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2022 Michigan Affirmative

Aff - Cyborg Writing - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

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Aff – Cyborg Writing – BFHR 7wk
Thanks to Nikki Raman for their hard work on this file! Please email khirn10@gmail.com with any comments or concerns
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Queer life is prestructured by chrononormativity – temporal linearity organizes life into staged sequences of maximum productivity in service of capital and statecraft. To have a life, to embody one’s flesh, is to belong to the state’s timeline of linear movement that brackets out the “excessive” and “unproductive” past unless it contributes to national futurity. Debate itself is structured by this temporal linearity – the resolutional demand for action is the generative point for zones of excess violence. Out of the narratives of chronobiopolitics emerges the sexual dissident of queerness, the anachronism, the flicker of history and pastness, that interrupts the sequence of cisheteronormativity and must immediately be effaced.
Freeman ’10 -- Professor of English at UC Davis, began her teaching career at Sarah Lawrence College, coming to UC Davis in 2000. She specializes in American literature and gender/sexuality/queer studies, and her articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals (Elizabeth Freeman, "Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories," Perverse Modernities: A Series Edited by Jack Halberstam and Lisa Lowe, Duke University Press, 2010, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1198v7z, accessed 4-16-2021) -- nikki
By portraying the reciprocal derangement of bodies and sequences, K.I. P. offers a through-the-looking-glass view of how time binds a socius. By ‘‘binds,’’ I mean to invoke the way that human energy is collated so that it can sustain itself. By ‘‘time binds,’’ I mean something beyond the obvious point that people find themselves with less time than they need. Instead, I mean that naked flesh is bound into socially meaningful em- bodiment through temporal regulation: binding is what turns mere exis- tence into a form of mastery in a process I’ll refer to as chrononormativity, or the use of time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum productivity. And I mean that people are bound to one another, en- grouped, made to feel coherently collective, through particular orchestra- tions of time: Dana Luciano has termed this chronobiopolitics, or ‘‘the sexual arrangement of the time of life’’ of entire populations. Chrononormativity is a mode of implantation, a technique by which institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts. Schedules, calendars, time zones, and even wristwatches inculcate what the sociologist Evitar Zerubavel calls ‘‘hidden rhythms,’’ forms of temporal experience that seem natural to those whom they privilege. Manipulations of time con- vert historically specific regimes of asymmetrical power into seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines, which in turn organize the value and meaning of time. The advent of wage work, for example, entailed a violent retemporalization of bodies once tuned to the seasonal rhythms of agricultural labor. An even broader description of chrononormativity appears in Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion of habitus—a social group’s culti-vated set of gestural and attitudinal dispositions. Bourdieu argues that ‘‘the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations’’ structuring the norms of embodiment, personhood, and activity in a culture takes shape within the rhythms of gift exchange. For Bourdieu, cultural competence and thus belonging itself are matters of timing, of coming to inhabit a culture’s expectations about the temporal lapses be- tween getting and giving such that they seem inborn. More recently, Judith Butler has shown how the rhythms of gendered performance— specifically, repetitions—accrete to “freeze” masculinity and femininity into timeless truths of being. Zerubavel’s “hidden rhythms,” Bourdieu’s “habitus,” and Butler’s “gender performativity” all describe how repe- tition engenders identity, situating the body’s supposed truth in what Nietzsche calls ‘‘monumental time,’’ or static existence outside of histori- cal movement. But Bourdieu alone allows us to see that subjectivity emerges in part through mastering the cultural norms of withholding, delay, surprise, pause, and knowing when to stop—through mastery over certain forms of time. In temporal manipulations that go beyond pure repetition, his work suggests, institutionally and culturally enforced rhythms, or timings, shape flesh into legible, acceptable embodiment. In chronobiopolitics, this process extends beyond individual anato- mies to encompass the management of entire populations: people whose individual bodies are synchronized not only with one another but also with larger temporal schemae experience belonging itself as natural. In a chronobiological society, the state