds come from the same place.
Megan Lambert, 21 (Megan Lambert, Captain, United States Air Force BA from Colorado State University and MLS from University of Denver, March 2021, accessed on 7-1-2022, Calhoun, The Naval Post Graduate School Institutional Archive, “THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: IMPROVING SECURITY COOPERATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN CRISIS RESPONSE”, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/67147/21Mar_Lambert_Megan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, HBisevac) NGB = National Guard Bureau
Historically, the SPP has faced issues stemming from the way in which the program is funded and how funding interacts with program management and manning. This section will detail the intricacies of SPP funding and how it creates challenges in meeting national security cooperation objectives. The SPP is managed by the NGB, and the stable-state program management personnel are sourced from the NG. However, engagements with Partner Nations are funded through COCOM Operations and Maintenance (OM) funds. Significantly, the NG personnel must be on active duty (Title 10) orders when they participate in engagements overseas. Thus, a problem in funding is created when moving personnel from Title 32 to Title 10 status, as the care and feeding of these personnel is not captured within OM funds, nor is it accounted for in authorizations under traditional NGB funding streams. Furthermore, engagements are designed to meet specific objectives, which are associated with different authorities. Therefore, any “activity that relies on multiple security cooperation authorities must comply with all legal and policy requirements for each authority relied on, and use the appropriate funding for each authority.”55 The intricacies of complex engagements spanning multiple objectives complicate planning and manning the activities appropriately in order to utilize the best personnel available to optimize each engagement.
Links to tradeoff---requires DoD personnel who are working on other SC activities
CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB
Much of the management of State Partnership Program (SPP) activities is handled by SPP coordinators assigned to each state’s National Guard headquarters, and by military officers assigned full-time to the U.S. Embassy accredited to the partner nation ‒ normally from the state National Guard involved in the partnership ‒ whose duty description includes coordinating SPP and often other Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities. The combatant commands (CCMDs) manage the latter group, providing for their pay and performance evaluations. These officers serve in a Title 10 status, typically hold the rank of captain through lieutenant colonel, but have different titles and tours of duty depending on the CCMD to which they are assigned. For example, officers serving in embassies within the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) are known as bilateral affairs officers (BAOs) and serve two-year tours, which can be extended. Those in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR are known as traditional combatant commander’s activities (TCAs) coordinators and are usually on six-month temporary duty assignments, which can be extended. In nations without a BAO, TCA, or similar officer, the state’s SPP coordinator travels to the partner nation to coordinate SPP activities. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) would prefer to have a BAO, TCA, or similar officer stationed at the U.S. Embassy for each of the 73 partnerships, and it is currently working on a plan to fund this.
2AC---NB---PTX
Links to politics. Requires Congressional funding.
Dickerson 13, Lieutenant Colonel @ US National Guard (Jeffrey, “Shifting State Partnership Program Resources to the Asia-Pacific Region,” US Army War College, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589403.pdf)//BB
The primary deterrent to SPP expansion within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as within other geographic regions, is lack of adequate funding. NGB currently receives a congressional funding allocation of $13,000,000 total for all 65 state partnerships.73 This essentially equates to $200,000 per partnership annually. Additionally, each new partnership costs approximately $830,000 initially.74 Based upon an expectation that congressional funding will remain at the current level for the next ten years, NGB currently forecasts expansion of the program at the rate of two countries per year over the course of the next ten years.75 Regrettably, this forecasted growth rate does not immediately take full advantage of the maximum partnering capacity of the National Guard. NGB estimates full partnering capacity of all 54 states and territories to be 85 partnerships.76 At the forecasted growth rate of two partnerships per year, it will take a full decade for the U.S. to maximize the full potential of the SPP. In order to take full advantage of the states’ maximum partnering capacity, DoD should immediately expand the program by 20 additional partnerships. Congress would need to increase the funding for the SPP from its current allocation of $13,000,000 to $26,600,000 initially in order to fund the initial partnership start-up costs, followed by an increase in annual funding of $4,000,000 thereafter for a total yearly funding of $17,000,000 annually to maintain 85 state partnerships.
2AC---INB---Non-Unique
NU---SPP high now
CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB
For more than 20 years, the National Guard has played an integral role in international security cooperation. Through the State Partnership Program (SPP) – which has grown from 13 partnerships with the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s to 73 partnerships today across all six geographic combatant commands (CCMDs) – the National Guard has contributed to the accomplishment of the U.S. national security objectives by developing and sustaining enduring relationships around the world.
2AC---INB---Soft Power Defense
Soft-power is either resilient or everything else that Trump has done thumps.
