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2022 Michigan Affirmative

Aff - Techno Orientalism - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

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Aff – Techno-Orientalism – BFHR 7wk
Notes
Thanks to David Sanico and Natalie Gao for turning out this file. Please email sanicod23@chcstudent.com (David) or nataliegao2023@gmail.com (Natalie) if you have any questions.
As you can see, there’s tons of different theses, impacts, and advocacies including writings about futurity, simulacra, feminism etc.---I’d encourage you to look at the different cards and see what different versions of the 1AC could look like.
Feel free to email khirn10@gmail.com with any questions or concerns
1AC
1AC – Techno-Orientalism
The language and code of the Western project produce an Asianized future, where the Asian Techno-Orient supplants the aspirations and anxieties of modern info capitalism, justifying Western dominance. In this state, the Asian body accelerates past the present and becomes the mirror of Western futural fears.
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤
These examples perfectly illustrate our definition of techno-Orientalism: the phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo- or hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political discourse.4 Techno-Orientalist imaginations are infused with the languages and codes of the technological and the futuristic. These developed alongside industrial advances in the West and have become part of the West’s project of securing dominance as architects of the future, a project that requires configurations of the East as the very technology with which to shape it. Techno-Orientalist speculations of an Asianized future have become ever more prevalent in the wake of neoliberal trade policies that enabled greater flow of information and capital between the East and the West. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism emerged in the mid-1990s when cultural theorists began to trace its manifestations and theorize its causes and implications. Kevin Morley and David Robins, Toshiya Ueno, and Kumiko Sato, principal trailblazers of the field, laid much of the valuable groundwork. Morley and Robins’s Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes, and Cultural Boundaries (Routledge, 1995), in which a definition of “techno-Orientalism” first saw print, remains the most cited in critical assessments of technological and Orientalist discourses; however, Ueno has probably written most extensively about techno-Orientalism as a discursive cultural phenomenon in the era of what he identifies as the “post-Fordist social environment of globalization” (223). “The basis of Orientalism and xenophobia is the subordination of Others through a sort of ‘mirror of cultural conceit,’” Ueno explains. “The Orient exists in so far as the West needs it, because it brings the project of the West into focus” (223).
Whereas Orientalism, as a strategy of representational containment, arrests Asia in traditional, and often premodern imagery, techno-Orientalism presents a broader, dynamic, and often contradictory spectrum of images, constructed by the East and West alike, of an “Orient” undergoing rapid economic and cultural transformations. Techno-Orientalism, like Orientalism, places great emphasis on the project of modernity—cultures privilege modernity and fear losing their perceived “edge” over others. Stretching beyond Orientalism’s premise of a hegemonic West’s representational authority over the East, techno-Orientalism’s scope is much more expansive and bidirectional, its discourses mutually constituted by the flow of trade and capital across the hemispheres. As Ueno observes, techno-Orientalism is first and foremost an effect of globalism. “If the Orient was invented by the West,” he writes, “then the Techno-Orient was also invented by the world of information capitalism” (228). Technological developments, driven by the imperial aspirations and the appetites of consumerist societies on both sides of the Pacific, propel the engines of invention and production. In its wake, Western nations vying for cultural and economic dominance with Asian nations find in technoOrientalism an expressive vehicle for their aspirations and fears. Our volume, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, documents past and current constructions of the role of Asia in a technologized future and critically examines this proliferating phenomenon.
Dr. Fu Manchu illustrates just one way in which techno-Orientalist imagery pervades Western cultural productions in the early twentieth century. The principal locales of techno-Orientalist projects as they developed in the late twentieth century have primarily been Japan and China. Ueno, whose influential analyses of “Japanimation” in the mid-1990s seeded the field of technoOrientalist studies, observes, “In Techno-Orientalism, Japan is not only located geographically, but is also projected chronologically. Jean Baudrillard once called Japan a satellite in orbit. Now Japan has been located in the future of technology” (228). Morley and Robins put a finer point on the temporal dimension of the spatial construction: “If the future is technological, and if technology has become ‘Japanised,’ then the syllogism would suggest that the future is now Japanese, too. The postmodern era will be the Pacific era. Japan is the future, and it is a future that seems to be transcending and displacing Western modernity” (168).
Whereas Japan’s dubious honor as the original techno-Orient was bestowed in the eighties with the help of the cyberpunk movement, the techno-Orientalizing of China occurred roughly a decade later.5 China was not yet a competitor in the global economy in the 1980s, when the West focused its wary gaze on what it saw as an invasion of Japanese capital investments and imports into Western economies. When China was recognized as a newly industrialized country (NIC) in the 1990s and its influence in the global economy increased, it, too, became once again a target of techno-Orientalist fashioning. The discourse on China’s “rise” in the U.S. context, consistent with techno-Orientalist contradictions, has focused on constructing its people as a vast, subaltern-like labor force and as a giant consumer market whose appetite for Western cultural products, if nurtured, could secure U.S. global cultural and economic dominance. This dual image of China as both developing-world producers and firstworld consumers presents a representational challenge for the West: Is China a human factory? Or is it a consumerist society, like the United States, whose enormous purchasing power dictates the future of technological innovations and economies?
