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2022 Michigan Disadvantage

DA - Turkey Appeasement - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

DA - Turkey Appeasement - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA
EMBOLDENMENT
1NC
US-Turkey defense cooperation is low now. The continuity of the alliance is at a crossroads.
Stein 21, director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the author of the forthcoming book The US War Against ISIS: How America and its Allies Defeated the Caliphate. (Aaron, “NOT A DIVORCE BUT A DEFENSE DECOUPLING: WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE U.S.-TURKISH ALLIANCE,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/not-a-divorce-but-a-defense-decoupling-whats-next-for-the-u-s-turkish-alliance/)//BB
After decades of speculation about the future of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, Washington and Ankara have finally reached a fork in the road. The day after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced plans to deepen defense cooperation with Russia, his government formally submitted a request to the United States for 40 new Block 70 model F-16 aircraft and upgrade kits for 80 F-16s already in service with the Turkish Air Force. The U.S. Congress may well block the sale. And even if it goes through, Erdoğan may well decide to buy more Russian weapons anyways. This impasse was the inevitable result of Ankara’s 2017 decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system and Washington’s subsequent decision to impose sanctions and remove Turkey from the F-35 fighter program. As a result, the Turkish Air Force faces a serious issue in the near future. Ankara remains steadfast in its commitment to deploy the S-400, a system that Washington and major NATO allies have deemed a threat to Western tactical aviation. Absent a compromise on the deployment and location of the S-400, Ankara could be left without a fighter to replace aging F-16s. Turkey has made clear that it intends to develop its own fighter, dubbed TF/X, but the project is marred by issues with engine procurement and, at best, will not be produced at scale until the mid-2030s. In the meantime, the Turkish government has sought to leverage its ties with Russia to coerce Washington into making concessions on the F-16 sale. In late September, following his visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly, Erdoğan expressed his irritation with U.S. President Joe Biden. He accused Washington of supporting terrorists in Syria, and suggested that the United States could not be trusted to provide the equipment to upgrade and sustain Turkish F-16s. As part of this effort, Erdoğan then travelled to Sochi, Russia in late September, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It was after this meeting that he announced the two countries could deepen defense cooperation to include work on fighter engines, submarines, and rocket motors. Erdoğan has also signaled that Ankara may, in fact, push ahead and import a second S-400 regiment from Russia. The United States has an interest in selling Turkey these F-16s. The Turkish government is a member of NATO and ancillary tensions over Syria should not negatively impact the sale of fourth-generation aircraft. But with trust so badly broken, it is unwise for Ankara to assume that U.S. policymakers will sign off on the export over concerns about “losing Turkey.” Playing the Russia card may not have its intended effect. The reality is that whatever Washington does, the United States and Turkey are rapidly reaching the last stage in their defense industrial decoupling. Legacy cooperation is now ending in favor of an autarkic Turkish effort to develop indigenous systems and find non-U.S. suppliers.
