Neg - Information Warfare - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ
Neg - Information Warfare - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ.docx
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***INFO WARFARE NEG*** The information warfare aff and neg was produced by: Drew Chico; Cyrus Esmailzadeh; Maggie Howerton; Sarah Kwon; Lenox Leverett; Raleigh Maxwell; Avi Shah; Ahsan Tahirkheli; Cy Turner Topicality T-Cybersecurity 1NC---T Cyberattacks Cybersecurity means protecting and recovering networks from cyberattacks. Alison Grace Johansen 22, writer for Norton, an American software company, “What is Cyber Security? What you need to know.” Norton, 4/28/22, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-cybersecurity-what-you-need-to-know.htmlhttps://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-cybersecurity-what-you-need-to-know.html//Wompus Cyber security is the state or process of protecting and recovering networks, devices, and programs from any type of cyberattack. Cyberattacks are an evolving danger to organizations, employees, and consumers. These attacks may be designed to access or destroy sensitive data or extort money. They can, in effect, destroy businesses and damage your financial and personal lives — especially if you’re the victim of identity theft. Cyberattacks also are on the rise. According to an Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) 2021 annual data breach report, there was a 68 percent increase in reported U.S. data compromises from 2020 to 2021. Moreover, breaches related to cyberattacks represented more attacks than all other forms. What’s your best defense? A strong cyber security system has multiple layers of protection that are spread across computers, devices, networks, and programs. This guide can help you decide if you need one of the cyber security plans offered by companies, and which kind may be right for you. However, a strong cyber security system doesn’t rely solely on cyber defense technology; it also relies on people like you making smart cyber defense choices. The good news is that you don’t need to be a cyber security specialist to understand and practice good cyber defense tactics. This article can help. Cyberattacks are operations to destroy and disrupt the operation of a network---excludes disinformation schemes Qinghui Liu 21, researcher at Zaozhang University in Shandong, China, “A comprehensive review study of cyber-attacks and cyber-security; emerging trends and recent developments.” Science Direct, November 2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484721007289#! Vote neg for limits and ground---it outweighs precision---including non-offensive cyber-operations explode the topic and dodge core generics. 2NC---Intent to exclude Cybersecurity refers to info and cyber operations---preventing disinformation is neither. Eneken Tikk and Mike Kertutten 20, Executive Producer of the Cyber Policy Institute, Estonia, and lead of the 1nternat10nal Law project at CPI and the Erik Castrén Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland, and Director of Strategy at the Cyber Policy Institute, and Senior Research Scientist at the Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, “Routledge Handbook of International Cybersecurity,” published in 2020 by Routledge Since this is a handbook of cybersecurity, the relationship between the concepts information operation and cyber operations deserves special attention here. The main difference between the concepts is that cyber operations are method-driven whereas information operations are purpose-driven. Cyber operations refer to actions conveyed in or via cyberspace. Information operations, on the other hand, are defined by the objective of affecting decision-making or opinion. This conceptual relationship has only been explicit in the US military doctrine since 2013 (United States Joint Staff, 2013, p. I-5). In the light of this conceptual relationship, the two concepts effectively intersect: information operations are realized by cyber operations. An example of the intersection is the alleged Russian influence on the US presidential elections in 2016, in which cyber methods were deployed to collect the information needed in the information operations against Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. Disinformation is often associated with information operations, with the connection between disinformation and propaganda being thoroughly discussed in the literature on the latter. Even if the common perception of propaganda often assumes that it is based on lies, disinformation is not a defining characteristic of propaganda. Indeed, disinformation is often avoided in propaganda in order to preserve its credibility. Following the established relationship between disinformation and propaganda, we exclude disinformation as a defining characteristic of our definition of information operations, even if it may be regarded as a method in the process. 2NC 2NC---Cyberattacks = Damage or Destroy A cyberattack means to damage or destroy a network---not spreading false information. Oxford ND Oxford Dictionary, “Cyberattack,” https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/cyberattack#:~:text=%2F%CB%88sa%C9%AAb%C9%99r%C9%99t%C3%A6k%2F,information%20on%20it%20without%20permission an attempt by hackers to damage or destroy a computer network or system. Disads DOD Tradeoff Link---scale up Moderation tech is impossible to scale up or requires robust infrastructure changes. Valerie Wirtschafter 21, senior data analyst in the Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies Initiative at the Brookings Institution, 8-25-2021, "The challenge of detecting misinformation in podcasting," https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-challenge-of-detecting-misinformation-in-podcasting/, cy A research agenda The potential for misinformation to go largely unchecked on podcasts is clear. But what is the scale of this problem? To explore that question, I recently examined more than 8,000 episodes of popular political podcasts. By using machine learning and natural language processing to match transcriptions of the podcasts with a fact-checking database of false or misleading political claims, I found that more than one-tenth of the episodes shared potentially false information.