Japan and China are thus signified differently in the techno-Orientalist vocabulary. Both are constructed as competitors and therefore threats to the U.S. economy; but while Japan competes with the United States for dominance in technological innovation, China competes with the United States in labor and production. To put it in starker terms, Japan creates technology, but China is the technology. In the eyes of the West, both are crucial engines of the future: Japan innovates and China manufactures. And as Asia, writ large, becomes a greater consumerist force than the West,6 its threat/value dualism commensurately increases. These differences in the technological signification of Japan and China manifest themselves in the fictive forecasts of the Asiantinged future. If Japan is a screen on which the West has projected its technological fantasies, then China is a screen on which the West projects its fears of being colonized, mechanized, and instrumentalized in its own pursuit of technological dominance.
India, another NIC, has also found itself under the techno-Orientalist gaze as a consequence of U.S. outsourcing practices. As a much maligned business strategy, outsourcing has provoked extremely negative public sentiments in the United States. These opinions find expression in a particular strand of techno-Orientalist discourse that consolidates China and India as the chief threats to the U.S. service and labor sectors. These Asian nations serve as the scapegoats for corporate decisions to move service and manufacturing jobs abroad and bear the brunt of the resulting xenophobic antipathies. Chinese and Indian workers, for instance, are routinely portrayed in techno-Orientalist and technophobic vocabularies; call center employees in India adopt Western Christian names and mimic the linguistic and idiomatic style of Americans, a practice so ubiquitous as to be parodied cinematically in romantic comedies such as Outsourced (2006), conjuring images of Dickian androids (or Blade Runner’s “replicants”) who simulate human behavior and threaten the distinction between “real” and “fake” Americans. Glossy spreads of endless rows of Chinese workers in corporate factories and towns in mainstream magazines such as Time and Wired seal the visual vocabulary of Asians as the cogs of hyperproduction. In the NIC contexts, techno-Orientalist discourse constructs Asians as mere simulacra and maintains a prevailing sense of the inhumanity of Asian labor—the very antithesis of Western liberal humanism.
The Asian body is rendered not as human, but as an exploitable technology. The death of Vincent Chin is an embodiment of schizophrenic Western hatred that must dismantle the Oriental factory machine to reclaim its personhood, subjectivity, and masculinity.
Roh et al. 15, David Roh is Professor of English at the University of Utah. He holds a BA in English from the University of California, Los Angeles, an Ed.M in Educational Technology from Harvard University, and an MA and Ph.D in English from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is author of Minor Transpacific: Triangulating American, Japanese, and Korean Fictions (Stanford University Press, 2021), Illegal Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), and coeditor of Techno-Orientalism (Rutgers University Press, 2015). His work has appeared in Law & Literature, MELUS, Journal of Narrative Theory, and Verge., (“Technologizing Orientalism”, Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, Rutgers University Press) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤
From the earliest era of Asian peoples in the United States, their technical abilities were both lauded and erased. An exemplar is the Chinese men who composed more than half of the labor force that completed the transcontinental railroad’s western portion over the high Sierra Nevada mountains to Promontory, Utah, in 1869. In the campaign to extend the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the American Federation of Labor argued in their publication, Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion, Meat vs. Rice, American Manhood against Asiatic Coolieism: Which Shall Survive? (1902), that the Chinese male body differed radically from the American male body. The publication argued that the Chinese laborer could withstand physical deprivations that American and European laborers could not (American Federation of Labor et al. 5, 14, 16, 18). This constructed difference rationalized discriminatory policies against Chinese railroad workers. Meat vs. Rice did not argue the Chinese had particular technical skills that were valuable for constructing the transcontinental railroad. On the contrary, the publication claimed the Chinese body simply did not require the conditions of safety, sustenance, and shelter that bodies of European descendents required. Implicit in their argument is a threat to the superior European laborer’s way of life or culture by a kind of unfeeling superhuman antithetical to the West’s liberal humanist credo.
The U.S. techno-Orientalist imagination is thus rooted in this view of the Asian body as a form of expendable technology—a view that emerged in the discourse of early U.S. industrialization and continued to evolve in the twentieth century. In 1982, a twenty-seven-year-old Chinese American named Vincent Chin was beaten to death by two white men in Detroit. The attackers, Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, were autoworkers in a U.S. auto industry that was losing market share to Japanese cars. Though Chin, a drafter, did not work in automobiles, Ebens and Nitz viewed him as representative—indeed, an embodiment—of Japanese auto manufacturing as they beat him with a baseball bat, reminiscent of Americans smashing Japanese-made cars in reaction to increasing auto imports in the early 1980s.9 The callous brutality of Chin’s death evinces something more than racial hatred; Chin not only was perceived as a convenient stand-in for the Japanese automotive industry, but embodied its traits—unfeeling, efficient, and inhuman. In Ebens and Nitz’s eyes, they were Luddites striking down the automatons that had been sent in to replace them. Techno-Orientalist discourse completed the project of dehumanizing Vincent Chin by rendering him as not only a racialized Other, but a factory machine that had to be dismantled by Ebens and Nitz to reclaim their personhood, subjectivity, and masculinity.10 The shock and outrage over Chin’s murder served as a critical rallying cry under which a coalition of ethnic-specific groups joined as Asian Americans.
