AT - Baudrillard K - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB
AT - Baudrillard K - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB.docx
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AT: Baudrillard Cyberian Islands Case Neg Crimsonia = Russia NATO’s cyberwar games clearly intend for Crimsonia to resemble Russia. Senker 16(Cath Senker, Cath Senker is a writer of non-fiction for children on diverse subjects such as history, world religions, and the environment. In 2018, she won the Educational Writers' Award, 12 September 2016, Cyber Crime and the Dark Net: Revealing the hidden underworld of the internet) The imaginary country Berylia (rather similar to Estonia) has been hit by a cyber assault on its drone manufacturer. The anonymous attackers are probably linked to Berylia’s enemy Crimsonia (very like Russia). They seek the laters cyber. More evidence. Journeyman 18(Film transcripts from “Estonia: Cyber War Games”, May 8 2018, Journeyman Pictures, https://www.journeyman.tv/film/7340, https://www.journeyman.tv/film_documents/7340/transcript/) The CCDCOE has been running Locked Shields every year since 2010 with a similar scenario: the fictional country of Crimsonia which seeks to dominate the region launches a massive cyber attack against the equally fictional Berylia. Berylia calls on its NATO allies for help. Although the scenario isn’t real, the attacks are meant to mimic threats that are, threat’s like those NATO faces from potentially hostile countries including Russia. Crimsonia = Russia and China Crimsonia is intended as a stand in for Russia AND China. Martin 21(Alexander Martin, Journalist of numerous journals focusing on technology based publications, April 13th 2021, Nato Prepares for world’s larget Cyber War game-with focus on grey zone, Sky News, https://news.sky.com/story/nato-prepares-for-worlds-largest-cyber-war-game-with-focus-on-grey-zone-12274488) How does it work? Organised by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in Tallinn, Estonia, the Locked Shields exercise is an annual network defence drill using real-world skills. The scenario is based on an attack on the fictional country of Berylia - hypothetically situated in the northern Atlantic - and an adversary called Crimsonia that is creating some artificial islands. Although the adversary is not mapped to a specific NATO adversary, Crimsonia has traits of both Russia and China in its ambitions and conduct. The idea is to test multiple teams' skills just as they would be tested if they were forced to remotely come to the aid of NATO ally Berylia as it is targeted by "a sophisticated and intense series of cyber attacks". Cyber War Games Good Cyber Defense Exercises (CDX) are an effective tool to evaluate the effectiveness of defense systems and protect infrastructure Seker & Seker 20 (Seker, Ensar, and Kamile Nur Seker, Nato Researcher and Cyber Security Expert. "Cyber Defense Exercises (CDXs) as a Testbed for Cyber Security Assessments. June 2020) CDXs are suitable platforms to test the IT and OT systems to be able to create better cyber security and cyber defense solutions. In this chapter, we will take a closer look to Locked Shields CDX to analyze how cyber exercises can be used as testbed environments. Lesson learned sections and evaluation of the exercise by all participants, can give ideas to cyber experts to improve and strengthen their security. So, it’s fair to say that CDXs can serve as excellent testbeds. Cyber experts from different fields who participate CDX can share their knowledge and experience each other via these exercises. Figure 3 shows a model for CDXs as a testbed.Locked Shields (LS) cyber defense exercise is organized annually by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE). It’s accepted by the authorities that Locked Shields is the world's largest, most complex and technologically advanced cyber defense exercise. In Locked Shields, blue teams are created by the NATO member nations or NATO allied nations. So, it is an international cyber exercise in state level. Locked Shields could be a good example to show how CDX can be used as testbed. Figure 4, 5, 6 shows some statistics about LS CDX. Based on Figure 4, while there were 9 blue teams in 2012 LS CDX, the number was increased to 22 in 2018. In Figure 6, the number of participants to LS CDX also growth (250, 250, 300, 400, 550, 800, 1000 respectively) in same period. This means LS CDX was able to attract more nations and more cyber experts every year. According to Figure 5, numbers of virtual machines were increased dramatically from 25 to 4000 in 6 years. It means LS CDX is getting more advance and complicated each year. More than 1000 cybersecurity experts from around the world have been involved in the 2018 Locked Shields exercise and the national teams of 21 countries have participated as blue teams. The exercise involved around 4000 virtualized systems and more than 2500 attacks by the red team. LS CDX follows a successful route to adopting information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The organizers of LS CDX succeeded in providing an interesting and complex environment for the blue teams to defend these against an intensive attack campaign. While blue teams can put their skills to test, they can also analyze and test new technologies in a safe and secure environment. In the context of LS13, the following areas were most challenging for the blue teams: Defending web applications. Detecting custom malicious code. Mitigating BGP hijacking attacks. Initiating efficient information sharing. In LS14, the most challenging areas are for blue teams: Filtering and detecting malicious traffic over IPv6. Monitoring for malicious WAN route changes and preventing BGP hijacking/man-in-the-middle. Protecting custom web applications. Finding pre-planted malicious programs and coping with RT‟s Anti-Virus evasion techniques (publicly available free tools were in most cases enough to evade AV solutions). Sharing actionable information with other blue teams. In 2015, new attack vectors included ICS/SCADA systems and Windows 8 and 10 operating systems, as well as an element of active defense. In 2017 the blue teams were tasked to maintain the services and networks of a military air base of a fictional country, which, according to the exercise scenario, experienced severe attacks on its electric power grid system, unmanned aerial vehicles, military command and control systems, critical information infrastructure components and other operational infrastructure. The size and scope of technologies, networks and devices used in Locked Shields 2017 has increased considerably – leading to more attacks and specialized systems