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2022 Michigan Counterplan

Aff - PRISM Updates - Michigan 7 2022 CPWW

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PRISM AFF
PRISM Supplement 1 --- CPWW
Apathy is a feature of our time – time governance has created a simulation where it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. Change is possible, but not in the current framework which twists us dry
Fisher 9 (Mark Fisher, experiencing the world, writer, theorist, teacher, k-punk. 2009, Zero Books, "Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?", Chapter 1: It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism)//gideon
We do not need to wait for Children of Men's near-future to arrive to see this transformation of culture into museum pieces. The power of capitalist realism derives in part from the way that capitalism subsumes and consumes all of previous history: one effect of its 'system of equivalence' which can assign all cultural objects, whether they are religious iconography, pornography, or Das Kapital, a monetary value. Walk around the British Museum, where you see objects torn from their Iifeworlds and assembled as if on the deck of some Predator spacecraft, and you have a powerful image of this process at work. In the conversion of practices and rituals into merely aesthetic objects, the beliefs of previous cultures are objectively ironized, transformed into artifacts. Capitalist realism is therefore not a particular type of realism; it is more like realism in itself. As Marx and Engels themselves observed in The Communist Manifesto, [Capital] has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. Capitalism is what is left when beliefs have collapsed at the level of ritual or symbolic elaboration, and all that is left is the consumer-spectator, trudging through the ruins and the relics. Yet this turn from belief to aesthetics, from engagement to spectatorship, is held to be one of the virtues of capitalist realism. In claiming, as Badiou puts it, to have' delivered us from the "fatal abstractions" inspired by the "ideologies of the past"', capitalist realism presents itself as a shield protecting us from the perils posed by belief itself. The attitude of ironic distance proper to postmodern capitalism is supposed to immunize us against the seductions of fanaticism. Lowering our expectations, we are told, is a small price to pay for being protected from terror and totalitarianism. 'We live in a contradiction,' Badiou has observed: a brutal state of affairs, profoundly inegalitarian - where all existence is evaluated in terms of money alone - is presented to us as ideal. To justify their conservatism, the partisans of the established order cannot really call it ideal or wonderful. So instead, they have decided to say that all the rest is horrible. Sure, they say, we may not live in a condition of perfect Goodness. But we're lucky that we don't live in a condition of Evil. Our democracy is not perfect. But it's better than the bloody dictatorships. Capitalism is unjust. But it's not criminal like Stalinism. We let millions of Africans die of AIDS, but we don't make racist nationalist declarations like Milosevic. We kill Iraqis with our airplanes, but we don't cut their throats with machetes like they do in Rwanda, etc. The 'realism' here is analogous to the deflationary perspective of a depreSSive who believes that any positive state, any hope, is a dangerous illusion. In their account of capitalism, surely the most impressive since Marx's, Deleuze and Guattari describe capitalism as a kind of dark potentiality which haunted all previous social systems. Capital, they argue, is the 'unnamable Thing', the abomination, which primitive and feudal societies 'warded off in advance'. When it actually arrives, capitalism brings with it a massive desacralization of culture. It is a system which is no longer governed by any transcendent Law; on the contrary, it dismantles all such codes, only to re-install them on an ad hoc basis. The limits of capitalism are not fixed by fiat, but defined (and redefined) pragmatically and improvisationally. This makes capitalism very much like the Thing in John Carpenter's film of the same name: a monstrous, infinitely plastic entity, capable of metabolizing and absorbing anything with which it comes into contact. Capital, Deleuze and Guattari says, is a 'motley painting of everything that ever was'; a strange hybrid of the ultra-modern and the archaic. In the years since Deleuze and Guattari wrote the two volumes of their Capitalism And Schizophrenia, it has seemed as if the deterritorializing impulses of capitalism have been confined to finance, leaving culture presided over by the forces of reterritorialization. This malaise, the feeling that there is nothing new, is itself nothing new of course. We find ourselves at the notorious 'end of history' trumpeted by Francis Fukuyama after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Fukuyama's thesis that history has climaxed with liberal capitalism may have been widely derided, but it is accepted, even assumed, at the level of the cultural unconscious. It should be remembered, though, that even when Fukuyama advanced it, the idea that history had reached a 'terminal beach' was not merely triumphalist. Fukuyama warned that his radiant city would be haunted, but he thought its specters would be Nietzschean rather than Marxian. Some of Nietzsche's most prescient pages are those in which he describes the 'oversaturation of an age with history'. 'It leads an age into a dangerous mood of irony in regard to itself', he wrote in Untimely Meditations, I and subsequently into the even more dangerous mood of cynicism', in which 'cosmopolitan fingering', a detached spectatorialism, replaces engagement and involvement. This is the condition of Nietzsche's Last Man, who has seen everything, but is decadently enfeebled precisely by this excess of (self) awareness.