and other institutions, including repre- sentational apparatuses, link properly temporalized bodies to narratives of movement and change. These are teleological schemes of events or strate- gies for living such as marriage, accumulation of health and wealth for the future, reproduction, childrearing, and death and its attendant rituals. Indeed, as the anthropologist John Borneman’s work clarifies, so-called personal histories become legible only within a state-sponsored time- line. his timeline tends to serve a nation’s economic interests, too. In the United States, for instance, states now license, register, or certify birth (and thus citizenship, eventually encrypted in a Social Security id for taxpaying purposes), marriage or domestic partnership (which privatizes caretaking and regulates the distribution of privatized property), and death (which terminates the identities linked to state benefits, redistribut- ing these benefits through familial channels), along with sundry privileges like driving (to jobs and commercial venues) and serving in the military (thus incurring state expenditures that often serve corporate interests). In the eyes of the state, this sequence of socioeconomically ‘‘productive’’ moments is what it means to have a life at all. And in zones not fully reducible to the state—in, say, psychiatry, medicine, and law—having a life entails the ability to narrate it not only in these state-sanctioned terms but also in a novelistic framework: as event-centered, goal-oriented, in- tentional, and culminating in epiphanies or major transformation. The logic of time-as-productive thereby becomes one of serial cause-and- effect: the past seems useless unless it predicts and becomes material for a future. These teleologies of living, in turn, structure the logic of a “peo- ple’s” inheritance: rather than just the transfer of private property along heteroreproductive lines, inheritance becomes the familial and collective legacy from which a group will draw a properly political future—be it national, ethnic, or something else. Chronobiopolitics harnesses not only sequence but also cycle, the dia- lectical companion to sequence, for the idea of time as cyclical stabilizes its forward movement, promising renewal rather than rupture. And as Julia Kristeva argues, the gender binary organizes the meaning of this and other times conceived as outside of—but symbiotic with—linear time. Kristeva claims that Woman, as a cultural symbol, comes to be correlated with the endless returns of cyclical time, as well as the stasis of monu- mental time: the figure of Woman supplements the historically specific nation-state with appeals to nature and eternity. Luciano dates a par- ticularly Anglo-American version of this arrangement to the early nine- teenth century, when ‘‘separate spheres’’ were above all temporal: the repetitions and routines of domestic life supposedly restored working men to their status as human beings responding to a ‘‘natural’’ environ- ment, renewing their bodies for reentry into the time of mechanized production and collective national destiny. In the wake of industrializa- tion in the United States, she writes, mourning was newly reconcep- tualized as an experience outside of ordinary time, as eternal, recurrent, even sacred—and so, I would argue, were any number of other affective modes. Mid-nineteenth-century writers figured maternal love, domestic bliss, romantic attachments, and eventually even bachelorhood as havens from a heartless world and, more importantly, as sensations that moved according to their own beat. The emerging discourse of domesticity, especially, inculcated and validated a set of feelings—love, security, har- mony, peace, romance, sexual satisfaction, motherly instincts—in part by figuring them as timeless, as primal, as a human condition located in and emanating from the psyche’s interior. In this sense, the nineteenth cen-tury’s celebrated ‘‘heart,’’ experienced by its owner as the bearer of archaic or recalcitrant sensations, was the laboring body’s double, the flip side of the same coin of industrialization. The fact that the wage system privat- ized domestic activities also meant that they could be experienced as taking place in a different time zone. In the home, time bound persons “back” to “nature,” a state of innocence that could be understood as restorative only if women’s domestic labor were fully effaced. If time becomes history through its organization into a series of discrete units linked by cause and effect, this organization in turn retrospectively con- structs an imagined plenitude of “timeless” time to which history can return and regroup. Thus the monumental or sacred time that Kristeva also describes as ‘‘Women’s Time’’ does not escape chronobiopolitical regulation either. Luciano’s crucial extension of and intervention into Kristeva’s work dem- onstrates that nations and other public forms of engroupment depend not only on progressive, linear time and the cyclical time that buttresses it but also on the illusion that time can be suspended. Pauses or interrup- tions