K - Fem IR - Starter - Michigan 7 2022
K - Fem IR - Starter - Michigan 7 2022.docx
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1NC File Notes This is the Wave 1 / Starter Pack Fem IR K for the 2022-2023 High School Policy Topic (NATO/EMERGING TECH) File creator: Dr. Sydney Pasquinelli (sydneypasquinelli@gmail.com) Plans for Improvement: There will be updated file and/or supplemental files released, by the “K lab,” throughout the UMICH 7 week debate camp Summary of Negative Argument Meta Level: Vulnerability is inevitable & ontological Link: The aff tries to securitize against vulnerability in IR Impact: “Protection Racket” The build up of offensive military strategies in the name of national defense / security… Turns case b/c it makes wars more likely Chivalric protectionism solidifies unethical gendered hierarchies Alt: To embrace vulnerability Alt is a prerequisite to – Solving the inevitable aff impacts Positive peace (Try or die for the alt) Ethical modes of doing IR (Breaking down hierarchies) SHELLS 1NC Shell - Long 1. The AFF attempt to securitize against geopolitical vulnerabilities produces more violence than it prevents – their politics of chivalric impact avoidance constitutes a “protection racket” that justifies the intensification of militarization Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 75-78 (SPP). While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), a closer look shows that the discourse of the protection racket is actually offensive in three distinct ways. First, it leads states to value offense in order to be the best possible protectors, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection. Second, it allows militaries aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and to start aggressive wars to protect those in need. 81 Third, insomuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, the protection racket can be associated with the increased likelihood of pursuing offensive military strategies. The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others.” Discourses of chivalrous masculinity served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics in World War I possible but also to constitute a set of gendered power relations that posited white men as protectors of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women. Examples of the influence of the protection racket on perceived offensive dominance and the cult of the offensive are common in present-day politics as well. This chivalric narrative has been resurrected in the post-Cold War era, and gendered identities have not only legitimated but also promoted wars. The various humanitarian wars of the 1990s are read as a narrative in which NATO, and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic, rescuers of weak and passive victims. Farmanfarmaian describes how the reports of the Iraqi Army raping women in Kuwait were used to construct Iraq as a barbaric enemy so that war was not only thinkable, but necessitated. This new American masculinity was “tough and tender,” capable of awesome military prowess but also compassion and empathy. The mission of “liberating” Afghan women was used to garner public support for the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to silence feminine protests against the war. Two and a half years later, this same discourse of “liberation” was used to fueled support to overturn the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, represented in racialized terms as an inhuman despot when the evidence against weapons of mass destruction turned out to be fabricated or exaggerated. This narrative of rescuing the Iraqi people (as “damsels in distress”) from the clutches of an evil man may help to explain why many people in the US and its allies came to believe, with little evidence, that the invading forces would be “greeted as liberators.” These rescue narratives demonstrate that the protection racket encourages offensive military policies even when it is couched in the language of defense and protection. The protection racket is a gendered discourse that produces the gender identities of just warriors and beautiful souls. It is also the backdrop that allows for offensive military policies to be viewed as defensive, thereby gaining traction and legitimating war by enabling offensive wars to take place under the mantle of “protection.” The existence of discourse of protection can therefore help us understand the occurrence of offensive policies in the light of an ostensible defensive dominance. Conclusion One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] erases the distinction between security and expansion," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur. 2. In proposing FIAT as a solution to vulnerability, the aff bestows authority in the USFG as the masculine protector of “its own” and “other” feminized subjects. This discourse locks gendered and racialized hierarchies into their model of IR. Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, SPP) For Cohn (2014, 53) “the most important piece of the puzzle” is “the ways in which vulnerability is intensely gendered at the symbolic level”. This is particularly so in the predominant international security theory and practice, where human vulnerability is perceived as a matter of “vulnerable groups” only and thus “displaced onto a subset of humans”. Drawing on her empirical work at the UN Security Council (SC) as an observer of discussions on the SC Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security, Cohn demonstrates that vulnerability is frequently discussed at the SC, yet always with a reference to some Others. In these discussions, vulnerability is never attached to those responsible for gendered security practices. The same, of course, applies to much of liberal politics today, where decision makers and state officials are presumed to be invulnerable, rational minds. In security practices, however, the implications of such othering are far-reaching, since they fundamentally shape our gendered understandings of whose in/security is recognised and recognisable. First, not only is the concept of ‘vulnerable groups’ deeply gendered in practices of security, but it is also heteronormatively gendered to apply to (cis)women, who are inherently connected to the infantilised mass of womenandchildren-and-thedisabledrest. This shows in the framework of UNSCR 1325 (Cohn 2014, 61), but also in the racialised development agendas in the Global South, where campaigns to invest in a girl for women’s financial empowerment are promoted as projects of global justice, even if they may in fact commodify women’s (re)productive bodies for the expansion of neoliberal capitalism (Wilson 2011; Roberts 2015). Such limited conceptions of gendered vulnerability also direct research and activism, as politically motivated funding instruments often require that researchers and NGOs focus their activities on ‘vulnerable groups’ that are explicitly defined as womenandchildren (and the disabled rest). Furthermore, when vulnerability is allowed for some but not others, only certain kinds of bodies’ vulnerability makes