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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - Security K - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW

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AT: Security
Securitization theory problematic
Essentialist/narrow
Securitization is narrow – solely focused on dominant actors and threats to security
Šulovic, 10 --- BCSP Intern (Vladimir Šulovic, " Meaning of Security and the Theory of Securitization", 10/5/10, PDC, http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00006385/01/Security_Theory_Securitization.pdf)//EG
The securitization framework has been a useful tool to analysts who want to challenge the notion of the objectivity of security threats. The framework is elegant and has generated much academic interest and sparked the number of critiques and debates, aiming to broaden and further specify the framework in order to increase its logical coherence and explanatory power. However important and innovative contribution to our understanding of security may it be, the securitization framework is problematically narrow. First, the form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the main focus on the speech of dominant actors, usually political leaders, which encourages an interpretation that securitization is only happening when there are discursive interventions of those who are institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of a particular political community (usually a state). This also excludes a focus on other forms of representations, such as images or material practices. (McDonald, 2008: 564). Thus, the focus is on the speech and its performative power to construct security. At the same time, the conceptual framework of securitization puts a special emphasis on the acceptance of the audience which is claimed to be essential in the successful securitization process. Contextual factors, which the Copenhagen school terms facilitating conditions, help explain why some securitizing moves are more likely to be accepted by the audience than the other. These facilitating conditions are taken as givens that either help or hinder securitization but are not conceptualized as constitutive of the speech acts, which is at odds with the claim that security is a social construction. There is tension between understanding securitization as a productive process by focusing on the performative power of the speech act, and as a constructed process by claiming that security is intersubjectively constituted. This tension gave rise to critique by the so-called Second Generation of securitization analysts who argue that securitization can not be properly understood outside historical and cultural context in which security discourse takes place. Thus, the very meaning of security is contextual. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security (McDonald, 2008: 564). This claim is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Waever, 1995: 56). Sometimes it is more effective if security is conceptualized in terms of normative goals that should be achieved or expression of the core values that are in need of being protected, than if it is articulated only in terms of “from what and from whom it needs protection”. Thus, seeing security as something negative per se does not represent a logical imperative anymore.
Securitization’s focus on dominant voices silences marginal populations
McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG
To date I have focused on the ‘narrowness’ of the securitization framework in analytical terms, suggesting the possibility for strengthening the framework by drawing out important elements of context and different forms of representation, for example, while also pointing to the limits and tensions within the framework that might make this difficult. I have also suggested in these contexts that it is important to avoid viewing the framework as shorthand for the broader construction of security. The question of which actors’ representations are viewed as significant within this framework, however, entails important normative commitments and has important normative implications. Put simply, the securitization framework focuses on articulations capable of leading to change in practice, with the default position being a focus on the ‘securitizations’ of political leaders who are able to achieve a wide audience in their statements and interventions, and who are able to marshal the resources of the state to respond European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 574 to the existential threat. As Wæver (1995: 57) argues, ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’. Such a focus serves to marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics, presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively consent to or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite discourses. In perhaps the clearest statement of this limitation, Lene Hansen (2000) has discussed the ways in which the focus on speech acts means contributing to the silencing of women, whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is neglected in a framework that focuses on the articulations of the powerful: of those whose voices can be heard and of those whose successful attempts at securitization can result in the enactment of emergency measures. Such a framework clearly has little to say about the plight of the most vulnerable in global politics and their experiences of — and engagement with — security and threat. Indeed for Hansen, the Copenhagen School does not simply neglect the experiences of women but in fact serves to further marginalize them. ‘If security is a speech act’, Hansen (2000: 306) suggests, ‘then