in the routinized rhythms of everyday life, in the sequences expected to unfold naturally from one another, become the material for a people- hood experienced as pre- or a-political, as merely human. In describing the narrative texture of modern nationality, Homi Bhabha too refines the distinction between linear-historical time and the more static times of cyclic and monumental time: he describes the dialectic between a ‘‘peda- gogical’’ time in which historical events seem to accrete toward a given destiny, and a ‘‘performative’’ time in which a people recreates itself as such through taking up a given activity simultaneously. Soliciting the masses to stop and feel together, activities done in tandem with strangers seen and unseen, like singing the national anthem or watching the Olym- pics, revivify national belonging as a matter of shared emotion rather than civic action. Bhabha claims that within performative strategies of national belonging, fissures can open up to suggest other historical moments or ways of living. And indeed, as Luciano points out, in counterpoint to the time of factory life in the antebellum United States, a set of ‘‘performa- tive’’ sensations and corporeal forms was imagined, or even felt, not just as a contribution to national destiny but also as an impediment to or bulwark against the pedagogical time of history proper. Mourning and romance, empathy and affection were not segmented into clock-time, even if highly ritualized public performances like courtship and grieving did follow timelines; the sentiments and their perceived rhythms coun-tered ‘‘work time’’ even as they were also a product of it. So did the time of specific bodily needs. As Eli Zaretsky writes, ‘‘The family, attuned to the natural rhythms of eating, sleeping, and child care, can never be wholly synchronized with the mechanized tempo of industrial capital- ism.” Emotional, domestic, and biological tempos are, though cultur- ally constructed, somewhat less amenable to the speeding up and micro- management that increasingly characterized U.S. industrialization. Time’s Wounds As Luciano puts it, in the dialectic between linear-national history and cyclical-domestic time, history appears as damaged time; time appears as the plentitude that heals the historical subject. Time, then, not only “binds” flesh into bodies and bodies into social but also appears to ‘‘bind’’ history’s wounds. But the figure of damaged time also became the signa- ture of late-nineteenth-century decadence and modernism. Of course, the appearance of sexual identity as a field of knowledge and self-description was part of a more general movement toward the abstraction and tax- onomizing of human qualities, the reification of both space and time, that began with industrial capitalism. In this sense, homosexual identity was simply the product of a historical moment in time. But sexual dissi- dents have also in many ways been produced by, or at least emerged in tandem with, a sense of “modern” temporality. The double-time of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was somewhat different from the highly gendered, sacred time of antebellum domesticity: rather than evoking timelessness, it trafficked in signs of fractured time. Its signature was interruptive archaisms: flickering signs of other histori- cal moments and possibilities that materialized time as always already wounded. Thus gay men, lesbians, and other ‘‘perverts’’ have also served as figures for history, for either civilization’s decline or a sublimely fu- turistic release from nature, or both. Here we might cite, for instance, the poet Renée Vivien’s Sapphic vampires, the novelist Djuna Barnes’s hybrid animal/child/lesbian Robin Vote, or T. S. Eliot’s sexually alien- ated J. Alfred Prufrock declaring himself to be ‘‘Lazarus, come from the dead!’’ Sexual dissidents became figures for and bearers of new cor- poreal sensations, including those of a certain counterpoint between now and then, and of occasional disruptions to the sped-up and hyperregu- lated time of industry. Freud’s concept of the unconscious acknowledged exactly this doubled time: it relocated modernity’s temporal splittings into the psyche’s in- terior (and thus from their moorings in historically specific changes). Freud theorized the ‘‘normal’’ self as a temporal phenomenon, the ego as a manifestation of displaced and disavowed past experiences. The Freud- ian unconscious refused to make an experience obsolete or to relegate it to the past; within the Freudian paradigm that Laplanche and Pontalis term Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, the mind recorded the signs of an event when the subject could not consciously process its meaning, and preserved these signs for future uses.