Neg - Digital Cyclops - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
Neg - Digital Cyclops - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
Indexed text preview
The Digital Cyclops Negative --- BFHR Case 1NC---Policy Debate is Aesthetic The imagination and debate over competing words is artistic, playful, and scholarly simultaneously. Chia, 96. (Robert Chia, University of Stirling. “The Problem of Reflexivity in Organizational Research: Towards a Postmodern Science of Organization” Organization, Volume 3, No. 1, February. SAGE Journals. Online.) One more recent development in organizational theorizing results from taking the problem of reflexivity seriously. Such organizational writers accept that both their own accounts and those generated by others are first and foremost linguistic constructions which operate according to established conventional linguistic codes. Theories of organization are deemed to be self-justifying 'intelligible narratives' which enable a community of inquirers to arrive at some consensus regarding their social experiences. As Gergen (1992) puts it: If there is one theme that unites most of those confronting the postmodern irony, it is a certain sense of ludic humility. The view of knowledge-making as a transcendental pursuit removed from the trivial enthralments of daily life, pristinely rational and transparently virtuous, becomes so much puffery. We should view these bodies of language we call knowledge in a lighter vein-as ways of putting things together, some pretty and others petty. (Gergen, 1992: 215) Hence, 'irony', 'self-reflection' and 'playful seriousness' replace the rational quest for 'certain' or even 'partially true' knowledge of an external organizational reality. For these 'metareflexive' theorists, both the bodyof-knowledge claims in organization theory and their own claims are to be understood in a lighter vein as artistically crafted pieces of work in their own right. Theories generated mirror the concerns and preoccupations of the theorists themselves and do not, as such, claim any absolute, grounded connexion with a reality beyond. Such writers would argue that these crafted pieces of 'linguistic web' contribute to the making of our organizational reality. 1NC---Kroker Wrong Kroker’s thesis is wrong and they devolve into the same humanistic principles he criticizes James Steinhoff 16, The University of Western Ontario, “Exits to the Posthuman Future,” Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2016, p. 533-536 In Exits to the Posthuman Future (2014), Arthur Kroker deploys a mutant strain of Marshall McLuhan’s (McLuhan and McLuhan 1988) medium theory to paint a dark picture of high-technology capitalist societies. At its most dire points this book appears to be an affirmation of Friedrich Nietzsche (1964) and Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) theses that God is dead and meaning is impossible. Advanced technology is the primary cause of this condition, which is the posthuman era. Kroker contends that previous conceptions of the posthuman were misguidedly optimistic and that the posthuman must be grasped as a state of total indeterminacy in which a literally living technology dominates human agency. Yet, there is a tension. Throughout the text there are moments of tangible hope for a traditionally humanistic future and, perplexingly, the book closes with an explicit call to recover the social and ethical values lost in the ravages of capitalism. In the end, it is hard to say what this book is intended to do. Kroker’s dark posthumanist prognosis stands starkly juxtaposed with his latent humanism. Arthur Kroker is a postmodernist Canadian theorist who has been studying the intersections of technology and culture since the mid-1980s. This new book consists of several essays comprised of original material and new versions of previously presented material. It is wide-ranging in topic, roving from drone warfare to Obama’s political rhetoric to media theory. In a high-speed and prolix style that recalls William Gibson’s cyberpunk fiction and the work of McLuhan and Paul Virilio, Kroker sets out a way of thinking about contemporary high-technological society' that follows the McLuhanian insistence on the constant and unavoidable influence of media on humans—but inverts it. The theoretical linchpin of this text is the “dark tetrad” (p. 25), Kroker’s inversion of McLuhan’s four laws of media. McLuhan asserted that all media have four effects on individuals and societies: to enhance something, to obsolesce something, to retrieve something that was previously obsolesced, and to intensify something to the point of its reversal (McLuhan & McLuhan, 4988). Kroker presents another side to the tetrad, which he describes, following Jacques Derrida (2006), as “hauntological” (p. 193). The dark tetrad describes disappearance instead of enhancement, substitution instead of obsolescence, abandonment instead of retrieval, and stasis instead of reversal (Kroker, 2014). These four functions describe the actions of media from a non-anthropomorphic standpoint. This dehumanization of McLuhan is necessary, Kroker asserts, because a fundamental feature of the posthuman era is that technology has “in the most literal sense ... now come alive” (p. 28). Yet Kroker’s main interest here is not the autonomous artificial intelligences of transhumanist speculation, nor is it the academic posthumanisms of Katherine Hayles (2008) or Donna Harraway (2000). Kroker’s posthuman age is “that historical moment when the power of technology turns back on itself, effectively undermining traditional concepts such as subjectivity, privacy, and bounded consciousness in order to render all things truly uncertain and unknowable” (p. 