it is simultaneously deeply implicated in the production of silence’. In many ways this focus on dominant voices in the construction of security is not a problem for the Copenhagen School alone. Traditional security proponents and some post-structuralists limit the number of actors deemed important in security terms in focusing on either state policy or dominant discourses. While Copenhagen School proponents allow the possibility for security actors and ‘securitizers’ other that state political leaders (Buzan et al., 1998: 31–3), this move is ultimately closed off by the dual suggestions that security is ultimately about states (e.g. Wæver, 1989: 314; Wæver, 1995: 47–9) and that security is articulated from a position of institutional power (Wæver, 1995: 57; Buzan et al., 1998: 32–3). The default position here is therefore a focus on the political leaders of states and their designations of threat. The methodological focus on speech acts might also be seen as relevant to this bias. As Jennifer Milliken (1999: 243–5) has argued, the tendency to ignore subjugated knowledge or voices is a general inclination within discourse analytical approaches to international relations. In short, the focus only on dominant voices and their designation of security and threat is normatively problematic, contributing to the silencing of marginal voices and ignoring the ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest these security constructions. But it also has problematic implications analytically. First, and echoing criticisms noted above, it pays insufficient attention to the means through which particular articulations of security and threat become possible: how, for example, are marginal actors and their articulations of security silenced or marginalized? Focusing on these marginalized or subjugated actors could point to some of the ways in McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 575 which ‘securitization’ becomes possible, expanding the emphasis on ‘contexts’ noted in the previous section. Second, it arguably encourages the particular logic of security which the Copenhagen School embraces. A range of (often marginal) actors contest dominant logics or discourses of security and threat through articulating alternative (even emancipatory) discourses of security and threat rather than simply arguing for ‘desecuritization’. Amnesty International’s campaign on human rights violations against Kurdish populations in Turkey in the 1990s, for example, particularly questioned the justification of these violations on the grounds of ‘security’. This was reflected in the title of its publication, Turkey: No Security Without Human Rights. For such actors, security (defined in non-statist, non-exclusionary and non-militaristic ways) can be a means for — or site of — emancipatory change. For the so-called Welsh School of critical security studies, focusing on the marginalized and ‘voiceless’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 159) points to the ways in which potentially exclusionary, statist and militaristic security discourses can be challenged and replaced without simply giving up on security as a political category. Here, it could be argued that the choice within the Copenhagen School to ultimately limit attention to powerful actors and voices blinds its proponents to the role of security as a site of competing discourses or images of politics, and even potentially as a site for emancipation. Narrowness in this context has important normative implications that those using the framework would do well to reflect upon.
ST excludes social security from its analysis and ignores how normal politics facilitate racial violence
Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19 --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG
Normal politics: pro democracy and free market govs/ govs that arent securitizing
Securitization theory similarly occludes the racial violence of normal (liberal) politics. This is not just a conceptual problem: it results in major empirical oversights. For example, though it contains the word ‘security’, securitization theory places social security outside of its frame of analysis, as part of ‘normal politics’: ‘Although it shares some qualities with “social security,” or security as applied to various civilian guard or police functions, international security has its own distinctive, more extreme meaning. Unlike social security, which has strong links to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). Securitization theory overlooks the power politics of social security and cannot see how Western welfare state social security systems support white (settler) heteropatriarchal forms of life, such as the nuclear family (Arvin et al., 2013; Cohen, 1997; Duggan, 2003; Kandaswamy, 2008), and disproportionately target racialized, indigenous, and poor communities for direct and violent interventions such as the removal of children from families through enslavement, the residential schools that formed part of the genocide of indigenous people, child welfare systems, migrant detention and removal, and so on. Closer to Copenhagen: Denmark now uses socialized daycare as a means for removing and assimilating Muslim children (Salem, 2018). Social and national security are imbricated. For example, current Islamophobic counter-terrorism programs often use social and health services to identify suspected ‘terrorists’ (Kundnani, 2014; Qurashi, 2018; Qureshi, 2015). Social security only entails ‘entitlement and social justice’ for those privileged by whiteness, heterosexuality, citizenship, and/or class status. Securitization theory’s civilizationist idealization of ‘normal politics’ occludes these dynamics.