involved. Specialized systems enable teams to practice the defense of systems that they are not working with on a regular basis. However, in the modern threat landscape incidents with specialized systems may potentially have a profound effect on a military mission or the entire society. In 2018, the attacks cause severe disruptions in the operation of the electric power grid, 4G public safety networks, drone operation and other critical infrastructure components. While the aim of the tech game is to maintain the operation of various systems under intense pressure, the strategic part should serve as a forum to understand the impact of decisions made at the strategic and policy level. When we analyze LS CDX, based on the statistics and After Action Reports (ARR), it can be said that, the exercise improved itself during the years and created a suitable testbed platform for cyber experts. Via this platform, professionals and decision makers in cyber were able to share their knowledge and experience with each other and test their defense skills and strategies against new technologies and new attacks. For future studies, a technical tool will be developed on the scoring system, which is a problematic issue for CDXs, and on the standardization of this system and the development of a fairer system. The integration of new technologies such as power grid systems and drone control systems into CDXs is a critical issue. With the integration of these special systems into the exercises, the existing problems and the methods to be followed are another work to be done in the future. The importance of defense exercises is increasing day by day. It would be possible for countries to be involved in the global cyber defense exercises in the international arena, spreading the development and implementation of their own CDX platforms on a national basis, and allocating higher budget figures to the planning and development of these exercises could contribute to achieving beneficial outcomes in the future to create stronger cyber defense systems. The emphasis on these exercises on the national and 18 international scene will provide benefits in terms of uncovering the vulnerabilities in the area of the cyberspace, as well as the revitalization of the cyber defense awareness, and also the integrated technologies that can be followed in exercises related to the cyber defense. Data from cyber conflict modeling can be useful in research and development of new cyber defense technologies Granasen et al 19 (November 2019, Granåsen, Magdalena, Swedish Defense Research Agency, Huskaj, Gazmend, Swedish Defense University, Varga, Stefan, Royal Institute of Technology, “Data Collection and Research in CDXs: Command and Control, Cyber Situational Awareness and Intelligence Perspectives on Cyber Defense,” 24th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium) The results showed that the data collected for the case study of the Swedish blue team during LS19 is meaningful and of sufficient quality for further analysis within the three research themes. Some issues concerning the quality of data were raised in the results section. These and other issues are further discussed in the current section. Concerning data quality, it can be concluded that data loss in the collected data will not impair the ability to conduct the analyses needed in order to explore the research themes C2 , CSA and intelligence. Analysis of different data sources in conjunction will be necessary in order to make sense of the data. The language in chat logs was sparse, and although the researcher is acquainted with the terminology used in these logs, it does not make sense until correlated with other information such as observations or published threat reports. As the exercise was organized by the CCDCOE, the research team only had part control of the data. This is the reason why data on the progress of threat reporting, score and network overview (available services) was collected through screenshots. It will be a time-consuming task to manually transfer these screenshots to a format that can be further analyzed. Still, the research team assessed that a screenshot of the information was better than not having access to this information at all. Using a well-established CDX such as Locked Shields for research is cost-efficient in that the scenario and scenario injects (including a 70-person red team), set-up, gamenet (including support personnel), communication infrastructure, participant invitation, scoring system, exercise control personnel and a lot of the administration already are in place. Furthermore, Locked Shields has gained a reputation that attracts very proficient cyber security experts, while it is likely that these people would not feel equally attracted to participate in a pure research experiment. From a Swedish perspective, one of the greatest benefits of participation in LS19 was the ability to meet and work with people from other organizations. Research within an international CDX clearly entails lack of experimental control and reduced access to data for the researchers, as well as continuous adjustments to fit the data collection to the exercise schedule. However, it also entails highly motivated, skilled and competitive participants, and a far more complex exercise environment than a normal research project would be able to finance. The initial results from the surveys indicated that the exercise as a whole seemed to have progressed smoothly, with positive ratings of teamwork, information sharing and strategy, as well as cyber situational awareness. The high performance score further emphasizes the success of the team. It is therefore clear that the case studied is well suited for analysis of how a successful team develops its strategy and what functional structures for coordination in a cyber defence team may look like. The participation of the research team can also be viewed as a success story. The team was engaged from the very beginning of the preparatory phase of the exercise. In this way, the researchers were able to learn contextual factors, such as the team leadership view on issues such as strategy and coordination, which may have affected the final outcome of the exercise, that were not necessarily written down or documented in any other way. The researchers were given the opportunity to describe their initial planning, which included the aim to be as non-intrusive as possible. This means that the data collection did not include any "freezes" in the exercise in order to collect data, neither were there any plans to collect excessive unnecessary amounts of data (video recordings, key-logging or screenshots). The research team explained their measures to preserve