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2022 Michigan Affirmative

Aff - Cyber Space Assets - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ

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AFF – Cyber Space Assets
Big thanks to Aayan Ali, Billy Blechman, Sanjith Geevarghese, Brandon Lin, Win Neubarth, Lauren Nieto, Dani Roos, Stephen Yang and Steven Yu for their help on this file.
1AC – Cyber Space Assets
1AC – China Advantage
Ukraine completely shifted NATO priorities towards Russia---failure to readdress Chinese advancements opens the door for Chinese adventurism AND security threats.
Liselotte Odgaard 22, professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 2/24/2022, "NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space," Washington Quarterly, 45(1), pp 175-180, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145, sg
NATO’s vague recognition in 2021 that China constitutes a challenge to the transatlantic alliance reflects an institution that has failed to take on the security threats emanating from Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 highlights the reasons why this omission is problematic. The war in Ukraine has reignited transatlantic unity of purpose in addressing threats from Moscow toward European security. The existential shock that Europe is facing now that a Russian regime has shown itself willing to go to war against European countries carries with it the risk that China will be forgotten when NATO discusses its future priorities. During the war, China is walking a tightrope between maintaining its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeping up cooperation with Russia. The future strength of the Chinese-Russian partnership is likely to be determined by the continued usefulness of Moscow in China’s efforts to carve out more space for a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, China will continue to engender threats to the US and Europe in all domains and across geographical regions.
With the summit statement of the North Atlantic Council released June 14, 2021, NATO extended a commitment to “engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance,” since “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”1 China’s coercive policies, nuclear arsenal, military modernization, military cooperation with Russia, lack of transparency, and use of disinformation are listed as main areas of concern for the alliance. NATO takes the China challenge seriously but has yet to devise a strategy to address it.
Compared to the United States, Europe took a long time to acknowledge its stake in managing security challenges from China. As Beijing pushed beyond its traditional zones of interest in East and Southeast Asia toward the Indian Ocean in the 2000s, US security policies began to focus more on China as Washington sought a new geopolitical equilibrium in Asia.2 Since 2014, France and the UK have spearheaded Europe’s naval diplomacy to counter the displays of force and increasing tensions in maritime Asia to which China contributes. This engagement has focused on regular exercises with the US and its Asian allies, operations in support of freedom of navigation, and base-sharing agreements.3 In 2021, the EU recognized that these geopolitical dynamics directly impact its security and announced the establishment of supportive mechanisms in its Indo-Pacific strategy.4 However, NATO has been conspicuously absent in these transatlantic endeavors designed to counter challenges to US and European security. Reflecting NATO’s absence from the main arena of US-China strategic competition, the alliance is hardly ever mentioned in off-the-record conversations on Indo-Pacific security between diplomats and think tank personnel.
NATO’s reluctance to take on the China challenge is perhaps not surprising, given its inherent assumption that the European continent is the jewel in the crown of the US alliance system, which is thought to guarantee US assistance in the event of a military threat against Europe. This assumption was challenged during the Trump administration, which openly questioned the US commitment to Article Five’s collective defense obligation. The invasion of Ukraine has given NATO a new lease on life and put it at the frontlines of transatlantic cooperation on deterring Russia from further military action in future. However, NATO’s focus on its eastern frontline carries the risk that the alliance turns into a Russia-focused European institution and ignores that China is a global great power competitor which also constitutes a major challenge to the security of all NATO member states.
Washington increasingly looks to the EU rather than NATO for guidance on Europe’s future security policy. One reason is that NATO’s toolbox is lagging in domains such as cyber and outer space, although cyber and outer space operations are key enablers of actions in all domains including air, sea, and land. One indication of this is the US-EU negotiations surrounding a common response to cyber threats which took place during the first US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2021. In addition, during Trump’s presidency, longstanding US dissatisfaction with Europe’s modest defense spending threatened to put NATO on the backburner in transatlantic security debates.5 Since then, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elicited a sea change in German defense policy with the announcement in February 2022 that defense spending will increase to more than 2 percent of its gross domestic output annually.6 While this may be a convincing signal that Europe will finally devote the resources required for its own defense and revive NATO’s central role in transatlantic security, there is also a risk that China will be moved to the periphery of the alliance’s agenda.