Neoliberal self-replication over-codes the public sphere and the resolution by commanding inward turns to obscures collective struggle—this doesn’t require engagement with the topic as a singlular reading, but instead opens up the opportunity for pluralist discourse and contestation over multiple articulations. The impact is the solidification of inequality—only shifting interpersonal relations towards coordinated action and forefronting contestation, rather than atomization can solve and reclaim the potential for activism
Robert Asen 17, Professor, Communication Arts Department, and an affiliate at the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Neoliberalism, the public sphere, and a public good, Quarterly Journal of Speech, Volume 103, 2017 - Issue 4, https://www-tandfonline-com.mutex.gmu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00335630.2017.1360507?scroll=top&needAccess=true, DOA: 8-27-18, y2k
Neoliberalism also obfuscates the means for redressing inequality and mobilizing diversity by weakening relations among people and devaluing coordinated action. For publics and counterpublics alike, the prospect of efficacious public engagement has long depended on bolstering interpersonal relations and empowering coordinated action. John Dewey regarded perceptions of mutual implication in the conduct and consequences of human affairs as forming the basis of a public. When perceived, consequences do not exert a mechanistic pull on the formation of publics, but facilitate transformative action by individuals, who “reflect upon” their connections with one another: “Each acts, in so far as the connection is known, in view of the connection.”13 Public engagement draws importantly on ideas and practices of mutual standing and connection, suggesting, for example, that people may jointly benefit from the alleviation of a problem. Or that people may work together to address issues and concerns in the name of fairness and justice. Or that people may work together to achieve shared goals that improve collective well-being. Plainly put, public engagement draws on the promise of a public good, which neoliberalism disavows through its strict reliance on a narrow individualism. As I argue in this essay, this notion of a public good does not refer to specific, bounded content; it does not demand shared experiences; it does not aim for consensus. Rather, this public good constitutes a practice of articulating mutual standing and connection, recognizing that people can solve problems and achieve goals—and struggle for justice—through coordinated action. In a networked public sphere, there is no singular, universal public good, but multiple articulations of a public good. Both the bourgeois public sphere and neoliberalism seek to promote singularity over multiplicity: the former by asserting the supposedly unique capacity of the bourgeoisie to discern a public good, and the latter by disaggregating a public good into individuals who can only act alone. In these ways, both the bourgeois public sphere and neoliberalism privilege established interests and raise obstacles for a vibrant critical publicity. I develop my argument over three main sections in this essay. In the first section, I explicate how a networked public sphere draws on a dynamic public good that calls attention to relationships and connects people in different ways as a force for public engagement. Enlivened through relationships, a networked public sphere may enable the productive power of difference and create opportunities for addressing inequalities. In the second section, I critique a neoliberal public built around the atomistic individual and guided by the principle of competition. Flattening difference and discounting inequality, a neoliberal public assumes that everyone can adopt the position of homo oeconomicus. In the third section, I discuss the prospects for resistance to a neoliberal public through the coordinated action of networked locals. Using the example of public education, I discuss how local advocates may work together to rebuild and expand connections across difference in a networked public sphere. A networked public sphere and a public good Defying an essentialist and static framework, a public good is dynamic and mobile, operating at different levels of society, and open to contestation and reformulation. A public good does not function as a container that holds a particular set of values, principles, and issues, although some publics may seek to define a public good in exclusionary terms. A public good does not refer to a discrete body of knowledge, an established group of institutions, or a coherent synthesis of public opinion. Rather, a public good circulates in society, connecting people’s perceptions and actions to their relationships with each other and the worlds they inhabit. It informs the ways that people make engagement meaningful. It is a network of discursive, embodied, and material relationships. Affirming this dynamism, public sphere scholars may productively conceptualize a public good as a practice that draws on relationships within and among publics and counterpublics to connect people in different ways. When advocates articulate a public good, they appeal to people to imagine their connections with others in particular ways, to perceive connections that may facilitate coordinated action towards addressing problems, issues, and goals. Insofar as publics do not reference naturally occurring associations, relationships within and among publics have to be constructed. People must perceive themselves as members of a community, allies in a struggle for justice, citizens implicated in the actions of their governments. Along these lines, Dewey distinguishes between the brute fact of human association and the consciously cultivated bonds of community. Humans are born and live among others, but community “is emotionally, intellectually, consciously sustained.” Coordinated action implies a collective subject, a “we” who should do something. Dewey holds that “‘we’ and ‘our’ exist only when the consequences of combined action are perceived and become an object of desire and effort.”14 Michael Warner offers an attenuated version of this argument in holding that “a public is constituted through mere attention.” Warner’s position productively draws attention to the constructed character of publics through “active intake.” However, he limits this activity in at least two ways: first, Warner emphasizes identification over and against the possibility of dissociation. He writes to audience of his book: “If you are reading this, or hearing it or seeing it or present for it, you are part of this public.” Yet this insistence conflates awareness and affiliation, which leaves no agency for someone who encounters something they find objectionable, or someone who may be aware of discourses