K - Disability - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB
K - Disability - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB.docx
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K --- Disability --- K Lab 1NC 1NC --- Shell Ableist rhetoric feeds the project of the war machine as we march towards the horizon of a new Able-bodied world order. Rejecting attempts at “rehabilitation” is key to understanding debility as inherent to all bodies and deconstructing the project of the war machine. Heathcote 18 – (Gina Heathcote is a feminist scholar working in the Centre for Gender Studies and the School of Law at SOAS, University of London, as well as a member at the Centre for Human Rights Law; War’s Perpetuity: Gina Heathcote (2018) War’s Perpetuity: Disabled Bodies of War and the Exoskeleton of Equality, Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44:1, 71-91,; Published online: 01 Aug 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2018.1470447) Dōgen “[B]etween fixing and forgetting … [s]uccessful rehabilitation permitted the ‘formerly’ disabled body to be reintegrated into the nation’s significant social structures, such as work and family. Made ‘ordinary’ again, ‘identical’ to ‘normal’ citizens, the disabled would ‘disappear’”. 57 Jennifer James’ account of the relationship between the disabled body, black bodies in the US, and soldier/citizenship draws out the complicated structural history of soldier/citizens in the US. She argues for recognition of the history of blackness in the US to be understood as ‘synonymous with disability’ as ‘black men have envisaged military participation as an avenue toward liberation and citizenship, heeding the call for “able-bodied” men needed to fill military ranks’. 58 Through an analysis of the literary texts of Gwendolyn Brooks, James argues for the need for representation, rather than repression, of the injured and maimed black body returned from war. As such, James demonstrates the relationship between legal subjectivity, citizenship, and soldiering in the US. In arguing that military service might ‘undo’ the othering of the black male body in the US, James in effect acknowledges the white, masculine subject of law who need not act to gain full subjectivity. However, James also challenges the accuracy of ‘“ableists’” representations’ for ‘the act of representation, no matter how “authentic,” aids in this estrangement precisely because the disabled are mediated’. 59 The military mindset to repair and restore the returned soldier through assistive technologies likewise reproduces the expectation that the maimed body is not quite a full subject and that the restoring of the body is necessary to be a full citizen. This approach, argues James, ignores the constructed nature of the debility produced through warfare and thus reifies the notion that the body must always be restored from debility. Drawing on the work of Henri-Jacques Stiker,60 James writes: This cosmetic fix allows the inequalities created by political, social and ideological practices that relegate certain bodies to economic, gender, sex and physical (racial) alterity to conveniently recede from view … through ‘naturalizing’ socially produced disability, naming all difference ‘disability’ and claiming all ‘disabled’ capable of ‘rehabilitation,’ preventative measures are judged unnecessary.61 James’ argument recognises not only the socially constructed nature of disability resultant from armed conflict, but also the social construction of ‘the poor to the unemployed’ as Other and in need of rehabilitative interventions by the state, rather than recognition of any need to transform structural inequalities. However, James’ approach also highlights the ‘socially constructed’ nature of disability which, I argue, might have two meanings.62 First, as James writes, drawing on Stiker, a host of differences become marked as ‘disabled’ in a manner that requires individual interventions over structural change. Second, thinking through the disabled body returning from combat, the body is twice constructed as damaged, initially through the risk contained in a political decision to send armed forces to combat situations which is, in essence, a constructed risk and then through the need to ‘restore’ the body of the soldier, rather than care or accept differences associated with disability. For individuals who are thus framed as disabled, whether as the consequence of political decisions, political apathy, or from chronic, genetic, or other medical conditions, the focus remains on the rehabilitation to become ablebodied rather than a recognition that all bodies carry debilities, risk debility, and are debilitated. Likewise, there is a failure to see how compulsory ablebodiedness is attributed to the imagined subject of law. The shift to honouring, accepting, and seeing debility as integral to subjectivity thus frames subjectivity differently and, potentially, accepts the interface of technology with any body as an aspect of subjectivity just as the entwined relationships with humanness