the participants’ anonymity (if this was requested). The nature of the meetings, e.g., personal interactions between exercise participants and the research team contributed to mutual trust and confidence building. The cordial relationship between the researchers and the participants probably contributed to the high survey response rates and a benevolent attitude to answering the questions. Having three persons in the research team meant a high workload, and an appreciation for that every team activity would not be observed. It should be noted that there could be a limit as to how many researchers are feasible for data collection to reduce the 16 risk of collecting too much data, duplicates of data, or disturbing the observed team. The inclusion of CSA-related questions in the team’s ordinary reporting procedure provided a less intrusive method for collecting SA-related data than if a traditional probing measure such as SAGAT or SART had been used. There was no indication of that the inference of SA-related questions in the internal reporting template disturbed the sub-teams. The internal reporting template was designed and administered by the reporting team, and the sub-teams were not aware of that some of the questions in the internal reporting template were induced by the research team. The research team may have positively affected the SA and even the performance in the team, in that they directed the team’s attention towards issues useful to include in the threat reports as well as for the understanding of the threats. This is, however, a risk with all data collection. For instance, the presence of observers may affect the behavior of the team, and the questions in the start-up survey may direct the team’s focus towards the issues mentioned in the survey. For integrity reasons as well as risk of data overload, the research team made a deliberate decision to not to capture network activity. It is assessed that network activity logs would produce a lot of data of which only a small part would be useful. Subsequently, a great deal of analysis would be required, and there would probably not be a great deal of added value for the research themes. For the current paper, a pluralist methodology [31] was employed, where different types of data were collected in order to address the research themes from several perspectives. It needs to be acknowledged that some data will almost always suffer from some data loss (for instance surveys), while other data is more complete, but requiring quite a lot of analytic effort and needing to be combined with other data in order to interpret it (i.e. communication logs). Some data is based on subjective assessment (surveys, observations). However who is best suited to assess the workload, if not those who are experiencing it? The pluralist approach finds answers in combinations and comparisons of data. The dataset will suit the analysis within all three research themes, and the same data items may be combined and analyzed in different ways to correspond to research questions within different themes. 6. Summary and Conclusions The objective of this paper was to explore the possibilities to collect meaningful data for research on Command and Control (C2 ) Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA), and Intelligence in conjunction with an interorganizational cyber defense team during a cyber defense exercise. The purpose of the data collection was to explore the possibilities to conduct research within these research areas. A variety of carefully selected data collection methods specifically tailored to suit the needs for relevant data for our research fields of interest was employed. Our research has shown that a CDX indeed provided a good opportunity to collect pertinent data to analyze Command and Control, Cyber Situational Awareness and Intelligence related research questions. The trove of collected data will be used to write papers according to our research themes. The working titles of some future papers in the works are: i) Exploring the development of coordination structures and strategy in a cyber defense team, ii) Acquiring Cyber Situational Awareness in a cyber defense team, and iii) Intelligence in support of a defensive cyberspace operation. The results obtained in this paper is further expected to be useful for refining data collection methods for CDXs. Baudrillard Indicts Baudrillard’s logic is faulty, it doesn’t take into account the thing to be simulated is equally affected by the real. War games and planning aren’t simulations, they’re the same as war, no meaning is lost. Von Hilgers 12 (Phillip, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of the History of Science at Harvard University, Managing Director at Meetrics, “War Games: A History of War on Paper,” Chapter 4: Historiography in Real Time (2012), translated by Ross Benjamin, 6/23/22 - FI) The Real of Simulations For a long time, media theories have burgeoned regarding how media seem to capture the world in simulations. The fact that media themselves are not based on virtualities but on realities — which even former radio officers occasionally find hard to master — is often overlooked. Thus sociologist Jean Baudrillard has elevated the simulacrum to the central concept for the description of the state of the Western world — without, however, asking about the historical development of the simulation. For Baudrillard, simulacra have, in an escalating fashion, first taken up the play with the real, then taken the place of its appearances, and finally themselves created a basis that is no longer dependent on the real. 32 In particular, the referential system of the image has thereby undergone a transformation that leads from reflection to self-referentiality. 33 The logic of this interpretation, however, implies that the real is excluded from the simulation media and their history is effaced. But it is precisely the development of war games that shows how much the real intrudes into the simulation media, which is the case whenever the simulation reaches its limit and suffers disturbances. The thing to be simulated is equally affected by the intrusion of the real, even if it sometimes takes on the technical forms of the simulation. In particular, effects of the real emerge at the communicative and mediatic level. In the military political war game, a Prussian legation councilor ’ s ability to empathize might underlie the position of the Polish foreign minister. However, the communication practices that are thereby tested could not be more real. It is in the war game that the difference between simulation and communication comes most clearly to ligh
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