7). It is a “dystopian phase of information technology” in which “the informatics of domination has appropriated the resistance spirit of the borderlands” (p. 96). Kroker argues that the permeable human/machine boundaries of Hayles and Hanaway have been superseded by7 all-encompassing machinic control. Kroker’s posthuman is thus a dark time for beings that still think of themselves as human. It is also a dark time because it is quite literally haunted. Kroker holds that: “the essence of the posthuman axiomatic inheres in the fact that technology now eagerly seeks out that which was previously marginalized as simultaneously ways of mobilizing itself as it effectively recodes every aspect of social and nonsocial existence” (p. 6). This is the hauntological aspect of media: that which was previously marginalized is resurrected by technologies to serve as their contents and reasons for being with no logic discernable to humans. The result is the bewildering posthuman era, which Kroker adumbrates using the concepts of acceleration, drift, and crash. Acceleration will be familiar to readers of other postmodernist technology theorists, such as Virilio, and needs little elaboration. Crash depicts the collision between accelerated technologies and traditional human qualities. Drift is Kroker’s most compelling contribution to thinking the posthuman. Drift describes the perturbations of a society no longer directed by human intention, but by myriad, incremental, and unpredictable mutations in the codes that underlie molar reality. Code drift “is the spectral destiny of the story of technology,” (p. 50) but it is also “nothing new,” (p. 52) in that human evolution is a history of sampling errors. The posthuman era is described as one of “drift culture” in that the randomness and non-teleological nature of the molecular realm takes over the molar. The dark tetrad is thus to be understood as a schematic of how code drift rearranges the world without intention or consciousness. Code drift converts humans to “data flesh” that fully absorbs the primary modernist disavowal—the sense of the absurd in all the great referentials—as its key conditions of possibility” (p. 53). Drift culture is the technological proof of existentialism. Kroker is quite brief on suggesting how we ought to proceed with social life in the drifting absurdity of the posthuman era. He devotes only a four-page epilogue to the question of what is to be done now. Not surprisingly, given the existentialist tone of the work, he advocates an aesthetic comportment toward the posthuman. Specifically, he endorses an aesthetics based on Jean-Frangois Lyotard’s (2011) notion of the “figural” or adiscursive gestalt—presumably adapting it to grasp the adiscursivity of ubiquitous code: “Art of this (posthuman) order recodes the question of aesthetics by the creation of a mode of perception that fully opens to the discontinuous, tire fragmentary, the uncertain, the reversal” (Kroker 2014, P-197)- This call for extreme openness evokes Nietzsche’s Dionysian mode of being, in which destruction and creation possess equal valence, but Kroker quickly qualifies this, asserting that since: the posthuman condition has revealed decadence ... as the basic ontology of late capitalism, the point of a figural art that would “harden, worsen, accelerate decadence” would be precisely the reverse, that is to say, it would draw into a greater visibility those intangible, but very real, impulses to social solidarity and ethical probity that haunt the order of the real. (p. 198) This foray into the supposedly posthuman ends with a call for the reinstatement of the most humanistic of principles. The idea seems to be that the novel form of living in the posthuman era is analogous to the collective yearnings of the “spirit of ’68.” AND, it’s biologically impossible---the thing that makes humans not chimpanzees is instrumental rationality <<< – they’ll assert that this argument naturalizes our model of thinking BUT that’s not a bad thing since we’re right – it’s their burden to prove efficacy in the short-term or the case obviously outweighs >>> Søren Riis 11, Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,” 2-8-2011 Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence. Kroker is wrong – doesn’t understand biotechnology, doesn’t understand his own philosophy, and ignores that the will to technology is inevitable Glynn 19 (Andrew Glynn PhD – Doctorate in Philsophy and meta-physician, “Arthur Kroker’s “The Will to Technology”, Dasein42, 13 February 2019, https://dasein42.medium.com/arthur-krokers-the-will-to-technology-97057aab9f7d, MG) Kroker is correct that the science most prevalent in the 20th century is that of biology rather than physics, and the most controversial technology therefore bio-technology. Kroker, like much of the public not actually versed in the technology part of bio-technology, jumps to the assumption that the small successes (such as bio-engineering bacteria to produce insulin) indicate that large scale human bio-engineering is ‘just around the corner’. The reality is far different — having just completed a short stint at a firm involved with Google in producing a genome variant search engine that meets all the security and identity management requirements that each genetic database owner puts on their data, we’re not even at the point where a reasonably simple search for a given genome variant can be accomplished. Biology itself is in much the same state as physics in 1900 when Planck first called for a quantum theory — there’s a strong sense that our past biology is overly simplistic, but not a clear path forward. The human genome project has taught us plenty of things, but the most important of those is that