and matter, environment and nonhuman animals have the potential to radically alter legal constructions and engagements with subjectivity. James goes on to remind us that the dismembered female form has a long history in Western iconography from the Venus de Milo to the cropped female body of contemporary Hollywood films: if women are reduced to ‘parts’, black women are split even further as they are asked to pry the signs of blackness from their bodies and as blackness is ripped from their bodies and reshaped into a myriad of cultural signifiers.63 The maimed body of war must therefore be restored in a way that female and black bodies can never be restored/completed, reinscribing white masculine histories into the project of assistive military technologies for returned soldiers. For Yasmin Gunaratnam, ‘[r]ace and gender, in other words, complicate the cultural presence of disability’. 64 Thinking forward, through these re-readings of the material and discursive effects of subject formation, borne through the experience of citizenship and its various dislocations, and invisibly carried through legal categorisation, demands new modes of understanding and representing subjectivity. An alternative framing of subjectivity might thus begin with the notion of debility and the body, acknowledging thus the interrelated othering of racial and gendered others in the construction of legal subjectivity endured by modern man. Debility thus frames the future interface with technology as not rehabilitative, or restorative, but rather akin to the already-interface between technology and humans: a process that has a history as old as human invention. The technology of fire, for example, fundamentally altered human existence, changed her needs, patterns, and consumptions. Moreover, the contemporary use of technology has starkly changed the understanding of humanness, how humans live, interact, survive. At the same time both technology and humans impact on the livelihoods of nonhuman animals and of earth. To shift toward the notion of intertwined existence – or subjectivities – the exoskeleton has inspired me to see the human body as body-never-whole-never-complete and as ordinary in its dependencies on others, including nonhuman animals, matter, and technologies. Thus, drawing on Donna Reeves, it is necessary to recognise: For people with impairments, the hybridisation of machine/human or animal/human is often synonymous with lived experience, particularly for those with physical or sensory impairments … Potential cyborg figures can be seen in the wheelchair user, the person with a cochlear implant, artificial leg or pacemaker, someone who uses an assistance dog.65 While Reeve acknowledges the differential cultural readings of different technologies, their gendered meanings, the economic privileges required for access, the dependencies, and the increased means of medical surveillance technologies invoked must also be heeded. Reeve argues, ‘[r]ather than seeing technology as “fixing” impaired people in normative ways (and therefore to be rejected), it is more productive to see the new ways of being in the world that emerge from living as cyborg’. 66 Thus, to see the debilitated body67 as motif for reimagining subjectivity requires recognition of the ways the conceptualisation of modernist man has always rendered the non-male, non-heterosexual/heteronormative body as not only othered but debilitated. Feminist theorising on subjectivity and feminist legal projects might thus take the othered body as the conceptual lens to engage the nonhuman, matter, and technology. Viva la Frida! The impact is techno caste system ordering those who have modified their bodies and those who have not Fahn 20 (Chia Wei Fahn is an Assistant Professor in the Masters of Occupational Therapy Program, Perfecting Bodies: Who Are the Disabled in Andrew Niccol’s Gattaca?, https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/5/2/6, 4/1/20) The social model of disability identifies systemic barriers and social exclusion as the main contributing factors in disabling people [18,34,35]. Gattaca depicts a new social model of disability, displacing the role of current physical norms in a “cascading series of replacements reminiscent of Derrida’s ideas of deferral or deferring—one replacement replacing another” [9] (p. 78). A social model of disability is employed here to show disability as a socially constructed identity. Niccol brings to public attention a provocative discourse on the issues that arise with the blind acceptance of genetic determinism and disabling the able-bodied. The disabled are genetically stigmatized, offspring of “those parents who, for moral or, more likely economic reasons, refrain from tampering with their offspring’s genetic makeup or who fail to abort a deprived fetus” that “condemn their children to a life of routine discrimination” [23] (p. 12). What began as a means to rid society of inheritable diseases has become a way to “design your offspring—the line between health and enhancement blurred forever” [23] (p. 36). The