On February 11, 2022, during the runup to the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Biden administration published its Indo-Pacific strategy as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was in the midst of a Pacific trip to Australia, Fiji, and Hawaii.7 This US prioritization signaled that despite Moscow’s war in Europe, Washington remains committed to strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific and competing with China. If the US drops the ball on the Indo-Pacific, Washington is concerned that China might use force against Taiwan.8 Consequently, the key question for the US is how many resources can be tied up in Europe without losing sight of the long-term goal: deterrence of China. As US strategic competition with China increases while NATO is sitting on the fence, failure to develop a transatlantic defense policy that addresses China will leave Europe vulnerable to China’s ability to exploit the weak links in European defense arrangements, which are newly fragmented by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.9
EU efforts to build an independent regional defense profile and nurture cooperation between Europe’s defense industry and national defense communities reflect a growing recognition that the region needs to become a self-reliant defense actor. However, Europe still needs to demonstrate that self-reliance does not imply merely focusing on Europe’s periphery. Otherwise, the industrial challenges from China may outcompete Europe’s defense industry. Shipbuilding is a case in point. By 2021, China built 50 percent of all existing ships in the world. Through design collaboration agreements, cyber espionage, and acquisitions, China has copied advanced innovative ship designs. Enormous financial resources from the state allow Chinese companies to enjoy economies of scale by building dual-use factories which not only outcompete Western companies in the commercial shipbuilding industry, but also threaten the production of navy vessels. If not taken seriously, Europe and the US may soon have no choice but to buy frigates from China.10 This example demonstrates the centrality of China for global economic and security developments and should encourage Europe to manifest a position of unified strength in defending NATO member states against Chinese security challenges. This realization will help convince the US and its adversaries that Europe continues to be a credible partner in countering common threats against transatlantic security, whether they appear in or beyond the European region.
China’s challenges to US and European security constitute such common threats across a broad range of sectors. These include gradual reinterpretations of principles of international law, the subversion of universal liberal market economic practices, and cyber insurgencies targeting a wide range of civilian and military entities. These Chinese policies all have major military implications because they are related to developments in the operating principles, capabilities, and priorities of China’s armed forces. Only NATO can offer an integrated transatlantic response to the military aspects of Chinese policies that threaten those sectors across the globe, including European actors. NATO’s involvement is essential if the credibility of the alliance’s security guarantees is to be preserved and an effective response to China’s encroachments on a liberal rules-based order is to be established.
NATO’s involvement is essential to establish an effective response to China
The omnipresent character of the China threat demonstrates that it is long overdue for NATO to position itself as a significant player in addressing Beijing’s challenges to transatlantic security. NATO is key to keeping US and European security policies coordinated when applying mechanisms of deterrence and defense against Chinese challenges. If transatlantic unity of purpose is lost, both the US and Europe are far less likely to succeed in addressing China sufficiently.
Non-kinetic attacks on space based assets are the most likely – NATO collective defense is key to deterrence
Madeline Moon 20, a member of the UK Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation from 2012 to 2015, rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities “THE SPACE DOMAIN AND ALLIED DEFENCE,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2017-space-domain-and-allied-defence-moon-report-162-dscfc-17-e-rev1-fin, p. 1-10 /BL
42. Non-kinetic means, for example, cyber hacking, laser dazzling, or the emission of electromagnetic pulses, can also be used to interrupt or disable rather than destroy satellites. While considered less damaging to the space environment and potentially less traceable, many forms of non-kinetic attacks are very difficult to attribute, stirring fears of quick escalation and questions of proportionality of response in a near future conflict where space-assets would likely be involved. Russia and China are already heavily invested in this domain, ultimately seeking the means to disrupt US hegemony in space (Pellegrino, Stang, 2016).
Non-kinetic means: cyber-attacks, jamming, spoofing, and dazzling
43. Because of the resulting debris, which can have a mutually destabilising impact, destroying satellites with kinetic force is not an ideal method for damaging satellite capability. Non-destructive and covert methods, such as cyber-attacks, jamming, spoofing, or dazzling are alternative means to disrupt and deny access to satellite capabilities. In fact, space warfare is more likely to involve the denial of vital information flows supporting command and control of an enemy’s forces, rather than the exoatmospheric destruction of its space-based assets.
44. By attacking a satellite’s control system, or mission package, an actor could take over control of the satellite, shut it down, change its orbit, put it on collision course with other space objects, or destroy its solar panels by exposing it to damaging levels of radiation. In addition, a satellite’s global network of ground stations might be subject to attack with potential serious consequences. 45. Rather than ASAT weaponry, cyber-attacks can instead be used to take control of a satellite or the whole communication network, including the ground stations (Suzuki, 2016). As implied above, cybersecurity and space security are inherently linked. As satellite technologies and space assets are sourced from a broad international supply base they require regular security upgrades to their software systems via remote, distributed connections, which make them vulnerable to cyber-attacks (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016).
46. Due to the nature of their missions, the military pays more attention than commercial operators to the defence of their space systems. As a result, commercial satellite telecommunications are more often than not less resilient than military ones. Still, as commercial satellites are increasingly co-opted or leased for military communications or other civilian mission-critical functions such as air traffic control, train rail traffic, electrical grid management, and other critical civilian infrastructure, commercial satellites can be considered high-value soft targets for adversaries (Suzuki, 2016). In addition, radio frequencies for satellite communications are limited and the increase in the number of commercial and private satellites puts pressure on scarce resources. Some operators are therefore using less secure frequencies, which are easier to hack (Suzuki, 2016).