≤≥ So even as an emerging consumer market and what Foucault calls the ‘‘incitement to discourse’’ about sexual types put an ever greater premium on novelty, the interlaced models of the unconscious and Nachträglichkeit insisted on a certain semiotic re- calcitrance. And in Freud, what we might now claim as a queer intem- pestivity evidenced itself in and with the body as well as the emotions. The repetitions and returns that disturb the Freudian subject appear not as pictorial or narrative memories per se but in forms that are at once metaphorical and visceral: a ‘‘slip of the tongue,’’ repetitive bodily acts, lingering symptoms with no apparent physical etiology. In this sense, the ‘‘perverse’’ Freudian body itself became the scene of and catalyst for en- countering and redistributing the past. This was particularly true of the body erotic. As early as the eighteenth century, Henry Abelove and Paul Morrison have argued, erotic life began to assume the contours of mechanized productivity, and specific sexual practices came to be seen as ‘‘foreplay,’’ acceptable en route to intercourse but not as a substitute for it.≤∂ In Freud’s update, these practices were remnants of childhood itself, not merely adult means to an orgasmic end. Psychologizing what had once been biological paradigms, Freud identi- fied taboo sexual practices as normal childhood behavior in which the pathological adult subject was simply stuck or frozen due to an inability to remember, conceptualize, or narrate past events. Orality, anality, fe- tishism, and so onthat lie became, in the Freudian itinerary, places that chil- dren visited on their way to reproductive, genital heterosexuality, but not places to stay for long. This stubborn lingering of pastness (whether it appears as anachronis- tic style, as the reappearance of bygone events in the symptom, or as arrested development) is a hallmark of queer affect: a “revolution” in the old sense of the word, as a turning back. Heather Love’s Feeling Backward, for instance, astutely diagnoses the ‘‘backwards’’ emotions elaborated by artists for whom the birth of the modern homosexual identity-form was constraining rather than liberating: shame, passivity, melancholy, and recoil, to name but a few, were ways of refusing the progressive logic by which becoming ever more visible was correlated with achieving ever more freedom.≤∑ Late-nineteenth-century perverts, melancholically at- tached to obsolete erotic objects or fetishes they ought to have outgrown, or repeating unproductive bodily behaviors over and over, also used pas- tess to resist the commodity-time of speedy manufacture and planned obsolescence.
In the contemporary digital era emerging technologies are no longer material but rather are subjective and ideological constructions grounded in the erasure of queered difference – normative technological computation and the system of laws that proceed from it form an infrastructure of control structured to maximize the functionality of technology while effacing its inextricable relationship to queer life – only a queer digital aesthesis can solve.
Ruberg et al ’18 -- (Bonnie Ruberg, Jason Boyd, James Howe,2018, "Toward a Queer Digital Humanities," University of Minnesota Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5749/j.ctv9hj9r9.11.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ab631047a0664f3e40ceb61daa13f4225&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6451%2Fcontrol&origin=search-results, accessed 7-15-2022) -- nikki
Queer DH Methodologies: Inspiration from Existing Work While queer studies can usefully employ DH tools and practices to produce scholarship focused on queer subjects, it is also important to examine how queer theory can inform current and future digital humanities methodologies. One of the key areas of debate in DH is the role that computing plays in differentiating DH from other modes of humanities scholarship. Some have argued that the digital humanities’ narrow focus on computation has led the field to imagine itself, supposedly like computation itself, as free from concerns of economics, race, gender, and sexuality. As Alan Liu observes, “While digital humanists develop tools, data, and metadata critically . . . rarely do they extend their critique to the full register of society, economics, politics, or culture. How the digital humanities advances, channels, or resists today’s great postindustrial, neoliberal, corporate, and global flows of information-cum-capital is thus a question rarely heard in the digital humanities” (Liu, web). Liu goes on to argue that DH must develop a “methodological infrastructure” that unites computational and cultural criticism. Similarly, Roopika Risam, in her essay on intersectionality in DH, suggests four areas in which the digital humanities need to develop in order to create a more inclusive and socially engaged standard of practice: “cultivating a diverse community,” “acknowledging inclusions and exclusions in data,” applying “theoretical models that position intersectionality as an already existing but oft-overlooked part of computation,” and developing systems “for understanding the ways difference [or lack thereof] shapes digital practices” (Risam). Liu’s and Risam’s critiques make it clear that currently dominant DH methodologies are not sufficient for the development of a queerly inflected digi

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