In the twenty-first century, the perceived economic threat of Japan and its automobiles has given way to China. Despite the fact that China does not have a particularly strong reputation as a high-tech nation, techno-Orientalism’s robust flexibility allows for seamless transplantation to another national site. China’s rapid economic rise is largely credited to its vast manufacturing base, which, coupled with cheap labor and less regulation, has made it an attractive production location for many tech companies, including Apple and Dell. And although the vast majority of Chinese cannot afford the iPads and iPhones they produce, we see in U.S. media a representational shift, using techno-Orientalist conventions, transforming Chinese from mindless workers to sinister agents. For example, in October 2010, a U.S. PAC called Citizens Against Government Waste uploaded a commercial titled “Chinese Professor” on YouTube.
Set in Beijing, China a.d. 2030, the commercial depicts a male professor lecturing in a large hall accompanied by high-tech gadgets. The lecture consists of conservative talking points regarding the decline of the United States. As colorful images of fallen nations scroll behind him, the professor explains, “America tried to spend and tax itself out of a great recession. Enormous socalled ‘stimulus spending,’ massive changes to health care, government takeovers of private industries, and crushing debt.” He concludes, “Of course, we owned most of their debt, so now they work for us.” With echoes of Fu Manchu, the professor smiles directly into the camera, eliciting his students’ mirth. By presenting the Chinese professor, the students, and the lecture as moving seamlessly between the lecture hall technology and the tablet screens that students hold in their laps, this video implies that China now leads the world in technological production and consumption. The encoded secondary message of the commercial sidesteps the reality of China’s still developing technological penetration by projecting a present-day existential fear into a vision of the future, with technology supposedly rooted in U.S.-based innovation. It is an elegant solution that effectively alarms the uninformed viewer by using a panAsian technological conflation to elide reality and implicitly accuse China of stealing U.S. intellectual property. Thus, although the national actors and the details are quite different from the automobile industry of the 1980s, we have a similar techno-Orientalist narrative: U.S. jobs and manufacturing are being stolen by inorganic, technologically infused persons who threaten not only our economic but humanistic integrity.
SF’s techno-Orientalist tendencies have become so common as to merit incisive parody. The animated series Futurama takes place a thousand years in the future, and both skewers and pays homage to SF conventions. In an episode from the sixth season, Futurama depicts the launch of the new “EyePhone,” a jab at Apple’s handset, as a pillory of modern consumerism. The series’ white protagonist, Fry, asks a retail clerk of South Asian descent, “you’re from one of those ethnicities that knows about technology; why is it called an EyePhone?” (Sandoval). Depicted in the show as having an intelligence level on par with Homer Simpson, Fry is not meant to be taken seriously, and often acts as a vessel for twentieth-century ignorance in a progressive future. What is notable in this exchange is how the producers of Futurama have Fry explicitly verbalize a familiar techno-Orientalist trope—Asiatic bodies functioning as gatekeepers, facilitators, and purveyors of technology. In this episode, the South Asian clerk literally acts as the final node on the assembly line that has been largely produced by robotic arms—the clerk reaches through the drapes to pull an EyePhone from a pile and we see mechanical limbs swinging about the factory. He is an assembly line automaton with a human skin, and his affectless, bored intonation belies his true nature as a machine. A less self-aware show might leave it at that, but Fry’s graceless pronouncement underscores the techno-Orientalist trope, taking SF to task while simultaneously paying ironic homage to the genre.
This same technologizing convention that Futurama so sharply satirizes is found in numerous literary works, including David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas (2004). Mitchell’s six stories link together characters and narratives spanning past, present, and distant future. Consequently, Mitchell’s novel has the unenviable task of repeatedly establishing the framing for each separate story line. An economical method for quickly thrusting the reader into the speculative future is to use a technologized East Asia, as he does in the story “An Orison of Sonmi-451.” The setting of Nea So Copros, the “corpocracy” of what appears to be a unified Korea sometime after the twenty-second century, is where we are introduced to our enslaved narrator, Sonmi-451, a cloned “fabricant” designed to serve in a fast-food restaurant. Mitchell paints Korea as the setting for high technology, enforced consumption, and excessive advertising; and his larger social critique lies in the mirroring of the fabricants who must serve and the “purebloods” who must constantly consume, a master-slave dialectic that relies on cannibalism, erased from view, and technology, projected into high visibility. Sonmi-451 eventually gains self-awareness, knowledge, and power to create a declaration of rights for enslaved fabricants and oppressed classes, but only after she reads the classics of Western civilization (187, 193). Thus, Mitchell’s novel reinforces both the perception of Asia as the definitive site for technophilic and technophobic speculations of an oppressive future and the view that only a Western-coded subject can truly realize liberal humanism in such an environment.
Digital spaces abound with reinscribed racial tropes and stereotypes; these are sites in which racialization is more likely to be reinforced than challenged (Nakamura, Cybertypes 227). However, we argue that techno-Orientalist conventions in new media are com

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