Enhanced security cooperation triggers Turkish aggression
Armbruster 21 (Natalie, Foreign Policy Research Associate Fellow at Defense Priorities, 10/8/21, Newsweek, “Turkey is Becoming a Problem for NATO—the U.S. Should Pay Attention | Opinion,” https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-becoming-problem-nato-us-should-pay-attention-opinion-1636810; accessed 6/20/2022) ng
Turkey, despite having the second-largest standing military force in NATO, is inching toward a point where it becomes a possible liability, instead of an asset. While not discounting the points of tension in Syria and Libya, the most glaring flashpoint for possible conflict is Turkey's enduring commitment to the defense of Azerbaijan against Armenia, through training Azerbaijani officers and supplying military equipment. Should a conflict erupt once more, it would be between Turkish-backed Azerbaijan and Russian-backed Armenia, presenting the potential for Turkey to, once again, be at odds with the Russian military and call for NATO aid or assistance. Even among NATO allies themselves, Turkey has fanned the flames of conflict, with Erdogan becoming more and more aggressive in the Mediterranean. In 2020, Turkey disregarded a U.N.-enforced arms embargo around Libya and responded with hostility when confronted by French patrols. Greco-Turkish tensions in the Aegean almost erupted into war in the same year after Greek and Turkish frigates nearly collided over drilling disputes, forcing the U.S. to step in and push for de-escalation and negotiations. Nevertheless, among these hostilities, Turkey has been left relatively unscathed by its NATO allies. As Turkey continues to stoke the fires of ongoing tensions, the U.S. must make clear that it will not fight Erdogan's wars under the obligation of NATO defense if these disputes erupt beyond Erdogan's control. Continued concessions and aid to U.S. partners, for simply being allies, are why American allies like Turkey have abused and taken advantage of these leniencies and strayed away from American interests. Alliances are not meant to be treated as sacred bonds of a covenant. They are formed to recognize parallel interests and commit to jointly serving those interests. NATO was formed to support European nations who wanted to counter the influence and might of Moscow and provide a unified defense against the now dissolved Soviet Union. If these same NATO allies are now flirting with Putin unapologetically, the U.S. should adjust the extent of its obligation to those whose interests lie opposite of American interests. The U.S. should rethink its responsibility of perpetual European defense and stop serving allies like Turkey their cake on a platter so that they can both have it and eat it too.
Specifically---that causes escalatory conflict in Syria. An explicit call-out reverses aggression.
Willis Krumholz 20. J.D., University of St. Thomas. "The US shouldn't support Turkey's reckless moves in Syria." Business Insider. 3-3-2020. https://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-shouldnt-support-turkeys-reckless-moves-in-syria-2020-3. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART
What's more, Turkish belligerence in Syria is revealing the cracks within the NATO alliance. America's European NATO allies are also relying on Turkey to control the flow of migrants from Syria into Europe—and Turkey's willingness to use this as a bargaining chip has given Turkey leverage over its European neighbors.
Going forward America needs to tread carefully, lest an alliance with Turkey drags the US into a wider conflict we have absolutely no interest in.
First off, the US State Department's unequivocal support for Turkey's actions is likely to embolden Ankara, as it stumbles into disaster in Syria. An emboldened Turkey increases the risk that Turkey and Russia stumble toward open conflict. Again, because Turkey is a NATO member, America has an Article 5 commitment to come to Turkey's defense if it is attacked.
By the way, Turkey already carries much responsibility for—from the get-go—funding the jihadist elements who fought in the bloody civil war. The Assad regime is brutal and has committed a host of human rights violations, but so have many of the jihadists Turkey has funded and armed.
Because of this, from an anti-terror perspective, Turkey is not the good guy in this fight. Areas outside the control of the Assad regime in Damascus are more hospitable to anti-US terrorists—including both ISIS and al-Qaeda. The fact that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was hiding out in one of these ungoverned spaces near Idlib is a stark reminder of this fact.
Turkey is neither a good friend nor an enemy, but right now America is committed to voice support for Turkey. That's a mistake. The truth is that NATO membership shouldn't be a one-way street, and collective-defense alliances with belligerent countries like Turkey are extremely far from cost-free. Cheerleading Turkey's footprint in Syria is the last thing the US State Department should be doing, as such a situation is directly opposed to US interests in the region.
Finally, an emboldened Turkey, less restrained in its attempt to depose Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, will also exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Syria. Right now, Turkey is prolonging the civil war in Syria.
This undermines both American humanitarian and counterterrorism aims, because the longer the war goes on the more violence and suffering ensues. Instead of applauding Turkey's actions in Syria, because Turkey seeks to take out Assad, the US foreign policy establishment should be calling Turkey out for destabilizing the region further.
US-Russia war
Hunt 22 [Edward Hunt, PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary; "Turkey Is Threatening War Against Syrian Kurds"; Progressive.org; Published: 6-8-2022; Accessed: 6-24-2022; https://progressive.org/latest/turkey-war-syrian-kurds-hunt-220608/; KL]
As President Erdoğan mulls military intervention in Rojava, the Biden Administration is facing the fact that a NATO country could be the aggressor in the world’s next major war.
