Neg - OCOs 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
Neg - OCOs 2 - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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Neg – OCOs 2 – BFHR 7wk Notes Thanks a ton to Chanden Climaco, Brandon Yang, and Marshall Green for their work on this file. Wave 2 of OCO’s aff/neg builds upon the starter pack OCO’s aff/neg file --- the NSA and Cybercom Tradeoff DA’s are designed to ideally apply to as many cyber affs as possible. The NSA DA in this file doesn’t reproduce every card in the starter pack. The aff section includes AT: new disads, a new zero-days mod, and various aff patchwork updates. Please email khirn10@gmail.com with any questions or concerns CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA CYBERCOM Tradeoff DA 1NC CYBERCOM DA CYBERCOM DA. CYBERCOM is securing election integrity now, but resources are key. Malbot 5/5, Malware News, 5/05/2022, “Nakasone to remain at helm of NSA, Cyber Command for at least one more year,” https://malware.news/t/nakasone-to-remain-at-helm-of-nsa-cyber-command-for-at-least-one-more-year/59887, Marsh The command, in particular, saw its authorities and responsibilities greatly expanded by the Trump administration and Congress. Most notably, Cyber Command — backed by intelligence from the NSA — has taken a central role in keeping U.S. elections free of foreign interference. In 2018, the military launched a campaign called Operation Synthetic Technology to protect the midterm elections that year. The effort saw the command deploy “hunt forward” teams to Eastern Europe; send direct messages to Russian disinformation operators letting them know that they had been identified; and launch an offensive strike that temporarily knocked the Internet Research Agency — an entity notorious for trying to sow discord among Americans — offline in the days around the election. The organizations also took action against Iranian hackers backed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the run-up to the 2020 election. The hackers posed as a far-right group to send threatening emails to American voters and posted a video to shake confidence in the U.S. voting process. Speaking at Vanderbilt, Nakasone said the U.S. would face “many more” such threats in the future. The plan trades-off and hinders future cyber developments. Ben FitzGerald 14, adjunct senior fellow at CNAS; Lt Col. Parker Right some military bro, 4/1/2014, “Digital Theaters: Decentralizing Cyber Command and Control,” Center for a New American Security, pp 16-18, JSTOR, Marsh Meeting military service cyber requirements is key to sustaining critical service investment in the development of cyber capability. The military services provide the trained cyber forces that USCYBERCOM employs. Although part of the joint cyber team, the services nonetheless expect that their service requirements and those of their service components at the combatant commands will be met in kind with their joint force contribution. If service cyber requirements are underserviced, the services will question their investment. For the services, cyber is a zero-sum game. Every additional unit of cyber costs them another unit of capacity elsewhere in the force. A theater cyber C2 structure that obscures service contributions or weakens the link between the service, its operational cyber units and its various service component requirements risks losing service interest and investment in developing cyber. Election integrity is vital to democracy---maintaining robust cyber defense and resources is key. Carrie Cordero 20, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow and General Counsel at CNAS, 11/12/2020, “How Cybersecurity Saved U.S. Democracy,” https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/how-cybersecurity-saved-u-s-democracy, Marsh According to a 12 November 2020 joint statement of U.S. election officials, the 2020 U.S. presidential election “was the most secure in American history.” That success was a result not of accident, but instead of deliberate, sustained, and comprehensive efforts at the local, state, and federal levels to ensure that it was secure from foreign interference. Those efforts to secure the election were borne out of the attempts by the Russian government to influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In the end, however, the efforts to enhance the cybersecurity of the U.S. electoral infrastructure in 2020 ended up protecting the integrity of the election not only from malign foreign activities, but also from domestic anti-democratic and illiberal efforts to undermine confidence in the 2020 presidential election. In 2020, the threats compounded as compared to 2016. A range of activities designed to protect the American election infrastructure from foreign malign activity ended up providing a bulwark against threatening domestic efforts to undermine and overturn the lawful election result. The U.S. experience in 2020 suggests that cybersecurity itself can play a critical role in protecting not only election infrastructure as a technical matter, but also providing a technical basis to counter illiberal forces as a mechanism to protect the democratic process of conducting a fair election. Cybersecurity itself just may have saved U.S. democracy from careening of the rails, continued sustained efforts to continue to harden election infrastructure cybersecurity and create a cadre of trusted officials, will likely be needed again. Democracy solves extinction Daniel Twining 21, PhD and President of the IRI, 10/10/2021, “America must double down on democracy,” https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/575693-america-must-double-down-on-democracy?rl=1, Marsh Democracy is under assault. China and Russia are pursuing strategic campaigns to undermine liberal values and U.S. leadership. Authoritarians from Belarus to Burma brutalize their citizens to stay in power. The debacle of U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and our national soul-searching in the wake of the 20th anniversary of 9/11 led some to wonder if support for democracy should remain a component of American foreign policy. The hard truth is that a world that is less free is one that is less secure, stable and prosperous. The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies. There are no quick fixes, but the best antidotes to the challenges of great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive democratic institutions — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. American retrenchment and isolationism compound the danger. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western retreat only emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable trading relationships. Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any man — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6. 2NC---Uniqueness---Resources CYBERCOM’s budget is tight, but sufficient to cover its current tasks. Michael S. Rogers 18, former United States Navy admiral who served as the second commander of the United States Cyber Command giving a statement for a House Hearing, “HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION,” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg25869/html/CHRG-115hhrg25869.htm, cc As we begin the process of looking at the 2018 budget, I am interested to know to what extent you were able to factor in strategy and threats and sort of strategic thinking about what needs to be done as you put together the budget for Cyber Command and to what extent you have still been hamstrung by the BCA and by those cap numbers. Admiral Rogers. So like any entity, it is all about prioritization for us. So we spend a lot of time figuring out with finite resources, even with growth, with finite resources how are we going to prioritize. So our input for the fiscal year 2018 budget in truth in lending, we just rolled it out as a government, as a Department this afternoon, during the midday today, so I have not yet seen the specifics yet. I know what the broad number for us is, but I haven't seen the sub-elements of that, so I will talk broadly. I apologize, but I will talk broadly. For the 2018 input, we tried to identify those priorities. At a macro sense, in no particular order, I have been arguing manpower; investment in core capabilities; and then, number three, how can I accelerate number one and number two, how can I do both of those faster. Because in some ways, even though as the WannaCrypt ransomware issue that we have been going through shows, there is capability in the Department. There are a lot of motivated men and women who are doing some good work. We were not impacted by WannaCrypt, and that wasn't from a lack of effort. We had spent significant time starting in March asking ourselves how might this play out, how do we position ourselves in the case of--because Microsoft had put out the patch for the vulnerability. We, as Microsoft users, saw that and started asking ourselves how might an opponent attempt to exploit this vulnerability even as we were working to patch. It is one of the reasons why we use a defense in-depth strategy. There is no one single solution. There is no one single way to fix this problem. It is layers built on top of each other. That really has been the key to our success. So we are asking ourselves how can we do this faster. Every day, one of my biggest concerns is--and I have never really had this same viewpoint in almost 36 years of commissioned service--every day I literally think to myself, we are in a race to generate more capacity and more capability at the same time that I am watching a host of global actors do the exact same thing. And so we are trying to sustain both staying up with them, but, quite frankly, my objective is to get ahead of the problem set. I don't like reacting to things. It is not an effective or efficient way to do business, and I don't think that is what the Nation wants from us. So until I am able to bore into the specifics of the budget, that kind of gives you a broad sense of what I thought we needed to focus on. Ms. Cheney. So would you say, Admiral, that the budget as it has been proposed provides the resources necessary to regain superiority in areas that we have lost it? Admiral Rogers. It certainly moves us along that road, but no one should think for one moment that this mission set, not unlike some others, is going to require increased and sustained investment over time. This is not going to be a 1 or 2 years we have increased you by some reasonable number, which has been the case for the last 2 years, and that is all you are going to need. If you look at the scope of the challenges associated with this mission set and from where we are starting, we have got a lot of hard work ahead of us. They’re gaining more autonomy now but skate on thin ice. Lauren Williams 22, Senior Editor at FCW, 3/30/2022, “Cyber Command’s acquisition growing pains,” https://fcw.com/acquisition/2022/03/cyber-commands-acquisition-growing-pains/363836/, Marsh U.S. Cyber Command is still getting its footing when it comes to steering acquisitions, but more resources are needed especially as the command gains more autonomy over its buying and budget power. A Government Accountability Office report released March 30 found that while the command responsible for DOD’s cyberspace operations has matured its Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture, it doesn’t yet have the metrics needed to justify acquisitions of new capabilities. The report states that while Cyber Command has taken necessary steps to assess the value of JCWA acquisitions, it still needs to develop outcome-based metrics, per DOD policy, to track whether a capability is delivering what a mission requires. “The