possibility of genetic manipulation extends the scope of ableism, and things we now accept as “normal”, such as myopia, obesity, and addiction, all present opportunities to perfect the species. Thinking back to the day of his birth, Vincent nostalgically remarks that “not so long ago, I would have been considered a perfectly normal, healthy baby. Ten fingers, ten toes. That was all that used to matter” [23] (p. 13). In a world where genetic screening is prerequisite to procreating, however, he is categorized as “[o]ficially [as] ‘In-Valids,’ also known as ‘godchildren’ . . . ‘deficients’, ‘defectives’, ‘geno-junk’ . . . ‘the fucked-up people’” [23] (p. 13). Average physical and intellectual normality is no longer the social ideal with the widespread administration of genomic treatments, causing normal and able bodies by today’s definition to gradually become part of the disabled and disenfranchised. Genetic editing extends the boundaries of ableist ideology to view all unaltered bodies as disabled, potentially opening an oppressive social caste that is more exclusive than the present disability dichotomy. Johnson Cheu’s essay, “De-gene-erates, Replicants and Other Aliens: (Re)defining Disability in Futuristic Film”, addresses future shifts in the social model of disability, arguing “if disability, as a social construction, exists on more than a theoretical plane, disability should be present as a social stigma in the future . . . which occupy a social stigma of being unfit, sub-human, inferior, that shows the very existence of disability as a social construction” [36] (p. 202). Disability in Gattaca remains a fixed category which humanity cannot transcend, “an atavism representing the remainder of normal at the end of normal” [9] (p. 14). Regarding genomics’ impact on the social political as well as economic class structures, Gattaca subverts the belief that genetic engineering betters lives for those who live with disabilities with an emphasis on the dissonance between promised potential and social reality. Unscreened births are categorized as “the ‘healthy ill’. They don’t actually have anything yet—they may never. But since few of the pre-conditions can be cured or reversed, it is easier to treat them as if they were already sick” [23] (p. 37). Genetic editing led to an amplified expression of ableism in human society, by decreeing those we deem normal by today’s standards the healthy disabled, “an unfinished and inherently malfunctioning organism” [8] (p. 260). Niccol predicts a future when our entire population is presumed to be in need of a cure. An “error free” biological profile becomes the sole determinant of ableism, an eradication of the “norm” we are accustomed to leads to further polarization of social and economic classes. Vincent’s self-perception is severely influenced by those surrounding him, a continuous undermining of his efforts in life while “from an early age I came to think of myself as others thought of me—chronically ill. Every skinned knee and runny nose treated as if it were life-threatening” [23] (p. 13). Niccol articulates genetic technology’s impact on society, examining how fundamentals in labor, class, and disability are redefined through the rise of genomics to form “a relation of power and substitution continuing from the social to the genetic” [9] (p. 81). For better or worse, genetic manipulation pushes the boundaries of what is previously considered as the human norm; all bodies are seen as “limited, defective and in need of constant improvement beyond species-typical boundaries” [37] (p. 254). The alt is a centering of disabled perspectives through crip technoscience Hamraie and Fritsch 19 (Aimi Hamraie is an Associate Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society at Vanderbilt University, Kelly Fritsch works in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, , Crip Technoscience Manifesto, https://catalystjournal.org/index.php/catalyst/article/view/29607, 4/1/19) Disabled people are experts and designers of everyday life. But we also harness technoscience for political action, refusing to comply with demands to cure, fix, or eliminate disability. Attentive to the intersectional workings of power and privilege, we agitate against independence and productivity as requirements for existence. Building upon earlier work defining crip technoscience as politicized design activism (Hamraie, 2015, 2017), we articulate four political commitments of crip technoscience as a field of critical scholarship, practice, and activism.2In framing crip technoscience as such, we follow feminist technoscience studies by describing both a realm of practice and a field of knowing that has emerged from it. Crip technoscience braids together two provocative concepts: “crip,” the non-compliant, anti-assimilationist position that disability is a desirable part of the world, and “technoscience,” the co-production of science, technology, and political life (Jasanoff, 2004; Murphy, 2012). Crip theory centers disability as a locus of resistance against “compulsory