[1] These flagged episodes have collectively received more than 100 million views, likes, or comments. This false content spans a wide range of topics in U.S. politics, from immigration (e.g., the idea that most DACA recipients are “hardened criminals”) to elections (e.g., that “eight Iowa counties have more adults registered to vote than voting age adults living”) to abortion (e.g., that Democrats “position on abortion is now so extreme that they don’t mind executing babies after birth”). These sharing patterns often spike around key political events, such as the 2020 election, and have become more common over time. The research project is ongoing and will expand to cover both more podcasts and more types of misinformation, including claims that have been linked to foreign influence operations. But for now, these early results indicate that popular political podcasts are serving as an important vector for the proliferation of misinformation. Policy implications Based on my preliminary research, the spread of false material via podcasts represents an underappreciated problem that will require infrastructure-level changes distinct from content moderation policies already in place on social media platforms. Unlike other forms of media in the iPhone age, podcasts are more difficult to moderate due to limitations with respect to audience engagement and the nature of podcast distribution mechanisms. Consider the role of the consumer in policing content. Like Facebook or Twitter, podcast distributors largely rely on the “crowd” to identify objectionable content, but the process for reporting this material as a listener is not straightforward. Apple’s podcasting app allows users to report concerns about episodes, but the reporting tool only provides a limited number of concerns to choose from, none of which encompass false or misleading content. Where Apple does specify guidelines about inaccurate or misleading content, these largely relate to podcast metadata and copyright issues. At present, Spotify provides no obvious way for users to report issues with specific episodes and only vaguely delineates content that is prohibited on the platform. The decisions made by Apple and Spotify ultimately have downstream effects across the industry. Most of the smaller players in the field lack the financial resources to carry out extensive content moderation and look to larger companies like Apple and Spotify to determine what should be removed. In making it difficult (or all but impossible) for users to report misinformation, Spotify and Apple effectively remove the crowd from helping curb the spread of false or misleading content. Tackling misinformation in podcasts may require reincorporating the audience in some capacity—from enabling users to comment or leave reviews on specific episodes to further experimenting with ways to transform podcasting into a conversation between the creator and the audience. From an infrastructure perspective, the nature of the RSS feed, which is open-sourced and accessible by design, represents a significant hurdle for content moderation. For example, Apple’s podcasting app—one of the most widely used apps for streaming episodes—aggregates content across thousands of approved RSS feeds. Once Apple approves a feed, it does not control the content added to these feeds. Although Apple can remove the RSS feed from its platform, some smaller platforms allow any content on an RSS feed to be played through their services, making it easy for listeners to access a removed podcast elsewhere. As a result, a content moderation decision at one platform, like removing a single episode urging listeners not to get a COVID vaccine, may not affect its availability via other platforms. Addressing the moderation of misleading material instead requires a fundamental rethinking of the broader podcast infrastructure. This latter infrastructure-level change will be difficult to implement but is fundamental to addressing the risks associated with the spread of misinformation. The spread of online misinformation has already demonstrated its ability to undermine deliberative democracies, and podcasts represent an underappreciated avenue through which such information proliferates. Internationally, misinformation shared via podcasts may resonate with and be amplified by foreign actors intent on sowing discord in U.S. politics. As a first step, it is critical to understand the scope of this problem in order to identify appropriate policy solutions to address the spread of misinformation within the unique contours of the podcasting space. Link---investigations Misinformation investigations are a money suck Victoria Smith and, Natalie Thompson 20, Security Officer at Group-IB, research analyst with the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 12-7-2020, "Survey on Countering Influence Operations Highlights Steep Challenges, Great Opportunities," https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/12/07/survey-on-countering-influence-operations-highlights-steep-challenges-great-opportunities-pub-83370, cy LACK OF FUNDING Almost 40 percent of respondents in the community survey cited a lack of funding as the most or second-most important challenge. In the targeted survey, six respondents also emphasized the precariousness of funding. The PCIO’s research has found that many organizations working to research or counter influence operations are nonprofit, heavily reliant on donations and grants. It is therefore not surprising that funding is a concern, given the growth in new initiatives in this field and increasing competition for the same funding. One community leader was concerned that long-term funding insecurities are having a detrimental impact on output; without funding security, decisions about recruitment and training cannot be made. Another leader was concerned that financial challenges might incentivize research organizations to compromise their independence or methodological rigor in an effort to attract resources and attention. A third respondent suggested that donors want reassurances of results in return for their money, but in a field with so many unknowns, it can be hard to promise results. The respondent had the impression that some donors are more drawn to headline-grabbing claims of successful interference in political campaigns or persuasive conspiracy theories and that this leaves fewer resources for research on under-the-radar issues and long-term investigations that have no guarantee of success. Another respondent also noted that investigations tend to be skewed toward retrospective analysis of known influence operations instead of prospective experiments. The latter analysis is more expensive and uncertain but could reveal deeper insights. Link---reach calculation Even calculating reach of misinformation is a resource drain. Clare Wardle and Nic Dias 18, U.S. Director of First Draft, Joint Doctoral Student in Communication and Political Science https://mediawell.ssrc.org/2018/10/30/10-questions-to-ask-before-covering-misinformation/?pdf=49652, cy When should we publish stories about mis- and dis-information? How much traffic should