command has been slow to determine metrics, in part because of inexperience conducting Value Assessments and the challenge of accounting for other factors—like new cyber operations tactics—on mission outcomes,” the report states. “If Cyber Command does not develop outcome-based metrics to inform future Value Assessments, it risks not being able to understand whether and how new capabilities benefit the cyber warfighting mission.” JCWA acquisitions are largely software based and include the data management-centric Unified Platform, Persistent Cyber Training Environment, Joint Common Access Platform, and Joint Cyber Command and Control for situational awareness. Value assessments are evaluations used to determine whether a capability is worth the investment. The watchdog body recommended Cyber Command “develop outcome-based metrics” that would be used for future acquisition value assessments. DOD concurred with the recommendation but in its response noted that Cyber Command had asked for additional resources to [enhance] the command’s ability to develop in this area.” A decision on that is pending with the Office of Management and Budget, according to the report. identified steps it is taking to develop metrics for future Value Assessments. Workforce challenges But there are also resource challenges, particularly with the workforce, according to the report. Cyber Command officials described understaffing in its acquisitions offices as “creating an all-hands-on-deck atmosphere, with individuals attempting to address emergent issues regardless of their office’s role, rather than a more coordinated approach.” Additionally, officials told the GAO that staff in its JCWA Integration Office would need to expand from seven staff to 55 personnel to meet responsibilities. “It will take time to fill additional positions, in part, because Cyber Command officials said they must first justify and validate the command has a need before beginning to bolster the workforce in fiscal year 2025,” the report states. “Cyber Command has a workforce study underway that officials anticipate will be complete later in fiscal year 2022.” Cyber Command has long been looking to increase its acquisition capacity, which has been bolstered by recent legislation, lawmakers’ support, and budget requests. The Biden administration's 2023 budget requests for nearly $11.2 billion to be spent on cyber operations, would help create five new cyber teams, while also investing in improvements to cyber ranges used for training and exercises. Some of those funds would go to enhancing the command’s role in acquisition of cyberspace programs and capabilities, according to the request. CYBERCOM has enough resources to operate. Joshua Rovner 20, John Goodwin Tower Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University John Goodwin Tower Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, 9/14/2020, “More Aggressive and Less Ambitious: Cyber Command’s Evolving Approach,” https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/more-aggressive-and-less-ambitious-cyber-commands-evolving-approach/, Marsh This year, U.S. Cyber Command celebrated its tenth birthday. It has much to celebrate: It achieved the status of a unified combatant command, its budget is healthy, and its commander, Gen. Paul Nakasone, is popular on both sides of the aisle. Nakasone’s more aggressive posture in cyberspace — what the command calls persistent engagement — has won the support of policymakers and legislators who wanted to see action against those who had been targeting U.S. interests. Before, U.S. cyber forces had shown restraint even in the face of repeated cyber attacks. Now, they will reach out into cyberspace to discover and mitigate threats before they could reach U.S. networks and damage U.S. interests. 2NC---Uniqueness---Ukraine Ukraine ops were small-scale AND shrouded in secrecy---can’t vote for a thumper you know nothing about! Sean Lyngaas 6/2, CNN’s cybersecurity reporter, 6/02/2022, “US confirms military hackers have conducted cyber operations in support of Ukraine,” https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/02/politics/us-hackers-ukraine-support/index.html, cc "We've conducted a series of operations across the full spectrum; offensive, defensive, [and] information operations," General Paul Nakasone said in an interview with Sky News. A spokesperson for the command did not dispute the accuracy of the article but declined to elaborate on what the command's operations in Ukraine have entailed. It's a rare public acknowledgment from US military officials of hacking operations that are often shrouded in mystery. Nakasone's comments, and the White House's response to them, suggest that cyberspace is a domain in which the Biden administration feels comfortable countering Russia without fear of escalation. President Joe Biden has pledged not to engage directly with Russia militarily during the Ukraine war so long as the US and its allies aren't attacked. Pro-Russia online operatives falsely claimed Zelensky committed suicide in an effort to sway public opinion, cybersecurity firm says Pro-Russia online operatives falsely claimed Zelensky committed suicide in an effort to sway public opinion, cybersecurity firm says "We don't see it as such," White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said Wednesday when asked at a news conference whether Cyber Command's actions contradicted Biden's pledge. Officials from Biden on down have for months warned about the threat of retaliatory Russian cyberattacks against US infrastructure after the US and its allies imposed sweeping sanctions on the Kremlin over its war in Ukraine. While analysts have proffered a range of theories, including improvements in US defenses, for why such a hack hasn't apparently happened yet, US officials tell CN
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