The United States is preparing for the possibility that Turkey, a NATO member, may invade Rojava, an autonomous region in northeastern Syria where both U.S. and Russian soldiers are currently stationed.
With Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan making increasingly ominous threats to launch a military intervention in Rojava, officials from the Biden Administration have been working to address these threats, aware that a NATO country could be the aggressor in the world’s next major war.
“Basically, Turkey wants to do the same thing that Russia is doing in Ukraine, which is to come in and commit war crimes against the citizens here,” said Nadine Maenza, the former chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, when she visited Rojava late last month. “I do hope the international community and the United States stand up.”
For several years, Turkey has been trying to destroy Rojava, a Kurdish-led enclave. The Turkish government wants to eliminate the region’s revolutionary Syrian Kurds, who have created an autonomous region inside Syria while providing a model of self-government for Turkey’s minority Kurdish population.
Erdoğan portrays Rojava’s Kurdish militants as terrorists. He accuses them of being part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a revolutionary movement that has been seeking Kurdish liberation in Turkey.
Turkey has already, in recent years, launched several incursions into Rojava. Its last major intervention, conducted in October 2019 with the support of the Trump Administration, devastated the area, leaving Turkey in control of a large swathe of territory.
Ceasefire agreements have created a highly complex environment, with security forces from several countries stationed in Rojava. Both Russia and the United States conduct military patrols, sometimes coming into conflict with one another.
Despite the Trump Administration’s backing of Turkey’s 2019 invasion, the United States has maintained a close partnership with Rojava’s Kurdish militants. Since the Syrian Civil War, the U.S. military has worked closely with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in combating the Islamic State, and U.S. officials have repeatedly praised them for their bravery.
As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden described the Kurdish-led forces as “courageous” and indicated that he would continue to support them.
The Syrian Kurds have created a revolutionary new society on a model that they call “democratic confederalism.” Since the early years of the Syrian Civil War, they have been building a confederated and autonomous region in northeastern Syria that is democratic, pluralist, feminist, and multi-ethnic.
“Progressives should support their effort to build a secure base for direct democracy, feminism, and pluralism,” Meredith Tax wrote earlier this year in The Nation.
Though many U.S. officials oppose the Syrian Kurds’ revolutionary project, sometimes even working against it, others have praised them for their achievements. At a hearing last month by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, several participants commended Rojava for its religious freedom and ethnic diversity, conditions that are unique to north and east Syria. And for the second year in a row, the commission called on the U.S. government to grant political recognition to Rojava.
“They’ve built a government where they have these remarkable conditions of acceptance and tolerance that really the rest of the world can learn from,” Maenza said during her visit to Rojava in May.
Turkey’s recent threats follow moves by Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Since Finland and Sweden have been sympathetic to the Syrian Kurds, with Sweden providing Rojava with financial and political support, Turkey has opposed NATO membership for the two countries.
Some analysts believe that Erdoğan is hoping the West will ignore another Turkish-led military intervention in exchange for Turkey’s support for Finland and Sweden to join NATO.
So far, the Biden Administration has moved slowly to address Turkey’s provocations. Though several high-level officials have stated their opposition to another Turkish military intervention, they have acknowledged that they are looking for ways to accommodate Turkey.
“Concerns that Turkey has raised directly with Finland and Sweden are being addressed by the Finns and the Swedes with the assistance of NATO,” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a press briefing last week. “We want to make sure that all allies have their security concerns taken into account, and that, of course, includes Turkey.”
For now, the main factor that could prevent the Biden Administration from siding against the Syrian Kurds is Rojava’s strategic importance in the Syrian Civil War. With the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces still controlling most of northeastern Syria, they have prevented Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from regaining control of an important region where oil reserves and wheat fields are located.