ablebodiedness” (McRuer, 2006)and “ablenationalism” (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015), agitating against liberal assimilation and inclusion practices bymarkingdisability as a desirably generativeand creativerelational practice (Fritsch, 2015a).We seek to bring crip theory and feminist technoscience into closer contact, exploring their generative frictions. In some respects, the field of disability studies has been entangled with science and technology studies (STS)—and feminist STS in particular—since its origins, especially through its critiques of biomedicine and militarism and in its embrace of situated epistemologies.In naming crip technoscience, we invoke long histories of feminist, queer, anti-racist, and disability collaborative praxis, such as in technoscience projects engaging Universal Design, sensory engineering, reproductive justice, and HIV/AIDS activism.2However, to date, criptheorists have had limited engagement with the criticalconcept of technoscience, particularly as it is used in feminist STS to mean the productive and non-innocent entanglement of scientific knowing and technological making.3This limited engagement has yielded an ahistorical position that science, technology, and medicine are anathema to crip world-remaking, ignoring disabled peoples’ ongoing, creative, and open-ended appropriations of science, technology,and medicine,particularlyinacts of protest and “epistemic activism” (Hamraie, 2012, 2017, p. 132). Crip technoscience thus calls forth Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha’s concept of “crip science” (2018, p. 69)to highlight the skills, wisdom, resources, and hacks disabled people utilize for navigating and altering inaccessible worlds. In pushing crip technoscience as a field of research and a practice of critical “knowing-making” (Hamraie,2017, p. 99), we conjure frictional practices of access production, acknowledging that science and technology can be used to both produce and dismantle injustice. As a field of study, crip technoscience begins from the feminist politics of technoscientific “non-innocence”(Haraway, 1991), acknowledging that many of the technologies that have enabled disabled people to gain access to the social world have been produced through military-industrial research and development, imperial and colonial relations, and ecological destruction, all of which contribute to the uneven debilitation of human and non-human life (Erevelles, 2011; Fritsch, 2015b; Kafer, 2013; Puar, 2017). Nevertheless, we contend that technoscience can be a transformative tool for disability justice.We contrast crip technosciencewith mainstream “disability technoscience” as a field of traditional expertrelations andpractices concerned with designingfordisabledpeople rather than withor bydisabled people. In mainstream disability technoscience, such fixes are understood as de facto goods, services for (supposedly) unfortunate disabled people, and ultimately depoliticized. Disability technoscience positions enhancement and capacitation as progressive moves to overcome disability. “Hackathons” led by charity organizations embody innovation-for-innovation’s sake and definedisability as a problemin search of a solution (Wong, 2015a,2015b). Disabled people are often treated purely as clients or users. For example, the organization Tikkun Olam Makers (TOM) describes disabled people as “need knowers” and non-disabled designers and engineers as “solution experts.” Riffing on the term special needs, which associates disabled people with minority interests outside of majority norms, these designations reinforce the division between disabled people as passive recipients of access or assistive technologies and non-disabled designers, developers, and technologists as experts. Disability technoscience reinforces the sense that disabled people are not already making, hacking, and tinkering with existing material arrangements. Disability is cast as an object of innovation discourse, rather than as a driver of technological change. Melanie Yergeau (2014) historicizes mainstream disability “hacktivism,” arguing that hackathons have become the “new telethon” in that they frame “disability as pitiable and in need of remediation.”4In response, Yergeau invokes “criptastic hacking”as a “disability-led movement, rather than a series of apps and patches and fixes designed by non-disabled people who cannot even be bothered to talk with disabled people.” Criptastic hacking highlights crip technoscience asa field of relations, knowledges, and practices that enables the flourishing of crip ways of producing and engaging the material world Links Link --- AI AI development homogenizes disability and labels disabled bodies as “Burdens” Shew 20 - (Ashley Shew 20 ; Ashley Shew is an Associate Professor in Science, Technology, and Society at Virginia Tech, where she participates in the STS PhD program, the Medicine & Society minor, the Disability Studies minor, the Bioethics graduate certificate, and Integra
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