that exclude them. Second, Warner discounts dialogic models of publics as placing too much emphasis on “polemic” and “argument.” Instead, he privileges the circulation of texts, which appears to compel a choice among modes of communication and limits the means of constructing publics. A public good operates in a networked public sphere by explicitly or implicitly calling attention to relationships, constructing or reconstructing relationships, and drawing on these relationships as a force for public engagement. The operation of a public good informs both publicity and counterpublicity. On this point, Fraser observes that counterpublics often direct their public engagement to “the appropriate boundaries of the public sphere,” namely, shared perceptions of what constitutes public and private issues. She cites as an example the efforts of counterpublic actors to reframe domestic violence as a public issue. In this discussion, Fraser does not reject public appeals, but “naturally given, a priori boundaries.” Indeed, she underscores the value of appealing to a public good in writing that “democratic publicity requires … opportunities for minorities to convince others that what in the past was not public in the sense of being a matter of common concern should now become so.”16 Note Fraser’s reference to “convinc[ing] others,” which suggests an effort by counterpublic actors to make connections and emphasize mutual standing. This discursive move resists the assumption that domestic violence is an issue that only concerns its victims. In this case and others, the prospects for social change encourage advocates to engage others who may not have seen themselves as implicated in an issue or problem so that they may see its wider import. In another case, focusing on the contemporary issue of state-condoned racial violence in the United States and the civil rights movements that have emerged to counteract this violence, Sarah Jackson and Brooke Foucault Welles argue that counterpublics have operated with “the express goals of both legitimizing and communicating their lived realities and pushing the mainstream public sphere to acknowledge and respond to these realities.”17 Legitimation, communication, and acknowledgement all draw on relationships—relationships among participants in counterpublics as well as relations among publics and counterpublics. For counterpublic actors, these relationships may redirect otherwise isolating experiences to connect people who have suffered police brutality. Engaging with like-minded others, counterpublic actors may better understand their experiences, refashion identities from passive victim to capable agent, and push for social change. Among publics and counterpublics, legitimation, communication, and acknowledgment place a responsibility on wider publics to see their connections to places like Ferguson and people like Michael Brown. In this sense, counterpublic actors rejected assertions that the murder of Michael Brown in Ferguson constituted a confined incident. They instead connected the shooting in Ferguson to issues of race in the United States, in which all citizens hold a stake. Demonstrating dynamism and mobility, actors in a networked public sphere may articulate a public good variously through multiple modes of engagement. This variety indicates that multiplicity does not attenuate the productive power of a public good, but may facilitate its functioning in ways that resonate with the perspectives of actors within and across publics and counterpublics. For example, as he explicates a vibrant mode of dissent for democratic deliberation, Robert Ivie discerns a “topos of complementary differences” that enables dissenters to express “relations of interdependence” with the people and societies they critique to sustain interaction and forestall violence. In maintaining relationships amidst disagreement, dissent “enhances democratic pluralism” by questioning “that which is taken for granted” as well as bridging “differences to generate constructive dialogue and deliberation. Beyond deliberation, people may employ various forms of rhetoric and communication to recognize mutual standing and facilitate coordinated action.19 Perhaps through creativity born of struggle, counterpublicity may lend itself to discursive innovation. Addressing its generative potential, Brouwer writes that counterpublicity may emerge through “unruly, passionate, enfleshed, ironic” and other modes of engagement.20 0 Illustrating this point, Yvonne Slosarski considers how participants in labor protests in Wisconsin in 2011 enacted alternatives to policymakers’ market-oriented efforts to disempower public employee unions by revoking their rights to collective bargaining. Although they did not defeat the legislation, protestors articulated visions of a public good in diverse ways. Besides traditional means like testifying at public committee hearings, protestors commenced a weeks-long occupation of the state capitol that “enacted a vision of communal, participatory democracy.” 21 Slosarski maintains that the occupation emphasized themes of “self-governance, solidarity, and respect” in the ways that protestors treated, cared for, and supported each other.22 By constructing and cultivating these connections, protestors presented alternatives to neoliberal views of self and society While neoliberalism emphasizes individuals, the relationships articulated in a public good facilitate complementary engagements of “I” and “we,” of individual and community. On this basis, individual identity and agency do not arise as autonomous achievements, but through practices of social construction. One’s sense of self and capacity for action arises in part through interaction with others. Gerard Hauser discerns in public discourse an intersubjective relation through which individuals understand their engagement from the perspective of a shared “we” while maintaining their distinctive contributions.23 Reciprocally, development of a collective identity and agency draws on the spirit of individuals to align with others, to recognize connections that may enable mutually valued action. From particular exchanges to broader engagements, Dewey identifies the mediation of individual and community as a key dynamic of democracy. He holds that from the standpoint of the individual, democratic practices and norms facilitate individuals’ equitable participation in the groups to which they belong. From the standpoint of the community, democracy demands “the liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are in common.” Yet this “common” does not admit to a transparent and singular reading, since individuals belong to many groups, and notions of potentiality and common interests and goods arise when “different groups interact flexibly and fu

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