47. As such, it is clear a range of cyber threats exists against space-based systems. The large amount of data transmitted through satellites presents an opportunity for adversaries to corrupt accuracy and reliability with a relatively low probability of discovery. Examples could be: States seeking a military advantage via the theft of intellectual property; organised criminal elements with sufficient resources seeking financial gain; amateur or professional hackers showing off their skills; or even capable terrorist groups wishing to disrupt services provided by space-based assets or inflict damage on the space environment. Of course, any combination of these threats is also imaginable depending on the adversaries’s assets and capabilities (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016).
48. Satellite feeds can also be jammed via the intentional interference in signal transmission and reception through the deliberate use of radio noise and electromagnetic signals. In particular, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to jamming attacks because civil applications have not always been designed with security in mind. Often, jamming of GPS signals or other radio telecommunications can even be carried out using simple, commercially-available tools (Suzuki, 2016). By way of example, North Korea has carried out a series of coordinated jamming attacks against the Republic of Korea, which affected GNSS signals in the Seoul area and led to the degradation of infrastructure such as mobile phone networks (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016).
49. Spoofing allows an adversary to manipulate the information about the location, position and condition of a satellite. Spoofed data is relatively hard to detect. If successful, the spoofing attack could damage critical infrastructure, such as the national power grid, by introducing false timing signals, or cause economic damage by targeting trading systems in the financial services sector (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016). Spoofing could also confuse the coordination of command and control of a nation’s armed forces in a time of crisis.
50. Dazzling is a way of blinding a satellite with a laser. If the laser is powerful enough, it can even burn satellite sensors and disable them (Airbus Space briefing). Docking and rendez-vous methods are alternative ways of damaging a satellite by using electronic or kinetic force. While docking would have the benefit of not producing space debris, it would expose the attacker to detection. To mitigate the potential consequences of a docking attack, the United States and its allies are developing a programme of Space Situational Awareness, which monitors any objects approaching existing space assets (Suzuki, 2016).
51. The trend toward the development of increasingly disruptive and non-attributable non-kinetic means puts the long-term stability of the space environment at risk. Increasing dependence on space-based architecture coupled with hybrid and asymmetrical disruption tactics will create a space environment ripe for rapid escalation and instability.
V. NATO AND THE SPACE DOMAIN
A. WHY SPACE MATTERS FOR NATO
52. As is clear from above, improvements in space technology drive the development of advanced military systems; they are important force multipliers when integrated into joint operations. Therefore, a clear and mutual understanding of how military, civil, commercial, national and multinational space capabilities contribute to military operations in order to achieve Alliance security objectives is essential. Increased awareness about the potential for adversaries seeking to exploit their own access to space for military purposes to the detriment of Allied assets and capabilities is vitally important (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, 2016).
53. At the strategic level, NATO is well positioned to strengthen deterrence in space. NATO’s collective defence and economic prosperity rely on space-based infrastructure, and an attack on the space assets of one Ally would impact the security of all. As such, NATO needs a whole-of-alliance approach to protect its interests in space to enhance resilience and deter any threat to its space-based capabilities. At the operational level, space needs to be incorporated in NATO planning and command structures. At the tactical level, relevant training should be provided to personnel and NATO exercises should reflect space warfare scenarios wherein Allied space-assets are denied or temporarily disabled (Schulte, 2012).
54. Today’s modern operational environment relies heavily on guaranteed access to space-based architecture – Allied forces' daily training, and maintenance and execution of ongoing operations are all made capable by a vast network of shared space assets. Allied space capabilities provide a number of products and services, including: global, strategic and intra-theatre satellite communications; positioning, navigation and timing services; terrestrial and space environmental monitoring; real-time space, geological, meteorological and oceanographic situational awareness; advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; as well as NATO Shared Early Warning and transponder tracking such as Friendly Force tracking and maritime tracking (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, 2016).
55. NATO’s most advanced military systems are dependent upon space-based assets in order to execute missions successfully, particularly Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs), the Alliance’s Ballistic Missile Defence programme, and the Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS), set to become operational in 2017. The AGS system consists of air, ground and support segments and will perform all-weather and persistent terrestrial and maritime surveillance in near real-time, contributing to a range of missions1 , providing military commanders with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground (GovSat, 2016).
56. Space capabilities contributing to the Alliance’s mission planning and execution at all levels of warfare come from government, military, civilian and commercial providers. NATO does not currently own any orbit spacecraft. It does, however, own and operate several terrestrial elements (e.g. SATCOM anchor stations and terminals). The United States provides the majority of space support NATO currently uses. However, in 2013, there were approximately 39 ‘military or government’ satellites owned by NATO Member States other than the US providing communication, imagery and automatic identification system detection.
57. The primary European NA

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