Neg - Solvency Takeouts - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
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**Negative** Thanks to Ros Goldman, Chloe Kwan, Lily Ren, Coralynn Yang, and Paul Wallace Security Cooperation Fails Bureaucracy 1nc Complexity SC is dysfunctional – bureaucratic system dooms solvency Bergmann and Schmitt 2021 Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs; Alexandra Schmitt senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, March 9, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/dmr U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. While it continues to control funding for its many Title 22 programs, they are largely executed via DSCA and the MILDEPs. Although Congress has recognized that it has, in effect, created the basis for confusion via the two departments’ dual congressionally mandated authorities and authorizations, a political decision to create a clear lead agent for these activities remains missing. One will return to the U.S. Government’s well-used practice of “fudging” when it comes to identifying who’s in charge. 2nc Complexity Dozens of agencies with overlapping and conflicting authorities ensure SC failure Young 2020 Thomas-Durell, phd, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, “The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance” September 10, 2020, https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2344014/the-politics-of-security-cooperation-and-security-assistance/ In terms of SC and SA, the proverbial elephant in the room is DOD. But this has not always been the case. This is one of the externalities of the George W. Bush administration’s response to the global war on terror; at the time, DOD found that existing U.S. training and particularly equipping programs funded by the Department of State’s appropriations and authorizations (Title 22, U.S. Code) simply were insufficiently responsive and nimble to meet operational commanders’ requirements. Congress responded to DOD’s entreaties for more authority to build partner forces in the FY 2006 NDAA, which authorized DOD (with the concurrence of the Secretary of State) to use its authorizations and appropriations (Title 10, U.S. Code) to build capabilities and capacity in partner armed forces in order to conduct counterterrorism operations. The perhaps predictable, if not inevitable, result of DOD rapidly trying to create capacity within partner armed forces was an embarrassing lack of attention paid to the financial niceties and details that are of great importance to Congress. As a RAND report observed, “DOD lacks the detailed financial data necessary to respond to new congressional reporting requirements. Moreover, DOD leaders are unable to compare SC spending across countries, regions, and programs, which is critical to future prioritization and resourcing decisions.”10 Perhaps it is inaccurate to characterize DOD as an elephant (in any room); in reality, it is more like a herd of independently minded creatures. Title 10 makes it clear that the individual MILDEPs exist in splendid political if not geographical isolation from each other, let alone from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The MILDEPs’ Major Force Programs reflect the clear objective of Congress that the former retain a high degree of autonomy from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding largely ignored verbiage in the law that explicitly states in the preamble to the three departments’ sections that the exercise of their functions are “subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.”11 The record demonstrates that the intent of Congress’s annual appropriations and authorizations easily trumps this provision of the law. The canonical source of the MILDEPs’ autonomy is found in the 12 roles and missions assigned to them in Title 10.12 It is the particular authority of training under which the MILDEPs’ authority to conduct SC and SA reside (for example, continental U.S.-based professional military education and all forms of training). Other key players in the planning and execution of these programs include the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which provides policy guidance and priorities; DSCA, with its newly enhanced powers granted to it via the FY 2017 NDAA (discussed below); the combatant commands, which act as planners and coordinators of these activities (under the authority of the Unified Command Plan); the Service components that execute many of the in-country training events; and finally, as extensions of the combatant commands, defense cooperation offices resident in-country that manage and direct both training programs and equipment transfers. Given the number of stakeholders, the politics of agreeing priorities, approaches, timing, scope, and so forth, the execution of SC and SA activities can be frightfully untidy. Security Cooperation fails (not with agenda DA) Tankel and Rand 15, Rand is the former deputy director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Tankel is an assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University (“Security assistance isn’t the quick fix the US thinks it is,” The Hill, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/250348-security-assistance-isnt-the-quick-fix-the-us-thinks-it-is/amp/) As we argue in a report recently released by the Center for a New American Security, Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment, part of the problem is that BPC has become a catchall for wide array of security assistance and cooperation programs, only some of which actually pertain to enhancing the capabilities and capacity of a partner’s military and civilian institutions. There are myriad challenges to deploying assistance and cooperation effectively. Recent events in Syria only scratch the surface. Security assistance and cooperation has been a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft for decades. The post-9/11 interest in using assistance and cooperation to incentivize and enable local partners contributed to the creation of a slew of new authorities and programs. Yet, despite its strategic centrality and large price tag, our report argues that many security assistance and cooperation