Brands 2018 - Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (Hal, "Not Even Trump Can Obliterate America's Soft Power," Jan 18, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-18/not-even-trump-can-obliterate-america-s-soft-power)
Third, Trump has weakened American soft power through his own behavior. He is hardly the only president to say loathsome things, but he is unique in displaying his unattractive qualities so openly, so unembarrassedly, so repeatedly. The president’s use of racist and xenophobic appeals, his disdain for democratic norms, his generally crass style of rhetoric and action — all these characteristics have been dragging down global respect for America since the moment he took office. The outraged global reaction to the “shithole countries” incident was sadly familiar — it mimicked the criticism the president earned through his refusal to condemn white supremacists after the violence last summer in Charlottesville, Virginia, as well as several other episodes. There is no ambiguity about the effect this is having. As early as June 2017, America’s global favorability in the Pew poll of global attitudes and trends had dropped from 64 percent at the end of Barack Obama’s presidency to 49 percent under Trump. Large majorities of global respondents described the American president as “intolerant,” “arrogant” and “dangerous.” Even Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin — ambitious dictators of revisionist countries — had higher personal favorability ratings than Trump. As Trump’s own defense secretary, James Mattis, has remarked, the U.S. needs to “get the power of inspiration back.” That’s not going to happen as long as Trump is president. The real question is how long it will take American soft power to recover once he departs. The good news is that U.S. soft power has traditionally been quite resilient — it has survived globally unpopular presidents before. The reason for this, as the Harvard scholar Joseph Nye points out, is that over the long term U.S. soft power derives less from the image of any individual than from the broader attractiveness of America’s society, culture and political values. The bad news, however, is that Trump can nonetheless do damage that will not be so easy to repair. As Nicholas Burns and Ryan Crocker, two of America’s most distinguished diplomats, have noted, the brain drain affecting the State Department today will have a lasting effect on America’s ability to exert non-military power effectively, because the department is losing so many individuals with experience that takes years or even decades to develop. (The fact that applications for entry-level spots in the Foreign Service are also down will make replacing that expertise all the harder.) More problematic still, even if Trump does not succeed in making the U.S. a less tolerant, less democratic, less attractive society, he may affect global views of America even after he leaves office. Once Trump is gone, most governments and populations around the world will probably breathe a sigh of relief. But they won’t forget that Americans elected such an individual as its president, and they will surely wonder what that says about the judgment and the character of the nation that has long claimed to be the “last, best hope of mankind.” Most of the countries the U.S. has traditionally worked with will be eager for their relationships with the superpower to get back to normal. Yet they will have seen what the U.S. electoral system is capable of producing, and so it will be a long time before the world ever looks at America quite the same way again.
Soft power is irrelevant to leadership.
Fedirka 2017 - Senior Analyst @ Geopolitical Futures (Allison, "Hard Power is Still King," Jul 20, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/hard-power-still-king/)
Soft Power Doesn’t Make Great Powers Nevertheless, many remain fixated on soft power. Just this week, a U.K.-based consultancy firm called Portland, in cooperation with the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, published a report ranking the world’s top 30 countries by soft power. The ranking is based on the composite score of soft power elements: culture, digital footprint, government, engagement, education and business/enterprise. The first thing that stands out is that European countries dominate the list, and these countries outrank others that are geopolitical heavyweights. Ireland outranks Russia, and Greece is above China. In fact, Russia, China and Turkey are all in the bottom six of this top-30 ranking. That two small European countries are considered more powerful than three much larger countries – countries that are major geopolitical centers of gravity – should automatically raise questions about the credibility of soft power. A second observation is that most of the countries at the top of the soft power ranking – France, the U.K., the U.S. and Germany – are also among the world leaders in hard power. The U.S. has regularly demonstrated that through hard power measures such as sanctions or military activity, it can coerce other countries to change their behavior. Germany is the economic powerhouse of the European Union and has threatened economic measures against smaller EU countries, especially Greece, to coerce them into supporting EU regulations. France’s cultural influence – a component of soft power – does have global reach, but the foundation for this cultural influence was colonization, a product of hard power. Soft power reads well on paper, but its dependence on persuasion makes it largely inconsequential in the world of geopolitics, whereas hard power dictates reality and the course of events.
Too many alt causes to soft power swamp their internal links.
Betley 2017 - studied philosophy, politics, and economics at St. Olaf College (Alexander M, "The decline of American soft power - will it persist after Trump?," Oct 6, https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2017/10/decline-american-soft-power-will-it-persist-after-trump)
Turmoil, disengagement But today, as noted by Mattis, the turmoil associated with domestic political discord, as well as a disengagement with the international community on key issues

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