“That’s a point of leverage because the Syrian government would love to have dominion over those resources,” Blinken said in 2020, referring to the region’s oil. “We should not give that up for free.”
As Turkey continues to threaten Rojava, the situation is growing increasingly precarious, with recent reports indicating that Turkey has already begun conducting military operations. Any major Turkish-led military incursion could spark a broader conflict, which would be especially dangerous with U.S. and Russian forces continuing to operate in the area.
“A potential war will not be an easy one,” warned Mazloum Abdi, the leader of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, in a recent interview. “It will not end in a short period of time—unlike Turkey’s expectations. It will be a hard war and will last for a long time.”
U---Coop Low
US-Turkey cooperation is zeroed now. Prefer evidence after Turkey’s support for Russia vs Ukraine
Gaber 6-22-2022, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies (Yevgeniya, “Turkey’s wartime bridge to the West is collapsing,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkeys-wartime-bridge-to-the-west-is-collapsing/)
Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine has forced countries around the world to reexamine their geopolitical choices. Turkey, a strategic partner to both of the states at war, has been affected more than most nations. Caught in a lose-lose situation where taking any side in the conflict would lead to a major rupture with the other partner, it has tried to maintain amicable relations with both Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the war has given Turkish leadership a chance to turn the challenges of this shaky equilibrium into an opportunity by positioning Ankara as a potential mediator between Moscow and Kyiv. While brokering a quick peace or even a ceasefire in this war is highly unlikely in the short term, Turkey nonetheless had a unique opportunity to mend its shattered relations with the West. However, nearly four months into the war, hopes for such a rapprochement are starting to fade, as Turkey’s balancing act gives way to a tilt toward Moscow. If Turkey wants to use the crisis to build bridges with the West, its time is running out. Promising start Prior to Russia’s invasion, Turkey and Ukraine had begun to develop a defense industry partnership that served as a security boost for both nations. It also drew praise for anchoring Turkey in the West, seemingly at the cost of deeper military ties between Ankara and Moscow. Turkey has been firm in its political support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and has consistently refused to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Over the past few months, it has dismissed Russian criticism to deliver “Bayraktar” drones to Ukraine. In the early stages of the war, it closed off the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian ships, further raising hopes that it would align with the rest of NATO in Ukraine’s defense. Meanwhile, Turkey’s active diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict have also garnered public praise from its NATO allies—something Turkish leadership highly appreciated after years of frosty relations with the West and with national elections looming in 2023. Senior American diplomats have made several visits to Turkey since the April launch of a new US-Turkey Strategic Mechanism aimed at normalizing bilateral relations. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has traveled to the United States to meet Secretary of State Antony Blinken in the first bilateral meeting of cabinet officials since President Joe Biden took office. For the first time in a while, Turkey was not only acting in line with transatlantic allies but also taking a lead in the region in a way that has bolstered its importance as a key NATO member. US officials have gone as far as to suggest that Turkey transfer its S-400 missile-defense systems to Ukraine in a bid to finally solve the problem of Russian air defense systems stationed in a NATO member state and the consequent Western sanctions imposed on Ankara. Turkey has bluntly rejected that proposal. Instead, it has slowly allowed domestic problems, regional geopolitics, and pragmatism to dictate its approach to the war. As a result, Turkish leadership once again appears eager to continue business as usual with an increasingly isolated Russia. Shifting winds Though only obliged to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits for the naval ships of states at war under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, Ankara has denied access to non-littoral NATO states as well. Turkey’s fears of losing out to the West in its ambitions for a kind of regional ownership of the Black Sea prevailed over the security threats posed by Russia. Turkey’s desire to limit the presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea, which might lead to further escalation with Russia, is understandable—even if not in line with the Alliance’s objectives. It is harder to justify the statements of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar wondering whether mines discovered in the Black Sea had been laid there deliberately to create an excuse for NATO minesweepers to enter those waters. Turkey is also blocking the quick addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO, trying to use the situation to solve its own problems and voice its own security concerns. It is highly unlik

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