programs fail to achieve U.S. objectives because of strategic and structural deficiencies. Strategically, U.S. policymakers are often not clear about the specific outcomes they intend to achieve with security assistance and cooperation. Even when objectives are clear, there may be too many of them for a single program, which results in conflicting objectives. This is especially troublesome when pressing, short-term objectives subvert long-term U.S. goals. Also, there is currently no system in place to adequately assess outcomes. This not only risks wasting taxpayers’ dollars. Failure to assess progress and adjust programs accordingly can actually reduce U.S. influence with recipient states, which may believe they can free-ride or begin to view assistance as an entitlement. The practice of using security assistance to build relationships sometimes contributes to this problem. So does the fact that policymakers too often look to security assistance as a quick fix or way to address demands to “do something.” Yet, security assistance and cooperation remains vitally important and is appealing, especially when options like large-scale U.S. military operations do not make strategic sense. This helps to explain the numerous new authorities that consecutive administrations have requested and Congress has created. The increase in new authorities has contributed to confusion about the purposes of different programs. Moreover, programs are sometimes chosen based on which authorities are available or most flexible rather than on the authority best suited to the task at hand. Finally, most of the new programs are housed at the Pentagon and not the State Department. As a result, programs are deployed to meet Defense requirements as opposed to implemented in a way that furthers broader foreign policy objectives. The bottom line is that more is not necessarily better. That goes for the number of authorities and the level of assistance or cooperation provided to U.S. partners. The spate of new authorities has exacerbated both imbalances between the Pentagon and the State Department and conflicts among the objectives that assistance and cooperation are used to achieve. Interagency conflicts have fragmented any security cooperation McNerney and Moroney 18 (Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center; Senior International/Defense Researcher; Affiliate Faculty, Pardee RAND Graduate School; M.A. in international relations, University of Maryland; B.A. in government and German, University of Notre Dame. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Senior Political Scientist; Ph.D. in international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, England; M.A. in European integration, University of Limerick, Ireland; B.A. in political science and history, Frostburg State University. “Reforming Security Assistance: Why the State Department Can't Lead from Behind”, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/09/reforming-security-assistance-why-the-state-department.html)LR The goal is to make the world safer and advance U.S. security interests. But is it working? For the most part, we don't know. Studies by the RAND Corporation have found evidence of potentially powerful returns on investment but also significant risks. Skeptics can point to many horror stories about American military equipment rotting in storage depots or being misused and U.S.-trained officers becoming dictators, coup plotters and human rights abusers. The State Department has oversight for all foreign assistance, including security assistance. Since 9/11, however, Congress has given the Pentagon significant increases in funding and authorities to cooperate with security forces around the world. If Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and members of Congress don't take steps toward reform, State may find it increasingly difficult to maintain this important leadership role. State's first challenge is the tangle of legislative authorities and stove-piped appropriations that drive U.S. security assistance. The U.S. spent roughly $42 billion in 2017 on foreign assistance, including $17 billion in security assistance. America's flagship security assistance program is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which provided almost $6 billion in military equipment and services to foreign partners last year. But State oversees many other security assistance accounts to support military education, peacekeeping, counterterrorism and other efforts. Several of the laws that authorize these programs are outdated, disjointed and inhibit agility and long-term planning. A review of security assistance authorities could go a long way toward clarifying congressional priorities and expectations in an international security environment that grows increasingly complex. For example, rather than reform the 42-year-old law that prohibits security assistance to foreign law enforcement, Congress simply provides a steady stream of waivers and exemptions, to the tune of about $2 billion annually. To what extent does Congress want the State Department to strengthen foreign police forces, border security officers, counterterrorism units and counter-narcotics investigators? What priorities and restrictions do they desire on this assistance? It's hard to say. RAND's 2016 report, From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation, identified similar problems for the Department of Defense (DoD), analyzing a convoluted patchwork of over 100 DoD authorities, many of which had been created or strengthened in the wake of 9/11. In 2017, Congress consolidated and reformed many of these authorities and created new reporting requirements to improve DoD's assessments of what's really required, monitoring of progress and evaluation of outcomes. Defense has greater authority now to re-prioritize resources from one country to another or one activity to another as it deems appropriate. In exchange for that flexibility, DoD has the responsibility to report more clearly on what's working and what's not. The State Department's second challenge involves planning. For example, FMF funding is allocated to individual partner nations, who tell the U.S. what equipment and services they would like, and U.S. officials decide whether to approve the request. Parallel discussions take place among different officials about peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, counterterrorism and other programs, each with its own planning processes and congressional reporting requirements. While there is certainly coordination along the way, there is often a transactional, disjointed feel to the process. Turf wars deck solvency Bender 16 (Bryan Bender, B.A in Political Science and English @ University of Pittsburg, Adjunct ProfessorAdjunct Professor Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Senior National CorrespondentSenior National Correspondent POLITICO .