ST makes it impossible to understand how securitizations manifests in different contexts by not analyzing the position of the audience
McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG
Not the speech act that matters but the reaction – instead of critiquing the lang of the 1ac they should be analyzing reactions to it -
Related to the above focus on the role of linguistic practices, it is also possible to argue that the securitization framework is problematically narrow in McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 571 its focus on the speech act relative to the social and political context in which the act itself occurs. Indeed, this is a problem acknowledged (but not fundamentally redressed) in Buzan et al. (1998).12 Put simply, in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts the Copenhagen School ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors — such as dominant narratives of identity — that condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security. This is particularly curious given that Wæver has explored these contexts in detail elsewhere, linking security perspectives and actions to narratives of history and identity in European contexts (Wæver, 1996; Hansen and Wæver, 2001). To the extent that there is engagement with the context of the speech act in the Copenhagen School, it has come in three central forms. The first is to suggest that we can see dynamics of securitization playing out in different ‘sectors’. For these theorists, the designation of threat looks different in the context of military concerns than environmental ones, for example. Perhaps most prominent in these distinctions is that between societal and state sectors (Wæver et al., 1993), the former defined in terms of the preservation of preferred identities and the latter in terms of the preservation of sovereignty (usually defined as non-intervention). This draws an important analytical distinction between often conflated referents of nation and state. However, the division between sectors does not go far enough in recognizing context, focusing only on different dynamics of securitization across different issue areas rather than on the processes through which these security referents are themselves given meaning. And as Roxanne Lynn Doty argues (1998/9), drawing meaningful analytical distinctions between these sectors is sometimes difficult and often unhelpful. Political leaders can and do simultaneously invoke sovereignty and identity as that in need of preservation, and attempting to compartmentalize security dynamics can obscure broader forms of discursive continuity in approaches to issues as disparate as immigration, environmental change and traditional military practices in particular historical or social contexts.13 The second form of engagement with contextual factors concerns the role of so-called ‘facilitating conditions’, referring to those dynamics, developments and institutional contexts that enable ‘securitizing moves’ to become successful. Here, Ole Wæver (2000: 252–3), echoing the discussion in Buzan et al. (1998: 31–3), has identified the importance of the form of the speech act; the role of the securitizing actor; and the ‘conditions historically associated with that threat’. The recognition of the latter two of these conditions — most prominently the third — certainly moves towards addressing the role of context. The problem here is more simply that this potentially important insight — which takes us beyond a set of strict criteria to be met in terms of the act of securitizing — is not incorporated within the securitization European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 572 framework itself, which focuses overwhelmingly on the peformative role of the speech act rather than the conditions in which securitization itself becomes possible (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 72). It is not a coincidence that this dimension of the securitization framework remains under-theorized: examining historical ‘experiences’ with threat designation calls for a looser and highly interpretative approach to analysis which potentially conflicts with the development of a neat and coherent set of ‘requirements’ to be met for securitization. Finally, the securitization framework engages with contextual factors in acknowledging the role of audiences and the importance of security pronouncements being ‘backed up’. This recognition would seem to be central to the broader recognition of the importance of context in the designation of security and threat, but there are two limitations here. The first is that, quite simply, what being ‘backed up’ means, how we know when it happens and what the implications are when it does not are radically under-theorized in the Copenhagen School. While recognizing that security is inter-subjectively constructed, the focus on the speech act as performing security arguably paints security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation. Thierry Balzacq (2005) has suggested that the role of audiences is underspecified because of Wæver’s reliance on Austin’s theorization of language. Here, the work is done by the articulation itself rather than the result of a negotiation between the articulator and the audience at whom the articulation is directed. More specifically, the power of the speech act would appear to be undermined by the full incorporation of the idea that the act itself is only one part of the securitizing process: that it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies. There are certainly opportunities here for counter-readings on this point. While retaining an emphasis on the productive nature of speech, Judith Butler (1997), for example, has suggested that Austin’s conception of the speech act implies the possibility that they can be either ‘perlocutionary’ (necessary for enabling particular actions) or ‘illocutionary’ (performing a function at the moment of speech). Allowing the possibility that speech acts are perlocutionary potentially enables greater attention to audiences who might either consent to particular actions suggested through speech or engage in contesting the terms of the speech act or the actions suggested in response to it (Butler, 1997: 15). An alternative interpretation of the speech act might be that it serves to construct or produce the audience itself.14 Further, it might be suggested that the role audiences play is in helping to constitute speech communities in which particular forms of representation are intelligible and legitimate and others unintelligible and illegitimate (e.g. Fierke, 1997). These are all particular readings of the ‘speech act’ that at some level constitute attempts to come to terms with the production–construction distinction, McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 573 what Holger Stritzel (2007) has defined as an ‘internalist–externalist’ distinction. The challenge for the securitization framework in this sense is that the above are quite different in their conception of 

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