a piece of mis- and dis-information have before we address it? In other words, what is the “tipping point,” and how do we measure it? On Twitter, for example, do we check whether a hashtag made it to a country’s top 10 trending topics? How do we think about the impact of mis- and dis-information, particularly on Twitter? Do we care about how many people see the content? Or do we care about who sees the content? In particular, is Twitter important in virtue of the number of people who use it, or is it important because certain groups, like news organizations and politicians, use it? How do our answers to these questions change how we evaluate the impact of information? How do we isolate human interactions in a computationally affordable manner? When we talk about the “reach” of a piece of content, we should be referring to how many humans saw it. Yet, identifying the number of humans who saw a piece of information can be difficult and computationally expensive. What algorithms might be devised to calculate human reach (at least on Twitter) in a timely and inexpensive way? Link---enforcement Even if the center’s inexpensive, enforcement isn’t. DHS 21, Department of homeland security, “Combatting Targeted Disinformation Campaigns,” https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/phase_ii_-_combatting_targeted_disinformation.pdf, cy An alternative to naming specific domestic threat actors is to alert information consumers to those threat actors who assume fake persona or claim to have credentials which they do not have. The status of the threat actor plays an important role in influencing the perceived trustworthiness of that threat actor.20 Someone who claims to be an epidemiologist will likely be viewed as more reliable on the topic of coronaviruses than a person who claims to be a bus driver. Information consumers who assume fake personas or claim fake credentials to deceive others for illegitimate purposes have no moral or legal standing for protection for their fraud, which is a form of disinformation. Revealing that credentials are fake can be accomplished without identifying the threat actor by name or by other information which can be tied to a specific person. Threat actors who spread disinformation often seem to act with impunity, facing few negative consequences for the harm that they cause. In some circles, their disinformation may enhance their status and generate lucrative opportunities for them due to the attention that they draw. Legal actions against threat actors are available, but limited in number, and invariably costly and time-consuming. In a deeply divided society, shunning and ostracism no longer have the practical import they may have had in earlier generations. The lack of perceived consequences encourages threat actors to continue their activities. We acknowledge the challenges in today’s environment and believe that punitive measures are less effective than measures which provide information about the threat actors upon which information consumers can make better informed decisions. Counterplans DOS/Non-Military Solvency---DOS---Information Warfare The DoS solves---old agencies for countering disinformation were reorganized and placed in the jurisdiction of the DoS and multiple empirics prove. USACPD 20, United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, tasked by Congress with "appraising U.S. Government activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics and to increase the understanding of, and support for, these same activities.” “PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW “OLD” WAR: COUNTERING STATE-SPONSORED DISINFORMATION” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Public-Diplomacy-and-the-New-Old-War-Countering-State-Sponsored-Disinformation.pdf //lenox As we gathered background information for this report, we noticed a pattern: experts and practitioners alike became quick to turn to the past for cues on how to proceed in the future. In fact, the discussion of the historical framework of disinformation as a threat area revealed a common understanding that the challenge of disinformation is “not new.” Several of our interlocutors spoke reverently of the tools of the Cold War and cited the merits of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and, most notably, the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) as successful instruments of PD in countering disinformation.2 However, these experts agreed that they might be over-emphasizing the similarities between the disinformation threat then and now, while perhaps unintentionally underestimating the differences. Much of the apparatus that supported Cold War-era counter disinformation efforts still exists today, albeit in a somewhat disaggregated form. In 1999, USIA closed down as an independent foreign affairs agency. Its information, cultural, and exchange components were integrated into the Department of State as, respectively, the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). Meanwhile, oversight of USIA's regional programs was turned over to the State Department’s geographic bureaus. USIA’s broadcasting components became part of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG–now the U.S. Agency for Global Media, or USAGM). The AMWG was formally disbanded in 1992 with no heir apparent; and at the BBG, the establishment of an independent board of directors removed direct USG editorial oversight and created a firewall between Congress and the independent journalism operations within the VOA and RFE/RL. In addition to the structural changes that have occurred since the integration of USIA functions into the Department of State, the rapid convergence of connection technologies -- the internet, mobile and social networks -- have fundamentally altered the domain in which information competition occurs. About half of the world’s population has access to one another via the combination of internet and social media access and mobile phones, which allow for disintermediated peer-to-peer communication at scale. The global information space is marked by a constant fight for attention, and viewership is determined by complex interactions among algorithms, professional media outlets, corporate brands, and user generated content via apps on mobile devices. As a consequence, modern public diplomacy practitioners find themselves in an environment that offers an overabundance of information—what Joseph Nye presciently described as a “paradox of plenty” that leads to a “scarcity of attention.”3 This shift has irrevocably changed the information environment in which PD officers operate, and it gives an asymmetric advantage to those who would attempt to
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