“Pentagon muscles out State Dept. on foreign aid” https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/general-diplomats-tussle-over-pentagons-growing-military-aid-portfolio-221177)LR “During the course of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in particular — and then more recently related to Iraq and Syria — there has been this steady accumulation of very specific authorities that have largely gone over to the Department of Defense,” the former Air Force officer and special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an interview. But now that large-scale combat in Iraq and Afghanistan has diminished, “It’s a fair question to ask, ‘Do we have the balance right between State and DoD?’” For decades, the power largely rested with the State Department, which is responsible for setting and implementing foreign policy. It has traditionally played the lead role in deciding who should get U.S. security assistance and has asserted its authority to squelch military proposals it considers unwise, officials said. Last year, the department vetoed a Pentagon plan to train snipers from Belarus, which has no free elections and where political dissidents continue to disappear with no government explanation. State also recently scuttled a plan to provide lip balm and brooms to the Jordanian military — items the department deemed wasteful. The Defense Department, though, increasingly has dollars on its side. The Pentagon’s budget for such overseas military aid has more than tripled from 2008 to 2015, compared with just 23 percent growth for the State Department, according to internal administration data provided to POLITICO. “You are going to see disagreement any time DoD is proposing a change of program in a way that the State Department would perceive as diminishing the degree of coordination that is required,” said a senior administration official directly involved in the internal deliberations. Even without a change in the law, though, the State Department has found itself virtually shut out of the review process in some cases, according to interviews with current and former department officials. For example, the diplomats recently learned the Pentagon was funding counter-narcotics operations in several nations in Central Asia that the State Department had previously deemed ineligible for military assistance. State also learned from media reports that the Pentagon was training a controversial Cambodian army general. And despite efforts to better coordinate the two departments’ activities, confusion remains about who is doing what. One consequence: The Pentagon has a program underway to provide $100 million worth of new helicopters to the Kenyan military, while State has separately pursued efforts to supply it with used helicopters. The State Department isn’t concerned solely about human rights and the aid recipients’ international behavior. Its supporters also argue that the State Department is better positioned than the military to manage the programs long-term. “There is no sustainment process with DoD,” said another administration official involved in the policy debate. “Ships we have provided are rusting pierside.” A recent analysis by the Congressional Research Service also concluded that recent policy decisions “have combined to slowly muddle the clear legal separation between State and DoD roles.” A March 9 analysis by the government-funded Rand Corp. similarly called for reviewing the two departments’ “roles, interests and coordination processes.” “This trend of giving more and more authority and taking them away from State is not a great thing,” said Ilan Goldenberg, who runs the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. “It is largely a function that in Congress DoD gets a lot more attention and has a lot more leverage.” 2nc Complexity – Recipient Countries Recipient countries fail to understand the complexity of US bureaucracy Arnold 20, colonel in USAF (Jason, “Add Value to Security Cooperation through Joint Unification,” FAO Journal of International Affairs, https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/add-value-to-security-cooperation?s=r) In the Security Cooperation Enterprise, the military departments loom large as the primary implementing agencies of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) cases, and in training activities.[6] These SC programs provide our international partners with the capabilities they require both for their own security and to assist in regional security objectives that improve the overall global security situation. Most open SC cases have one of the military departments as an Implementing Agency (IA) and each service has built its own organizational structure, bureaucracy, and automated systems to support the effort.[7] Over the decades, a familiar dynamic has taken place. The military departments have developed their own implementing processes in an insular way, isolated from the other branches, and accommodating their own unique business rules, methods, and systems separate from the others. In addition to contributing to the already significant complexity of the SC Enterprise, the familiar replication of effort, divergent doctrine and practice, and inefficient use of resources is again evident. Still, the Services continue to diverge. Consider the difficulties these differing systems place on our international partners. Friendly foreign nations, committed to working toward our mutual security interests, must not only understand the various roles
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