most genes or gene combinations are interpreted dynamically in some way based on the environment, and since we know neither the meaning of most of the genetic code, nor how the interpreter works, and we have no Rosetta Stone to give us a clue to either, bio-engineering at the human level is going to remain relatively simplistic for some time. We’re not in the bionic age quite yet, though Kroker appears to believe we are. There are genes that map directly to phenotypes, such as eye colour, but that appears to be largely true only in phenotypes that are relatively unimportant, again such as eye colour, which makes little difference to anyone other than cosmeticians. I won’t go into the number of more important predictions made by Heidegger in particular that Kroker is apparently completely oblivious to, despite many of them having already come to pass in the short time since his death in 1976, or in danger of coming to pass imminently. However omissions such as the identity of the ‘last god’; the ‘thin wall’ that separates our pure imagination (as in dreams) with our experience of reality; and the notion of Being as change are somewhat unforgivable. Of course, that takes us back to the omission of Hegel and the light Hegel’s work shines on the three thinkers Kroker does deal with. Kroker seems to miss that for Heidegger technology is a ‘destining’, i.e. a dispensation of Being itself (and in some senses the most overt manifestation of Being in postmodern times), and therefore not something to be either for or against, but something one needs to discover a “free relation” to. This destining subverts the title of the work itself, in that technology as a dispensation of Being has nothing to do with will in Nietzsche’s sense, where will to power reverts almost immediately to will to will, since power is only the ability to will more. He also skims over the important notion of the ontological transparency of technology, i.e. given an iPhone, nearly anyone can see almost immediately how it could be better, how it doesn’t (yet) quite substitute for the essence of technology, though we do use specific technological artifacts of that kind in substitution for technology as a whole in our daily speech without thinking much if anything about it. The same cannot be said when we look at a tree or a horse, for instance. The book is written in a fast-paced style apparently intended to get average readers interested in the work of these thinkers and how it both affects and is affected by events in the world since their work was written. In some ways it works, in others it seems to cause Kroker to skim over some of the most crucial concepts. Kroker is wrong – doesn’t understand biotechnology, doesn’t understand his own philosophy, and ignores that the will to technology is inevitable Glynn 19 (Andrew Glynn PhD – Doctorate in Philsophy and meta-physician, “Arthur Kroker’s “The Will to Technology”, Dasein42, 13 February 2019, https://dasein42.medium.com/arthur-krokers-the-will-to-technology-97057aab9f7d, MG) Kroker is correct that the science most prevalent in the 20th century is that of biology rather than physics, and the most controversial technology therefore bio-technology. Kroker, like much of the public not actually versed in the technology part of bio-technology, jumps to the assumption that the small successes (such as bio-engineering bacteria to produce insulin) indicate that large scale human bio-engineering is ‘just around the corner’. The reality is far different — having just completed a short stint at a firm involved with Google in producing a genome variant search engine that meets all the security and identity management requirements that each genetic database owner puts on their data, we’re not even at the point where a reasonably simple search for a given genome variant can be accomplished. Biology itself is in much the same state as physics in 1900 when Planck first called for a quantum theory — there’s a strong sense that our past biology is overly simplistic, but not a clear path forward. The human genome project has taught us plenty of things, but the most important of those is that most genes or gene combinations are interpreted dynamically in some way based on the environment, and since we know neither the meaning of most of the genetic code, nor how the interpreter works, and we have no Rosetta Stone to give us a clue to either, bio-engineering at the human level is going to remain relatively simplistic for some time. We’re not in the bionic age quite yet, though Kroker appears to believe we are. There are genes that map directly to phenotypes, such as eye colour, but that appears to be largely true only in phenotypes that are relatively unimportant, again such as eye colour, which makes little difference to anyone other than cosmeticians. I won’t go into the number of more important predictions made by Heidegger in particular that Kroker is apparently completely oblivious to, despite many of them having already come to pass in the short time since his death in 1976, or in danger of coming to pass imminently. However omissions such as the identity of the ‘last god’; the ‘thin wall’ that separates our pure imagination (as in dreams) with our experience of reality; and the notion of Being as change are somewhat unforgivable. Of course, that takes us back to the omission of Hegel and the light Hegel’s work shines on the three thinkers Kroker does deal with. Kroker seems to miss that for Heidegger technology is a ‘destining’, i.e. a dispensation of Being itself (and in some senses the most overt manifestation of Being in postmodern times), and therefore not something to be either for or against, but something o
Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.