sense. Consequently, those who cannot – because of their sexed and racialised bodies for instance – appear as vulnerable in the predominant security discourses, seem suspicious and emerge as a threat. The wrong kind of vulnerable bodies appear as incomprehensible, and the ethical responsibility to secure needs of these “other others” becomes blurred and denied (Ahmed 2010; see also Ahmed 2004). Here, the recent European political representations of young refugee men make a conspicuous example. Especially in the social media, but often also in the yellow press, male refugees are recurrently portrayed as terrorists’ and lazy aliens, who forge asylum claims and come after a better social security instead of staying in the conflict-zones to defend ‘their’ womenandchildren at home. Simultaneously, they are represented as sexual predators and pathological rapists, and hence a threat to ‘our’ womenandgirls (Rettberg and Gajjala 2015). In security politics throughout Europe, such portrayals have been indirectly and post-factually used as justifications to curb migration and increase security measures at the borders and in public spaces – which further adds to the embodied insecurity of those identified as racial Others. 3. The Protection Racket produces hierarchies and savior narratives that make structural violence and flashpoints for war inevitable Peet and Sjoberg, 2020 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida; the Late Jessica Peet taught IR at the University of Florida and USC. Introduction to Gender and Civilian Victimization in War (Print Book), SPP) As scholars, the "lenses" we use "foreground some things, and background others" in our research (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999). Our research questions start with the ideas, concepts, and variables we see as most important in global politics. For example, the scholars who have written on intentional civilian victimization have started with the ideas, concepts, and variables they see as most important in global politics, including regime type, international law, strategy, and culture. Like other scholars in IR, feminist work uses "lenses" to foreground variables of particular interest, specifically sex, gender, and sexuality; gender identity; and gender hierarchy, using "gender lenses" to view global politics (V. Peterson and Runyan 1999: 2). Looking through gender lenses is a way "to focus on gender as a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes" (Steans 1998: 5). While women's oppression is a primary concern for feminists, "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women .... [T]he concept, nature and practice of gender are key" (Zalewski 1995). Feminists, then, "ask what assumptions about gender (and race, class, nationality, and sexuality) are necessary to make particular statements, policies, and actions meaningful" (Wilcox 2009). In our analysis of civilian victimization, we focus on how the concept, nature, and practice of gender influences states' and other war-fighting parties' decisions to target civilians and ask what assumptions about gender are necessary to make intentional civilian victimization appealing, despite the non-combatant immunity norm. With this focus, we also look at the intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism in constituting both the idea of the civilian and her vulnerability. In order to fully grasp why those are important questions, we need to spend a little time understanding what feminists mean by 'sex' and by 'gender' in this context. Many people see sex as biology - male and fem ale sex organs make people men or women. 4 In the conventional wisdom, then, gender is directly related to, and maps onto, sex - men are masculine and women are feminine. However, feminist scholarship has "questioned the conventional assumption that gender differences (and subordination) are rooted in biological differences between women and men" (Scott 1987; Sjoberg 2006a: 32). Instead, feminist scholars suggest that the relation between sex and gender is presumed rather than natural, where masculinity and femininity are separable from maleness and femaleness. Masculine characteristics, like strength, protectiveness, rationality, aggressiveness, presence in public life, domination, and leadership, then, are perceived as related to maleness, while in reality they are not reserved for men. Conversely, traits associated with femininity, like weakness, vulnerability, emotion, passivity, privacy, submission, and care, are assumed to be the domain of women, while that is not always or even normally the case. Genderings can be read into and back onto sex, which is malleable rather than set, and co-constituted with gender (e.g., Butler 1990, 1993). Applying this understanding, gender cannot be operationalized as a 'yes' or 'no' (or 'male' or 'female' question), or as a matter of degree. It also cannot be accounted for by asking questions about 'what women do' differently than 'what men do' in global politics.5 Instead, it is more of a constellation of significations, where masculinities and femininities are mutually constituted (along with race, class, sexuality, etc.) in specific, hierarchical relation to one another - where ( often) masculinities are prized and powerful, while femininities are seen as undesirable and therefore subordinated. In this context, we can talk not just about men and women and masculinities and femininities but of masculinism and feminization. Masculinism is the prizing of masculinities and the exclusion and/ or devaluing of femininities in social and/ or political contexts. Masculinism leads to feminization - the devaluing of femininities by putting down or putting aside people, groups, or ideas associated with femininities and by associating devalued or marginalized people, groups, or ideas with femininities (V. Peterson 2010; see also V. Peterson and Runyan 2010). 6 V. Spike Peterson describes feminization as devalorization: Not only subjects (women and marginalized men), but also concepts, desires, tastes, styles, "ways of knowing" ... can be feminized - with the effect of reducing their legitimacy, status and value. Importantly, this devalorization is simultaneously ideological (discursive, cultural) and material (structural, economic) .... This devalorization normalizes - with the effect of "legitimating" - the marginalization, subordination, and exploitation of feminized practices and persons ... the "naturalness" of sex difference is generalized to the "naturalness" of masculine (not necessarily male) privilege, so that both aspects come to be taken-for -granted "givens" of social life (V. Peterson 2010). In this vein, a key tenet of feminist theorizing about the global political arena is that it is gender -hierarchical (Sjoberg 2009). Though masculinities and femininities are detectable across known human history, they are not static, temporally, geographically, or culturally. Quite the opposite, the dominant 'masculinity' or 'femininity' is different at different times, and in different places and cultures. While "the
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